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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the money supply process and the 
transmission mechanism of monetary changes in the Greek Economy. The 
first chapter of the tjesis presents a survey of the theory of the 
money stock determination. After a discussion of the problems surround-
ing the definition of money, the old and new views on the money stock 
determination are examined. The survey ends with an examination of the 
concept of the monetary base and the problem of its control by the 
authorities. The second chapter provides a detailed account of the 
money supply process in the Greek Economy, by examining both theore-
tically and empirically the dependence of the money multiplier upon 
interest rates. The third chapter represents an empirical analysis 
of the question on whether the Greek authorities have been controlling 
the cash base of the system or/and its domestic component. Chapter 
four discusses some theoretical aspects of the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy and provides some preliminary empirical evidence 
regarding the potential importance of money in influencing economlC 
activity in the Greek Economy. Finally, the last chapter of the thesis 
presents a detailed theoretical model which takes into account the 
institutional peculiarities of the Greek financial system and, in the 
context of this model, examines the mechanisms through which the po-
licy instruments affect" the main endogenous variables of the system. 
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I N T ROD U C T ION 
Is the supply of money exogenous or endogenous with respect to 
interest rates in the Greek Economy? Do the Greek monetary authori-
ties control the cash base of the system or they leave it uncontrolled 
in which case the base may be influenced by other key macrovariables 
of the system? What is the importance of money in the Greek Economy, 
given institutional peculiarities of the Greek financial system such 
as administered interest rates on bank loans and deposits, and practi-
cally non-existent organized markets for government debt instruments? 
These are the central questions on which the present thesis attempts 
to throw ligh~. 
The examination of the first 1ssue 1S undertaken by constructing 
a money supply hypothesis for the Greek Economy, following the multi-
plier approach, and by testing the dependence of the money multiplier 
and its proximate determinants upon interest rates. The analysis of 
the second issue, which is motivated by the view that potential exo-
geneity of the base should be distinguished from actual exogeneity, 
is essentially empirical and uses as a basic tool an identity speci-
fying the sources of the monetary base derived from the Central Bank's 
balance-sheet. The question of the importance of money in the Greek 
Economy is analysed at two levels. At a simple level the analysis takes 
place in the context of the standard IS/LM model and some rudimentary 
empirical evidence is provided. At a more sophisticated level the issue 
is examined theoretically in the context of a more complex model which 
incorporates some main institutional peculiarities of the Greek mone-
tary system and in which the effects of monetary and fiscal policy 
changes are examined in detail. 
Although the examination of the first issue may be of interest 
only to those concerned with the Greek Economy, the analysis of the 
other two issues is of rather more general interest. In particular, the 
empirical method used for the examination of the exogeneity-endogeneity 
issue of the monetary base is perfectly general and may be applied to 
any economy in order to throw some light on the issue of actual (as dis-
tinct from potential) exogeneity of the base. 
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Furthermore, the results derived from the theoretical analysis of 
monetary and fiscal policies in the Greek Economy may be relevant 
for Economies with comparable financial systems, and they may also 
be contrasted with policy effects derived from conventional models 
relevant for financially developed Economies. 
The first chapter of the thesis presents a selective survey on 
the theory of the money stock determination which provides a theore-
tical backround for the two following chapters. After a discussion of 
the issues involved 1n the operational definition of money the tradi-
tional approach to the money supply is examined. A lot of space is 
devoted to the examination of the theoretical and empirical aspects 
of the "new view" approach to the money stock determination. After 
a critical evaluation of the two approaches, a section is devoted to 
a closer examination of the concept of the monetary base and the prob-
lems surrounding its control. 
The second chapter deals with the construction and the test of 
a money supply hypothesis for the Greek Economy. After a brief description 
of the Greek financial system, which provides the necessary institutional 
setting for subsequent analysis, a money supply identity is derived 
which expresses the money stock in terDS of its proximate determinants: 
the monetary base and three allocation ratios which determine the value 
of the money multiplier' . Using this identity the separate contribution 
of each proximate determinant to secular and cyclical changes in the 
stock of money 1S investigated. In the final - and more important -
section of the chapter a behavioural analysis of the money multiplier 
and its proximate determinants is undertaken, supported by empirical 
testing of the crucial behavioural equations. 
Chapter three attempts to throw light on the exogeneity - endoge-
neity issue of the monetary base for the Greek Economy, by dealing with 
the question of whether monetary authorities have been controlling the 
base and/or its domestic component over the period 1959-1976. The ma1n 
analytical tool is an identity for the sources of the monetary base 
derived from the Bank-of-Greece balance-sheet. The method used to obtain 
empirical evidence is the examination of the lead-lag structure between 
the different components of this identity using cross-correlation ana-
lysis. Moreover, further evidence is provided by undertaking "Sims 
tests" for unidirectional causality between the base and its domestic 
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component on the one hand, and income and prlces on the other. 
Chapter four deals with the influence of money on economic acti-
vity. In the first section a brief survey on the Keynesian-Monetarist 
debate regarding the transmission mechanism of monetary changes and 
the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies is pro-
vided. In the second section a preliminary investigation of the import-
ance of money ln the Greek Economy is undertaken in the context of the 
IS/LM model, and some rudimentary empirical evidence is provided. 
The final chapter of the thesis examines in detail the monetary 
mechanism in the Greek Economy using a model which takes into account 
the main institutional peculiarities of the Greek monetary system. The 
model attaches primary importance to the market for bank credit and 
incorporates the government budget financing identity. The chapter 
starts with the construction of a simple supply and demand for bank 
credit hypothesis and continues with a partial equilibrium analysis 
of the credit market which leads to the distinction of three possible 
states of this market. In each of them the effects of policy instruments 
on the main endogenous variables of the system may differ both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively. Next the model is specified and the nece-
ssary amendments are indicated which make it conformable to each of 
the three states distinguished. Using this model, the effects of the 
changes in the exogenous variables upon the main endogenous variables 
of the system, notably income, are derived explained and compared for 
each of the states of the bank credit market. 
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C HAP T E R 1 
"THE THEORY OF THE MONEY STOCK DETERMINATION" 
In this chapter we present a survey on the theory of the money 
stock determination, in which we try to examine critically the logic 
of alternative views on the subject and assess their implications for 
monetary theory and policy. 
After a discussion of the lssues involved In the operational de-
finition of money which takes place in section one, we proceed in section 
two, to examine the traditional approac~ to the· money supply, usually 
referred to as the "old view". 
In section three, we start by examining the logic and implications 
of the more recent approach to the money stock determination, referred 
to as the "new view", which lS considered to be in sharp contrast to 
the traditional approach. In proceeding we survey a small but typical 
part of the empirical research on the money supply, which throws light 
to the question on whether the evidence supports the Hnew" or the "old 
view:! approach to the subject. Finally, in the last subsection of section 
three we attempt a formal evaluation of the two alternative views. 
In section four we undertake a closer examination of the monetary 
base, which is a major determinant of t~e money stock, and we also 
discuss the problems surrounding its control, both in the case of a 
closed economy and in the case of an open economy operating under a 
fixed exchange rate system. Finally in the last section of the chapter 
(section five) we briefly summarize the main conclusions of the previous 
. sections. 
It should be stressed right from the beginning,that the survey to 
follow is far from being an exhaustive one; its purpose is not to provide 
an, as complete as possible, presentation of the literature, but rather 
to outline the main streams of thought on the subject and to attempt a 
critical evaluation. 
Section 1: The definition of money 
Money is defined by its functions; the prlmary function of money is 
that it acts as a means of payments. t'!oreover since transactions have a 
time dimension, money by virtue of its p~imary func~ion, must necessarily 
act as a store of value. Finally, it proves efficient for money to act as 
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a unit of account, but this last function is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient ingredient of its definition. 
The functional definition of money is widely accepted by econo-
mists and can be found in any standard textbook on monetary theory. 
Problems arise however and diversion of opinion lS created, when one 
comes to decide which of the many financial assets circulating in a 
modern financially developed economy, do satisfy the above definition, 
and should therefore be classified as money, and which do not. For, 
although the classification may be trivial for s~me assets, as for 
example currency, for other assets, such as time deposits, the classi-
fication may not be obvious at all. 
Two main approaches to the issue have been developed in the liter-
ature; the one tries to settle the proper operational definition of 
money on a priori, theoretical grounds, while the other rejects any a 
priori dividing line between money and non-money and maintains the view 
that the issue should be resolved on pragmatic grounds. 
In what follows, we shall discuss those two approaches lTI turn, 
starting from the theoretical one. 
1. 1. The theoretical approach to the lssue 
Three interesting attempts have been mainly made to define money 
on theoretical grounds; the first is due to W. Newlyn the second to 
B. Pesek and T. Saving, and the third to Morgan. 
. I· (1) N 1 d· h t" f S In a stlmu atlng paper , ew yn enles t e asser lon 0 ayers 
that "there is no single asset or group of assets that uniquely pos-
sesses a uniform monetary quality that is totally absent from all other 
assets,,(2). 
Newlyn argues that the above conclusion is based on Sayers' viewing 
of money as a store of value from the point of v±ew of the owner, which 
neglects the basic function of money which is, of course, the means of 
payments function. 
(1) 
(2) 
Clearly the monetary quality of an asset, when viewed as a store 
w. Newlyn: "The supply of money and its control" Economic Journal 
1964 esp. ppf. 334~339. 
see also H. Newlyn: ':Theory of Money'; second ed. 1971 ch. 2. 
R. S. Sayers: "Monetary thought and ?olicy in England:: Economic 
Journal 1960 p.716; Sayers' view ci~ed ln the text is incorporated 
in the "Radcliffe report': (1959). 
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of value from the point of view of the owner, is a matter of degree 
and therefore the inability to draw a clearcut dividing line between 
" "d " " money an non-money comes as a natural concequence. 
According to Newlyn a correct criterion to distinguish between 
money and non-money can be developed, based on the operational effects 
of money 011 the Economy, in its function as a means of payments. Spe-
cifically, Newlyn's criterion is) in.h:'s own words as follows: "An 
asset can only be regarded as a means of payments if the effect of 
drawing upon it to make a payment, is identical with the effect of a 
physical transfer of currency. That is to· say, the effects outside the 
monetary sector must be confined to the change in the indebtedness be-
tween payer and payee. This will be the case only if the concequential 
adjustments in the financial system have a zero sum. When this 1S so, 
the payment will not involve any change in the asset/liability complex 
of the public other than that between the payer and the payee; such a 
payment will be termed neutral". 
Clearly according to the proposed criterion currency 1S money by 
definition. Also demand deposits transferable by cheque, satisfy Newlyn's 
criterion and should be classified as money, since a payment by cheque 
involves only a reduction in the payer's current account matched by an 
equal increase in the payee's account ~ith no other repercussion 1n the 
financial system whatever, provided that commercial banks maintain ho-
mogeneous reserve conventions with respect to their demand deposit 
libilities. 
Time deposits with commercial banks should or should not be clas-
sified as money, according to the "neutrality criterion", depending on 
. whether commercial banks distinguish between them and demand deposits 
in their liquidity conventions. If banks do not distinguish between 
demand and time deposits, then the latter should be classified as money; 
for, any payment made through a cheque drawn on a time dep0sit account 
and credited to a current account does not disturb the actual reserves 
of the banking system relative to rese~ve requirements and thus it does 
not create any disturbance in the loan market. If on the other hand 
banks hold higher reserve ratios on demand deposits than on time deposits, 
a payment effected by debiting a time ~eposit account and crediting a 
current account will not be neutral; average reserve requirements will 
rise and the banks will sell securities or reduce loans in order to 
adjust their reserve position, thus disturbing the conditions in the 
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loan market. As a concequence of the bank's actions, the total of de-
mand and time deposits will be reduced and therefore the initial pay-
ment will not have zero sum. Thus if commercial banks hold differential 
reserve ratios with respect to demand and time deposits, the latter 
should not be classified as money according to Newlyn criterion. 
An interesting question arises on whether deposits with non-bank 
financial intermediaries can be classified as money. Let us apply the 
neutrality criterion to the case of a typical group of financial inter-
mediaries of the UK economy such as Building Societies(3). A cheque (or 
its equivalent) drawn on Building Society deposits and credited to a 
current account of the Banking sector has the following effects: a re-
duction of the payer's account with the Building Society, an equal in-
crease of the payee's current account with a commercial bank and a re-
duction of the Building Society's deposits with commercial banks. Since 
the Building Society's deposit liabilities and its balances with com-
mercial banks are reduced by the same amount, the ratio of its working 
balances to deposits has fallen below the desired level and thus the 
Building Society, either sells securities or/and reduces loans in order 
to replenish its balances; thus a payment effected by drawing upon a 
building Society's account has a non-zero effect on the loan market which 
is reflected in a reduction in the total of deposits with commercial banks 
and Building Societies. 
We therefore conclude that deposits with Building Societies do not 
satisfy the neutrality criterion and thus they should not be classified 
as money. The same conclusion holds for the deposits with any other non-
bank financial intermediary as long as it keeps its balances in the form 
.of deposits with commercial banks, as in fact is the case with most fin-
ancial intermediaries, or, in the case where the intermediary keeps its 
balances in the form of cash, as long as it maintains a different re-
serve ratio than that maintained by commercial banks. 
Finally we should mention that Newlyn's criterion rejects the In-
elusion of unused overdraft facilities with commerial banks in the de~ 
finitions of money, the reason being that, given the banks' liquidity 
conventions, any use of them requires a reduction of some other asset 
(3) A comparable group of financial intermediaries for the US economy 
are Savings and Loans Associations. 
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which in turn will have repercussions for the loan market. 
Although the neutrality criterion is theoretically appealling, it 
nevertheless has been shown to be unsatisfactory by Friedman and 
S h t (4) h ... d . c war z ,w 0 cr1 t1c1ze Nevllyn' s approach 1n a simple and straight-
forward manner. 
The crux of their criticism is based on the observation, that for 
currency and demand deposits, Newlyn uses the implicit assumption that 
the payee wishes to hold the sum transferred to him in the same kind 
of asset, as that upon which the payer drew in order to make the pay~ 
ment; whereas in the application of his criterion for other financial 
assets he puts no implicit constraint on the kind of asset which the 
payee wishes to hold relatively to the payer, A symmetrical application 
of Newlyn's criterion however, require~ either the adoption of the same 
implicit assumption, not only for currency and demand deposits but for 
all other assets, or the relaxation of the assumption in the case of 
currency and demand deposits. 
The concequences for the first alternative can be seen if we apply 
Newlyn's criterion in the case of building society deposits; if, in 
making a payment, the payer draws on a Building Society deposit, and 
the payee deposits the cheque with a Building Society, all that happens 
1S merely a transfer of funds from one account to another, with no change 
in the total deposit liabilities of Building Societies and with no re-
percussion in the market for loans whatsoever. Thus according to Newlyn 
the payment is neutral and deposits wit~ Building Societies should be 
classified as money. 
Let us now examine the consequences of the application of the 
.neutrality criterion for demand deposits when Newlyn's implicit assum~ 
ption with respect to this asset is relaxed~ Suppose that when a payment 
is made by drawing on a current account with a commercial bank, the payee 
prefers to hold the sum transferred to ~im, not in the form of deposits 
with commercial banks, but in the form OL currency, As a result, de-
posits and reserves of the banking system fall by the same amount and 
the actual reserve ratio falls below the required one. In order to re-
plenish their reserves, commercial banks sell securities or/and reduce 
loans and in the process of banks adjustment the total of cash and de-
posits held by the private sector falls. Thus demand deposits fail to 
(4) See M. Friedman and A. Schwartz: "The Definition of Money" 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, February 1969. 
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be classified as money, according to the neutrality criterion, in pre-
cisely the same way in which Building Society deposits also fail. 
We see therefore that a syrnetrical application of the neutrality 
criterion, renders it operationally empty; for if the implicit assumption 
made with respect to currency and demand deposits 1S generalized, then 
virtually all financial assets should be classified as money, while if 
the assumption is relaxed, no asset, except currency, should be included 
in the definition of money. 
Another attempt towards a theoretical demarcation between money and 
d b P k d S . (5) h 1· d h N . non-money, was rna e y ese an aV1ng w 0 app 1e teet Prlvate 
Wealth criterion to distinguish between financial assets which possess 
the monetary quality and assets which are simply debts. 
The main, widely accepted, theoretical contribution by Pesek and 
Saving, was to' show that the well established distinction introduced 
(6) by Gurley and Shaw between "inside" money (bank deposits) and "out-
side money': (currency and commodity money), the former in contrast to 
the latter involving no net wealth effect for the private sector is 
incorrect and that the relevant issue for excluding or including bank 
depositsin Net Wealth, is whether or not they bear the competitive rate 
f 
. (7) 
o 1nterest . 
The essense of Pesek and Saving's argument can be put very simply; 
assume that it costs nothing to set up and operate a bank in terms of 
real resourses absorbed and suppose that the bank holds a given amount 
of deposit liabilities (D) having extended an equivalent amount of 
credit to the private sector. From an accounting point of view, deposits 
held by the public are exactly offset by advances made to them by the 
bank, and therefore bank deposits are not included in private sector's 
Net Wealth. However, if deposits are non-interest bearing and bank loans 
yield the market rate of interest, the Net Worth of the bank to its own-
ers is not zero, but it is equal to the capi t.alized value of the interest 
income received from the loans extended. Since - abstracting from ~eserve 
( 5) 
B. Pesek and T. Saving: "Money Wealth and Economic Theory" (New York 
Mc~1illan 1967). 
(6) Gurley and Shaw: "Money 1n a Theory of Finance" (Hashington 1960). 
(7) For an illuminating analysis of Pesek and Saving thesis see H.G.Johnson: 
"Inside money, outside money, Income, Wealth and Welfare in Monetary 
Theory", Journal of Money Credit and Banking 1969. Also reprinted as 
chapter 4 in H. G. Johnson: 'Turther Essays in Honetary Economics!1 (1972) • 
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requirements - the loans extended are equal to the bank's deposit 
liabilities, the net worth of the bank is equal to r.D - D (where D: de-
r 
posit liabilities and r: the market rate of interest). 
Clearly the positive value of the bank created in the case of non-
interest bearing deposits should be included in private sector's Net 
Wealth, since it is an asset to bank owners without being anybody's 
liability. Moreover, since the value of the bank is equal to the amount 
of deposit liabilities, it is a matter of indifference whether we include 
the bank's Net Worth or its deposit liabilities in private sector's Wealth. 
In the opposite case where banks pay the competitive rate of interest 
on their deposits, their net interest income is zero and so is their net 
worth; clearly in this case bank deposits do not constitute Net Wealth. 
If, between the two extremes, commercial banks pay positive interest 
on their deposits, but lower than the market rate,then only part of their 
deposit liabilities constitute Net Wealth; in particular if the market 
rate of interest is (r) and the deposit rate is (rD) (rD < r) then banks' ~D 
net worth is equal to (1- ) D. If for example the rate on deposit 
r 
liabilities is 80 per cent of the market rate, only 20 per cent of the 
amount of deposits outstanding constitutes net Wealth. Moreover, the 
higher the deposit rate relative to the market rate, the lower is the 
proportion of the deposit liabilities which is included in private sec-
tor's net Wealth. 
Now, according to Pesek and Saving, money includes along with cur-
rency those liabilities of the intermediary sector which are included 
in Net private sector's Wealth; all other liabilities not included in 
Net Wealth are simply debts and do not possess the monetary quality. 
According to the Net Wealth criterion, demand deposits with commer-
·cial banks which bear no interest should be classified as money. On the 
other hand, time deposits which do bear interest are debt but not money, 
at least as far as banks are not constrained in their competition for 
time deposits. Note however, that if demand deposits were paid the market 
rate of interest they would not pass the Net Wealth criterion and there-
fore they would not be money. 
Let us now probe more deeply into the reasonlng underlying Pesek 
and Saving's criterion. Why Wealth holders wish to hold non-interest 
bearing deposits which have an opportunity cost In terms of interest 
forgone on alternative earning assets? The answer is that bank deposits 
transferable by cheque and convertible into currency on demand provide 
a utility by virtue of their function as a medium of exchange. For this 
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reason - Pesek and Saving argue - bank deposits can most fruitfully 
be thought of, not as liabilities, but as the product of the banking 
industry which "produces" the medium of exchange. 
Indeed the creqtion of a positive net worth for the banking 
system equal in value to the amount of non-interest bearing deposits 
outstanding can be thought of as the r.esult of s~me banks being given 
without charge a valuable charter to produce the medium of exchange up 
to a certain amount each; clearly the value of such charter given to a 
bank is equal to its net worth because this is the maximum amount the 
bank would be willing to pay in order to acquire the charter if it was 
traded in the market. 
In equilibrium, the public would hold deposits up to the point where 
the marginal utility of the services rendered by them is equal to the mar-
ket rate of interest. Pesek and Saving argue that the monetary content of 
a "dollar" of deposits can be measured by the capitalized value of the 
flow of utility it provides and since in equilibrium the marginal utility 
of demand deposits is equal to the market rate of interest, the monetary 
content of a "dollar" of deposits is simply one dollar(8)! 
If we now assume that the authorities, although restricting the total 
quantity of bank deposits(9), they allow free entry in the banking industry, 
competition among banks for bank deposits would lead the banking sector 
to pay interest on deposits equal to the market rate of interest. In this 
case however, the opportunity cost of holding bank deposits would become 
zero and thus in equilibrium the marginal valuation of the services ren-
dered by bank deposits would also be zero. Therefore, - Pesek and Saving 
conclude -, when bank deposits bear the competitive rate of interest, the 
monetary content of a "dollar" of depositsis zero. Bank deposits loose 
·all their "moneyness", becoming simply debt and the banking sector is not 
anymore a money producing industry but simply an industry providing pure 
intermediary services. 
In the intermediate case where, say because of imperfect competition, 
banks pay interest on their deposits thought 10~-ler than the market rate, 
bank deposits are considered by Pesek and Saving as a "joint product", 
(8)monetary content of one dollar of deposits = m.H.~f dep. 
since in equilibrium m.m.of dep.= r we have that: monetary content 
r 
of one dollar of dep.=-r-= 1 dollar. 
(9)This restriction is necessary for otherwise, given that the cost of 
producing bank deposits tends to zero, it would pay the banks to expand 
bank money indefinitely and as a result the price of money in terms of 
goods would tend to zero. 
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being partly money and partly debt~ The monetary content of a dollar of 
deposits is equal to the difference between the market rate of interest 
and the deposit rate relatively to the market rate of interest (r-rD/r). 
This is because, according to Pesek and Saving, the money content of a 
dollar of deposits is equal to thediscounted value of the flow of utility 
rendered by a unit of bank deposits, in equilibrium the utility flow 
being equal to the opportunity cost of deposits which is equal to the 
difference between the market rate and the rate paid on deposits. 
Although Pesek and Saving tackled the problem of the definition of 
money in a novel and provocative way, their analysis has been shown to 
be wrong by Friedman and Schwartz(lO) who argue that Pesek and Saving's 
analysis is based on a fundamental confusion between the concepts of 
"marginal" and "average" or alternatively between "price" and "quantity". 
Pesek and Saving's confusion betwe'en "marginal" and "average", lies 
in their identification of the utility provided by a "dollar" of deposits 
with the opportunity cost of holding deposits. This is however true only 
for the marginal unit of deposits; all intramarginal units have a utility 
higher than the opportunity cost of deposits and thus the average utility 
per dollar of deposits, is higher than the opportunity cost. 
Therefore it is simply not true that when the opportunity cost of 
deposits falls to zero - as it is the case when the deposit rate is equal 
to··the market rate - bank deposits .loose all their "moneyness"; for, the 
average utility rendered by them is not zero but positive. 
From an alternative point of view we may say that Pesek and Saving 
confuse the price of "moneyness" with the quantity of "moneyness" con-
tained in a "dollar" of deposits. The opportunity cost of holding bank 
money which in equilibrium equals the utility provided by the marginal 
'unit of deposits, expresses the market valuation of the monetary quali-
ty included in each unit of bank deposits, or, what is the same thing, 
the r e n tal p ric e of "moneyness". On the other hand the average 
utility obtained per dollar of deposits may be thought to express the 
quantity of the monetary quality contained in each deposit unit. By iden-
tifying the utility rendered by a dollar of deposits with the opportunity 
cost of holding deposits, Pesek and Saving confuse "price" and "quantity". 
It is precisely this confusion that leads them to argue that when, 
for example, the rate of deposits is 60 per cent of the market rate of 
(10) . M. Friedman and A, Schwartz op. Clt. 
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interest, the "debt content" of a dollar of deposits is 60 cents, while 
the "monetary content" is 40 cents and that as the rate on deposits rises 
the "money content" falls eventually becoming zero when the deposit rate 
is equalized with the market rate of interest. 
But the above reasoning is clearly wrong; it is not true that when 
the deposit rate is 60 per cent of the market rate the "moneyness" con-
tained in unit of deposits is 0.4. What is true is that the rental price 
of "moneyness" relative to the total cost of holding deposits is 40 per 
cent. Moreover as the rate on deposits rises relatively to the market 
rate, it is not the quantity but the price of "moneyness" that is reduced. 
When deposits are paid the competitive rate of interest the rental 
price of ttmoneyness" becomes zero; but the fact that in this case "money-
ness"becomes a f r e ego 0 d, does not, of course imply that it 
ceases to exist as a good. 
We therefore see that Pesek and Saving's Net Wealth criterion is 
erroneous; bank deposits may bear the competitive rate of interest and 
thus they may not be counted as a net asset in the balance-sheets of the 
private sector and still be money 1n every meaningful sense. 
A third attempt to define money on a priori gvounds can be found in 
(11) the work of Morgan . The construction of Morgan's theoretical criterion 
rests heavily upon Yeager's argument that the medium of exchange can be 
sharply differentiated from any other asset in terms of the way in which 
(12) . people react to eliminate a monetary disequilibrium. Yeager pOlnts 
out that, unlike other assets, money is not traded in any particular 
market but, by virtue of its function as a means of payments enters ex-
changes in all markets. An excess demand/supply of money reveals itself 
as an excess supply/demand for all other assets real and financial. Mo-
-netary equilibrium is restored via a process which affects prices or/and 
quantities of a large number of goods services and financial-assets. By 
contrast an excess demand/supply of any other asset is mainly eliminated 
in the particular market in which the asset is traded through a change 
1n the price and/or quantity of the asset in ques~ion. Consequently, 
Yeager argues, an excess demand/supply of money has much more pervasive 
and disruptive effects than an excess demand/supply of any other asset, 
even the nearest of near moneys. 
(11)E.V. Morgan; "The Essential Qualities of Money" The Manchester School 
of Economic and Social Studies 1969. 
(12)L.B. Yeager; "Essential properties of the medium of exchange" 
Kyklos vol. 21 1968. 
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Morgan formalises Yeager's argument by stating three possible ways 
in which markets react to excess demand for any specific asset: 
(a) The price of the asset may rise and this will tend to restore equi-
librium in the market in which the asset is traded. This is what happens 
in the markets for non-reproducible rea: assets and for some financial 
assets such as bonds and equities. 
(b) Excess demand may lead to an increase in the total stock of the asset. 
This happens in the case of certain financial assets which are redeemable 
on demand or at short notice such as National Saving Securities and Buil-
ding Society deposits. 
(c) Excess demand for the asset may reveal itself as an excess supply 
of all other assets. If prices are flexible, a general excess supply of 
other assets wquld reduce their prices;· if not, it would lead to a curt-
ailment of output and a fall in real income. 
In accordance to Yeager, Morgan asserts that the essential charac-
teristic of money is that the response to excess demand/supply of it is 
of type (c) rather than (a) or (b), and therefore any asset characterized 
by response (c) should be classified as money. The problem, then, is to 
establish necessary and sufficient conditions which ensure that an asset 
is characterized by type (c) response. A first necessary condition for 
an asset to qualify as money is that it should be fixed in value in terms 
of the unit of account. This ensures response (c) rather than response 
(a). A further necessary condition is that the supply of the asset should 
be exogenous in the sense that the amount issued by an issuer is not 
affected by the transactions of any transactor who is not an issuer of 
the asset in question. This ensures response (c) rather than (b). This 
latter condition is always fulfilled if an asset is perfectly acceptable 
as a means of payment, since, in this case, the issuer of the asset would 
never be called upon to redeem it and therefore the supply of the asset 
would be exogenous in Morgan's sense. T~us according to Morgan, perfect 
acceptability and fixity in terms of the unit of account are both neces-
sary and sufficient for an asset to qualify as money. 
Although the condition of perfect acceptability is met by cash, which 
is endowed the status of legal tender, ~his condition is not met by bank 
deposits. 
Commercial bank deposits are only ?artially acceptable as means of 
payments and consequently banks may be called upon to redeem them fOT 
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cash; in this case the total amount of bank deposits will contract. 
Therefore bank deposits are not exogenous in Morgan's sense and thus 
they fail to qualify as money. Morgan, finding the exclusion of bank 
deposits from the definiton of money unsatisfactory, lmposes a further 
necessary condition: "The further condition we need for the deposits 
and/or notes of commercial banks to qualify as money is the existence 
of a mechanism which provides offsetting action whenever the volume of 
notes or deposits of a bank is altered by the actions of transactors who 
are not issuers of money. In general, this condition is met by banks 
which keep a reserve with a central bank, and only by such bankslt. 
The reasoning behind the above condition is that any change in bank re-
serves caused by a deposit or withdrawal-of cash can be offset by appro-
priate open market operations undertaken by the monetary authorities. Given 
that the total amount of bank reserves is determined by the Central Bank, 
bank deposits will be immune to the behaviour of the non-bank public. 
Clearly, in this case, bank deposits meet Morgan's exogeneity criterion 
and therefore they qualify as money. On the other hand, deposits with 
non-bank financial intermediaries should not enter the definition of mo-
ney, according to Morgan's criterion, since these institutions keep their 
reserves in the form of deposits with commercial banks, rather than in 
the form of deposits with the Central Bank and therefore there is no built-
in mechanism which ensures immunity of non-bank financial intermediaries' 
liabilitites to transactors' actions. 
Morgan's approach to the definition of money can be criticized on 
two grounds. First his assertion that there is a built-in mechanism through 
which the Central Bank offsets changes in bank reserves caused by the a-
ctions of the non-bank public is rather arbitrary. The fact that a Central 
·Bank has the ability to offset changes in bank reserves does not neces-
sarily imply that it will in fact do so. Thus , whether bank deposits are 
exogenous or not seems to depend on the authorities policy actions. A se-
cond, more serious criticism, refers to Yeager's argument which represents 
the building block of Morgan's criterion. The classification of an asset 
as money in terms of the way in which an excess demand/supply of it is 
eliminated is questionable. Although it may well be true that a monetary 
disequilibrium has pervasive repercussions for the economy, it is also 
true that an excess demand/supply of other assets have also some rep~r­
cussions, which in the case of some assets such as government bonds and 
equities may be quite significant. Thus the distinction between money 
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and non-money according to the argument developed by Yeager and accepted 
by Morgan seems to be of degree rather than kind. 
1. 2. The empirical approach to the definition of money 
Up to now we have examined three interesting attempts to develop the-
oretical criteria by the application of which it is to be decided whether 
or not a financial asset should be counted as money, unfortunately how-
ever, we have seen that all criteria have flqws which render them un-
satisfactory. 
We now turn to examine the pragmatic approach to the definition 
of money. The common characteristic of all economists favouring this 
approach is that they believe that the issue is empirical and therefore 
should be resolved by empirical criteria. Different criteria however have 
been adopted by different economists .. 
One approach tries to find the best empirical couterpart of~the con-
cept of money as a specialized means of payments. Although it is widely 
accepted that demand deposits serve as a means of payments there is much 
less agreement on whether time deposits or deposits with non-bank finan-
cial intermediaries can be considered as such. As Goodhart(13) points 
out, a transfer of funds from A to B by debiting A's time deposit account 
and crediting B's current account or vice versa, completes the payment 
for both A and B and thus there is no strong theoretical basis for ex-
cluding time deposits from the definition of money. On the same grounds 
it can be argued that, at least in principle, a credit of an account with a 
non-bank financial intermediary accompanied by an equivalent debit of 
another account either with a bank or with another financial intermediary, 
constitutes final payment and thus deposits with non-bank financial inter-
mediaries may be counted as money. 
The real issue however, is whether people do in fact use time depo-
sits or/and deposits with other financial intermediaries as means of 
payments; Goodhart argues that the issue should perhaps be decided on 
empirical grounds by examining the relative turnover of financial assets, 
since the degree by which various types of assets serve as means of pay-
ments may approximately be calculated by their relative turnover. For 
example a low turnover of time deposits and deposits with Building So-
cieties relatively to the turnover of demand deposits probably reveals 
(13)C.A.E. Goodhart: "Money Information and Uncertainty". Macmillan 1975 
chapter 1, section D. 
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that there is a real difference between those assets and demand deposits 
in their use as means of payments. 
The trouble with the "relative turnover" criterion is that it does 
not provide a sound basis to decide whether or not an asset should be 
included in the definition of money. Should a turnover of time deposits 
relative to demand deposits of - say - 40 percent, be considered satis-
factory, or is it too low for the classification of time deposits as 
money? Clearly whatever the decision may be, the resulting classification 
will inevitably contain a certain degree of arbitrariness. 
The logical implication of the turnover criterion seems to be that 
a correct monetary concept involves the construction of a weighted average 
of the assets "produced" by the financial system of the economy under con-
sideration each asset being weighted by its relative turnover. Neverthe-
less, whatever the theoretical attractions, such a definition of money 
may have, it seems a too artificial and complex concept to be used in 
theoretical and practical issues of monetary policy. 
In conclusion we may say that although the relative turnover criterion 
is usef~l to give some indication regarding the nature of an asset as a 
means of payments, it certainly cannot provide an unambiguous classifi-
cation of financial assets as money or non-money. 
Another empirical approach to the definition of money, looks at the 
issue from a policy point of view, by seeking to find that monetary aggre-
gate which performs best in terms of stability in the demand for money 
f . Th . b h· d h d·· (14) th t • unct10n. e reason1ng e 1n t e propose cr1ter10n 1S a Slnce 
the demand for money function is an important link in the transmission 
mechanis~f monetary policy, a more §tgp~e de~aDd'for_money~function, . 
allo~$ a more accurate prediction .pf Lh~ effects ·-of .changes. iiLthe.::.;money 
'~tock_ on ·tpe key endogenous macro variables of the system. 
It is important to point out that the comparison of different asset 
aggregates in terms of their performance in the demand for money function, 
provides indirect evidence about the degree of substitutability between 
financial assets. If, for example a concept of money inclusive of time 
deposits performs better in terms of stability in the demand for money 
function than a monetary aggregate including only currency and demand 
deposits, then time deposits and demand deposits may be considered as 
sufficiently close substitutes, for the former to be included along with 
(14)This criterion has been proposed 
definition of money: theoretical 
Money Credit and Banking August 
,- . 
by Laidler; 
and empirical 
1969 . 
. - '. 
see D. Laidler: "The 
problems". Journal of 
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the latter in the definition of money. 
The reason is that, given the standard arguments of the demand for 
money function - a market rate of interest and a "constraint variable" 
such as income or Wealth -, a significant improvement in the stability 
of the function when time deposits are ~ncluded in the definition of 
money, means that some of the unexplained variation in the demand for 
money existing when the exclusive concept of money is used, is elimi-
nated. This in turn implies that the preexisiting degree of instability 
in the demand for money should have been, at least partly, due to a sub-
stitution process taking place between cemand and time deposits, inde-
pendent of the variation in the market rate of interest and the constraint 
variable included as argumentsof the demand for money function. 
If on the other hand, the inclusion of time deposits in the defi-
nition of money brings a significant deterioration in the stability of 
the demand for money function, it should be inferred that Wealth holders' 
attitude with respect to demand and time deposits is sufficiently differ-
entiated for the inclusion of time deposits in the definition of money 
to be justified. This is because, assuming that a money concept including 
only currency and demand deposits is stably related to the standard argu-
ments of the demand for money function, a significant deterioration of 
the stability of the function resulting from the inclusion of time depo-
sitsin the definition of money means that, although the typical explana-
tory variables explain well the demand for the exclusive money concept, 
they are either improper or insufficient to explain the demand for the 
inclusive concept, with the same degree of accuracy; this in turn implies 
that the behaviour of wealth holders with respect to demand and time de-
posits is significantly differentiated. 
As the above reasoning reveals, the "stability criterion" takes 
into account the substitutability of assets, not by directly measuring 
its degree, but by assessing the assets' performance in the demand for 
money function. Whether or not an asset is a sufficiently close substi-
tute with demand deposits for the former to be included in the definition 
of money depends on how well or bad the asset performs in terms of sta-
bility in the demand for money. 
The "stability criterion" however, 1.S confronted with difficulties 
in cases where the introduction of an asset in the definition of money 
does not bring any significant change in the stability of the demand 
for money function; for in such cases the criterion necessarily 
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takes a neutral position on whether or not the asset in question should 
be counted as money, thus leaving the issue to be decided on other 
grounds. In other words, since the degree of substitutability between 
a "candidate" asset and the assets already classified as money is 
assessed by the asset's performance in the demand for money function, 
in cases where the introduction of the asset in question in the defi-
nition of money has a neutral effect in terms of stability of the function, 
the proposed criterion cannot tell whether or not the degree of substi-
tutability is sufficient for the asset to be classified as money. 
This is precisely the situation in the US economy regarding time 
deposits with commercial banks; as Laidler points out(15) the empirical 
evidence on the demand for money reveals that the stability of the 
function is not significanly affected by the exclusion or inclusion 
of time deposits in the definition of money; in either case the demand 
for money is a highly stable function of a market rate or interest and 
some concept of Wealth. Thus Laidler concludes that " .... which particular 
aggregate of commercial bank liabilities the authorities try to manlpu-
late is a question to be settled on other grounds ..•. As far as the de-
mand for money is concerned there seems to be nothing to choose between 
h . 'd d,,(16) t e alternatlves conSl ere . 
Another pragmatic approach to the definition of money seeks to de-
fine as money that aggregate of financial assets which is most closely 
correlated with one or more key macroeconomic variables of the system. 
The rationale for this ap~roach is that even if knowledge on how mone-
tary policy works is limited, success to identify a consistently high 
correlation between money and a key endogenous variable of the system, 
such as aggregate income, permits the authorities to predict with some 
accuracy the effects of monetary policy on the variable in question. 
There are however problems involved in relation to the proposed 
criterion; different monetary aggregates may perform best, when corre-
lated with different endogenous variables, or even with different lagged 
values of the same variable. Perhaps more important - and this criticism 
also applies for the stability of the demand for money criterion -, the 
"highest correlation criterion" does not take into account that although 
(15)D. Laidler Ope cit. 
(16)D. Laidler Ope cit. p. 524. 
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a particular monetary aggregate may exhibit a higher correlation with 
one or more endogenous variables of the system, it may not be an easily 
controllable one. 
Generally speaking, it is possible for some kind of trade-off to 
exist between the "degree of conformity" to a proposed criterion and 
the "controllability" of the resulting :::onetary aggregate, in which 
case the choice of the "right" definition of money should necessarily 
become "two-dimentional", taking into account the factor of controla-
bility. For, even if a clear-cut distinction between money and non-
money was possible to be achieved on the basis of some criterion, it 
would not be of any significance from a policy point of view if the 
resulting monetary aggregate was not a controllable one. 
Before ending this section on the definition of money, we should 
say that although a consensus has not been reached among economists as 
to the "right" definition of money, different economists having proposed 
different criteria, two definitions are widely in use for all practical 
purposes: the first includes currency held by the non-bank public and 
demand deposits with commercial banks; the second includes the assets 
included in the first definition plus time deposits with commercial banks. 
Both the above definitions have been extensively used and continue to be 
used, in most empirical work on monetary economics. 
Section 2: The traditional approach to the money supply 
The traditional theory of the money stock determination, which has 
been labeled in retrospect as the "old view", is based on an identity 
derived by simple algebraic manipUlation of two basic definitions; the 
definition of the money stock and the definition of the monetary base. 
The identity is converted into a theory, by making specific assumptions 
about the behaviour of the banks, the public, and the monetary authori-
ties. 
The money stock is conventionally defined as the total of currency 
(notes plus coin) held by the non-bank public plus deposits of the non-bank 
public with commercial banks(17)The monetary base, which is alternatively 
referred to as the "cash base" or "high-powered money" is equal to the 
(17)For the moment we bypass the distinc~ion between demand and time 
deposits. 
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total of currency in circulation plus commercial bank deposits with the 
Central Bank and constitutes a liability of the Central Bank (18). 
For the purposes of the money supply theory total currency in Clr-
culation is separated into currency held by the general public and cur-
rency held by commercial banks, which along with deposits with the 
Central Bank comprise the reserves of the banking system. Thus the 
monetary base can be defined as the total of the two main components: 
currency held by the non-bank public plus the banking system's reserves. 
It should be noted that, although the separation of the cash base 
between currency and bank reserves is important for the theory of the 
money stock determination, any reallocation of cash between commercial 
banks and the public having repercussions for the stock of money, the se-
paration of the total amount of bank reserves between currency and de-
posits with the Central Bank is a matter of administrative convenience 
with no significance for monetary theory; a reallocation of the stock 
of reserves by a commercial bank in favour of currency involves nothing 
more than a debit of the bank's account with the Central Bank matched 
by an equal credit of the item "notes in circulation" of the Central 
Bank's balance-sheet; both total reserves of the commercial bank and 
Central Bank's total monetary liabilities remaln unchanged. Since, there-
fore, the separation of total bank reserves between currency and deposits 
with the Central Bank serves no purpose for the theory of the money stock 
determination, bank reserves are treated as a whole in the definition of 
the cash base. 
The need for reserves arlses from the nature of bank deposits as 
means of payments, as well as from the fact that deposits are convertible 
into currency either on demand or after short notice. The holding of re-
'serves provides the necessary liquidity enabling a bank to meet adverse 
clearing balances resulting by an excess of cheque payments by its own 
customers over cheque receipts, as well as negative encashment balances 
. f h h d . (19) resultlng from an excess 0 encas ments over cas eposlts . 
(18)This is strictly true for Bank .notes and deposits of the banking 
system with the Central Bank; coin is the liability of the treasury. 
Since however coin has an insignificant total value relative to notes 
and bank deposits it can be disregarded in monetary analysis. 
(19)see H.T.Newlyn: "The Theory of Money" second edition. Oxford 1971, 
ch. 2 p.19. 
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It is important to note that even if the banking system consisted 
only of a monopoly bank and the general public held only bank deposits 
and no currency at all, the need to hold reserves would still arise, as 
long as the government insisted to accept only cash as a means of final 
t · . t t . . h h· (20) F . h· paymen ln 1 s ransactlons wlt t e prlvate sector . or, 1n t 1S 
case cheques received by any government agency from the private sector 
would be presented for encashment to the monopoly bank, which must hold 
reserves in order to be able to meet the government's demand for cash. 
After the above remarks on the concepts of the monetary base and 
bank reserves let us proceed to examlne formally the logic of the "old 
view" on the money stock determination. First let us write down the 
definitions of the money stock and the monetary base in algebraic form: 
(2.1) M - C + D 
(2.2) H - C + R 
where (M) is the money stock, (D) denotes bank deposits, (C) is cur-
rency held by the public, (H) denotes the monetary base and (R) de-
notes bank reserves. Let us now perform the following sequence of simple 
algebraic operations: 
D/H - D/(C+R) = (D/D) / {(C+R)/D} - 1 / {(C/D)+(R/D} => 
1 
=> (2.3) D = ------ • H 
(C/D) + (R/D) 
M = C+D = (C/D) D + D - (C/D + 1) D => (2.4) M = (1 + C/D) D . - . . 
Substituting (D) from (2.3) into (2.4) we obtain: 
1 + (C/D) 
(2.5) M = • H 
(C/D) + (R/D) 
Relations (2.3) and (2.5) express the stock of bank deposits and 
money in terms of the monetary base (H) and ~wo ratios: the ra~io of 
bank reserves to deposit liabilities and the ratio of currency held 
(20)see C.A.E. Goodhart: "Money informa-:ion and Uncertainty" 
Macmillan 1975, ch. 6 p. 108 
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b . (21) y the public over deposits with commerc~al banks . 
A similar expression can be easily derived for bank credit (CR) 
1.e the stock of earning assets of all forms held by the banking system. 
By definition we have: 
(2.6) CR = D - R 
Now (2.6) can be written as follows: 
CR = (1 - R/D).D; substituting D from (2.3) we obtain: 
1 - (R/D) (2.7) CR = ~--~---'--'-
(R/D) + (C/D) 
• H 
(21) Expression: (2.5) linking the money stock to:the cash base is not 
the only one which can be derived; expressions having different form, 
but equivalent to (2.5) have been derived by economists dealing with 
the subject. Friedman and Schwartz derived the following expression for 
the money stock: 
(D/R) (1 + D/C) 
M = -------------- . H 
(D/R) + (D/C) 
(see Friedman and Schwartz: " A monetary history of the U.S. 1867-1960" 
NBER 1963 Appendix B). Manipulating the expression by Friedman and 
Schwatz we have: 
(D/R) (l+D/C) (l+l/(C/D)) 
M = --------------
(D/R) + (D/C) 
• H - (D/R)--------
l/(R/D) + l/(C/D) 
(D/R) {(l+C/D)/(C/D)} 
(C/D+R/D)/(R/D)(C/D) 
• H - (D/R) 
(1+C/D) 
(C/D+R/D) (D/R) 
• H -
l+C/D 
.H----- . H 
C/D + R/D 
The last expression in the above sequence lS relation (2.5) of the text. 
Cagan's expression for the money stock is as follows: 
1 
M ~ --------~----------- • H 
R/D + C/M - (R/D)(C/M) 
(See P. Cagan: "Determinants and effects of changes in ~he Stock of Money" 
Columbia University Press 1965 chapter 2). Noting that: 
C/M = (C/D)/(l+C/D) and substituting for C/M in Cagan's expression we have: 
1 
M = -------------------------- • H -
C/D (R/D)(C/D) 
(R/D)+ l+C/D - l+C/D 
1 
- ---------------------------------------
• H = 
{R/D+(R/D)(C/D)+(C/D)-(R/D)(C/D)}!l+C/D) 
(continued in p.24) 
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Clearly expressions (2.3), (2.5), (2.7) are identities describing 
the stock of bank deposits, money and bank credit in terms of two ratios 
and the cash-base of the system but having no explanatory power whatso-
ever. The traditional approach to the money supply attributes to the 
above identities theoretical content by making the following three crucial 
assumptions regarding the behaviour of commercial banks, the non-bank 
public and the monetary authorities. 
1) There lS a minimum ratio of bank reserves to deposit liabilities, 
sometimes established by convention but in most cases enforced by mo-
netary authority regulation, which is considered necessary for the 
smooth functioning of the banking system. Commercial banks are not 
allowed to hold reserves lower than those indicated by the required 
reserve ratio, while on the other hand,_ they do not find it profitable 
to hold excessive reserves which do not bear interest instead of interest 
bearing assets. Thus if a positive or negative discrepancy arises between 
footnote (21) continued from p. 23 
1 
- (l+C/D)/(R/D+C/D) 
(R/D+C/D)/(l+(C/D) 
We therefore see that the expression derived by Cagan is equivalent to 
the expression (2.5) of the text. James Heade derived a long time ago, 
the following expression for the Money stock: 
1 
M = ------------------- G 
n(l-q)(l-p(l-m»+lq 
(See J. Meade: "The amount of money and the Banking system" E.J.1934) 
In Meade's expression G is the stock of gold, (n) denotes the banks reserve 
ratio, (1) is the part of the total currency in circulation backed by 
gold, (m) is the part of the commercial bank deposits with the Central 
Bank backed by gold and (p) denotes the banking system's deposits with 
the Central Bank to total reserve ratio. l'leade I s expression is more com'" 
plicated than the previous ones since the ratios (1) and (m) are taken 
to be different; assuming 1 = m = k t~e above expression becomes: 
(q~ currenc¥-total money ratio) 
1 G 1 G 
M = ----- =----
n(l-q)+q k n+q-n.q k 
Since k is the part of the monetary base "backed" by gold it follows that 
G/k is equal to the monetary base and thus Meade's formula collapses to 
the formula derived by Cagan. 
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actual and required reserves, banks will take quick steps to adjust their 
actual reserve ratio to the required one. 
2) Since both bank deposits and currency serve as means of payments 
they will both be used by the general public to finance transactions~ 
Given their payment habits and the structure of their expenditures, the 
non-bank public will allocate their total money balances between bank 
deposits and currency in a way which is most convenient to them. Although 
changes in icome and prices affect the demand for total means of payments, 
proponents of the "old view" implicitly assume that such changes do not 
alter the desired allocation of the public's money balances between cur-
rency and bank deposits. 
Thus while in the long-run the desired currency-deposit ratio may 
change because of gradual changes in payment habits and the structure 
of expenditures as well as because of improvements in the services pro~ 
vided by the banking system, in the short-run the ratio in question can 
be plausibly considered as exogenous and highly stable and for analytical 
purposes it can be treated as constant without the introduction of serious 
error. 
It should be mentioned that in financially developed economies the 
desired cash-deposit ratio is low, people prefering to hold the bulk of 
their money balances in the form of bank deposits and holding currency 
only for the purpose of financing everyday transactions of small value. 
The reason is that the use of bank deposits in making payments provides 
much greater convenienc~ and safety relatively to cash. 
3) The monetary base of the system is under the potential control of 
the monetary authorities; cash is the liability of the Central Bank and 
'it is taken for granted that the Bank can have complete control over its 
liabilities. 
Given the stock of "high-powered" money the commercial banks and 
the non-bank public will be in "equilibrium" when the actual reserve 
ratio is equal to reserve requirements and the actual cash-deposit ratio 
is equal to the desired one. Denoting the required reserve ratio by (r) 
and the desired cash-deposit ratio by (d), the "equilibrium" conditions 
can be written as follows: 
( 2. 8a) RID - r, (2.8b) CID = d. 
Substituting conditions (2.8) into identities (2.3), (2.5), (2.7), we 
get the following expression for the equilibrium stocks of bank deposits, 
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money and bank credit: 
1 1 + Co. 1 - r (2.9) D-
. H, (2.10) M-
. H, (2.11) CR- . H. 
r + d r + :i I' + d 
As the above expressions show, the equilibrium stocks of bank depo-
sits, money and bank credit, depend on ~he cash base of the system and 
on three "proportionality factors" usua::"="y referred to as the deposit, 
money and bank credit multipliers. All three multipliers are negatively 
dependent on the (I') and (d) ratios; the higher those ratios are, the 
lower the values of the multipliers and vice-versa. Moreover}since in 
financially developed economies both (I') and (d) are small fractions of 
. (22) 
unity, the values of the multipliers exceed unlty and therefore any 
given expansion or contraction of the cash-base brings a multiple expan-
sion or contraction of bank deposits ba~k credit and the money stock. 
The traditional approach to the theory of the money stock determin-
ation explainsthe multiple expansion of deposits and bank credit and 
derives the values of the relevant multipliers in terms of a converging 
process of successive rounds of bank expansion initiated by a rise in 
actual bank reserves relative to reserve rquirements, in each round some 
of the initial excessive reserves "leak:"ng" partly into required reserves 
and partly in desired cash holdings by ~he general public. 
To illustrate the process assume 2 rise in the cash base by one mo-
netary unit achieved, say, by Central Bank purchases of securities from 
the non-bank public; given that the public's desired cash-deposit ratio 
is equal to (d), a proportion (d/1+d) of the rise in the base will be 
held in the form of cash while the rest (1/1+d) will be deposited with 
commercial banks; banks find themselves with excess reserves equal to 
(1/1+d)(l-r) and thus they expand their earning assets by an equal a-
mount; the public hold a proportion (d/l+d) of the additional (1/1+d). 
(1-r) units of money they receive, in the form of cash and redeposit 
the rest (1/1+d) with the banks; thus we have a second round rise in de-
posits equal to {1/(1+d)2} (1-r); agai~ the banking system finds itself 
with surplus reserves equal to {1/(1+c)2} (1-r)2 and "purchases" assets 
of an equal amount; the expansion resul~s in a third round in deposits 
equal to {1/(1+d)3} (1-r)2. The process continues until the whole increase 
(22)This is precisely why the above "p!':Jportionality factors" are called 
"multipliers". 
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in the base is absorbed by the banking system ir. the form of required 
reserves and by the non-banking public in the form of desired cash ba-
lances(23). 
The total rlse in deposits and bank credi~ are glven respectively 
by expressions(2.12), (2.13) below: 
(2.12) 8D = (1/1+d) { 1+(1-r)/(1+d)+(1-r)2/(1+d)2+(1-r)3/(1+d)3+ .•... } 
(2.13) . 223 3 ~CR = (1-r)/(1+d) {1+(1-r)/(1+d)+(1-r) /(1+d) +(1-r) /(l+d) + •... } 
The limiting sum of the convergent series appearing in the square 
brackets of expressions (2.12), (2.13), can be s~own to be equal to 
(1+d)/(r+d)(24). Substituting this expression in (2.12), (2.13) we have: 
(2.12') 8D = (1/1+d)(1+d/r+d) = 1/(r+d) 
(2.13') 8CR = {(1-r)/(1+d)}.{(1+d)/(r+d)} = (1-r)/(r+d) 
Comparing (2.12'), (2.13') with expressions (2.9), (2.11) respectively 
we see that the total rise in deposits and bank credit resulting from 
a unit increase in the cash base coinside with t~e values of deposit 
and bank credit multipliers. 
Since the deposit, bank credit and money mUltipliers all depend 
upon the (r) and (d) ratios and since the "old v:'ew" takes the r~ratio 
as a constant which in most cases is set by the ~onetary authorities, 
and the d-ratio as a highly stable exogenous mag~itude, it follows that the 
multipliers in question are also stable and exogenous. Although exoge-
neity of the multipliers is a necessary conditio~, it is not sufficient 
for the exogeneityof deposits bank credit and mo~ey, the exogeneity of 
these latter variables depending crucially on the monetary authorities' 
.choice to control the cash base of the system instead of the level of 
interest rates. 
To illustrate, let us take the conventional IS/LM model and assume 
that the authorities choose to peg the rate of iaterest at a given level 
(23)The approach of deriving the values of deposit and Credit multipliers 
as the limit of process of successive rounds of bank expansion is an 
old one, initiated by the work of Phillips ~~d amplified by Rogers; 
See C.A. Phillips: "Bank Credit" Macmillan Co. 1919 and J.H. Rogers: 
"The absorbtion of bank credit" Econometric~ 1933. 
(24) 1 
1+( 1-r)/(1+d)+( 1-r)2 /(1+d)2+ ..... = ------
1 1+d 
:= 
1- (1-r)/ C.+d) (r+d)/(1+D) r+d 
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intervening in the market when necessary so that to keep the market 
rate of interest at a chosen level. Under this setting, fluctuations 
in income caused by fluctuations in expenditures result in fluctu-
ations in the demand for money in the same direction; for the rate of 
interest to remain at its pegged level, the supply of money must change 
in line with demand and for this to happen the monetary authorities must 
provide the necessary amount of cash. Thus in the case where the autho-
rities have an interest rate target the money stock is demand determined, 
causality running from income to the money stock and from the money 
stock to the monetary base. 
If however the authorities choose to control the cash base of the 
system, the "old view" implies that the nominal money stock is a comp-
letely "sypply determined" exogenous va;riable unaffected by the main 
endogenous macroeconomic variables of the system and independent of the 
asset preferences of the public bet~-1een money and other assets. If there 
is a disequilibrium between the demand and the supply of money , the 
burden of adjustment will fall entirely on demand and equilibrium will 
be achieved through the proper adjustment of the arguments of the demand 
for money function. In short, once created, a given nominal quantity of 
money can neither be increased nor extinguished through an endogenous 
adjustment process initiated by the private sector; equilibrium will 
be achieved by the economy adjusting to the given nominal money stock 
and not the other way around. 
Besides the exogeneity of the nominal money stock which may be 
considered as the main implication of the "old view", proponents of 
this approach draw a sharp distinction between banks and non-bank finan-
.. .. (25) h· h' It' t 1 b d th t'o th t clal lntermedlarles , w lC lS U lma e y ase on e asser l n a 
bank deposits serve as means of payments while the liabilitites of NBFIs 
do not. The function of bank liabilities as means of payments and the 
banking system's provision of the payments transmission services, makes 
it convenient for NBFIs to hold their reserves ih the form of ban~ de-
posits. According to the proponents of the "old view" this is crucial 
fact leading in two important functional contrasts between banks and 
NBFIs. 
First, shifts of the public's preferences between bank deposits 
and NBFI's liabilities, simply result in a change of ownership of bank 
(25)From now on referred to as NBFls for convenience. 
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deposits, leaving the total of bank assets and liabilities unaltered(26). 
On the other hand such shifts have as an immediate effect equalchanges 
in NBFI's reserves and liabilitites which in turn necessitate further 
adjustments by NBFls for the purpose of restoring their desired reserve-
liability ratio which has been disturbed by the initial shift in asset 
. holder's preferences. Thus the liabilities of the banking system are 
independent of the private sector's asset preferences while those of NBFls 
are directly affected by such preferences. 
Second, commercial banks inherently possess a much larger credit 
expansion potential, than any other group of NBFls, the reason being that 
NBFI's expansion is subject to much more important leakages than is ex-
. b . b k (27) A h . panslon y commerclal an s • ssume t at the banklng system, finding 
its reserves excessive relative to deposit liabilities, acquires earnlng 
assets; apart from a small drain of cash in the hands of the non-bank 
public indicated by their currency-deposit ratio, the main bulk of 
cheques initially received by the sellers of earning assets will be even-
tually redeposited with the banking system, providing the means for fur-
ther "rounds" of bank expansion. This is true, irrespectively of whether 
the recipients of cheques at each stage of subsequent transactions depo-
sit them with the banking system or with NBFls, as long as the latter 
hold their reserves in the form of bank deposits. 
On the other hand, there is not any inherent tendency for cheque 
payments accompanying a credit expansion of any group of NBFls to be re-
deposited with them. The funds received by the public will be spent on 
many assets both real and financial, and although at some stage in the 
chain of transactions it is quite possible that some part of the origi-
nal funds will be redeposited with NBFls, the largest part of them will 
leak into other forms of wealth. Thus although NBFls may be able to get 
(26) Guttentag and Lindsay argue as follows: "So long as NBFls, hold 
their reserves as deposits, the aquisition of earning assets bycom. banks 
i$ not restricted by the public's desire to maintain their holdings 
of claims against NBFls in the same proportion to deposits as before. 
The reason is that such a shift does not extinguish deposits; it merely 
transfers their ownership to NBFIs, who feed them back to the public 
through credit expansions" see J.M. Guttentag and R. Lindsay: "The 
Uniqueness of Commercial banks"J6urnal of Political Economy 1968 p.999 
(27)See W. L. Smith: "Financial Intermediaries and monetary controls" 
Quart7rly Journal of Economics 1959, See also Guttentag and Lindsay Ope Clt. p.p. 996-997. 
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involved in a multiple credit expansion, their ability lS much less 
than that of commercial banks. 
It is important to emphasise that, according to the "old view", 
the two functional contrasts between Banks and NBFIs examined above 
arise from the monetary nature of bank liabilities (28); if bank deposits 
did not possess the monetary quality, ttey would not be used as reserves 
by NBFIs and the above differences would not arise. 
The logic and implications of the traditional theory of the money 
stock determination examined in this section came under forceful attack 
by an alternative approach to the issue, widely known as the "new view". 
This approach denies the exogenous nature of the money stock and asserts 
that the differences between banks and NBFIs are of degree and not of 
kind not hingeing on the monetary natur~ of the bank liabilities. The 
next section is devoted to the examination of the "new view" on the the-
ory of the money stock determination . 
. Section 3: Theory of the money stock determination: the IInew view'·' 
The "new view" on the money supply has its origins in the contri-
butions by Gurley and Shaw which first appeared in a series of papers 
in professional periodicals(29) and were subsequently consolidated in 
. (30) 
an lmportant book on monetary theory . Gurley and Shaw tend to blur 
the sharp distinction traditionally drawn between banks and NBFIs(31) 
considering as irrelevant the assertion that bank liabilities are money 
while the liabilities of NBFIs are not, and pointing out that each 
(28)Guttentag and Lindsay (op.cit. p.1002) argue as follows: "Thus we 
.. come back to the point made earlier: use of the payments mechanism 
by NBFIs is the crux of the greater credit expansion potential of 
banks. And we see the central importance of the fact that banks 
create the principal means of payments". 
(29)J.G. Gurley and Shaw: "Financial aspects of Economic Development" 
American Economic Review 1955. 
JwG. Gurley and E. Shaw: "Financial Intermediaries and the Saving 
Investment process" .Tournal of Finance May 1956. 
J.G.Gurley and E. Shaw: nThe Growth of debt and money in US, 1800-
1950: A suggested interpretation" Review of Economics and Statistics 
August 1957. 
(30)Gurley and Shaw: "Money in a theory of Finance~ Hashington 1960. 
(31)"There are many similarities between the monetary system and non-
monetary intermediaries and the siQilarities are more important than 
the differences" (Money in a theory of finance p.202) 
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financial instrument possesses its own unique characteristics(32). 
According to their view, the banking system is only one of the many 
different kinds of financial intermediaries and the behaviour of banks, 
as of any other intermediary, should be analysed in terms of their 
attempts to achieve an optimal portfolio of assets and debts within the 
constraints imposed to them by private sector asset preferences as well 
as by monetary authorities regulations. 
Although it is widely recognised that the origins of the "new view" 
are to be found in the work of Gurley and Shaw, it is equally true that 
the establishment of the "new view" as a major approach to the issue of 
the money stock determination, owes much to the work of James Tobin. In 
(33) . 
a, by now famous paper , Tobln undertakes an illuminating exposition 
of the "new view" and forcefully contrasts the implications of the new 
approach with the implications of the traditional theory of the money 
(34) 
supply • 
In subsection 3. 1. below we shall examlne the logic of the "new 
view" and contrast its implications with those of the "old view" examined 
in the previous section, mainly basing the arguments on Tobin's contri-
bution. 
3. 1. The logic and implications of the "new view" 
Assuming that commercial banks are profit maximizing institutions, 
totally unconstrained from reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings 
on their deposits, let us start by asking what determines the allocation 
of a glven stock of bank deposits between bank reserves and earning assets. 
Sinc.e bank reserves bear no interest, the holding of -them involves 
an opportunity cost equal to the rate of return on alternative earning 
(32)"The difference between the monetary system and non-monetary intermediaries 
aries in this respect is not that one creates (money) and the other 
does not but rather that each creates its own unique form of debt .... 
... Money is, unlike other financial assets, for it is the means of 
payments. Corporate stocks are unlike other financial assets, too, 
for they carry ownership rights in corporations ..... 1f (Money in a 
theory of finance pp. 198-199) 
(33)J. Tobin: "Commercial banks as Creators of Money" In D. Carson (ed): 
Banking and Monetary Studies (1963). Also printed as ch .. 1 (pp.1-11) 
In Hester and Tobin (eds): "Financial markets and econonnc act ivi ty" 
Cowles Foundation monograph 21 (New York 1967). References to Tobin's 
paper will be made from this latter source. 
(34)To the best of my knowledge the labels "old view" and "new view" were 
~ntroduced by Tobin in the paper cited above. 
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assets. On the other hand the holding of reserve reduces the risk of a 
bank finding itself unable to fulfill its reconvert ion commitments on 
demand, in cases of unfavourable variations in deposits. Clearly the 
higher the reserve-deposit ratio the lower is the risk of illiquidity 
and also the lower ~s the return on bank portfolio; given that return 
is "good" and risk ~s "bad", a bank will try to allocate the funds at 
her disposal in such a way, so that to achieve its desired balance 
between risk and return. 
Thus the allocation problem faced by banks is a typical case dealt 
by the theory of portfolio selection(35) and can be solved according to 
the well established principles of that theory. Assuming that banks are 
risk averters, their indifference curves between risk and return will 
exhibit the standard convex shape and this ensures that their equilibrium 
allocation will not represent a "corner' solution"; ~n equilibrium a bank 
will hold reserves up to the point where the marginal implicit return 
in terms of liquidity services is equal to the opportunity cost of hold-
ing them. Moreover portfolio theory suggests that provided that the "sub-
stitution effect" dominates the "income effect" a rise in the rate of 
interest will cause a fall of the equilibrium level of reserves relative 
to deposits. Therefore the commercial banks reserve ratio is a choice 
variable negatively dependent upon the rate of interest on alternative 
earning assets; changes in the market rate of interest cause inverse 
changes in the reserve-deposit ratio. 
The achievement. of portfolio balance is not the only choice available 
to commercial banks; apart from allocating optimally a given amount of 
deposits between reserves and earning assets, a bank unconstrained by 
monetary authority regulations will attempt to attain the optimum size 
'of liabilities by manipulating the rate offered on deposits. Given the 
preferences of the private sector between bank deposits cash and other 
(35)One of the main contributors to the theory of portfolio selection 
is of course Tobin; see J. Tobin: "Liquidity preference as behaviour 
t~wards risk" Review of Economic Studies February 1958; see also 
his subsequent work: "The theory of portfolio selection" in Hahn 
and Brechlin (eds): "The theory of interest rates" (Macmillan, 
London 1965). 
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financial assets, commercial banks will attract more funds(36) only by 
raising the deposit rate; thus the marginal cost of attracting deposits 
will be an increasing function of the level of deposits. As long as the 
marginal return on bank portfolio is higher than the marginal cost of 
attracting deposits, banks will keep raising the deposit rate in order 
to attract more funds; the optimum size of bank liabilities will be 
achieved to the point where the marginal return on bank portfolio· is 
equal to the cost of attracting one more unit of deposits. 
Summarising the above discussion we may say that commercial banks 
actively attempt to achieve an optimum portfolio of assets as well as 
an optimum size of liabilities, within the constraints imposed to them 
by private sector's preferences, their behaviour being directed by well 
established microeconomic principles. Moreover it is important to note 
that the behaviour of NBFIs is based on exactly the same principles which 
direct the behaviour of commercial banks; this is precisely the reason 
why the proponents of the new view assert that banks and non-banks are 
in principle similar institutions their differences being of degree 
rather than of kind. 
In proceeding we turn to examlne how the implications of the analysis 
of bank behaviour undertaken above are contrasted with the implications 
of the "old view". As we have seen in the previous section, the equili-
brium stocks of money and bank deposits are according to the "old view" 
completely supply determined exogenous variables independent of the public's 
preferences between money and other assets. A shift in wealth holder's 
preferences from money to interest bearing securities will leave the money 
stock and bank deposits completely unaffected while the rate of interest 
will fall sufficiently to induce the public to keep willingly holding 
"the given nominal quantity of money. 
On the other hand, according to the "new view" the above shift in 
asset preferences will result in .a reduction of the equilibrium stocks 
of money and bank deposits, through the following process: the fall in 
(36)In a closed economy, the private sector can deposit more funds with 
the banks, either by directly reducing its cash holdings or by selling 
government securities for cash. This latter action however depends 
upon the authorities willingness to provide cash; if the authorities 
are unwilling to increase the cash base of the system, the necessary 
funds can be provided only by a reduction in the public's cash-depo-
sit ratio. 
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the rate of interest caused by the shift in asset preferences will re-
sult in a downward shift in the banks' marginal revenue curve and thus 
the new optimal stock of bank liabilities is lower than the previous one; 
banks will try to get rid of the excess amount of deposits by lowering 
the rate offered on them; the lower deposit rate will induce a rise 
in the public's demand for cash relative to deposits and thus a certain 
amount of bank deposits will be extinguished; moreover the fall in the 
rate offered on deposits will induce a further shift of the public's 
preferences from deposits to securities and thus a further fall in the 
rate of interest which in turn will probably induce a further' reduction 
in the deposit rate. If the underlying process is stable a new equili-
brium will be achieved characterised by lower.interest rates on earnlng 
assets and bank deposits, a lower equilibrium stock of deposits and a 
higher cash-deposit ratio. 
It is crucial to note, that even if commercial banks were not allowed 
to vary the deposit rate, the shift in the private sector's preferences 
from money to alternative interest bearing assets would still result in 
a fall of the equilibrium level of deposits. Indeed the process described 
above does not take into account the fact that as the interest rate on 
securities falls, commercial banks' desired reserves rise relative to 
deposits; as the banks try to adjust their actual reserve rati·o to the 
higher desired level, they sell securities to the public and in the pro-
cess of the ensuing cheque payments a corresponding quantity of bank 
deposits is extinguished. In general the process of adjustment to changes 
in the private sector's preferences will involve both changes in the de-
posit rate and changes in the equilibrium allocation of bank portfolio 
between bank reserves and earning assets; a fall in the demand for money 
'will not only result in a reduction of the deposit rate but also to a 
rise of the banks' desired reserve ratio. 
The above analysis suggests that the "new view" on the theory of 
the money stock determination implies, contrary to the "old view", that 
bank deposits and the money stock are end 0 g e n 0 u s variables 
dependent upon the structure of private sector's preferences between mo-
ney and other assets; accordi~g to the "new view" the equilibrium stock 
of money is not completely supply determined magnitude to which demand 
must adjust, but it is determined by the interaction of commercial banks' 
behavioural responses with the public's portfolio preferences. Any gap 
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between the stock of money and the demand for it will not be eliminated 
solely by the adjustment of demand; changes in the rate of interest 
occuring during the adjustment process will induce commercial banks to 
share the burden of adjustment with the private sector. 
The old and the new views are not in contrast solely with respect 
to the exogeneity-endogeneity issue of the money stock; their implications 
also differ on the "Uniqueness of commercial banks" lssue. Proponents of 
the "old view" assert that the fact that commercial banks' liabilities 
serve as means of payments creates sharp functional differences between 
banks and NBFIs. Two such differences examined in the previous section 
are first that bank deposits, incontrast to NBFI's liabilities, are inde-
pendent of the private sector's preferences between them and the liabi-
lities of NBFIs and second that banks are inherently subject to much 
lower leakages - or what is the same thing, to much higher. redeposit 
ratios - than NBFls and therefore they possess a much higher credit ex-
pansion potential than any other group of financial intermediaries. 
On the other hand, proponents of the "new view" deny that differ,-
ences between banks and non-banks depend on the monetary nature of bank 
liabilities and assert that the existing differences are rather due to 
the restrictions imposed upon commercial banks by the monetary authori-
oties(37). In particular the "new view" regards the first of the two 
functional differences between banks and non-banks implied by the "old 
view" as wrong and the second as irrelevant and misleading. 
Refering to the first difference, the "new view" denies the assertion 
that bank deposits are independent of the public's preferences between 
them and NBFI's liabilities by the following reasoning: the impact effect 
of an autonomous shift in the non-bank public's preferences from bank 
deposits to the liabilities of NBFI's will be a rise of NBFI's liabili-
ties accompanied by an equal rise of their balances with commercial banks; 
bank deposits will be partly redistributed from the non-bank public in 
favor of NBFls but their total level will remain unchanged. This is how-
ever the beginning of the story; for now NBFIs find themselves with 
excess funds the largest part of which will be used for the acquisition 
(37)As Tobin points out fl ••••• the differences which do exist, have little 
intrinsically to do with the monetary nature of bank liabilities. 
The differences are more importantly relative to the special reserve 
requirements and interest rate ceilings to which banks are subject ..•. " 
see J. Tobin op. cit. p. 10. 
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of earning assets; in the process of NBFI's expansion, rates of interest 
will be falling and this fall will cause a rise in commercial banks' de-
sired reserve ratio; as the banks try to adjust their reserve ratio to 
the higher desired level, they sell earning assets which are purchased 
by the expanding NBFls; since the latter pay commercial banks by cheques 
drawn upon their accounts with them, a corresponding quantity of bank 
deposits will be extinguished. As Tobin points out "in effect NBFls 
favoured by the shift in the pub-lic's preferences simply swap the depo-
sits transferred to them for a corresponding quanti.'tyof bank assets" (38) • 
Thus the above line of reasoning suggests that, contrary to the 
implications of the "old view", the "new view" implies that bank depo-
sits do depend upon private sector's preferences between them and the 
liabilities of NBFls; shifts in the public's preferences between those 
two financial assets will not only affect NBFI's liabilities, but also 
the total amount of bank deposits. 
Moreover, proponents of the "new view" assert that the distinction 
between banks and non-banks in terms of different sizes of leakages or -
what is the same - different redeposit ratios in the process of credit 
expansion, drawn by the "old view" is at best misleading, confusing 
" . ff . h h . h . f' I . b' ,,( 3 9 ) lmpact e ects Wlt t e ultlmate ac levement 0 equl 1 rlum • Accor-
ding to the" new view" the equilibrium stocks of bank deposits and NBFI's 
liabilities as well as the equilibrium stocks of credit extended by banks 
and non-banks are determined in the context of a general equilibrium 
system where both the public's and the intermediaries' asset preferences 
are specified. The public's preferences are described in terms of demand 
functions for each financial instrument depending upon the own rate of 
interest, rates of interest on alternative assets and total private wealth. 
Similarly the preferences of each financial intermediary (including banks) 
are described ln terms of demand functions for reserves and other finan-
cial instruments which depend upon interest rates and the intermediary's 
liabilities, as well as in terms of the inter~ediary's rate setting 
functions. Redeposit ratios do not enter at all in the equilibrium so-
lution of a general equilibrium system like the one outlined above and 
thus, although it may well be true that different redeposit ratios be-
tween banks and non~banks affect the dynamic adjustment process towards 
(38)see J. Tobin op.cit. p. 7. 
(39)see C.A.E. Goodhart: "Money information and uncertainty"(1975) 
chapter 7 p. 143. 
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equilibrium, they do not affect the final determination of the equilib-
rium stocks of assets and liabilities of the system. 
However, despite its plausibility, the above reasoning does not 
seem to be well founded. In particular the argument that redeposit ratios 
do not enter the equilibrium stocks of intermediaries' liabilities and 
credit seems rather mistaken. The reason is that the public's asset pre-
ferences between bank deposit and NBFI liabilities imply certain desired 
redeposit ratios between banks and non-banks and the equilibrium amounts 
of financial intermediaries' liabilities and credit can be expressed in 
terms of these ratios. Moreover, as long as NBFI hold their reserves in 
the form of bank deposits, banks are subject to higher redeposit ratios 
and therefore the assertion of the "old view" that banks have a larger 
credit expansion potential than NBFI is valid. It is worth mentioning 
that both Wood(40)and Coghlah41 ) explicitly demonstrated this' proposition 
using "new view" types of financial models and adopting the comp:lrative 
static method of anqlysis. 
The fact that the "old view" assertion regarding the relatively 
stronger credit expansion potential of commercial banks retains its va-
lidity should not be interpreted as a refutation of the "new view". 
Differences between the two views are not - or should not be - defined 
in terms of a set of results obtained, but rather in terms of their 
analytical approaches. The "old view" works with fixed preferences ratios 
of the public and financial intermediaries whereas the "new view" endo-
genizes these ratios by making them dependent upon other endogenous va-
riables of the system such as interest rates. The fact that the two views 
may lead to some common results is irrelevant to their validity as ana-
lytical frameworks. 
Up to now the.logic and implications of the "new view" have been 
examined under the assumption that commercial banks are institutions 
unconstrained by monetary authorities' regulations. Since however in 
reality commercial banks are prohibited to pay interest on their demand 
deposits and are subject to reserve requirements imposed on them by the 
monetary authorities, the question arises whether the ~'new view" retains 
its theoretical content within such a regime of constraints or whether 
(' 40) J.M. Wood: Two notes on the uniqueness of Commercial Banks. Journal 
of Finance 1970 
(41)R.T. Coghlan: Analysis within the "New View". Journal of Money Credii: 
and Banking 1977. 
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its logic collapses to the logic of the "old view". 
As we have seen in the previous section the "old view" asserts 
that commercial banks are always fully "loaned-up" for they do not find 
it profitable to hold excess reserves in ?lace of interest bearing assets. 
Thus the money multiplier which depends upon the public's cash-deposit 
ratio assumed to be quasi constant ln the short-run and upon the required 
reserve ratio, provides, according to the "old view", a tight link be-
tween the money stock and the cash base of the system. Proponents of the 
"new view" however argue that even ln a regime of constraints, the money 
supply process implied by the "old view" is misleading, their main point 
of disagreement being that the reserves commercial banks are content to 
hold relative to deposits do not necessarily coincide with reserve re-
quirements. 
According to the "new view", when market rates of interest are low 
relative to the Central Bank's discount rate, it may well pay commercial 
banks to hold excess reserves both because of speculative considerations 
motivated by the expectations of rising interest rates and because excess 
reserves provide cheaper liquidity services relatively to borrowing from 
Central Bank in view of unfavourable fluctuations·in bank deposits. As 
the market rate of interest rises relatively to the discount rate, the 
opportunity cost of reserves increases and thus the incentive for the 
banks to hold excess reserves diminishes; above some critical value of 
the market interest rate-discount rate differential excess reserves be-
come virtually zero in which case commercial banks are fully loaned-up 
and the whole amount of reserve holdings represents required reserves. 
Nevertheless even in the case where commercial banks are fully 
lpaned-up reserve requirements do not necessarily impose, according to 
the "new view", an effective constraint upon bank expansion the reason 
being that the banking system can acquire additional reserves to support 
an expansion by borrowing from the Central Bank; indeed if market rates 
of interest are high relative to the discount rate, commercial banks 
will most probably find it profitable to supplement the existing stock 
. (42) I . 1 b k of reserves by Central bank borrowlng • In genera commerCla an 
(42)AS Tobin points out "reserves are available at the discount window and 
in the money market at a price. Thiscost the bank must compare with a-
vailable yields on loans and investme~ts. If those yields are low re-
lative to the cost of reserves the ba~k will seek to avoid borrowing 
reserves and perhaps hold excess reserves instead. If those yields are 
high relative to the cost of borrowi~g reserves, the bank will squeeze 
excess reserves and borrow reserves occasionally or even regularly". 
J. Tobin Ope cit. p.g. 
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borrowing from the Central Bank can be thought of as an increasing fun-
ction of the market rate-discount rate differential: the higher the above 
differential, the lower the cost of borrowing relative to the return that 
can be earned by placing the borrowed funds on earning assets and thus 
the stronger the incentive of commercial banks to borrow from the Central 
Bank. 
The algebraic difference between excess reserves and commercial 
bank borrowing from the Central Bank is widely refered to as "free reserves"; 
positive net free reserves for the banking system as a whole imply that 
part of the total supply of unborrowed reserves avaiiable to commercial 
banks is left unused, whereas negative net free reserves imply not only 
that the available supply of unborrowed reserves is fully utilized to 
support bank expansion but moreover that unborrowed reserves are supple-
mented by borrowing through the discount window. Since excess reserves 
and bank borrowing are respectively decreasing and increasing functions of 
the market rate-discount rate differential, it follows that free reserves 
are a decreasing function of the above differential; when market rates of 
interest are low relative to the Central Ban~s discount rate, free re-
serves are positive; as market rates rise, the volume of desired free re-
serves falls and beyond a certain value of the market rate-discount rate 
differential free reserves become negative: banks are squeezing reserves 
as tightly as possible and moreover they borrow from the Central Bank. 
Summarising the argument of the "new view" so far, we may say that 
the total reserve position of the banking system is not solely characte-
rized by reserve requirements but also by commercial banks' desired free 
reserves which depend negatively on the market interest-rate discount 
rate differential. Thus the money multiplier linking the money stock to 
the amount of unborrowed cash' (43) supplied to the syst'em by the monetary author-
ities does not only depend upon the cash-deposit ratio of the non-bank 
public and the required reserve ratio but it also depends upon the free 
reserve ratio of the banking system. 
Given the supply of unborrowed cash provided by the monetary autho-
rities'a rise (fall) in the free reserve ratio desired by commercial 
banks will cause a fall (rise) in the value of the money multiplier and 
a contraction (expansion) of the money stock. Since the money multiplier 
depends negatively on the free reserve ratio which in turn is a de-
(43)By the term "unborrowed cash" we refer to the monetary base net of 
commercial bank borrowing from the Central Bank. 
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creasing function of the market interest rate-discount rate differential , 
it follows that the money multiplier is a~ increasing function of the 
above differential; thus ceteris paribus changes in the rate of interest 
will cause changes in the same direction in the value of the money multi-
plier and the volume of the money stock. 
Clearly the dependence of the money multiplier on the rate of inte-
rest implies that the stock of money is an endogenous variable of the 
system; a shift in wealth holder's portfolio preferences between mo-
ney and other assets or an autonomous change in total spending will 
affect the rate of interest which in turn will affect the stock of 
money. We therefore see that according to the "new view" the endoge-
neity of the money stock holds even in a regime of reserve require-
ments and interest ceilings on deposits. 
Moreover the dependence of the monej multiplier on the rate of 
interest loosens the tight link between the level of unborrowed cash 
and the money stock emphasized by the "old view". According to the 
"old view" a given r1se of the cash base of the system will result In 
a multiple expansion of the money stock proportional to the value of 
the money multiplier; according to the "new view" however, the link 
between cash and the stock of money 1S not so tight: the open market 
purchases of securities through which the rise in unborrowed reserves 
is brought about lower the market rate of interest and as a result 
the desired free reserves of the banking system rise and the value of 
the money multiplier falls; 1n addition banks' attempts to expand, by 
investing the increased supply of reserves cause further reductions 
in the rate of interest which in turn further depress the value of 
the multiplier. 
Thus contrary to the implications of the "old view", the "new 
view" implies that a given rise in the supply of cash causes a rise 
in the money stock less than proportional to the initial value of 
the money mul tip"lier; for, as the argument of the previous paragraph 
shows, an endogenous mechanism operates during the process of mone-
tary expansion, which lowers the value of the money multiplier. 
3. 2. The "new view": empirical evidence 
The dependence of the money stock upon the rate of interest, im-
plied by the "new view" is an empirically testable proposition, the 
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validity of which is subject to confirmation or rejection by the evi-
dence. The empirical research on the money supply virtually started in 
the early sixties and the large majority of the empirical contributions 
referred to the US economy. In what follows we shall briefly review a 
small part of the empirical work that took place on the subject. 
One of the first empirical studies which took place in the context 
of the US economy has been conducted by A.J. Meigs and dealt with the 
(44) . functional dependence of commercial banks' free reserves • Melgs post-
ulates that the desired free reserve ratio is a function of market interest 
rates and the discount rate; the actual free reserve ratio is determined 
by the desired ratio via the partial adjustment mechanism and by the 
rate of injection or withdrawal of unborrowed reserves by the monetary 
authorities. The single equation tests undertaken by Meigs using the 
Ordinary Least Squares method support the hypothesis that commercial 
bank desired free reserve ratio depends positively upon the discount 
d . I h k f . (45) rate an negatlve y upon t e mar et rates 0 lnterest. 
(44)A.J. Meigs: Free reserves and the Money Supply Chicago 1962. 
(45)To give a flavour of the results obtained by Meigs we report the 
following two regressions estimated for the period 1947-58 using 
monthly data: 
, . 
(a) 
(b) 
100(R /D) = 0.835 + 0.0985 r - 0.464 r 
F (0.0200)(0.0939) d (O.0711)b 
R2 - 0.62 
100(RF/D) = 1.409 - 0.549 (rb/rd)t -(Oo •. 302312)r3-S+ (0.0180)(0.129) 
4> +4> 
+ 0.0726 (t-1 t) R2 - 0.70 
(0.0185) 2 
where (Rr/D): the free reserve ratio, rd: the discount rate, 
rb: the bill rate, r3-S: the three to five years government securities 
rate 4>: the rate of c'hange in unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve 
requirements. Standard errors are in parenthesis (see Meigs op.cit. p.70). 
In the first equation above the coefficients of the bill rate and the 
discount rate have the right signs but the coefficient of the discount 
rate is statistically insignificant. According to Meigs this is due to 
collinearity arising from the high correlation between rd and r b • As 
Meigs points out both the ratio of the bill rate to discount rate and 
(continued ln p. 42) 
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The dependence of free reserves upon rates of interest supported 
by Meigs' empirical investigations is con=irmed by S. Goldfeld who esti-
mated behavioural equations for both com~ercial banks' excess reserves 
and borrowing from the Federal Reserve System in the context of an 
aggregate quarterly model of the postwar 0S economy, which pays special 
attention to the monetary sector(46). Gol~feld postulates that desired 
excess reserves and desired borrowing froD the Fed depend negatively 
upon the Treasury bill rate and the discount rate-bill rate differential 
respectively. 
Referring to the negative dependence of excess reserves upon the 
bill rate Goldfeld argues as follows: "A bank holding excess reserves 
bears an opportunity cost which is represented by the yield it could 
have obtained by holding its funds in another form. With short-term govern-
ment securities the most obvious alternative to excess reserves it seems 
appropriate to approximate this cost by the yield on Treasury bills,,(47). 
Referring to commercial banks' desired borrowings, Goldfeld rationalizes 
their dependence upon the discount rate-bill rate differential by the 
following reasoning: "The choice between discounting and liquidation 
of an asset depends on the relationship between the discount rate and 
the yield on the asset. Given large blank holdings of US Governments, 
banks are likely to compare the discount rate with a rate on one of 
the short-term securities to see if they ~ish to rely on the Fed for 
funds. We therefore choose to compare the discount rate with the rate on 
. (48) three months Treasury Bllls" . 
footnote (45) continued from p. 41 
the rate on 3-5 years governments appear in equation (b) above "in 
order to test a hypothesis that interest rates are involved in two 
ways: First the spread between bill rate and discount rate, or their 
ratio, may influence the banks' choice between borrowing and selling 
bills when reserve adjustments become necessary. Second the absolute 
level of market interest rates may influence the choice between hold-
ing excess reserves or holding earning assets" (see Meigs op.cit. p. 72). 
As it can be seen from equation (b) above, the coefficients of the 
biil rate-discount rate ratio and the 3-5 years rate on government 
securities have the right signs and are statistically significant. 
(46)5. Goldfeld: "Commercial Bank Behaviour and Economic Activity" 
Amsterdam 1966. 
(47) . see Goldfeld Ope Clt. p. 38 
(48)see Goldfeld op. cit. p. 50 
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Given the dependence of commercial banks' desired excess reserves 
and borrowing upon rates of interest, Goldfeld further postulates that 
changes in actual excess reserves and borrowings depend upon their re-
spective desired values via a partial adjustment mechanism, as well as 
upon various constraint variables such a s deposit flow s of various types. 
The regressions estimated by Goldfeld explain changes in excess re-
serves and bank borrowing separately for city and country banks; the 
statistical results obtained, support the hypothesis that commercial 
banks' excess reserves and borrowing from the Fed depend negatively on 
the bill rate and the discount rate-bill rate differential respectively~49) 
Free reserves equations similar in specification to those estimated 
by Meigs and Goldfeld have been also estimated by Hendershott and De 
Leeuw (50) who d b th th 0 d· L t S d h T use 0 e r lnary eas quares an t e wo stages 
Least Squares methods; the statistical results obtained regarding the 
coefficients of the Treasury bill and discount rates conformed with a 
priori expectations. The two stages least square method yielded higher 
coefficients for the bill rate and the discount rate but they also yielded 
much higher standard errors relative to the Ordinary Least Squares method; 
thus the OLS estimates yielded 'much higher t-coefficients than those 
yielded by the 2SLS method. 
Although an equation linking free reserves to rates of interest forms 
an essential building block for the construction of an endogenous money 
supply hypothesis, it does not in itself constitute such a hypothesis. 
In what follows we shall briefly review some "complete" money sypply mo-
dels, formulated by a number of economists which link the money stock with 
rates of interest. In particular, we shall examine Teigen's hypothesis, 
Brunner and Meltzer's linear and non-linear hypothesis and the Modigliani-
Rasche - Cooper hypothesis. 
R. Teigen formulated his hypothesis, the essentials of which are 
. (51) 
reproduced below, in a simple and stralghtforward manner; we start by 
writting down the following identity: 
(49)For the statistical results obtained see Goldfeld Ope cit. pp. 39-43 
and 51-53. 
(50)see P. Hendershott and F. De Leeuw: "Free reserves, interest rates 
and deposits: a synthesis" Journal of Finance 1970 pp. 599-613. 
(51)R. Teigen: "Demand and Supply functions for money in the United 
States: Some structural estimates" Econometrica 1964. 
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(3.2.1) H = C + R + R 
r e 
(3.2.1) says that the cash base of the system (H) must be absorbed 
into desired currency holding by the non-b2~k public (C) and commercial 
bank holding of required (R ) and excess reserves (R ). 
r e 
On the other hand the monetary base ca~ be thought of as consisting 
of two components: unborrowed cash, which is taken to be the exogenous 
part of the monetary base and it is sometimes referred to as the "adjusted 
base", and commercial banks' borrowing from the Central Bank which ispartly 
demand determined and thus it is considered to be an endogenous magnitude. 
We can therefore write the following identity: 
(3.2.2) H = H + B a 
where: H the adjusted base and B: banks' borrowing from the Central Bank. 
a 
Combining (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) we get the following equation: 
(3.2.3) H - C + R + (R -B) = C + R + FR are r 
where: FR: free reserves. Denoting by (d) the non-bank public's desired 
cash-deposit ratio and by (r) the banks' required reserve ratio we can 
write the following equations: 
(3.2.4) 
3.2.5) 
C = d.D 
R = r. D 
r 
(where D: bank deposits) 
Finally the system lS closed by the definition of the money stock: 
(3.2.6) M = C + D 
Substituting (3.2.4) and (3.2.5) into (3.2.3) , solving for (D) 
and subsituting the resulting expression along with (3.2.4) into 
(3:2.6) we obtain the following expression for the money stock: 
1+d 
(3.2.7) M = --~ 
r+d 
H 
a 
1+d 
r+d 
. FR 
From equation (3.2.7) it is easily seen that the total money stock 
can be decomposed into two parts: an exogenous part (M*) represented by 
the expression: 
1+d 
r+d 
H 
a 
and an endogenous part (- 1+d ?R) depending negatively on 
r+d 
the level of the free reserves which in turn are postulated to depend 
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negatively on the market interest rate-discount rate differential. Clearly 
then, the ratio of the total money stock relative to the exogenous part 
of the money stock (M*) should be positively depending upon the market 
rate-discount rate differential (i-id ) i.e. we must have: 
(3.2.8) (~) = x,> 0 
M;'~ 
Equation (3~2.8) which repre~ntsTeigen's testable hypothesis 
was combined with a demand function for money depending on income and 
the rate of interest and with an income equation, and it was estimated 
using the Two Stages Least square method. The results obtained confirmed 
Teigen's hypothesis: the coefficient of the market rate-discount rate 
d ·ff t· I h d h . h· d h' hI . ·f· (52) l eren la ate rlg t slgn an was 19 y slgnl lcant. 
In proceeding, we turn to examine the hypothesis formulated by Brun-
ner and Meltzer; first we shall briefly outline their linear hypothesis 
and next we shall discuss their non-linear hypothesis in somewhat more 
detail. The linear hypothesis has been initially formulated by K. Brun-
ner(53) and has been subsequently summarised and empirically tested by 
Brunner and Meltzer~54) 
The hypothesis is derived by the combination of two distinct mechanisms; 
the first specifies the banking system's adjustment to surplus reserves -
- the latter defined as the difference between commercial banks' actual 
and desired reserves - and it represents a careful elaboration of the 
"old view" mechanism of multiple expansion of bank credit and deposits 
(52) . . Teigen's tests were made for the perlod 1946-1959 uSlng quarterly 
data; below we report two typical results for the money stock, obtained 
by combining the money supply function with a linear and a logarithmic 
demand for money function respectively: 
(a) (M/M*) = 0.8522 + 0.0751 (i-id ) + 0.0328 S4+ 0.1254)S5; R
2
=0.726 DW =1.536 
(0.0068) (0.0159) (0.0095) (0.0175 
(b) (M/M*) = 0.8528 + 0.0719 (i-id ) + 0.0334 S + 0.1267 55; R
2
=0.716 DW =1.510 
(0.0071) (0.0167) (0.0098) 4 (0.0180) 
S4' S5' represent dummy variables included to take into account 
structural shifts in the money supply equation. 
(53)K. Brunner: "A schema for the supply theory of money" International 
Economic Review January 1961. 
(54)K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer: "Some further investigations of Demand 
and Supply functions for Money" Journal of Finance 1964 
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. (55) 
orlginated by the work of Phillips and Rogers and described in the 
previous section. According to the above mechanism the change in the money 
stock which results from a given amount of surplus reserves is given by 
the following formula: 
(3.2.9) dM = m.S where m: the money multiplier and S: surplus reserves. 
The second mechanism specifies the processes generating or absorb-
lng surplus reserves which are independent of the mechanism of mUltiple 
expansion of credit and deposits. For the banking system as a whole Brun-
ner and Meltzer specify the generation or absorbtion of surplus reserves 
by the following equation: 
where dH denotes changes in the monetary base, dL denotes reserves li-
berated or absorbed because of changes in reserve requirements for demand 
d 
and time deposits and dco ' dto ' dvo represent changes, in the public's 
holdings of currency and time deposits and in the banks' desired holdings 
of reserves in excess of reserve requirements, which occur independently 
of changes in the public's monetary wealth and the banks' deposit liabi-
l Ot' (56) 1 leSo 
Clearly a rise in the monetary base and a rise lD bank reserves 
resulting from a lowering of legal reserve requirements generate surplus 
reserves for the banking system; moreover a rise in (to) represents a 
reallocation of the existing monetary wealth in favour of time deposits 
(~5)See. section 2 p. 27 footnote (23). 
(56)Brunner and Meltzer specify the following demand functions for cur-
rency time deposits and banks' desired excess reserves 
(1) C - c
o
(x1 ) + cW -p 
(2) T = t
o
(x2 ) + tW 
d d 
+ d1D + d2T (3) - Vo (x3 ) v -
where W: monetary wealth (money plus time deposits) D: demand deposits 
and T: time deposits. Changes in Cp ' T, and v
d resulting ,from changes 
in monetary wealth are essential ingredients of the multiplier rnecha-
mechanism and thus the coefficients c, t d1 , d2 are essential determin-
ants of the value of the money mUltiplier (m). On the other hand changes 
in the components co' to' vg which are independnet of monetary wealth 
and respond to changes in other argume~ts, represented respectively by 
the vectors Xl, x2, x3, generate or absorb surplus reserves independently 
of the multiplier mechanism. 
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and against demand deposits and since the ~atter are subject to higher 
reserve requirements, the rise in (to) generates surplus reserves. On 
the other hand a rlse in (co) represents a reallocation of monetary 
wealth in favour of cash and against bank deposits while a rise in 
(vg) represents a rise in commercial bank holdings of desired excess re-
serves, occuring independently of changes in deposit liabilities; it 
is therefore clear that rises in (co) and (vg) absorb surplus reserves. 
Combining equations (3.2.9), (3.2.1J) we get the following 
equation for the money stock: 
(3.2.11) 
In their empirical investigations Brunner and Meltzer use both an inc-
lusive (including time deposits) and an exclusive money concept. Equation 
(3.2.11) applies as it stands for the inclusive.concept (M2 ) and thus 
we can write: 
(3.2 .. 12) 
The formula for the exclusive concept (M1 ) requlres two adjustments; 
first it is clear that the appropriate money multiplier (m1 ) is smaller 
than (m ) since time deposits generated by the multiplier process are 2 
excluded from the money stock; second (dt
o
)' which represents a rise in 
time deposits at the expense of demand deposits, occuring independently 
of changes in monetary wealth, should be substracted from (M1 ) created by 
the multiplier process. Thus the equation for (M1 ) can be written as follows: 
(3.2.13) 
Integrating equations (3. 2. 12.), (3. 2. 13.) we obtain: 
(3.2.12') 
(3.2.13') 
(S7)rn ,n are the integration constants. 
o 0 
d 
- m v 1 0 
(57) 
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The above equations are supplemented by a behavioural relation postulating 
that v~ (i.e. the part of banks' desired reserves which is independent of 
deposit liabilities) is a decreasing function of the market short-term 
d 
rate of interest; i.e. (3.2.14) Vo = eo - eli (where 1: market rate 
of interest); Substituting (3.2.14) into (3.2.12') and (3.2.13') 
we get: 
(3.2.15) 
(3.2.16) 
Equations (3.2.15), (3.2.16) have been tested tor the period 1930-
1959 (annual data) by Brunner and Meltzer who used both the ordinary and 
the two stages least squares methods, the -latter using different linear versions 
of a demand for money function. The results obtained from the tests re-
veal that the money multipliers (m1 ), (m2 ) are highly significant and 
that the rate of interest (i) enters significantly and with the right 
slgn 1n equations (3.2.15), (3.2.16). 
Moreover Brunner and Meltzer tested a different version of their li-
near hypothesis, obtained by splitting the monetary base (H) into its exO-
genous part (H ) referred to as the "adjusted base" and commercial banks' 
a 
borrowing from the Fed (B), and by making this latter component dependent 
positively upon the short-term market rate of interest (i) and negatively 
upon the discount rate (id ). 
The above hypothesis can be expressed 1n algebraic terms as follows: 
(3.2.17) 
(3.2.18) 
H = H + B 
a 
Combining (3. 2. 17.), (3. 2. 18.) with (3. 2. 15.) (3. 2. 16.) we get: 
(3.2.19). 
(3.2.20 
M2 - (m
o 
+ eo + m2bo ) + m2 (Ha+L) - rn2a 1c o + m2a 2t o + 
+m2 (e1+b1 )i - m2b2i d 
M1 - (m
o 
+ eo + m1bo ) + m1(Ha +L) - m1a1co - {1-m1a 2} to + 
+ m1(e1+b1 )i - m1b2i d 
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Equations (3.2.19), (3.2.20) were estimated for the period 1930-
1959 (annual data) by both the Ordinary Least Squares and the Two Stages 
Least Squares techniques, but the results obtained regarding the signi-
ficance of the short-term rate of interest and the discount rate were 
rather unsatisfactory: in all estimated regressions the coefficient of 
the discount rate was statistically insignificant while the coefficient 
for the short-term market rate was significant only in the regression 
for the inclusive money concept, estimated by the two stages least 
squares technique. When however, the above equations were estimated ln 
first difference form using annual first differences of quarterly data 
for the periods 19491 - 1958IV and 19491 - 1962IV the coefficients of 
both the short-term rate of interest and the discount rate, became clear-
I . . f· d h·· f d· h .. . ( 58 ) Y slgnl lcant an t elr slgns con orme Wlt a prlorl expectatlons . 
. (59) Brunner and Meltzer's non-linear money supply hypothesls expressed 
the money stock as the product of the adjusted monetary base times the 
money multiplier which depends upon certain allocation ratios of com-
mercial banks and non-bank public; some of those ratios are in turn made 
dependent upon market interest rates and the discount rate. 
The following relations constitute the basic theory: 
(3.2.21) 
(3.2.22) 
(3.2.23) 
(3.2.24) 
(3.2.25)" 
H = H + B a 
where H: the monetary base, H; the adjusted 
a 
base, B: commercial bank borrowing from the FED 
H - C + R + R 
r e 
where C: cash held by the public and R , 
r 
R - r(D+T) 
-r 
R - e. (D+T) -e 
R : commercial banks' required reserves and 
e 
desired excess reserves. 
where D: demand deposits, T: time deposits, 
r: the required reserves - total deposits ratio. 
where e: the desired excess reserves - depo-
sits ratio. 
C = k.D where k: the non-bank public's desired cash-de-
posit ratio. 
(58)The statistical results for the linear money supply hypothesis appear 
in Brunner and Meltzer Ope cit. tables 3b(p.265), 4b(p.267) and 5a,5b(p.271) 
(59)See Brunner and Meltzer op.cit.; see also Brunner and Meltzer: "Liquidity 
traps for Money Bank Credit and interest rates" Appendix II JPE 1968. 
(3.2.26) B = b(D+T) 
(3.2.27) T = t.D 
(3.2.28) M1 - C+D -
(3.2.28' ) M2 - C+D+T -
- 50 -
where b: commercial banks' desired borrowing 
ratio. 
where t: the public's desired Time deposit-demand 
deposit ratio. 
definition of the exclusive concept of the mo-
ney stock. 
definition of the inclusive concept of the 
money stock . 
Combining equations (3.2.21), (3.2.22) we get: 
(3.2.29) H = C+R +R -B 
are 
Substituting equations 
solving for ro) we get: 
(3.2.23) - (3.2.27) 
(3.2.30) D - 1 
(r+e-b)(1+t)+k 
H 
a 
into (3.2.29) and 
Combining now equations (3.2.30), (3.2.23), (3.2.28) and (3.2.30) 
(3.2.25), (3.2.27), (3.2.28') , we get the following expressions for 
the exclusive and inclusive money concepts respectively: 
(3.2.31) 1 + k 
(r+e-b)( 1+t )+k 
(3.2.32) 1 + k + t 
(r+e-b)( 1 +t )+k 
H 
a 
H 
a 
In the above expressions the difference (e-b) represents commercial banks' 
desired free reserve ratio (f); thus the multipliers for M1 and r12 can be 
written as follows: 
(3.2.33) 1 + k (3. 2. 34.) 1 + k + t 
(r+f)( 1+t )+k (r+f)(l+t )+k 
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• 
As formulae (3.2.33), (3.2.34) show 1 the multipliers for the exclu-
sive money concepts (ml ) and (m2 ) depend upon the non-bank public's cash-
demand deposit and time deposit-demand deposit ratios as well as upon 
commercial banks' required and free reserve ratios (I' and f respectively). 
Before presenting the response patterns of the money multipliers to 
changes in each of the above ratios, we should make explicit the nature 
of the required reserves - total deposits ratio as a weighted average 
of the legal reserve requirements on demand and time deposits. Let I'd 
and rt denote the legal reserve requirements on demand and time deposits 
respectively; the total amount of commercial banks' required reserves is given 
by the following identity: 
R I' 
d t 
= I' D + I' .T 
Dividing both sides of the above identity by (D+T) and making some simple 
algebraic manipulations we obtain the following e~ression: 
d 1 
r = I' --- t + I' ---t which can be written as follows: 
l+t l+t 
(3.2.35) where 6=1/(1+t) 
In table 1 below we present the partial derivatives of the money multi-
pliers rnI , m with respect to each of the ratios determining their magnitude; 2 . 
TAB LEI 
d t f t k r r 
t l-(r+f) (l+t) -(l+k) -(l+k)t -(l+k)(l+t) 
<0, - ( 1 + k )( I' +f) <0, <0, ,-ml 82 82 82 82 82 
d t t 
I -(l+k+t) <0, -(l+k+t)t <0, - (1 + k+t )( 1 +t ) <0, (I' -I' )+k{l-(r +f)} , m2 8 2 82 82 82 
-( l+t){ l-(r+f)} 
82 8= (r+f)( 1 +t )+k 
amI amI 3m2 am2 I <0 Remark: Since f = e-b we have that - <0, a-e-ae -at af I 
amI 
.,. 
amI am2 am2 
-
- --
>0 -- - - -- >0 -- - -
ab af ab af 
- 52 -
As it can be seen from Table 1 the partial derivatives of m and m 1 2 
with respect to the rd, rt and f ratios have unambiguously negative signs. 
A sufficient though not a 
is that the legal reserve 
than reserve requirements 
necessary condition for 3m2/3t to be positive 
requirements on demand deposits (rd ) be no less 
on time deposits (rt ). Since in most economies' 
such a condition 1S imposed by the monetary authorities we take the deri-
vative 3m2/3t to be positive. 
The formula for the partial response of (m1 ) to changes in (t) re-
veals that when the free reserve ratio, (f), is positive, am1/3t is unambi-
guously negative; when however, free reserves are negative the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a negative response of m1 to changes in (t) 
is that the legal reserve requirements on'time deposits must be larger 
than the absolute value of the free reserve ratio. This condition is also 
sufficient, though not necessary for the stability of the process of multiple 
expansion of credit and deposits by commercial banks. Whether or not this 
condition 1S met is a pragmatic question depending upon the institutional 
characteristics of different financial systems as well as upon the monetary 
h .., . ( 60 ) F th US .' th t t f h' h B aut or1t1es act10ns . or e economY,ln e con ex 0 W lC runner 
and Meltzer undertook most of their research on the money supply~this condi-
tion is met and therefore we have that: 
(3.2.36.) 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the partial derivative of m2 
with respect to the k-ratio to be negative is that the total reserve ratio, 
(r+f), be less than unity. Under a fractional banking system this condition 
is'always met and therefore 3m2/3k is negative. Finally, the partial deri-
vative am
1
/3k is negative provided that (r+f)(l+t) is less than unity. Since 
. . . 11 dId . (61) this condition is almost certainly met ln flnancla y eve ope economles , 
the partial derivative is negative. 
(60)Clearly the authorities can always impose the condition rt> - f upon 
the system by raising sufficiently the discount rate or/and by impo-
sing restrictions upon commercial banks' borrowing. 
(61)Assuming a value of (r+f) of 0.15 a negative am1/ak requires that 
the t-ratio is less than 5.6. In financially developed economies such 
a condition is almost certainly met. 
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(3.2.37) 
Two out of the four ratios which determine the values of the multi-
pliers, m1 and m2 are made dependent upon interest rates. In particular, 
Brunner and Meltzer postulate the follo~ing functional dependences for 
the excess reserves and borrowing ratios: 
(3.2.38) ae/ai < 0 
(3.2.39) ab/ai > 0 
where i: the short-term market rate of interest, id: the discount rate. 
From (3.2.38), (3.2.39) and from the definition of free reserves it 
follows that: 
(3.2.40) af/ai < 0 af/aid > 0 
Moreover Brunner and Meltzer postulate that the non-bank public's de-
sired time deposit-demand deposit ratio depends positively upon the 
time deposit rate (it) and negatively upon the market rate of interest 
(i)(62): 
(3.2.41) t = t(it , i); at/ait > 0 at/ai < 0 
Assuming that the time deposit rate set by commercial banks depends 
positively upon the market rate of interest, the total response of the 
t-ratio to changes in the market rate (i) is given by the following 
expression: 
dt at at 
(3.2.42) - ~-- +--
ai ai 
From the above relation it is easily seen that dt di lS positive or 
negative depending on whether the first term in the RHS of (3.2.42) 
dominates the second or vice versa. Brunner and ~eltzer take the total 
dt derivative di to be positive by assuming that the partial response of -(t) 
to changes in the time deposit rate is lar.ger in absolute magnitude than thecor 
(62)The postulated negative dependence of the t-ratio on the market 
rate of interest reflects the assumption of closer substitutability 
between time deposits and interest bearing securities than between 
demand deposits and securities. 
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responding partial response to changes in the market rate of interest. 
Given the specification of the response patterns of ml and m2 to 
changes in the (f) and (t) ratios, as well as the qualitative speci-
fication of the latter ratios' responses to changes in interest rates, 
the response patterns of the money multipliers m1 , m2 to changes ln 
the short-term market rate. of interest (i) and the discount rate (id ) 
b . d . d(53) T bl 2 b can e easlly erlve . a e elow presents the expressions 
glvlng the partial derivatives of ml and m2 with respect to (i) and 
(id ) . 
TAB L E 2 
af ami dt af 
------ + ------ < 0 
af ai at di af 
af am2 dt af 
--- --- + --- --- > 0 ------< 0 
af ai at di af 
As the above table shows the partial derivatives ami/aid' am2/ai, 
am2/aid have unambiguous signs; on the other hand, in the expresslon 
for ami/ai, the first term is positive while the second is negative and 
therefore the sign of aml/ai is ambiguous. 
Given the dependence of the money multipliers m1 , m2 upon rates of 
interest, the supply functions for Ml and M2 can be written as follows: 
(53) 
ami am2 ami am2 af 
We remind that < O· > O· < O· , , , , 
~f df ~t ~t 'di 
af at 
, > 0 
aid ai 
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(3.2.43) N1 - m1(rd , rt, k, 1, i d ) Ha; where cH11/drd , aM1/art ,ar11/ak <0 -
dM1/di > 0, a:·:1/aid < 0, aMI/aHa > 0 < 
(3.2.44) M2 - m2(rd , rt, k, 1, i d ) Ha; where aM2/drd , aM 2/art ,aM2 /ak <0 -
aM2/ai > 0, df·: 2/aid < 0, aM2/aHa > 0 
The monetary authorities' policy instruments are the legal reserve 
requirements on demand and time deposits (rd , rt), the adjusted base (Ha) 
and the discount rate (id ). Changes in each of the above instruments 
affect the money supply both directly and indirectly via changes in 
th k f . (64) 0 h h d . e mar et rate 0 1nterest . n t e ot er han the 1nfluence on the 
money supply of changes in the economy occuring independently of the 
monetary authorities' actions, such as changes in the public's prefer-
ences between money and other assets or autonomous changes in total 
spending, is exerted via the market rate of interest. 
Up to this point, we have examined the theoretical derivation of 
the non-linear money supply hypothesis; next we turn to examine how 
Brunner and Meltzer proceed to test their hypothesis. 
Consider the formulae (3.2.31), (3.2.32) for M1 and M2 (p. 50) 
Logarithmic differentiation of either of these formulae leads to the 
following express1on: 
dM· dHa + Eli 
drd 
+E2i 
drt 
+E3i 
dk 
+E4i 
de 1 (3.2.45) = + 
M· Ha rd rt k e 1 
+E5i 
db 
+ E6i 
dt 
. 1 - 1, 2 , -
b t 
.. 
coefficients EJ1 (j - 1, 6; . = 1, In the above expression the - ... , 1 2) 
(64) Take for example a rise in the monetary base (Ha); the resulting 
total changes 1n equilibrium stock of money (say M1 ) is given by: 
di 
---= + --- ---; 1n this express10n, the first term 
aHa aHa ai dHa 
of the RHS represents the direct influence of (Ha) while the second 
represents the influence working via the rate of interest. 
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are the elasticities of the appropriate multiplier (m.) with respect 
1 
to the parameter associated with Eji. It is clear from the table 1 
(p. 51) as well as from relations (3.2.36), (3.2.37) that the elasti-
.. 
cities EJl have the following signs: 
.. 
EJl < 0 (j = 1, ... ,4 i = 1, 2) 
The above elasticities are rational functions of the ratios rd, rt, k, e, 
b, t, but they are treated as constants by Brunner and Meltzer on the 
grounds that empirical investigation revealed that their coefficient 
of variation is radically smaller than the coefficient ofvariation of 
the associated parameter. 
Given the assumption of constant elasticities, integration of 
(3.2.45) results in the following expression: 
(3.2.46) 
The first three terms ln the RHS of (3.2.46) reflect the monetary au-
thorities' policy actions and the fourth term reflects the non-bank 
public's cu'~rency patterns which in the context of the non-linear hypo-
thesis are treated as exogenous. For the purposes of their empirical 
investigations Brunner and Meltzer treat the sum of the first four terms 
of the RHs of (3.2.46) as single exogenous variable: 
(3.2.47) i = 1, 2. 
On the other hand lne, lnb, lnt are, as we have already seen, de-
pendent upon interest rates; adopting a log-linear specification for 
"the functional dependence of e, b, t upon interest rates and taking ln 
to account the qualitative results of Table 2 (p.54 ) we can write: 
(3.2.48) 
where a 1 > 0 
< 
1 = 1, 2. 
2 
a > 0; 
Combining equations (3.2.46), (3.2.47), (3.2.48) and writing down ex-
plicitly the resulting equations for M1 and M2 we get: 
(3.2.49) 
(3.2.50) 
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Equations (3.2.49), (3.2.50) have been tested by Brunner and Meltzer 
for the period 1929-1959 (annual data) using both the Ordinary and the 
Two Stages Least Squares methods. The 25L5 results were in general 
successful: the coefficients of K1 , K2 were highly significant and very 
close to unity; the coefficients (al) (a2) were both positive and sig-
nificant; finally the coefficients (b1 ), (b2 ) were both negative, in 
accordance with a prlorl expectations, :::;ut only b1 was significantly 
different from zero. 
After we have examined Brunner and Meltzer's linear and non-linear 
hypothesis, we finally turn to summarise another money supply model form-
ulated by Modigliani Rascheand Cooper. (65) (66) M-R-C assume that the 
currency component of the money supply is demand determined and their 
efforts are concentrated in deriving a-supply function of the banking 
system's demand deposits. Their hypothesis is based on a free reserve 
equation rigorously derived from the individual bank profit maximizing 
behaviour and it is supplemented by an identity connecting free reserves 
with demand deposits. 
Let us start our examination of M-R-C model by writing down a simpli-
fied balance-sheet of a "representative" bank 
(3.2.51) RR + S + CL + I - D + T + B* + CA 
where RR: required reserves, S: surplus reserves (idle reserves plus 
loans to the Federal Funds market), CL: commercial loans, I: investments 
in securities, D: demand deposits, T: time deposits, B*: bank borrowings 
(both from the Fed and from the Federal funds market) CA: bank capital. 
Let us also write down the following definitions: 
(3.2.51a) RU = RR + S - B1: 
(3.2.51b) RR = 6D + TT 
(3.2.51c) FR - S - B~': 
where RU: unborrowed reserves. 
where 6,T, legal reserve requirements on 
demand and time deposits respectively. 
where FR: free reserves. 
(65 ~odigliani ,Rasch~, Cooper: "Central Bank policy, the ~1oney supply 
and the short-term rate of interest" Journal of Noney Credit and 
Banking May 1970 
(66)From now on ModiglianiRascreand Cooper will be referred to as 
t·l- R-C. 
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From the bank's balance-sheet and definitions (3.2.5la) - (3.2.5lc) 
the following identities can be derived which will be useful in the 
subsequent analysis. 
(3.2.52) 
(3.2.53) 
(3.2.54) 
(3.2.55) 
FR = D(l-a) + T(l-T) - CL - I + CA {Derived by combining 
(3.2.51) with (3.2.51b), 
(3.2.5lc)} 
~D = ~RU + ~CL + ~I-~T-~CA {Derived by substituting (3.2.5la) 
into (3.2.51), solving for D, and 
taking first differences} 
~FR - ~RU - a~D - T~T {Derived by substituting (3.2.5lb), 
(3.2.5lc) in (3.2.5la) solving for 
FR and taking first differences} 
D = 
RU - T - FR 
a 
{Derived by substituting (3.2.5lb)(3.2.51c) 
into (3.2.51a) and solving for D} 
For the purposes of their model M-R-C assume that time deposits is an 
exogenous variable; moreover, given that their model is intended to be 
a short-run one, they make the plausible assumption that in the short-
run commerial loans are demand determined, variations in them being 
caused at the initiative of the bank's customers. In this case, the 
only choice variable of the bank in the short-run is the variable (I) 
representing the bank's investments In securities; as it can be clearly 
seen from identity (3.2.52) any choice of I implies a corresponding 
choice of FR and vice-versa; therefore an optimal choice of I implies 
that the resulting level of free reserves will also be optimal and vice-
versa. 
In the beginning of any decision period the bank lS assumed to form 
anticipations about the values of D, T, CL which will prevail over the 
corning decision period but these anticipations are subject to error. This 
. , 
notion can be formalized by regarding demand deposits, time deposits and 
commerical loans as random variables (D, r, CL) subject to a known (sub-
- - -jective) probability distribution. Let D, T, CL denote the means of the 
three random variables and define: 
- -(3.2.56) _ CL CL 
By means of (3.2.52), (3.2.56) we can write: 
- - -FR = FR + x 
where (3.2.57) FR - D(l-a) + T(l-T) CL - I + CA 
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and (3.2.58) X = xD(1-6) + xT(l-T) - xCL 
The assumed probability distributions for D, T, CL imply a probability 
distribution ~(x) for the random variable x where the corresponding cu-
mulative distribution is denoted by ~(x). Now the problem faced by 
the individual bank is to choose (I) optimally so that to· maximize its 
expected profits, where expected profits are given by the following 
expression: 
(3.2.59) P - K + CL + iI + rf-FR (rR + ~)d ~(x) ~oo (rR -)d ~( ) 
- r CL -00 + rSJ~rR +x ~ 
In the above expression P denotes expected profits, K denotes those 
components of profits which are independent of the bank's portfolio com-
position such as operating costs, interest on time deposits etc; rCL' i, 
r, rs denote respectively the commercial loan rate, the yield on secu-
rities the rate on borrowed funds and the yield earned on surplus re-
(67) 
serves; clearly from the individual bank's point of view all the 
above rates are given parameters. The first integral ln (3.2.59) is the 
expected cost of borrowing if the realisation of the random variable -x 
is sufficiently small to make borrowing necessary while the second In-
tegral is the expected return on surplus reserves if positive free re-
serves should arise. Adding and substracting: 
-
rsf=::R (F-R + x)D ~ (x) 
in the RHS of equation (3.2.59) we obtain: 
-
(3.2.60) - - -FR - -P - K + rCL CL + iI + rsFR + (r-rs)!_oo (FR + x)d ~(x) 
The first order condition for profit miximization is obtained by setting 
the derivative dP/dI equal to zero. Totally differentiating (3.2.60) with 
respect to I and taking into account that dFR/dI = -1 {see equation (3. 
2.57)} we obtain the following expression: (i-rs)-(r-rs ) ~(-FR). 
Setting the above expression equal to zero and rearranging terms we 
get the folloHing profit maximizing condition: 
(67)We note that rs is not necessarily zero since surplus reserves include 
loans in the Federal funds market. 
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-(3,2.61) <ll(-FR j ) ~ (i-rs)/(r-rs ) 
Given the values of i, r s ' r and the fu~ctional form of the cumulative 
distribution <ll(x) the value of F-R h' h t' f' th b j W 12 sa 1S les e a ove condition 
represents the optimal amount of free reserves for the jth individual 
bank. The dependence of the optimal fre~ reserves FRj upon the expression 
(i-rs)/(r-rs ) is easily explained with the help of figure 1 below; 
1 
-----------------------------
-------------------------
<ll(-FR) 
B ~--------------~ 
o -FR 
- 0 + 
FIG U R E 1 
the distance OA represents a given value of the expresslon (l-rs )/(r-rs ); 
as figure 1 shows, at this value, equation (3.2.61) is satisfied when 
free reserves have a(negative) value of FRo. Now if the value of (i-rs )/ 
-/(r-rs ) rises to OB, the value of FR which satisfies (3.2.61) is FR1. 
Thus figure 1 clearly shows that as the value of (i-rs)/(r-rs ) rises 
the optimal level of free reserves falls. Aggregating (3.2.61) over 
all banks we obtain the following relation: 
(3.2.62) 
i-rs 
FR = FR(---) 
r-r s 
FR' < 0 
For equation (3.2.62) to be used as a building block in an empirically 
testable money supply hypothesis, there is need to establish apropriate 
empirical counterparts for the rates (i),(rs ), (r) that appear as argu-
ments in (3.2.62). The choice of an empirical counterpart for (i) is 
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straight forward: Slnce the decision period referring to the choice 
of commercial banks' optimal portfolio of securities is presumably 
short, (i) should be identified with a short term rate of interest 
such as the three months Treasury bill rate. 
The choice of empirical counterparts for (r) and (rs ) 1S more 
problematic; M-R-C argue that identification of commercial banks' 
borrowing rate (r) with the discount rate (d) is unsatisfactory since 
(d) is a- downwards biased measure of the true cost of borrowing at 
the discount window and the more so the larger is commercial bank 
borrowing. This hypothesis - the authors argue - is supported by the 
empirical evidence which shows that as borrowing grows, the rate of 
the Federal Funds market tends to be bid up to a growing premium over 
the discount rate (d). On these grounds, M-R-C consider the rate of 
interest prevailing in the Federal Funds market as more appropriate 
empirical counterpart for (r) than the discount rate, Moreover in an 
appendix to their paper M-R-C show by an explicit analysis of demand 
and supply in the Federal Funds market, that the equilibrium conditions 
in that market imply the following relation between (r) {identified 
with the Federal Funds rate}, (d) and the level of free reserves (FR): 
(3.2.63) r = R(d, FR) RFR < a 
Regarding the empirical identification of the yield earned on surplus 
reserves (rs ) the authors point out that it cannot be identified with 
zero since surplus reserve include not only idle reserves but also loans 
in the Federal Funds market, in which case, it would appear that (rs ) 
should be related to the Federal Funds rate (r). M-R-C argue that the 
-differential (r-rs) should tend to remain relatively constant, mainly 
reflecting transaction costs associated with the Federal funds market. 
Given the above presumption and taking into account that the expression 
can be written as 1 + (i-r)/(r-rs ), equation (3.2.62) 
can be approximated as follows: 
-(3.2.64) FR - F(i-r) F' < a 
Given the optimal amount of free reserves, the banking system's 
-
optimal amount of investments (1) is determined by substituting FR 
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for FR 1n equation (3.2.57) and solving for I: 
(3.2.65) I - D (1-0) + T (l-T) - CL + CA - ?R 
In equation (3.2.65) the determina~ion of the optimal amount of 
investments in securities (I) 1S based on anticipations of the values 
of D, T, CL that will prevail 1n any given decision period, formed at 
the begining of the period. A more general formulation however would 
take into account that, most probably, commercial banks are willing and 
able to partly adjust their portfolios to anticipation errors which e-
merge during the decision period itself and at the same time to allow 
their actual free reserves to adjust gradually to their optimal level. 
To take into account the above possibilities equation(3.2.65) is written: 
(3.2.66) -CL -
-{nFF~ + (1-nF)FR_1} + CA 
where roD' mT' mCL are the speeds of adjustment to anticipation errors 
referring to demand deposits, time deposits and commercial loans re-
spectively. Moreover since D, T, CL represent expected values they 
should be forecasted in terms of observable magnitutes. The forecasting 
hypothesis used by M-R-C is as follows: 
(3.2.67) where Z = D, T, CL o < mZ < 1 
. if m' = 0 Z the above expression reduces to the static expectation hypo-
thesis: Z = Z_l; if on the other hand mZ = 1 (3.2.67) reduces to 
Z = Z which of course means that commercial banks are perfectly successful 
in forecasting the value of Z. 
Substituting (3.2.67) into (3.2.66) and ~a~lng use of identity 
(3.2;52) (p. 58) we obtain: 
-(3.2.68) 61 = TID(l-o) 6D + DT(l-T) 6T - DCL~CL - nr(FR - FR_ 1 ) + 6CA 
where DZ = 1 - (l-mZ)(l-rnZ) Z = D, T, CL 
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The coefficients nZ have an upper limit of unity occuring when com-
mercial banks fully predict the future levels of D, T, CL, (mZ - 1) 
or if they adjust perfectly to the prediction error (mZ = 1) and a 
lower limit of zero occuring when banks are totally unsuccesssful 
both to predict the values of D, T) CL (mZ = 0) and to adjust to the 
anticipation error (mZ = 0). 
Combining (3.2.68) with identity (3.2.53) (p. 58 ) and solving for 
6D we obtain the following equation: 
(3.2.69) 6D - I 
Substituting (3.2.69) into identity (3.2.54) and solving for FR we obtain: 
(3.2.70) FR - ~iR + I(I-~)FR_I + --~-- {(I-nD) 1~6 ~RU - (l-nCL)~CL + 
nF 
+ n~ ~T}j 
where ~- . , 
Let us rewrite equations (3.2.63), (3.2.64) for convenience: 
(3.2.63) r = R(d,FR) 
(3.2.64) FR = F(i-r) F' < 0 
Equations (3.2.63), (3.2.64) along with (3.2.70) form a system of 
three equations in three endogenous variables (rR, FR, r); substituting 
(3.2.64) into (3.2.70), combining the resulting expression with (3.2.63) 
and ~olving for FR we get a reduced form solution for free reserves the 
linear approximation of which is as follows: 
(3.2.71) 
where 
o < 6 < 1 
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The supply of demand deposits can ~e thought of as generated by 
the free reserve equation (3.2.71) plus the identity (3.2.55) which 
we rewrite for convenience: 
(3.2.55) D - RU - TT - FR 
6 
Given that RU and T are taken to be exogenous variables and that T and 
6 are known parameters, the successful estimation of (D) rests heavily 
upon the successful estimation of the free reserves equation. 
A generalized version of the free reserves equation (3.2.71), which 
takes into account that the time unit with respect to which the relevant 
variables are defined may include several decision periods, has been 
estimated by M-R-C for the period 1955-1966 using quarterly data. The 
statistical results were highly successful: the coefficient of determi-
nation was about 0.95 and the coefficien~of ~RU, ~CL, were highly signi-
ficant and had the right signs. Moreover despite the col linearity between 
(i) and (d) the coefficients of both the Treasury bill rate and the dis-
count rate were significant and had the right signs. It is clear from 
identity (3.2.55) that the statistically significant negative and posi-
tive dependence of free reserves upon (i) and (d), found by M-R-C, 
imply that demand deposits depend positively upon the short-term rate 
of interest and negatively upon the discount rate. 
The general conclusion which emerges from the above selective survey 
of the empirical research on the money supply is that the nominal stock 
of money significantly depends upon the market rate of interest and the 
discount rate. Clearly this conclusion is very important for the "new 
view" on the theory of the money stock determination for it confirms its 
main assertion that the quantity of money 1S not a completely supply 
determined exogenous varriable but instead it 1S an endogenous variable 
of the system determined jointly by the portfolio preferences of com-
mercial banks and the non-bank public. 
3. 3.: A formal evaluation of the "old" and the "new views" on the 
money stock dertmination. 
After we have examined the logic and implications of the "old 
view" and the "new view" approaches to the money supply, we attempt in 
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this subsection a somewhat formal evaluation and compar1son of the 
two approaches using as our framework of analysis the standard IS/LM 
macromodel. He first start with a formal comparison of the implicationsof 
the two views which refer to the exogeneity-endogeneity issue of the no-
minal money stock. 
The monetary sector of the IS/LM model consists of a demand for 
money function depending positively on income (Y) and negatively on 
the market rate of interest (i), a supply of money function and a mo-
netary equilibrium condition. As we have already seen, in both the "old 
view" and the "new view" formulations the supply of money can be expressed 
as the product of the monetary base times the money multiplier, the maln 
difference between the two views being that the "old" one takes the mo-
ney multiplier as a given exogenous mc3:gnitude while the "new view" makes 
it positively dependent upon the rate o£ interest. 
Let us write down the equations of the IS/LM model adopting the 
"old view"formulation for the money supply: 
(3.3.1) 
(3.3.2) 
(3.3.3) 
(3.3.4) 
(3.3.5) 
(3.3.6) 
S - S(Y, i); 
I - I(i); 
o < Sy < 1, S. > 0; 
1 
the saving function 
I· < o· 
1 ' 
the investment function 
S - I; the goods market equilibrium condition 
Md = L(Y, i); the demand for money function Ly > 0, Li < 0 
MS - m.H; the supply of money function (m:money multiplier, 
H: cash base) 
the monetary equilibrium condition. 
Substituting (3.3.1), (3.3.2) into (3.3.3) and (3.3.6) into (3.3.4) 
(3.3.5), the system (3.3.1) - (3.3.6) reduces to the following one: 
(3.3.7) S(Y, i) = I(i) 
(3.3.8) M = L(Y, i) 
(3.3.9) M = m.H 
Given that the money base (H) 1S a policy instrument under the control 
of the monetary authorities, the syste~ (3.3.7) - (3.3.9) contains three 
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endogenous variables (Y, i, M) which CG~ be solved 1n terms of the 
exogenous variable (H). It is easily seen however, that the above 
system is segmentable: the equilibrium level of the nominal money 
stock is determined by equation (3.3.9) alone in terms of the exogenous 
monetary base and the given value of t~e money multiplier; the solution 
for (y) and (i) is then determined by inserting the solution for (M) 
in equation (3.3.8) and solving the system of equations (3.3.8) (3.3.7). 
Since the equilibrium stock of money is a supply determined variable 
whose solution value is given by equation (3.3.9) alone, it is clear 
that the quantity of money is exogenous with respect to the system 
consisting of equations (3.3.7) (3.3.8); causality runs unidir~ctionally 
from the money stock to income and the rate of interest. 
Let us now incorporate the "new view" formulation of the money 
supply in IS/LM model, by replacing eq~ation (3.3.9) with equation: 
(3.3.9') M = m(i).H m'(i) > 0 
It is clear that contrary to the system of equations (3.3.7), 
(3.3.8), (3.3.9), the system (3.3.7), (3.3.8), (3.3.9') exhibits full 
simultaneity; equation (3.3.9') can not be segmented from equations 
(3.3.7), (3.3.8). In this case the stock of money 1S a genuine endo-
genous variable of the system influenced by wealth holders' asset 
preferences between money and other assets, autonomous changes in 
total spending as well as by changes in fiscal variables. Assume for 
example an autonomous rise in aggn=gatespending; this rise tends to 
raise income which in turn causes a rise in the demand for money re-
lative to the supply of it; the resulting rise in the rate of interest 
'which takes place in order to equilibrate the money market induces a 
rise in the nominal quantity of money supplied by the banking system. 
By a similar line of reason1ng it can te show~ that a shift in the 
public's preferences in favour of money induces a rise in the money 
stock. The endogeneity of the money stock can be easily demonstrated 
algebraically: let (10 ) and (Lo) denote autonomous spending (including 
government spending) and a "shift factor in the demand for money. 
Adding the terms (1 0 ) and (Lo) to equations (3.3.7) (3.3.8) respectively 
totally differentiating the system (3.3.7), (3.3.8), (3.3.9') and solving 
for (M) we obtain the fOllowing expressions for the total response of 
the nominal quantity of money to changes in autonomous spending and 
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shifts in wealth holders' portfolio preferences between money and 
"bonds": 
(3.3.10) 
dM miLyH 
= > 0 
-dIo miSyH + Ly(Si-:- li ) - SyLI 
dM miSyH 
- > 0 -(3.3.11) 
dLo SymiH + Ly(S·-I.) - SyLi l l 
As formulae (3.3.10), (3.3.11) show, the response of the money stock 
to changes is autonomous spending and wealth holders' asset preferences 
is positive. Moreover it is easily seen that if the money multiplier 
lS taken as an exogenous magnitude ind.ependent of the rate interest 
as the "old view" asserts, the derivative mi would be zero in which, 
case both and would become zero which implies that the 
quantity of money would be independent of changes in autonomous spending 
and wealth holders' asset preferences. 
Irrespectively of whether the "old view" or the "new view" formula-
tion for the money supply is adopted, it should be recognized that both 
the supply and the demand for money specified in the IS/LM model as 
well as In more complex macromodels are in fact "quasi reduced" forms 
derived from a "higher level" structural system in which the behavioural 
patterns of commercial banks and the non-bank public with respect to 
bank reserves, cash and bank deposits are specified. Our next task is 
to demonstrate the above proposition with the help of a simple "higher 
(68) level" model ; the model will also be used to compare formally the 
logical structures of the "old view" and "new view" on the money stock 
determination. 
(58)For an excellent analysis of the money stock supply in the context 
of a structural financial model which explicitly specifies the port-
folio preferences of the private sector as well as the portfolio pre-
ferences and the rate setting functions of the intermediary sector 
see: C. A. Goodhart "~1oney informat ion and uncertainty" (Macmillan 
1975) ch. 5 section B. 
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The model to be used is as follows: 
(3.3.7) SCi, 
Cd 
-
P -
(3.3.12) 
Dd -
-
(3.3.13) 
(3.3.14) 
Y) - I(i); -
Cp(i, Y) ; 
D(i, y) ; 
the goods market equilibrium condition 
Cpi < 0, CpY > 0; 
Di < 0, Dy > 0; 
the non-bank public's 
demand for cash 
the public's demand for 
bank deposits 
commercial bank's demand of reserves. 
(3.3.15) H - Cd + Rd. P , equili~rium condition for total cash outstanding 
(3.3.16) 
(3.3.17) 
(3.3.18) 
C - Cd. equilibrium condition for cash held by the public; -p p' 
{actual cash holdings, Cp ' should be equal to desired holdings 
R = Rd. , equilibrium condition for bank reserves; {actual 
holdings of bank reserves should be equal to reserves desired 
by the banks} 
equilibrium condition for bank deposits. 
The above model consists of eight independent equations in eight 
d . (. d d d S ) en ogenous var1ables 1, Y, Cp ' D , R , D , Cp , R ; the monetary sector 
of the model contains three behavioural equations (3.3.12), (3.3.13), 
(3.3.14) and four equilibrium conditions (3.3.15)-(3.3.18). 
Since the equation for the demand for cash and deposits of the 
above model are both made dependent upon the rat~ of interest and 
aggregate income, the non-bank public's desired cash-deposit ratio will 
·in general be dependent upon income and the rate of interest. In parti-
cular there is a presumption that the ratio in question will depend po-
sitively upon the market rate of interest on the grounds that, probably, 
"bonds" are closer substitute with bank deposits rather than with cash; 
moreover if it is assumed that bank dep8sits are a "luxury good" rela-
tive to cash, the cash-deposit ratio will be negatively dependent upon 
aggregate income. 
Nevertheless, despite the above reasoning most "old view" as well 
as some of the "new view" formulations of the money supply, take the 
cash-deposit ratio as constant, at least in the short-run~ In the context 
Cd} p 
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of the present model the necessary and sufficient condition for such 
constancy is that the interest rate and income elasticities of demand 
must be the same for both cash and deposits. Although there is no parti-
cular reason why the above condition should be satisfied and moreover 
we have already argued that on a priori grounds He expect the ratio of 
cash to deposits to be positively dependent on the rate of interest and 
probably, negatively dependent on aggregate income, let us assume for 
the sake of the argument to follow, that the above necessary and suffi-
cient condition for a constant cash-deposit ratio is satisfied. The 
incorporation of a constant cash-deposit ratio in our model can be 
easily achieved by assuming that the demand for cash and deposits have 
ident icalfunctional forms which differ only by a proportionality factor. 
Thus we can replace equation (3.3.12) of the model which represents the 
demand for cash by the following one: 
(3.3.12a) cg = k.D(i, y) 
The modified system consisting of equations (3.3.7)(3.3.12a) and 
(3.3.13) - (3.3.18) incorporates the "old view" approach to the money 
supply, since the public's desired cash-deposit ratio (denoted by k) 
and commercial banks' desired reserve ratio (denoted by r) are treated 
as constants. We may now ask what modifications are needed to convert 
the above model into a model of the "new view". One obvious modification 
is to replace equation (3.3.14) of the model with equation (3.3.14') 
below which makes the desired reserve-deposit ratio (r) negatively de-
pendent upon the market rate of interest (i): 
(3.3.14') ar/ai < 0 
Another less direct modification made possible under the assumption 
that the rate on bank deposits is free to vary, is to make the cash-de-
posit ratio (k) negatively dependent upon the deposit rate (iD) and 
supplement the model with a commercial banks' deposit rate setting function. 
Formally we can replace equation (3.3.12a) with equation (3.3.12'a): 
(3.3.l2'a) dk/diD < 0 
and add to the model a deposit rate setting function represented by 
equation (3.3.19) below: 
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(3.3.19) 
Either of the above modifications lS in itself sufficient to convert 
the "old view" model into a "new view" one, there being no need for a 
change in the basic structure of the model. In fact the "old view" model 
can be regarded as a special case of a model of the "new view" in which 
the interest elasticities of one or more endogenous variables are set 
equal to zero. Thus, although it lS true that historically, proponents 
of the "old view" concentrated their efforts in the derivation of de-
posit and credit multipliers for both banks and other financial inter-
mediaries and disregarded interest rates whereas proponents of the "new 
view" payed explicit attention to interest rates and portfolio preferences 
of the banks and the public, the two views do not constitute intrinsically 
. . b h (69) lrreconclla Ie approac es . 
In particular the model we are using ln this subsection shows that 
the two Vlews are alike in that they both specify preferences by com-
mercial banks and the non-bank public. Of course, the main difference 
between the two views which differentiates their implications with respect 
to the exogeneity-endogeneity issue of the nominal money stock lies in 
that the new view makes dependent upon interest rates one or more variables 
which the "old view" regards as independent of them. 
Let us now take the model consisting of equations (3.3.7), (3.3.12a), 
(3.3.13), (3.3.14'), (3.3.15) - (3.3.18) and see how it can be reduced 
into the standard IS/LM model which contains a demand for and a supply 
function of money. Substituting (3.3.16) into (3.3.12a), (3.3.15); 
(3,3,17) into (3.3.14'), (3.3.15); and (3.3.18) into (3.3.13), (3.3.14') 
the model can be written as follows: 
(3.3.7) SCi, y) = I(i) 
(3.3.20) Cp = kD(i, y) 
(3.3.21) D = D(i, y) 
(3.3.22) R - r( i). D -
(3.3.23) H = Cp + R 
(69)For an interesting attempt to reconcile the two views see: D.M.Jaffee: 
"The structure of models of financial intermediation" University of 
Essex Dept. of Economics: Discussion paper No.36 October 1970. 
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Adding equations (3.3.20), (3.3.21) of the above system by parts we 
obtain: 
(3.3.24) Cp + D = (1 +k) . D (i, y). 
The LHS of (3.3.24) is by definition the stock of money (M), whereas the 
RHS represents the demand for money which can be written as: 
Md = L(i, y) where L· = (l+k)D. < 0 1 1 Ly = (l+k)Dy > 0 
Thus equation (3.3.24) can be written as follows: 
(3.3.24') M = L(i, y) 
Substituting equation (3.3.21) into equation (3.3.20) we obtain: 
(3.3.25) C = kD P 
Substituting equation (3.3.25), (3.3.22) into (3.3.23) and solving for 
(D) we obtain the following expression for deposits: 
-(3.3.26) D - 1 H 
k + rei) 
Substituting (3.3.26) into (3.3.25) and adding the resulting expression 
for Cp and (3.3.26) by parts we obtain: 
(3.3.27) 1 + k -H 
k + rei) 
The LHS of (3.3.27) 1S the definition of the money stock while the 
RHS is the familiar supply function expressing the nominal stock of 
money as the product of the monetary (H) times the money multiplier 
1 + k {----- }; equation (3.3.27) can therefore be ~~itten as follows: 
k + rei) 
(3.3.27' ) M = m(i).H 
Now the system of equations (3.3.7), (3.3.24'), (3.3.27') obtained from 
the system consisting of equations (3.3.7), (3.3.20)-(3.3.23) by a pro-
- 72 -
per sequence of substitutions, 1S precis~ly the standard IS/LM model. 
We have therefore demonstrated that bott the demand and the supply of 
money functions contained in most macroi..odels are "quasi-reduced" forms 
deri ved from "highel level" models in w:-.ich the portfolio preferences 
of both financial intermediaries and the public are explicitly speci-
f · d(70) I . . 1e. t 1S 1mportant to note that t~e validity of the above pro-
position does not depend upon the speci::ic model we have been using; 
in principle any model could have been used, although for complex mo-
dels the demonstration of the proposition may be tedious. 
In relation to the above analysis it should be stressed that the 
fact that the multiplier formulation of the money supply is a "derived 
formulation" obtained from a "higher level" financial system constitutes 
the major conceptual weakness of the multiplier as an analytical approach 
to the money supply. For, as it is generally true for any reduced form 
solution, the multiplier approach per s e does not reveal the be-
havioural process involved in the adjustment of the money stock; it 
(71) 
only indicates the result of this process. To give an example, 
the proposition that a glven rise 1n tte monetary base brings about 
a rise in the stock of money equal to tte rise in the base times the 
value of the multiplier, does not explain the process through which the rise 
in the stock of money is brought about. To understand how the multi-
plier works we need to specify the structure of the "higher level" 
financial system from which the money multiplier is derived. 
Section 4: The monetary base and the ~ssue of its control 
In the previous sections of this survey we oftenly referred to the 
concept of the monetary base, as a major determinant of the money stock 
and as a magnitude which is under the potential control of the monetary 
authorities. In this section we turn to a closer examination of the 
(70)D.M. Jaffee obtains reduced-form so~utions for bank deposits and 
bank credit from a financial model which specifies the portfolio 
preferences of the private and intermediary sectors; 
see D.M. Jaffee Ope cit. pp.2-6. 
(71)The lack of behavioural content of ~he multiplier is stressed by 
Goodhart in his illuminating critiq~e of the multiplier approach; 
see Goodhart Ope cit. chapter 6 sec~ion C 
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monetary base concept and the problems involved In its control. 
Since, as we have mentioned in section II, the cash base is the 
liability of the Central Bank, the examination of the concept can be 
most fruitfully carried out with the help of a simplified balance-sheet of 
a representative Central Bank. Such a balance sheet is presented below: 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Gold and foreign exchange Re-
serves (R) 
Government securities held by 
B 
Central Bank( CB) 
r 
Advances to the government (Ag) 
Advances to the banking system(Lb) 
Notes In circulation (C) 
Deposits by commercial banks (DCB ) 
Deposits by the government (Dg) 
Writting the above balance sheet In algebraic form we have: 
(4.1) 
In identity (4.1) above C + DCB is by definition the monetary base 
(H) while the algebraic difference between (Ag) and (Dg) represents the 
net advances of the Central bank to the Government sector (from now on 
denoted by Lg). Thus (4.1) can be written as follows: 
(4.2) R + 
Identity (4.2) specifies the sources of the monetary base, showing how 
(72) 
changes in the base are generated. Ceteris paribus increases in the 
stock of foreign exchange reserves due to overall Balance-of-payments 
surpluses raise the cash holdings of the private sector by an equivalent 
amount since the foreign exchange acquired by the private sector from 
(72)For the derivation of the "source base" from the consolidated balance-
sheets of the Fed and the Treasury see: L.C. Andersen J.L. Jordan: 
"The monetary base - Explanation and Analytical fJse". Federal Reserve 
Bank of Saint Louis Review August 1968. 
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abroad is sold to the Central Bank in exhange for domestic currency. 
Also ceteris paribus increases in net advances to the government and 
the banking sector bring about corresponding rises in the cash base on 
a one-to-one basis. Finally changes in the stock of government bonds 
held by the Central Bank brought about bJr open market operations consti-
tute the standard method used by the Central Bank to change the monetary 
base; open market ~urchases increase the stock of government securities 
held by the Central Bank and bring about a corresponding rise in cash 
and vice-versa. 
Besides the above identity which specifies the sources of the base 
another identity exists specifying how a given amount of cash is appor-
tioned between the banking sector and the non-bank pUblic: 
(4.3) 
Identity (4.3) above, describes the "uses side" of the monetary 
base; it shows the way in which total cash is distributed between cash 
held by the non-bank public (Cp ) and bank reserves (Rb ) which consist 
of vault cash and deposits with the Central Bank. As it is well known 
from the mUltiplier approach to the money supply, the significance of 
identity (4.3) lies in that any redistribution of the total amount of 
the base between the banks and the public is accompanied by changes in 
the total amount of bank credit and deposits. 
Besides the basic concept of the base examined above, two other 
related concepts have been developed in the US monetary literature: the 
"extended base" and the "adjusted base". 
The concept of the extended base (Hex) takes into account the fact 
"that changes in legal reserve requirements for bank deposits by the mo-
netary authorities, have effects on bank credit and deposits, similar with 
those brought about by direct changes in the monetary base. A fall in re-
serve requirements for demand and time deposits liberates reserves and 
permits a monetary expansion in much the same way as a rise in the base; 
on the other hand a rise in reserve requirements absorbs bank reserves 
and thus it is equivalent in its effects to a fall in the monetary base. 
(73) A time series for the extended base can be constructed as follows : 
(73)For an explanation on how the extenced base is constructed see 
Andersen and Jordan op.cit. 
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first the amount of reserves liberated or absorbed because of decreases 
or increases in reserve requirements in any given period is calculated 
by the following formula: 
(4.4) 
where LR denote liberated reserves(74), rd are reserve requirements for 
demand deposits and rt are reserve requirements on time deposits. Next 
the cumulative amount of liberated (or absorbed) reserves calculated 
from a given "base period" up to a certain period (t) is added to the 
monetary base of the period in question; thus the extended base for 
period (t) is given by the formula below: 
t (4.5) Hex - Ht +i~OLRi 
As it is clear from identity (4.5) above, changes in the extended 
base can be brought about by direct changes in cash or by changes in 
legal reserve requirements on deposits. Thus the extended base incorpo-
rates two major actions: open market operations and changes in reserve 
requirements. 
However, changes in the monetary base as well as in the extended 
base can also come through changes in the Central Bank advances to the 
banking system (see identity 4.2); since these advances are at least 
partly .determined by commercial banks' demand for borrowing, it follows 
that changes in the base do not come only as a result of monetary au-
thority discretionary actions but also as a result of commercial bank 
"decision referring to desired borrowing through the discount window. 
The concept of the "adjusted base" removes this endogeneity source of 
the monetary base by substracting commercial bank borrowing from the 
total amount of cash outstanding. Thus the definition of the adjusted base 
is as follows: 
(4.6) 
Combining the definition of the adjusted base with identities (4.2), (4.3) 
(74) A negative value for LR denotes absorbed reserves. 
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we obtain identities (4.7) (4.8) showing the sources and the uses side 
of the adjusted base respectively: 
(4.7) R + 
(4.8) 
r 
+ L - H g a 
where UR: unborrowed reserves (Rb - Lb ) 
An identity explicitly linking changes in the adjusted base with the 
government and foreign sector's net positions can be derived with the 
help of identities (4.9), (4.10) below: 
(4.9) ilR = BOP 
(4.10) ilB 
r 
Identity (4.9) says that changes in foreign exchange reserves within any 
given period are equal to the overall balance-of-payments position for 
this period, while identity (4.10) says that the public sector budget 
deficit must be financed either by loans taken from the Central Bank 
or/and by floating bonds in the open market. Combining (4.9) (4.10) 
with (4.7) written in first diffenrence form, we obtain: 
(4.11) ilH = BOP + BD -a + -.,----
r r 
-According to identity (4.11) changes in the monetary base within any 
given period are equal to the overall BOP surplus plus the budget deficit 
run by the government min u s the total issue of bonds by the govern-
ment within the period p Ius open parket purchases of bonds by the 
Central Bank. 
Let us now turn to examine, with the help of identity (4.11), the 
issue of the control of the base faced by the monetary authorities, first 
starting by assuming a closed economy or - what is equivalent for our 
purposes - an economy operating under a "cleanly" floating exchange rate 
system. Under this assumption the balance-of-payments net position is 
• 
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zero and thus (4.11) can be written as follows: 
(4.11') 6H - BD + 
a 
6B 
r r 
It is clear from the above identity that if the monetary authorities 
have a target for the base they must offset through open market operations 
any discrepancy between the chosen target and actual changes in the base 
coming through fiscal imbalances. Suppose for example that the government 
runs a deficit of 100 monetary units per period and that 40 per cent of 
the deficit is financed by issuing bonds while the rest is financed by 
loans from the Central Bank; if the Bank chooses to permit an increase 
in the cash base of 20 monetary units only, it must offset the 60 mo-
netary units rise in the base resulting from the budget deficit which 
is financed by Central Bank loans, by selling bonds in the open market 
equal in value to 40 monetary units. 
The fact that the monetary authorities can undertake open market 
operations to offset changes in cash coming through fiscal imbalances, 
has led many economists to assert that in a closed economy, the base 
is an exogenous variable under the complete control of the monetary au-
thorities. Although this assertion may be true in practice, it should 
be noted that from a theoretical point of view, open market operations 
per s e are not sufficient to ensure a control of the base which 
makes sense, in all conceivable circumstances. 
Assume for example that the monetary authorities choose to keep the 
base constant while at the same time the government runs a deficit. For 
·the monetary target to be achieved, the deficit must be wholly covered 
by bond sales to the private sector; if bond sales take place income and 
tax revenues will be rising, the budget deficit will be getting smaller 
and eventually a long-run equilibrium will be achieved with a balanced 
budget. 
However, government security sales to the private sector are not 
necessarily expansionary; if we accept that a rise in the stock of govern-
ment bonds held by the private sector constitutes a rise in net wealth, 
we have two wealth effects operating in opposite directions: a wealth 
effect operating through the consumption function which is clearly ex-
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pansionary and a wealth effect operatin~ through the demand for money, 
which, given the supply of money, raises the rate of interest and there-
fore is contractionary. Thus whether bo~d sales are on the whole ex-
pansionary or contractionary, depends O~ whether the wealth effect work-
ing via the consumption function is stronger or weaker than the wealth 
effect working via the demand for money~75) 
If the net effect of bond sales to the private sector is contraction-
ary, pure bond financing of the budget deficit leads to cumulative insta-
bility: income falls and therefore the deficit becomes larger requiring 
larger bond sales to finance it, which in turn further depress income. 
Clearly this situation is not sustainable; sooner or later recourse to 
financing of the deficit through money creation will will be made. 
In connection to the above argument, it should be emphasized that, 
ln practice, control of the base can be achieved without any fear of 
cumulative instability since the fiscal authorities can balance the budget 
by manipUlating tax rates. This possibility however does not deprive the 
argument of its theoretical validity for the above argument is intended 
to show that open market operations are not in themselves sufficient to 
ensure control of the monetary base in all conceivable circumstances. 
Let us now take for granted that lD a closed economy the authori-
ties are ln principle able to control t~e cash base of the system if 
they choose to and examine the implications of such policy. 
It is an elementary truth in econonics that in a free market the 
authorities cannot control both quantitJ and price. Taking the example 
of the bond market, which is particular~y relevant for our analysis,if 
the monetary authorities choose to supply a given amount of bonds to the 
'private sector, they have to accept whatever rate of interest clears 
the bond market) while if they choose to peg the rate of interest at 
(75)For a formal derivation of the stacility condi~ions under pure bond 
financing of the deficit see: A. B~inder and R. Solow: "Does fiscal 
policy matter?" Journal of Public ~conomics 1972 .. This paper should 
be supplemented by the paper of Scarth in the 1976 lssue of the same 
journal. . . . . 
For a non-mathematical discussion of the staDlllty condltlon see: 
D. Currie: "Macroeconomic policy ane the government financing re-
quirement: a Survey of Recent developments"; printed in the confer-
ence proceedings of the 1977 AUTE Conference. 
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a glven level they must supply whatever quantity of bonds the private 
sector demands. In a deterministic world where a known and completely 
stable demand for bonds exists, it 1S indifferent whether the authori-
ties control price or quantity, Slnce a given price of bonds corresponds 
to a given quantity demanded and vice-versa. 
In the real world however the demand for bonds is subject to stocha-
stic disturbances; unsystematic fluctuations in income as well as vo-
latile changes in expectations cause unsystematic fluctuations in the 
demand for bonds. In view of those fluctuations the authorities' choice 
to control the cash base, which implies a control of the quantity of 
bonds supplied in the open market, results in fluctuations in the rate 
of interest which may be quite sharp e?pecially in the short-run where 
inertia or transaction costs prevent a .quick response of the market to 
changes 1n interest rates. 
Now since the market for government securities 1S a delicate market 
where expectations about future interest rates play a crucial role and 
Slnce these expectations are affected by past changes in interest rates, 
it follows that frequent and erratic interest rate fluctuations confuse 
market operators by intensi~ingthe uncertainty they face regarding fu-
ture bond prices, and in periods of depressed financial climate, where 
a substantial body of operators is dominated by extrapolative expectations 
they may even cause financial panics. As a result, the confidence of in-
vestors in government securities may be damaged and this may have serious 
implications for the financing of government needs. Thus we may say that 
frequent and sharp interest rate fluctuations are in general regarded as 
"bad" and therefore they may considered to represent the cost of the au-
thorities' choice to control the monetary base. 
The above analysis of the implications of controlling the base for 
the government bonds market holds not only for a closed economy but also 
for an open economy. However, in the case of an open economy operating 
under a fixed exchange rate systeQ, the authorities' ability to control 
the base is more problematic. 
Assuming that the economy runs a balance-of-payments deficit and 
abstracting for the moment from capital movements, private sector's 
wealth decreases every period by an amount equal to current account de-
ficit. In the absence of sterilization, the fall 1n wealth will take the 
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form of a cash drain. The fall in cash resulting from the BOP deficit, ex-
erts an unambiguously contractionary effect on income both because it 
raises the rate of interest and because it exerts a contractionary 
wealth effect on the consumption function; as lncome falls the BOP be-
comes gradually smaller and eventually a stock-flow equilibrium is achi-
eved with a zero BOP deficit. 
If on the other hand the authorities attempt to sterilise the mone-
tary effects of the BOP through open market bond purchases, the fall in 
wealth resulting from the BOP deficit takes the form of a fall in bonds 
held by the private sector and as we have already discussed, changes in 
the stock of bonds held by the private sector have a net expansionary 
or contractionary effect on income depending on whether the wealth effect 
on the consumption function dominates the wealth effect on the demand for 
money. If bond sales have a net expansionary effect on income, the pro-
cess of adjustment is stable: income will be gradually falling and event-
ually BOP equilibrium will be achieved. If however bond issues are con-
tractionary sterilization of the monetary effects of the BOP will lead 
to cumulative instability: as time passes income will be rising and the 
deficit will be getting larger requiring larger bond purchases to keep 
the monetary base constant, which in turn further raise income and ac-
centuate the BOP deficit. 
Clearly in this case the authorities cannot keep sterilizing the 
BOP deficit; sooner or later, they will either let the monetary effects 
of the BOP to operate or they will take other measures to correct the 
deficit. Moreover even if sterilization leads to a stable adjustment 
process, this process will be slower relative to the adjustment process 
taking place when the authorities allow the monetary effects of BOP to 
operate and thus sterilization leads to a larger cummulative fall in the 
stock of reserves. This fact constitutes a serious factor which, most pro-
bably, affects the authorities' attitude towards sterilization policy. 
The ability of the authorities to control the cash base of the 
system becomes more problematic if we take into account capital mobi-
lity. In the absense of sterilization, capital movements smooth out the 
economy's adjustment to a BOP deficit; the rise in the rate of interest 
brought about by the fall in cash resulting from the BOP deficit induces 
capital inflows which mitigate the initial interest rate rise and partly 
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offset the fall in reserves caused by the current account deficit. 
If on the other hand the authorities sterilize the BOP deficit, 
the resulting fall in the rate of interest will cause capital outflows 
which raise the overall deficit and require further open' market 
bond purchases in order to keep the cash base constant. In the case 
where the elasticity of capital mobility with respect to domestic-
foreign interest rate differentials is high the capital outflows re-
SUlting from sterilization will cause a substantial deterioration of the 
balance of payments' capital account and consequently a large reduction 
in the stock of foreign reserves. Apart from this reason which is in it-
self sufficient to constrain the authorities' sterilization operations it 
is recognised that the higher the elasticity of capital movements with 
respect to interest rate differentials .the more difficult the implement-
ation of sterilization policy becomes; in the extreme case of perfect 
capital mobility, sterilization is impossible since the open market bond 
. purchases necessary to offset the monetary effects of capital outflows 
tend to infinity. 
As a conclusion to the above analysis we may say that in an open 
economy operating under a fixed exchange rate system, the balance of pay-
ments puts a constraint to the authorities' ability to control the mo-
netary base. Especially ln the case of high interest elasticity of ca-
pital movements, the authorities' ability to undertake independent Mone-
tary Policy is strictly limited. 
Section 5: Summary and conclusions 
We started this survey with a discussion of the problems surround-
.. 
ing an operational definition of the money stock. We have seen that three 
interesting theoretical criteria developed by Newlyn.,Pesek and Saving and 
Morgan respectively, fail to draw a clear dividing line between money and 
non-money, the first criterion being theoretically empty if applied "sy-
metrically" to all financial assets, the second being essentially wrong, 
confusing the concepts of "marginal" and "average" and the third being 
based on assumptions of questionable validity. Moreover we have seen that 
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although each of the empirical criteria, proposed by economists who be-
lieve that the issue should be resolved on pragmatic grounds, has its 
merits, it also has weaknesses which prevent an unambiguous classifi-
cation of financial assets as money or non-money. 
In section 2 we turned to the examination of the traditional a-
pproach of the money stock determination oftenly referred to as the "old 
view". The "old view" expresses the money stock - defined as currency 
held by the public plus bank deposits - as the product of the monetary 
base times a proportionality factor called the "money mUltiplier", which 
1S a decreasing function of two ratios: the commercial banks required re-
serve ratio which is established by law or convention, and the non-bank 
public's desired cash-deposit ratio which is taken to be constant at 
least in the short-run. According to the tradition initiated by the 
work of Phillips and Rogers, the value of the multiplier is obtained 
as the limit of a converging process of succesive rounds ·of bank ex-
pansions (contractions) initiated by a rise (fall) in actual bank re-
serves relative to reserve requirements, in each round some of the ini-
tial surplus reserves leaking partly into reserve requirements and partly 
into desired cash holdings by the public. Since the money multiplier de-
pends on two given exogenous ratios, it follows that it is itself exo-
genous. Moreover, given that the cash base of the system is a policy in-
strument under the complete control of the monetary authorities, the 
"old view" implies that the money stock is a completely supply determined 
exogenous variable. 
In section 3 we examined the "new view" on the theory of the money 
stock determination, originated by the work of Gurley and Shaw and po-
.pularized by Tobin's famous exposition. 
In the first subsection of section 3 we examined the logic and impli-
cations of the "new view" and we saw that the "new view" denies the mecha-
nical response of commercial banks implied by the old view and asserts 
that the behaviour of commercial banks as well as of any other financi31 
intermediary is directed by the standard microeconomic principle of pro-
fit maximization. The optimum size of bank deposits is achieved to the 
point where the marginal return on bank portfolio is equal to the margi-
nal cost of attracting and holding deposits. Changes in the private sec-
tor's asset preferences shift the marginal curves of commercial banks and 
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therefore alter the optimum Slze of bank liabilities. 
Moreover even if commercial banks are constrained by reserve re-
quirements and interest rate ceilings on their deposits their behaviour 
is significantly different from that implied by the "old view". In part-
icular proponents of the "new view" assert that commercial banks' free 
reserve ratio is a choice variable depending negatively upon the market 
rate of interest. This dependence implies that the money multipl~er and 
therefore the nominal stock of money depend positively on the market 
rate of interest which in turn implies that, contrary to the assertions 
of the "old view", the money stock is an endogenous variable of the system 
affected by wealth holder's portfolio preferences between money and other 
assets. 
In the second subsection of section 3 we surveyed a small part of 
the empirical research on the money supply and we saw that the evidence 
overwhelmingly supports the dependence of the money stock on the rate 
of interest. 
Finally ln the third subsection we attempted a somewhat formal eva-
luation of the "old" and "new views" on the money stock determination 
and we have shown that although the two Vlews have different implications 
regarding the exogeneity-endogeneity issue of the money stock, they do 
not constitute intrinsically irreconcilable approaches; in particular the 
two views are alike in that they both can be thought of as specifying 
portfolio preferences for commercial banks and the non-bank public. In 
addition, we have shown that the multiplier formulation of tRe money 
supply is a "quasi-reduced" form of a higher level system in which the 
asset preferences of the banks and the public are explicitly specified. 
"This constitutes the major weakness of the multiplier as an analytical 
approach to the money supply, since, as it is generally true for any re-
duced form solution, the multiplier per s e does not reveal the 
behavioural processes involved in the adjustment of the quantity of money 
to changes in the exogenous variables of the system. 
In the final section of this survey (sectiori 4) we undertook a closer 
examination of the monetary base with the help of a simplified Central 
Bank balance sheet. After we examined the concepts of the "extended 
base" and the "adjusted base", we turned to the problem of the control 
of the base. We saw that the authorities' choice to control the base 
may result in frequent and sharp fluctuations in the market rate of 
interest which may be thought to represent the cost of the monetary 
authorities' policy choice. Moreover, we saw that in an open economy 
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operating under a fixed exchange rate system the authorities ability 
to control the base is constrained by BOP considerations; expecially 
ln the case where the interest elasticity of capital movements is high, 
the authorities' ability to undertake independent domestic monetary po-
licy is strictly limited. 
In the following two chapters, some of the issues discussed in this 
chapter, will be applied in the case of the Greek Economy. Specifi-
cally, in the next chapter we shall undertake an analysis of the money 
supply process in the Greek Economy adopting the money multiplier ap-
proach. One of the purposes of the analysis is to discover whether the 
money multiplier is exogenous or whether it is dependent upon interest 
rates. In chapter three we analyse the endogeneity-exogeneity issue 
of the monetary base ln the Greek Economy. In particular we examine the 
question of whether, during the time period under consideration, the 
authorities have controlled the cash base or whether the base was an en-
dogenous variable of the system. The analysis of chapter three is mo-
tivated by the view that, even if it is accepted that the authorities 
are able to control the base in all conceivable circumstances, potential 
control of the base does not necessarily imply actual control of it. 
Therefore whether or not the base is actually exogenous or endogenous 
cannot be decided on a priori grounds but it is a question requlrlng 
empirical investigation. 
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C HAP T E R TWO 
THE MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS IN THE GREEK 
ECONOMY: a "multiplier approach" 
As we have seen ln the previous chapter, the main point of disagree-
ment between the old and the new view on the theory of the money stock 
determination refers to the exogeneity-endogeneity issue of the money 
multiplier. The old view takes the money multiplier as an exogenous ma-
gnitude whereas the new view asserts that the multiplier is an endogenous 
variable depending upon the rate of interest. 
The main task of this chapter is to develop a money supply hypothesis 
for the Greek economy, following the conventional multiplier approach, and 
use the hypothesis to throw light on the exogeneity-endogeneity issue of 
the money stock. 
The first section of the chapter provides the necessary institution-
al setting for the subsequent analysis by giving a brief description of 
the Greek financial sector accompanied by some statistical evidence re-
garding the liability structure of financial institutions. 
In the second section we derive analytically a money supply identity 
for the Greek Economy, which constitutes an essential building block for 
the construction of our money supply hypothesis. This identity expresses 
the stock of money in terms of its proximate determinants which are the 
monetary base, the reserve ratio, the cash-demand deposits ratio and the 
saving and time deposits-demand deposits ratio. 
In section three we use the money supply identity to investigate 
the separate contribution of each proximate determinant to secular and 
cyclical changes in the stock of money. 
In section four we undertake a behavioural analysis of the alloca-
tion ratios which determine the value of the money multiplier and we 
test the dependence of these ratios upon interest rates. 
step to the analysis we derive and directly test the 
As a final 
functional 
dependence of the money multiplier upon rates of interest. 
Finally in an appendix to this chapter, we show how the borrowing 
ratio of financial institutions can be incorporated into the money supply 
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hypothesis and we report the results o~ statistical tests regarding the 
behavioural dependence of this ratio upon the loan rate-discount rate 
differential. 
Section 1: A brief description of the Greek Financial System(1) 
The Greek financial sector consists of three main groups of financial 
institutions: The Central Bank, the Commercial Banking system, and what 
the Greek Statistics call "Special Credi t Institutions~' 
Although the recent establishment of branches of foreign banks in 
Greece somewhat strengthened. the "competitiveness" of the system, the 
Greek commercial banking sector retains its traditional oligopolistic 
structure, one bank -the "National Bank of Greece"-being the leading 
firm in the industry. 
As it is generally the case, the bulk of Greek Commercial Banks' 
liabilities consists of demand')saving and time deposits held mainly by 
the private sector but also held by public enterprises and public enti-
ties(~) The main item of commercial bank assets consists of loans of 
a short term nature which meet the needs for working capital in industry 
and commerce, and -to a lesser extent- of medium and long term loans 
which finance real capital formation~3) 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
For the structure of the Greek financial system see: 
S.G. Andreadis: Banking in Greece, in H.W. Auburn: Comparative 
Banking 1966 pp 72-75; 
J.I." Halikias:"Potentials and Problems of Credit Policy: The 
Greek experiencelfAthens 1976 chapter 1 
L.S. Lolos: The Banking system, Athens 1966 pp. 172-187 
It is·worth mentioning that during the first decade after World 
War II, a substantial part of commercial bank liabilities consisted 
6f Central Bank credit, the reason being that in this period the flow 
of private deposits was insufficient to finance bank credit to the 
economy; suffice it to mention that in 1953, 27.4% of bank liabilities 
consisted of Central Bank Credit. 
To give a quantitative flavour, we report the maturity structure of com-
mercial bank loans as percentages of total bank assets for 1965 ; com-
mercial bills discounted: 13.1, loans up to 1 year 24.4, loans from 
more than 5 years 5.8-
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Tables 1.A and 1.B below, show the annual rates of growth 
of private deposits and deposits by public enterprises and public enti-
ties with commercial banks over the period 1960-1976; Table 1.C shows 
the ratio of deposits by public enterprises and public entities to pri-
vate deposits with commercial banks over the period 1959-1976. 
Table 1.A: annual rate of growth of private deposits with commercial 
banks: 1960-1976. 
1959 
1960 17.8 
1961 16.3 
1962 23.9 
1963 21.7 
Table 1.B: 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
Table 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
18.6 
25.5 
13.2 
32.3 
1.C: 
6.7 
6.8 
7.3 
6.7 
7.3 
1964 6.6 1969 22.0 1974 18.5 
1965 9.9 1970 25.6 1975 31.2 
1966 21.9 1971 28.3 1976 25.0 
1967 9.1 1972 28.5 
1968 30.7 1973 11.0 
annual rate of growth of deEosi ts by Q,ublic enterErises and 
public entities with commercial banks: 1960-1976. 
1964 26.9 1969 11.0 1974 26.8 
1965 6.3 1970 11.6 1975 9.8 
1966 17.1 1971 16.5 1976 73.4 
1967 -1.0 1972 14.9 
1968 25.5 1973 15.7 
ratio of ,deposits by public enterprises and public entities 
over total ;erivate de:eosits with commercial banks (%):1959-1976. 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
8.7 
8.4 
8.1 
7.3 
7.0 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
6.4 
5.7 
5.1 
4.6 
4.8 
1974 
1975 
1976 
5.1 
4.3 
5.9 
From table 1.C we see that the ratio of public to private deposits 
wi th commercial banks is quite small; over the period 1959-1976 this ratio 
had an average value of 6.45 per cent. Moreover, as inspection of table 
1.C reveals, the public to private deposits ratio with commercial banks, 
follows an increasing trend over the period 1959-1966, which implies that 
-88-
the average rate of growth of public deposits over this period was 
higher than the average rate of growth of private deposits. From 
tables 1.A, 1.B we calculated the average annual rates of growth of 
public and private deposits which are 19.9% and 16.8% respectively. 
Over the period 1967-1976 the ratio of public to private deposits 
had a declining trend; over this period the average rate of growth of 
private deposits was 22,. 9% ~'lhereas that of public deposits was 20.4%. 
Moreover if we ommit the abnormal growth of public deposits in 1976, 
the average rate of growth of public deposits over the period 1967-
1975 is 14.5 per cent. 
Inspection of tables 1.A and 1.B reveals that the annual rates 
of growth of both private and public deposits with commercial banks 
are quite high and their year-to-year changes are rather volatile. 
The average rate of growth of private deposits with commercial banks 
over the period 1960-1976 was 20.47 per cent with a coefficient of va-
riation of 37.8 per cent, whereas the average rate of growth of public 
deposits over the same period was 20.24 per cent with a variability 
around the mean of 79.6 per cent. 
Private deposits with commercial banks consist of three main cate-
. .. (4) d d d d . gorles: savlng, tlme an eman eposlts. 
Public enterprises hold only demand deposits with commercial banks 
whereas public entities hold demand, time, and another category of de-
posits which the Greek statistics classify under the heading "other". 
As the Bulletin of the Bank-of-Greece explains, this category includes 
mainly deposits of insurance funds with the General Hellenic Bank and 
the National Bank of Greece and deposits of the American Mission in 
Greece 
Table 1.D in next page, presents the structure of private deposits 
with commercial banks. 
It is apparent from table 1.D, that the largest part of private de-
posits with commercial banks consists of saving deposits amounting on 
average to 62.6 per cent of total private deposits over the period 1959-
1976; moreover the saving deposit-total deposit ratio assumes consider-
able stability around its average value the coefficient of variation 
(4) There is also another category of deposits, namely restricted deposits, 
but their magnitude is small; since they are similar in nature with 
time deposits they are subsumed under this category. 
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being 3 per cent only. 
Time deposits comprise 20.7 per cent, on average, of total private 
deposits with commercial banks over the period 1959-1976 ; during this 
period, the time deposit-total deposit ratio follcwed an upward trend 
which implies that the average rate of growth of private time deposits 
from 1959 to 1976 was higher than the average rate of growth of total 
pr~vate deposits. 
The demand deposit-total deposit ratio had a mean value of 16.5 per 
cent over the period 1959-1976 and was following a downward trend which 
implies that over the above period demand deposits were increasing slower 
than saving and time deposits. 
Table 1.D : structure of private deposits with commercial banks: 
1959-1976 (end-of-year data) 
demand dep-total saving dep-total time dep-total year dep ratio dep ratio dep ratio 
1959 25.4 59.6 15.0 
1960 25.1 63.4 11.5 
1961 24.2 62.7 13.1 
1962 20.4 58.4 21. 2 
1963 17.9 59.7 22.4 
1964 19.3 62.4 18.3 
1965 19.7 62.1 18.2 
1966 17.2 64.1 18.7 
1967 15.6 6'+.4 20.0 
1968 14.7 65.9 19.'+ 
1969 13.5 64.7 21.8 
1970 12.8 64.4 22.8 
1971 11.8 64.0 24.2 
1972 13.5 61.8 24.7 
1973 13.7 61.3 25.0 
1974 11.9 62.5 25.6 
1975 11. 0 63.6 25.4 
1976 10.1 63.3 26.6 
Table 1.E in next page provides some information about the struct-
ure of deposits by public enterprises and public entities with commer-
cial banks ; since, as we have already mentioned, public enterprises hold 
only demand deposits and public entities hold demand, time and another 
category of deposits classified under the heading "other", the ratio of 
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demand to total deposits provides sufficient information about the structu-
re of deposits by public enterprises and public entities with commercial 
banks. This ratio has an average value of 44.56 per cent over the period 
1959-1976 with a coefficient of variation of 32.5 per cent. As it can be 
clearly seen from table I.E the demand deposits-total deposits ratio was 
following an upward trend over the above period although there seem to be 
cyclical fluctuations around that trend. 
Table 1. E: ratio of demanddeposi ts to total deposits by public enter-
prises and public entities with commercial banks (%) 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
26.9 
36.1 
35.6 
27.5 
24.7 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
20.6 
30.7 
50.6 
46.3 
44.1 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
44.2 
52.1 
62.2 
62.4 
59.3 
1974 
1975 
1976 
59.8 
55.3 
63.7 
Finally in table 1.F we present the annual rate of growth of demand 
deposits with commercial banks by both the private sector and by public 
enterprises and public entities, over the period 1960-1976. 
Table 1.F: annual rate of growth of total demand deposits with commerc-
ial banks: 1960-1976 
1960 19.2 1965 15.9 1970 21.7 1975 17.3 
1961 13.2 1966 16.6 1971 21.8 1976 30.0 
1962 2.7 1967 -2.5 1972 40.3 
.1963 8.0 1968 22.6 1973 12.1 
1964 14.0 1969 11.7 1974 7.2 
The rate of growth of demand deposits with commercial banks follows 
a mild upward trend(5) over the period 1960-1976 but there are large flu-
ctuations around the average rate of growth over the above period. The 
mean value of the rate of growth of demand deposits, calculated from the 
figures of table 1.F is 15.98 per cent with a coefficient of variation 
of 62.8 per cent. 
(5) The estimated trend line is as follows: gD = 9.91 + 0.759 t R2 - 0.145 
(1960 = 0) where gn: the rate of growth of deposits. 
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According to the Greek Statistics, the S p e cia I C red 1 t 
Ins tit uti 0 n s (from now on referred to as SCI, for con-
venience) consist of the "Agricultural Bank of Greece", the "National 
t10rtgage Bank", the "Consignations and Loans Fund", the "Hellenic Bank 
of Industrial Development", the invest~2nt banks and the Postal Savings 
Bank. 
The Agricultural Bank of Greece is specialized in several activi-
ties connected with the agricultural sector; it provides short and long 
term loans to individual farmers as well as to unions and cooperatives 
of farmers. 
The National Mortgage Bank provides Housing loans to the lower in-
come classes of the population. The Consignations and loans Fund gives 
credit to local authorities as well as to other public entities; it 
also finances activities connected with the Tourist Industry. The Hel-
lenic Bank of Industrial Development as well as the Investment Banks 
extend credit of medium and long-term maturity to industry for invest-
ment purposes. 
With the exception of Postal Savings Bank, which was very success-
ful in attracting deposits from the private sector, the other SCI did 
not succeed to attract sufficient amounts of deposits to finance their 
credit activities and thus depend heavily upon Central Bank Funds. In 
addition,it is important to note that the allocation of Postal Savings 
Bank's available funds to different uses, is to a large extend under 
the direct control of the monetary authorities. Part of the funds is 
directed to the Agricultural Bank of Greece, another part is used for 
the purchase of government securities, a third part is deposited with 
commercial banks, and the remaining funds are used to provide credit to 
the economy, the main part of this credit being extended to public enter-
prlses. 
Tables 1.G, 1.H below show the annual rates of growth of private 
deposits and deposits by public enterprises and public entities with 
SCI and table 1.1 shows the ratio of public to private deposits with 
SCI. 
Table 1.G: annual rate of growth of total private deposits with SCI 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
38.8 
25.9 
30.2 
30.0 
23.3 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
15.8 
20.6 
8.7 
30.1 
19.7 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
22.1 
24.0 
18.8 
9.6 
18.4 
1975 
1976 
33.2 
28.1 
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Table 1.H: annual rate of growth of de~osits by public enterprises and 
public entities with SCI: ~j60-1976. 
1960 23.3 1965 4.1 1970 8.7 1975 25.4 
1961 16.9 1966 14.2 1971 7.3 1976 30.5 
1962 12.4 1967 0.1 1972 21.4-
1963 25.7 1968 12.3 :"373 10.0 
1964 32.6 1969 13.0 1974 27.9 
Table 1.1: ratio of de:gosi ts by Public enterErises and Eublic entities 
to total 12rivate deEosits with SCI (%): 1959-1976. 
1959 33.1 1964 24.5 1969 15.6 1974- 13.3 
1960 29.4- 1965 22.0 1970 13.9 1975 12.6 
1961 27.3 1966 20.8 1971 12.0 1976 12.8 
1962 23.6 1967 19.2 1972 12.3 
1963 22.8 1968 16.6 1973 12.3 
The average value of the public deposits-private deposits ratio with 
SCI over the period 1959-1976 is 19.11 per cent, three times as large as 
the mean value of the corresponding ratio with commercial banks over the 
same period. Moreover, as table 1.1 reveals, this ratio steadily decli-
nes from 1959 to 1971, being roughly stable from 1972 to 1976. 
The path followed by the public deposits-private deposits ratio with 
SCI, clearly implies that over the period 1960-1976 the average rate of 
growth of public deposits with SCI was lower than the average rate of 
. growth of private deposits. 
The average annual rates of growth of private and public deposits 
with SCI, calculated from tables 1.G, 1.H, are 23.3 per cent and 16.7 
per cent respectively. 
Tables 1.J and 1.K below provide information about the structure of 
private and public deposits with SCI. Regarding the structure of public 
deposits we note that public enterprises hold only negligible amounts 
of demand deposits with SCI, whereas public entities hold, demand deposits, 
time deposits and a third category under the Heading "other". As the 
Bulletin of the Bank of Greece explains, this category mainly includes 
deposits by local authorities with the "Consignations and Loans Fund" as 
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well as deposits by Insurance Funds with the "Agricultural Bank of Greece". 
We note that the largest part of public entities' deposits with SCI con-
sist of deposits under the heading "other", time deposits comprising a 
very small part of total deposits with SCI. 
Table 1.J : structure of private deposits with SCI : 1959-1976. 
year 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
"Table 1. K 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
37.1 
34.9 
38.1 
37.0 
32.6 
demand dep-total 
dep ratio 
5.8 
6.3 
4.8 
5.4 
5.0 
4.6 
4.6 
3.1 
3.2 
2.9 
2.5 
2.0 
1.9 
1.8 
2.4 
2.2 
1.9 
2.5 
saving dep~total 
dep ratio 
74.6 
70.8 
73.0 
75.4 
78.2 
77.5 
76.7 
80.1 
81.8 
82.2 
82.8 
83.2 
82.1 
81.2 
79.4 
82.5 
82.4 
84.8 
time dep-total 
dep ratio 
19.6 
22.9 
22.2 
19.2 
16.8 
17.9 
18.7 
16.8 
15.0 
14.9 
14.7 
14.8 
16.0 
17.0 
18.2 
15.3 
15.7 
12.7 
ratio of demand deposits to total deposits by public enterprises 
and public entities with SCI (%) : 1959-1976. 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
33.3 
36.2 
37.6 
41.0 
41.0 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
47.6 
45.7 
47.7 
45.3 
45.0 
1974 
1975 
1976 
43.4 
42.8 
42.3 
The mean values of private demand, savlng and time deposit to total deposit 
ratios with SCI, calculated from table 1.J above, are, over the period 1959-
1976, 3.5, 79.3 and 17.1 per cent respectively. Obviously the main bulkof privai 
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deposits with SCI consis~of saving deposits; moreover the saving depo-
sits-total deposits ratio follows a mild upward trend largely at the ex-
pense of a downward trend in the demand deposit-total deposit ratio. 
This clearly implies that, on average, saving deposits rise faster and 
demand deposits rise slower than the average rate of growth of total pri-
vate deposits with SCI. 
Inspection of table 1.K reveals t~at the ratio of demand to total 
public deposits with SCI "jumps" from 37.6 per cent ln 1966 to 41.0 per 
cent in 1967 and from 41.0 % in 1968 to 47.6 % in 1969, from then on as-
suming higher values than those assumed OVer the period 1959-1966. 
The average value of the demand deposit-total deposit ratio by pu-
blic enterprises and public entities is 35.85 per cent over the period 
1959-1966 and 44.18 over the period 1967-1976. Over the whole period 
1959-1976 the average value of the above ratio is 40.47 percent. 
Table 1.L below shows the annual rate of growth of demand deposits 
by public enterprises and public entities with special credit Institutions. 
As it can be seen from this table, the rate of growth of demand deposits 
does not seem to show any significant time trend and moreover its year-
to-year fluctuations are quite volatile. Over the period 1960-1976 the 
average rate of growth of demand deposits with SCI is 17.5 per cent with 
a coefficient of variation of 49.5 per cent. 
Table 1.L: annual rate of growth of demand deposits by public enterpri-
ses and public entities with SCI (%): 1960-1976 
1960 27.1 1965 14.2 1970 1.4 1975 21.4 
1961 15.6 1966 5.5 1971 13.3 1976 38.1 
1962 20.8 1967 10.0 1972 15.2 
1963 14.1 1968 13.3 1973 17.9 
1964 26.6 1969 24.4 1974 19.7 
~ 
Having provided statistical evidence regarding the liabilities of 
commercial banks and SCI, we now come to give evidence which will faci-
litate structural comparisons of the liabilities side of these two groups 
of Financial institutions. 
Table 1.M in next page shows the ratio of demand deposits from all 
sources with SCI to demand deposits from all sources with commercial banks. 
Tables 1.N and 1.P show the ratio of total private deposit5with SCI to 
total private deposits with commercial banks and the ratio of total public 
deposits with SCI to total public deposits with commercial banks. 
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Table 1.M: ratio of demand deEosits from all sources with SCI over de 
mand dep. from all sources with commercial banks: 1959-1976. 
1959 16.8 1964 25.3 1969 26.2 1974 19.6 
1960 17.9 1965 24.9 1970 21.8 1975 20.2 
1961 18.3 1966 22.5 1971 20.3 1976 21.5 
1962 21.6 1967 25.4 1972 16.7 
1963 22.8 1968 23.5 1973 17.5 
Table 1.N: ratio of .total Erivate deEosits with SCI to total Erivate 
deposits with commercial banks (%) : 1959-1976. 
1959 25.3 1964 41.9 1969 42.4 1974 36.4 
1960 29.8 1965 44.1 1970 41.3 1975 36.9 
1961 32.2 1966 43.6 1971 39.8 1976 37.8 
1962 33.9 1967 43.5 1972 36.8 
1963 36.2 1968 43.3 1973 36.4 
Table 1.P: ratio of total Eublic deEosi ts with SCI to total Eublic de-
posits with commercial banks (%): 1959-1976. 
1959 123.0 1964 117.0 1969 103.0 1974 94.0 
1960 128.0 1965 115.0 1970 101.0 1975 107.0 
1961 119.0 1966 112.0 1971 93.0 1976 81.0 
1962 118.0 1967 113.0 1972 98.0 
1963 112.0 1968 101.0 1973 93.0 
The average value of the ratio of demand deposits with SCI to demand 
deposits with commercial banks, calculated from table 1.M above, is 21.2% 
over the period 1959-1976 with a coefficient of variation of 14.4%. Du-
ring the period 1959-1964 this ratio was rising continuously which implies 
that the rate of growth of demand deposits with SCI was in every year over 
the above period higher than the rate of growth of demand deposits with 
commercial banks. The same conclusion holds for the period 1972-1976, 
while during the period 1965-1971 the ratio in question was fluctuating 
from higher to lower values. 
The ratio of total private deposits with SCI to total private deposits 
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with commercial banks has an average value of 37.8 per cent; this ratio 
was growing continuously over the period 1959-1965 implying a rate of 
growth of private deposits with SCI faster than the rate of growth of 
deposits with commercial banks over the above period. During the period 
1966-1972 the ratio in question was falling steadily although at a mild 
rate, whereas over the period 1973-1976 the private deposits with SCI -
private deposits with commercial banks ratio remained roughly constant. 
The ratio of deposits by public enterprises and public entities with 
SCI to deposits with commercial banks had, over the period 1959-1976, an 
average value of 107.1 per cent,which implies that over this period pu-
blic enterprises and public entities were jointly holding, on average, a 
slightly larger amount of deposits with SCI than with commercial banks. 
However, as it can be seen from table 1.P the above ratio was following 
a downward trend which implies a rate of growth of public deposits with 
commercial banks higher , on average, than the rate of growth of public 
deposits with SCI. 
Before ending this section we present table 1.R below, derived from 
tables (l.D), (l.J), which gives a summary comparison of the structure of 
private deposits with commercial banks and SCI over the period 1959-1976. 
Table 1.R: Comparison of the structure of private deposits with commercial 
banks and SCI: 1959-1976. 
Commercial 
banks 
SCI 
Commercial 
banks 
SCI 
average 
demand dep. 
total dep ratio 
16.5 % 
3.5 % 
coef. of variation 
of demand dep. 
total dep. ratio 
29.5 % 
43.2 % 
average 
saving dep. 
total dep .. ratio 
62.6 % 
79.3 % 
coef. of variation 
of saving dep. 
total dep. ratio 
3.1 % 
4.9 % 
average 
time dep. 
total,dep. ratio 
20 .. 7 % 
17.1 % 
coef. of variation 
of time dep. 
total dep. ratio 
21.2 % 
15.5 % 
As it can be seen from table 1.R, the average value of the demand 
deposits to total private deposits ratio is much higher and much more 
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stable for commercial banks than for 3CI. 
The average saving deposit-total private deposit ratio is higher 
for SCI than for commercial banks; both ratios are highly stable, the 
ratio for commercial banks being marginally more stable. Finally the 
average time deposits-total private deposits ratio with commercial banks 
is slightly higher and somewhat less stable than the corresponding ratio 
with SCI. 
Section 2: Derivation of a money ~upply formula for the Greek Economy. 
The first decision which has to be made in the formulation of a mo-
ney supply hypothesis refers to the choice of the money concept to be 
used. In the context of the Greek economy the choice area includes at 
least eight candidate definitions of money to be considered: 
(A) Cash held by the non-bank public plus private demand deposits with 
commercial banks. 
(B) Cash held by the non-bank public plus private demand deposits with 
commercial banks and SCI. 
(C) Cash held by the non-bank public plus private demand deposits as 
well as demand deposits by public enterprises and public entities 
with commercial banks. 
(D) Cash held by the non-bank public plus private demand deposits as 
well as demand deposits by public enterprises and public entities 
with commercial banks and SCI. 
(E) Cash held by the non-bank public plus total private deposits with 
commercial banks. 
(F) Cash held by the non-bank public plus total private and public (ie 
deposits by public enterprises and public entities) deposits with 
commercial bankS. 
(G) Cash held by the non-bank public plus total private deposits with 
commercial banks and SCI. 
(H) Cash held by the non-bank public Dlus total private and public de-
posits with commercial banks and SCI. 
Although the problem of the "rigr-.t" definition of money in the 
Greek economy is an important issue a~j deserves careful examination, 
d . h' . h" t d (6) we shall not eal Wlt 1t 1n t 1S S U y. 
(6) For a brief discussion of the theoretical and empirical problems 
involved in the operational defi~ition of money see chapter 1, 
section 1. 
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Instead, following the practice of the Greek statistics, we choose 
to use definition (D) in our subsequent analysis. Thus we define the 
money stock in the Greek economy as being the sum of cash in the hands 
of the non-bank public plus private demand deposits, as well as demand 
deposits by public enterprises and public entities with commercial banks 
and SCI. The above narrow definition of money is in accordance with the 
function of money as a means of payments. It is perhaps the case that 
the narrow and broad definitions of money are differentiated more sharp-
ly in the Greek Economy than in other countries with more developed 
Financial systems the reason being that, due to the limited development 
of alternative financial instruments, Saving and Time deposits are more 
extensively used in the Greek Economy as a means of accumulating Wealth. 
The monetary base (also referred to as the "cash base" on "high-
powered money") is defined as the sum of cash in the hands of the non-
bank public (including both the private sector and public enterprises 
and public entities) plus the reserves of commercial banks and SCI. Com-
mercial Bank and SCI reserves consist of deposits with the Bank-of-Greece 
plus vault currency. 
Cash consists of currency in the hands of the non-bank public plus 
demand deposits of the non-bank public(7) with the Bank-of-Greece. The 
ratio of demand deposits of the non-bank public with the Central Bank 
over their currency holdings is quite small having an average value of 
6.47 per cent over the period 1959-1976 with a coefficient of variation 
of 22.0 per cent. Clearly then, the total amount of cash consists main-
ly of currency holdings. 
Having defined the money stock and the monetary base, we are now 
ready to proceed in the derivation of our money supply formula. 
(7) 
(2.1) M C + D 
(2.2) H C + R 
(2.3) C k . D. 
(2.4) R r. (D+T) 
(2.5) T t.D. 
The "non-bank public" includes the private sector, public enterpri-
~A~ and Dublic entities. 
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In the above equations (M) is the stock of money, (C) is cash held 
by the non-bank public, (D) is total demand deposits by the private sector 
as well as by public enterprises and public entities with commercial 
banks and SCI, (H) is the monetary base, (R) is total reserves held by 
commercial banks and SCI, (T) is total deposits other than demand by the 
private sector as well as by public enterprises and public entities with 
commercial banks and SCI, (k) is the ratio of cash held by the non-bank 
public over their demand deposits with commercial banks and SCI, (r) is 
the ratio of commercial banks' and SCI's reserves over total deposits 
of the non-bank public with them, and (t) is the ratio of total deposits 
other than demand to total demand deposits of the non-bank public with 
commercial banks and SCI. 
Substituting equation (2.5) into. (2.4), substituting the resulting 
expression, along with (2.3), into (2.2), solving for (D) and combining 
the expression for (D) with equations (2.1), (2.3) we obtain the following 
expression for the money stock: 
(2.6) M = l+k • H 
r( l+t )+k 
Let us now write down algebraically the definitions of the variables 
(R),(D), (T),appearing in equations (2.1)-(2.5) and defined verbally 
above as well as some identities to be used in the construction of our 
money supply hypothesis: 
(2.7) D - DCB + DCB + DSCI + DSC1 - pr pub pr pub 
(2.8) T TCB TCB TSCI + TSC1 - + pub + - pub pr pr 
(2.9) R - RCB + RSCI -
(2.10) DCB DCB DCB CB - + + DSCI - pr pub 
TCB TCB CB - + pub + TSCI - pr 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
In the above identities the superscripts CB SCI refer to commercial 
banks and SCI whereas the subscripts pr., pub. SCI refer to the private 
sector, public enterprises and public entities, and Special Credit Insti-
+l1t-;cms resDectively.. DCB denotes deposits from all sources with com-
-100-
mercial banks, TCB denotes deposits other than demand from all sourses 
. SCI d d d . f w1th commercial banks, D denotes eman epos1ts rom all sources 
with SCI, TSCI denotes private deposits other than demand with SCI pr 
and so on. It is important to note that SCI (mainly the Postal Saving 
Bank) hold deposits with commercial banks whereas the latter do not de-
CB CB posit funds with SCI. Thus the variables DSCI ' TSCI appearing in 
identities (2.10) (2.11), denote demand and deposits other than demand 
by SCI with commercial banks. 
The reserve ratio,(r),appearing 1n expression (2.6) for the money 
stock, can be written as follows: 
(2.14) 
Combining identities (2.7) (2.8) with (2.10), (2.11) and (2.12),(2.13) 
we get: 
(2.15) D + T = (DCB+ TCB ) + (DSCI+ TSCI ) - (D~~I + T~~I) 
Substituting identities (2.9) (2.15) into (2.14) we get: 
r = 
- --~----------------------------------------------------------------
", r 
1 + 
(DSCI+ TSCI ) 
(DCB + TCB ) 
. RCB/(DCB+ TCB ), The express10ns 
+ 
(DSC1+' TSCI) (DCB + TCB ) SCI SCI 
are commercial banks' and SCI's reserve ratios, denoted by (rCB )' (rSCI ) 
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. 1 (8) . ( ) respectlve y. from the above expresslon for r it is clear that (r) 
is a weighted average of commercial banks' and SCI's reserve ratios, 
and can be written as follows: 
(2.16) r = ArCB + (l-A)rSCI 
where: ( 2 . 17 ) 
Manipulating the expression for (A) we obtain: 
(DSCI+ TSCI ) CB CB (DSCI+ TSCI ) D
SCI
+ TSCI 
(2.18) A - 1- .+ -
(D + T) DSCI+ TSCI D + T 
In expression (2.18) the ratio (DSCI+'TSCI)/(D+T) is the ratio of total 
deposits by the non-bank public with SCI to overall deposits by the non-
CB CB SCI SCI bank public with commercial banks and SCI and (DSCI+ TSCI)/(D + T ) 
is the ratio of total deposits by SCI with commercial banks over total 
deposits by the non-bank public with SCI; denoting those ratios by 
(i-a) and (g) respectively the expression for (A) becomes: 
(2.19) A = a + gel-a) 
where (a) 1S the ratio of total deposits by the non-bank public with c~m­
mercial banks to overall deposits by the non-bank public witn commercial 
banks and SCI and (g) is the ratio of SCI's deposits with commercial banks 
to total deposits by the non-bank public with SCI. 
The ratio of total deposits other than demand to total demand depo-
sits by the non-bank public denoted by (t) in the expression (2.6) for 
the money stock can be written as follows: 
T + T ub ( 2 • 20) t - _p ....... r __ ..... p_ 
D pr + Dpub 
where T private deposits other than demand pr 
with com. banks and SCI 
Tpub deposits other than demand by public enter-
prises and public entities with com. banks and SCI. 
Analogous notation holds for demand deposits. 
Starting from expression (2.20) and undertaking a sequence of simple 
algebraic operations we obtain: 
(8)The reserve ratio of commercial banks is defined as deposits with the 
Bank-of-Greece plus vault currency over total deposits from all sources 
(including SCI) with commercial banks. The reserve ratio of SCI is de-
fined as deposits with the Central Bank plus vault currency over total 
net deposits with SCI. Total net deposits with SCI are equal to total 
public with SCI minus deposits by SCI with COffi-
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= (2.21) 
1 + (D ublD ) P pr 
In the above expression, (T ID ), (T ublD ub) are the private 
. pr pr p p 
and public, deposit other than demand-~emand deposit ratios which will·be 
denoted by tprtpubrespectively. From (2.21) it can be clearly seen that 
the t - ratio is a weighted average of t pr ' tpub and can be written as 
follows: 
(2.22) 6tpr + (1-6)tpub = t 
1 D pr where (2.23) 6 - ------------- = 
1 + (D ub/D ) P pr 
By an exactly analogous procedure we obtain the cash-deposit ratio 
(k) as a weighted average of the relevant private and public ratios: 
(2.24) k = ok pr + 
At this point it would be convenient to bring together the main equ-
ations of the model: 
(2.6) 
where: 
(2.25) 
where 
M = 
M --
H ... 
m = 
m = 
k = 
r = 
1 + k 
r(l+t)+k 
the stock 
H 
of money 
the monetary base 
1 + k 
r(l+t)+k 
the money mUltiplier 
the cash-demand deposits ratio 
the ratio of commercial banks' 
of the non-bank public 
and SCI reserves over total 
private and public deposits with commercial banks and SCI 
t = the total deposits other than demand-demand deposits ratio 
by the non-bank public. 
(2.16) r 
where the commercial banks' reserve ratio 
the SCI's reserve ratio 
(2.19) A = a + g(l-a) 
where 
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the ratio of deposits by the non-bank public with com.banks 
over total deposits by tt2 non-bank public with commercial 
banks and SCI 
g = the ratio of SCI's deposi~s with commercial banks over total 
deposits by the non-bank public with SCI 
(2.22) t = ot + (1- o)t ub 
where 
pI' P 
tpr= the ratio of private deposits other than demand with com. 
banks and SCI over private demand deposits with com. banks 
and SCI. 
t pub - the ratio of deposits other than demand by public enter-
prises and public entities over their demand deposits, with 
commercial banks and SCI' 
(0) the ratio of private demand deposits with commercial banks 
and SCI over total overall demand deposits with commercial 
banks and SCI 
(2.24) k = Okpr + (l-o)kpub 
where k . the cash-demand deposit ratio by the private sector 1S pI' 
kpub is the cash-demand deposit ratio by public enterprises and 
public entities. 
The expression (2.6) for the money stock, supplemented by expressions 
(2.16), (2.19), (2.22), (2.24) form an essential building block in the 
construction of our money supply hypothesis. In table 2.A below we 
present the partial elasticities of the money multiplier (m) with re-
spect to the (r), (t) and (k) ratios. 
Table 2.A: expr~ssions for the partial elasticities of the money multi-
plier (m) w.r. to (r), (t), (k) ratios~9) 
Emr Emt Emk 
r(l+t) k 1-r( l+t) (a) rt < 0 < 0 < 0 
6 6 1 + k 6 
where 6 = r(l+t)+k (a) provided that r( l+t)< 1 
(9) The expressionsof table 2-A, also sive the partial elasticities 
of the money stock (M) w.r. to the (r),(t),(k) ratios :;·the partial 
elasticity of m w.r. to the monetar~: base un is unity. 
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As table 2.A shows, the elasticities of (m) with respect to the 
(r) (t) and (k) ratios are negative: an increase in each of these ra-
tios reduces the value of the money mUltiplier. Moreover, these ela-
sticities are rational functions of the (r), (t) and (k) ratios. 
In table 2.B below, we provide estimates for the partial elastici-
ties Em,r Em,t, Em,k using average values for the (r), (t), (k) ratios 
over the period 1959I-1976IV (end-of-quarter data) and over the subperiods 
1959I-1967IV,1968I-1976IV (end-of-quarter data). 
Table2.B: elasticity estimates 
Period Emr· Emt Emk 
1959I-1976IV - 0.198 - 0.169 - 0.050 
1959I-1967IV - 0.197 - 0.162 - 0.050 
1968I-1976IV - 0.182 - 0.160 - 0.067 
Remark: Over the period 1959I-1976IV the average values of the (r), 
(t), (k) ratios were 0.1079, 5.9221, 3.0206 respectively. Over the 
subperiods 1959I-1967IV, 1968I-1976IV the average values of (r), (t), 
(k) were 0.1347, 4.5468, 3.0345 and 0.0810, 7.2974, 3.0068 
It is apparent from the above table that the elasticity values are 
low and moreover their variation between the three time periods is quite 
small. 
Before ending this section it is useful to give some evidence about 
the weights (A) (6) appearing in expressions (2.16), (2.19) and (2.22) 
(2.24) respectively. The average value of (A) over the period 1959-1976 
(end-of-year data) was 0.744 with a coefficient of variation of 5.51 %. 
As it can be seen from equation (2.16) such a value of (A) implies that 
changes in (r) reflect to a larger extent· variations in the commercial 
bank reserve ratio (rCB ) than in SCI reserve ratio (rSCI ) 
The average value of (6) over the period 1959-1976 is 0.752 with a 
coefficient of variation 7.40%. As equations (2.22) (2.24) reveal such 
a value of (6) implies that variations in (t) and (k) ratios reflect to 
a larger extent variations in the (t) (k) ratios of the private sector, 
rather than variations in the respective ratios of public enterprises 
and public entities. 
Section three: contribution of each proximate determinant to secular 
and cyclical changes in the money stock 
The money supply formula derived in the previous sections is 
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clearly an identity and the next step in our analysis should be to give 
this identity behavioural content· by examining the behavioural dependen-
ces of the allocation ratios which determine the value of the money multi-
plier. However the equation for the money stock can be fruitfully treated 
as an identity, to provide useful insights into the money supply process; 
lD particular the money supply formula, properly transformed, can be used 
to provide information regarding the separate contributions of the proxi-
mate determinants of the stock of money to its rate of change over any 
given period under examination. Such an approach has been followed by 
Cagan, in the context of the U.S. Economy,who obtained interesting re-
sults regarding the relative contribution of each proximate determinant 
to secular and cyclical changes in the money stock~10) 
In this section, broadly applying Cagan's approach to the case of 
the Greek economy, we shall be using the money supply formula (2.6) (see 
page 99) to provide historical evidence regarding the relative contribu-
tions of the factors which determine the value of the money stock to both 
its secular and cyclical changes over the period 1960111-19761I. 
Starty{~ our analysis, we properly transform the money stock identity 
so that to obtain the separate contributions of (H) and the (k), (r), 
(t) ratios, adopting the transformation method developed by Friedman 
and Schwartz~11)Taking logarithms of the money supply formula (2.6) 
of the previous section we obtain: 
(3.1) In M = In(l+k) - In {r(l+t)+k} + In H 
Expressing equation (3.1) in first difference form between period 
1 and period 0 we get: 
(3.2) In M1 In Mo - In (1+k1) - In (l+ko ) - In {r1 (1+t1 ) + k1} 
+ In {r (1+t) + k } + (lnHl - InH ) 000 0 
The separate contribution of each proximate determinant of the 
money stock can be found by allowing the determinant in question to 
vary between periods 0 and 1, while keeping all other proximate determ-
inants constant; denoting the separate contributions of (H), (k), (r), 
(10 ) 
Ph. Cagan: "Determants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of 
Money, 1875-1960" (Columbia University Press 1965) 
chapter two. 
(ll)M. Friedman and A. Schwartz: A monetary history of the United States, 
1867-1960 (NBER) (Princeton University Press, 1963) Appendix B. 
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(t) by CH, Ck ' Cr ' Ct respectively, we have: 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
C 
r 
= 
In HI - In Ho 
In(1+k1)-ln(l+k )+In{r (l+t )+k }-In{r (l+t )+k1} o 000 0 0 
In{r (l+t )+k } 
000 In{r1(I+t )+k } o 0 
In{r (l+t )+k } - In{r (l+t1)+k } 00000 
It is important to note that the sum of the RHS of equations (3.3) 
(3.6) lS not equal to the RHS of equation (3.2). As Friedman and 
(12) . Schwartz point out, thls problem arises, because observations are 
at discrete time and therefore, for all practical purposes, changes 
in (k), (r), (t) should be necessarily taken as discrete time changes. 
For continuous time changes, this problem does not arise: the separate 
contributions of (H), (k), (r), (t) are obtained simply by taking the to-
tal time derivative of In M in equation (3.1). 
Calling the item necessary to make the sum of the RHS of equations 
(3.3) - (3.6) equal to the RHS of equation (3.2) the "interaction term" 
and denoting it by (e) we have: 
(3.7) e = In{r (l+t )+k1} o 0 
The above factor exerts an effect to changes in the money stock 
but this effect cannot be exclusively attributed to any of the proxi-
mate determinants of the money supply; it is rather an effect exerted 
jointly by the (k), (r), (t) ratios and this is why it is called the 
"interaction term". Denoting In Ml - In Mo' which is the rate of change 
in the money stock between periods 0 and 1, by (gM) and substituting 
equations (3.3) - (3.7) into equation (3.2) we obtain: 
Using quarterly data, we calculated each term of identity (3.8) 
over the period 19601-1976IV. Since however the rates of growth of the 
(12) 
See M. Friedman and A Schwartz: op cit page 794 
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money stock and the monetary base show a strong seasonal pattern we 
took four quarter moving averages for gM and CH; moreover, in order 
to retain the equality between the RHS and LHS of identity (3.8), we 
also took four quarter moving averages for Ck , Cr ' Ct and e. In the 
process of taking moving averages, the observations 19601, II, 1976 III, 
IV were lost and thus the adjusted data covers the period 1960 III -
1976 II. 
Table 3.A, below, shows the average absolute contributions of 
(H), (k), (r), (t) to the rate of change of the money stock over the 
period 1960 III - 1976 II and the subperiods 1960 III - 1968 IV, 
1969 I - 1976 II; table 3.B,shows the average relative contributions 
over the same periods. 
Table 3.A: Average absolute contributions of the ]2roximate determinants 
of the money stock· (in 2ercentage terms) 
- - - -period gH CH Ck C Ct e r 
1960111-197611 3.5650 3.5250 0.0051 0.3053 -0.2112 -0.592 
1960111-1968IV 3.3940 3.2630 -0.0750 0.5216 -0.3009 -0.0147 
19691 -197611 3.7600 3.8210 0.0956 0.0602 -0.1096 -0.1072 
Table 3.B: Average relative contributions of the ]2roximate determanants 
of the money stock (in 12ercentage terms) 
period CH/gM Ck/gM <\/gM ct/gM e/gM 
1960111-197611 98.87 0.14 8.56 -5.92 -1.65 
1960111-19681V 96.14 -2.21 15.37 -8.86 -0.44-
19691 -19761V 101.62 2.54 1.60 -2.91 -2.85 
As it can be seen from table 3.B, the relative contribution of the 
monetary base to changes in the money stock is positive and very high 
both over the whole period and over the two subperiods under examination. 
Thus we may say that in the long run, the largest part of the rate of 
growth of the money stock can be attributed, on average, to the rate of 
growth of "high-powered" money. 
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The relative contribution of the cash-demand deposit ratio (C
k
) 
tends to zero over the period 1960111-197611, the reason being that 
the small negative contribution of the k-ratio over the subperiod 
1960111-19681V is largely offset by a positive contribution of a 
roughly equal absolute magnitude over the subperiod 19691-197611. 
The relative contribution of the reserve ratio to the rate of 
growth in the stock of money, is positive both over the whole period 
and over the two subperiods under examination. In the subperiod 
1960I11-1968IV, the average relative contribution of the reserve ratio 
was 15.37 per cent, the reason for this relatively high positive value 
being, that during the subperiod in question, some large reductions in 
the reserve ratio took place. On the other hand, in the subperiod 19691-
197611, the relative contribution of the r-ratio WaS positive but had a 
very low value. 
Finally, as it can be seen from table 3.B, the relative contribution 
of the t-ratio to the rate of growth in the money stock is negative in 
all three periods, this finding being in accordance with the upward 
trend in the t-ratio over the period 1960III-19761I. The relative 
contribution of the t-ratio over the subperiod 19601II-1968IV was -8.86 
per cent, partly offsetting the positive contribution of the reserve 
ratio over the same subperiod; on the other hand the contribution of 
the t-ratio over the subperiod 19691-197611, although negative, is 
markedly lower in absolute magnitude, accounting only for -2.91 per 
cent of the average rate of growth in the money stock. 
Looking at the data for the rate of change in the money supply 
over the period 1960111-197611 we were able to detect six easily 
discernible cycles listed in table 3.C below: 
Table 3.C: Cycles in the rate of growth in the money stock over the 
period 1960III-1976II. 
Cycles Duration Peak Trough 
I 1961IV - 19651 19641 1965I 
II 196511 - 1966111 1965IV 1966II1 
III 1966IV - 1968111 1967111 1968111 
IV 1968IV - 197111 1970IV 197111 
V 1971111- 19731V 19731 1973IV 
VI 19741 - 19751V 1974IV 1975IV 
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The average duration of the above cycles is 9.5 quarters with a 
coefficient of variation of 29.5 per cent. The average duration of 
expansions is 6.16 quarters nearly twice as much as the average dura-
tion of contractions which is 3.34 quarters. The maximum expansion 
period is 10 quarters (cycle I) and the minimum period is 3 quarters 
(cycle II). On the other hand, the maximum contraction period is 4 
quarters (cycles I, III, VI) while the minimum period is 2 quarters 
(cycle IV). 
Given the existence of cycles in the rate of growth in the money 
stock it is of interest to investigate the relative contributions of 
the proximate determinants to the cyclical movements in the stock of 
money. To pursue this task we worked as follows: First, we isolated 
four stages in each cycle: mid-expansion, peak, mid-contraction, 
trough. Next, for each cycle we calculated the average rate of growth 
of the money stock and the average contributions of (H), (k), (r), (t) 
OVer the cycle and then, for each stage of the cycle, we calculated the 
deviations of the rate of growth in the money stock and the contributions 
of H, k, r, t from their respective means. The relative contribution 
of each proximate determinant of the money stock in ee~h stage of the 
cycle was obtained by dividing the deviation of the contribution of 
each determinant of the specific stage, from its mean contribution 
over the cycle, by the deviation of the rate of change in the money 
stock at the specific stage from its mean value over the cycle. Thus 
a value of the relative contribution of the monetary base of~say- 0.40 
at the peak of cycle I, means that 40 per cent of the deviation of the 
rate of change in the money stock at peak from its mean value over cycle 
I, can be attributed to the deviation of the contribution of the monetary 
base at peak from its average contribution over cycle I. 
Table 3.D below shows the average relative contribution of each pro~ 
xi mate determinant of the money stock over all stages of each cycle. 
Table 3.D: Average relative contribut~ons of the proximate determinants 
of the money stock over all stages of each cycle (%) 
cycles H k r t e 
I 84.80 11.22 -10.19 36.92 -22.75 
II 12.29 - 3.23 65.70 30.00 - 4.76 
III 107.72 -31.60 47.2g -33.52 10.12 
IV 184.26 4.20 -90.20 5.93 - 4.19 
V -19.47 6.81 92.57 37.44 - 3.73 
VI 42.50 - 8.00 69.09 - 6.09 2.5 
all cycles 68.68 - 5.70 29.04 11.18 - 3.8 
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The last row of table 3.D, shows the average relative contributions 
of H, k, r, t over all stages of all cycles and it constitutes a summary 
.. 
measure of the relative contributions of the proximate determinants to 
cyclical changes in the money stock. Comparing the last row of table 3.D 
with the first row of table 3.B which shows the relative contribution of 
each factor to the secular rate of growth in the money stock, we observe 
that the average relative contribution of (H) to cyclical movements in 
the money stock becomes considerably smaller whereas the relative contri-
bution of the r-ratio increases considerably over cycles. Moreover the 
relative contributions of the k and t ratios increase in absolute value 
over cycles, and the contribution of the t-ratio becomes positive. 
In addition table 3.D reveals that the intercyclical variation of 
the relative contribution of each factor is quite high, this being espe-
cially so for the contributions of Hand r. 
The contribution of the monetary base assumes a value of -19.47% 
in cycle V and a value of 184.26 per cent in cycle IV; the contribution· 
of the r-ratio assumes its highest algebraic value in cycle V (92.57%) 
and its lowest value in cycle IV (-90.20%) . 
. ~,:,:,_ .. The variation of the relative contributions of the proximate deter-
minants of the money stock is also quite high among the different stages 
of the cycles. This is shown in table 3.E below which shows the average 
relative contributions of H, k, r, t to each stage of the cycles. 
Table 3.E: average relative contributions of the proximate determinants 
of the money stock in each stage of the cycles (%) 
cycle stages H k r t e 
mid-expansions 165.83 0.30 -29.50 -15.62 -21.01 
peaks 40.33 3.35 42.75 20.76 - 0.49 
mid-contractions -21.27 -10.88 89.58 36.93 5.64 
troughs 89.85 - 8.86 13.33 5.05 0.63 
Moreover table 3.E reveals some interesting information regarding 
the relative magnitudes of the contributions of the factors affe~ting 
the money stock. In particular the relative contributions of (H) and 
(r) are roughly of the same magnitude at peaks, while at mid-contractions 
the contribution of (r) is by far the highest amounting to 89 per cent 
and the contribution of the monetary base is negative and has a relatively 
1m., absolute value. On the other hand, at r..id expansions and troughs, 
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the relative contribution of the monetary base dominates the contributions 
of all other proximate determinants of the money stock. Finally it is of 
interest to note that at mid-contractions the contribution of the t-ratio 
is positive and assumes a quite high value (36.93 per cent). 
Summarising the discussion so far, we may say that the contributions 
of the proximate determinants are sufficiently differentiated between· 
secular and cyclical movements in the :7loney stock. In particular the 
relative contribution of the reserve ratio significantly increases du-
. (13) r~ng cycles, largely at the expense of a fall in the relative contri-
bution of the monetary base. Moreover the relative contributions of 
the proximate determinants of the money stock exhibit a high variation 
both between cycles and between the different stages of the cycles. It 
should be recognised however, that the above conclusions have a tentative 
character since the number of cycles we were able to isolate during the 
period under examination is quite small. It would most probably be 
worthwhile for the cyclical behaviour of the money stock to be extensive-
ly examined in a separate study which would cover a longer time period. 
Before ending this section, it would be of interest to investigate 
whether an association exists between the contribution of the monetary 
base and the contributions of each of the other proximate determinants 
of the money stock. 
Table 3.F below, presents the association patterns for both the whole 
period 1960 111-197611 and for the stages of the cycles isolated during 
this period. 
Table 3.F: Correlation coefficients among the contributions of the 
proximate determinants of the monel stock. 
CorrH k CorrH CorrH,t CorrH,k+r+t Corr ,r H+r,k+t , 
-O~. 220 -0.525(S) 0.161 -0.500(S) -0.113 
-0.307 -0.184- 0.295 -0.127 -0.106 
Remarks: (a) CorrH k denotes the correlation coefficient between the 
absolute contributi~n of H and the absolute contribution of th: k-:atio; 
C denotes the correlation b-">t~<leen the absolute contr1.but~on of orrH,k+r+t . ~ . A 1 
H and the combined absolute contr~but1.ons of k, r, t rat1.Os. na ogous 
notation holds for the other correlations. (b) The first.row of numbers 
is calculated from 64- observations covering the whole per1.od 1960III-197611. 
The second row is calculated from 24- observations ~overing the four stag:s 
of eachof the six cycles isolated in the above per1.od. (c) the superscr~pt 
(S) denotes statistically significant correlations. 
(13) 
(See next page) 
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As the above table shows, of all the calculated correlation coeffi-
cients, only two are significantly different from zero: the correlation 
between the contribution of H and the combined contribution of k, r, t 
ratios and the correlation between the contributions of Hand r. 
One attractive explanation for the negative and significant corre-
lation between the contribution of the monetary base and the combined 
contributions of the k, r, t ratios, is that the monetary authorities, 
in their attempt to control the stock of money manipulate the monetary 
base so that to offset the variations of the money supply caused by the 
var;atl."ons of the k r t ratl."os oJ.. , , • However, such an hypothesis cannot 
be accepted since the above correlation is almost exclusively due to 
the negative and significant correlation between the contributions of 
the cash base and the reserve ratio, ~hereas if the hypothesis were 
valid we would expect a strong correlation between the contribution of 
(H) and the combined contribution of k, r, t and weaker correlations 
between the contribution of H and the separate contribution of each of 
the other proximate determinants of the stock of money. 
Since the monetary base has a positive effect on the money stock 
and the reserve ratio has a negative effect, it follows that the nega-
tive correlation between the contribution of Hand r implies a positive 
association between these two proximate determinants of the stock of 
money. Two plausible explanations can be given for this positive asso-
ciation; first a direct link may be said to exist running from the 
cash base to the reserve ratio through the following process: a rise 
in the base brings about a rise in bank reserves and deposits and thus 
a rise in the actual reserve ratio. Assuming that it takes time for 
the banking system to adjust its actual reserve ratio to its desired 
level, a positive association between Hand r may be observed providect 
that the time interval between succesive observations is relatively 
short; the longer the interval between observations the weaker this 
direct link is bound to be. Second t~e positive association between 
Hand r may be thought to arise because a "third" variable affects H 
and r in the same direction. Let us take for example a rise in nomi-
nal income; this may bring a rise in the demand for bank credit which 
(13) (From previous page) 
This result seems to be in qualitative accordance with the empirical 
finding obtained by Papadakis that, whereas secular changes in the 
money stock are primarily due to changes in the monetary base, cycli-
cal changes in the money stock are strongly influenced by the beha-
viour of the money multiplier. See John M. Papadakis:"Mon~ and Eco-
nomic Activity; the Greek experience 1950-1975", Athens 1979, Chap.2,6. 
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in turn may induce an, at least temporary, fall in the banking system's 
reserve ratio, if banks decide to accomodate the increased demand for 
loans. On the other hand the rise in income may bring a fall in the 
cash base via the balance-of-payments and/or the government budget. 
In concluding this section we should briefly explain the reason 
which dictated the calculation of Corr (H+r, t+k) presented in table 
3.F. The banking system's reserve ratio consists of the required re-
serve ratio and the desired excess reserves ratio; assuming that 
changes in the total reserve ratio are dominated by changes in reserve 
requirements, and further assuming that the monetary authorities are 
able to control the cash base, the monetary authorities may be thought 
of as manipulating both Hand r ~n order to offset undesirable variations 
in the K and t ratios which are outside of their control. If such an 
hypothesis were valid we would expect a significantly negative correla-
tion between the combined contributions of Hand r and the combined 
contributions of k and t ratios. However, as table 3.F shows, the 
correlation coefficients although negative are statistically insigni-
ficant both for the whole period 1960111-197611 and for the observations 
taken at the different stages of the detected cycles. 
Section four: Behavioural analysis of the proximate determinants of the 
money multiplier; dependence on interest rates. 
In this section we derive the second part of our money supply hypo-
thesis for the Greek economy, whose first building block has been derived 
in section two, by undertaking a behavioural analysis, accompanied by 
empirical evidence, of the allocation ratios which determine the value 
of the money multiplier. 
For convenience let us rewrite the equations constituting the first 
building block of our hypothesis. 
(4.1) l+k M - r(l+t)+k H 
(4.2) m 1+k = ~~--~--
r{l+t)+k (m the money multiplier) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) A = a + g(l-a) 
where a - the ratio of total deposits by the non-bank public with 
commercial banks to total overall deposits 
g = 
(4.5) k --
(4.6) t -
-
where 
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the ratio of deposits by SCI with commercial banks to total 
deposits by the non-bank public with SCI 
ok + (1-0)kpub pI' 
ot + (1-0)tpub pI' 
the ratio of private demand deposits to total demand depo-
sits with commercial banks and SCI. 
Right from the beginning, the following remarks are ~n place: 
(1) In the analysis to follow we shall make the assumption that the 
behaviour of both (k) and (t) ratios is dominated by the behaviour of 
k and t respectively. This assumption can be rationalized on three pr pI' 
grounds: first the weight (0) is quite high (approximately 0.752) and 
thus the behaviour of (k) and (t) will tend to reflect more the behaviour 
of kpr and tpr than the behaviour of kpub ' tpub ; second, on theo-
retical grounds, we do not expect qualitatively different behaviour of 
public enterprises and public entities from the private sector; third, 
the separate analysis of the private sector's and public sector's behavi-
our is confronted with sOme practical difficulties: referring to the 
(k) ratio, there is no way to find k ,k ub because of lack of data re-pI' p 
garding the allocation of cash between the private sector and public 
enterprises and public entities; referring to the (t) ratio we remind 
that public deposits with commercial banks and SCI are dominated by de-
posits under the heading "other". Since the Greek statistics provide 
information, not on the nature of those deposits but only on the insti-
tutions holding them, there is no way to associate tpub with rates of 
interest on time or saving deposits which are relevant for deposits by 
the private sector. 
(2) In our subsequent analysis, we shall treat the (a)-ratio as if it 
was dominated by private sector behaviour. The plausibility of this 
assumption can be shown if we disagregate the definition of (a) in which 
case we have: 
= 
1 + 
T ) + (DCB + TCB )/(D + pI' pub pub pI' 
(D ub+ T ub)/CD + T ) P P pI' pr 
T ) pr 
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CB CB In the above expression the ratios (Dpub+ Tpub)/(Dpr+ Tpr) 
(D ub+ T ub)/(D + T ) are both quite small and thus we can reasonably p p pI' pI' 
assume that the value of (a) is dominated by thE value of (nCB+ TCB )/ 
pI' PI' (D + T ). pI' pI' 
(3) It is important to note that, in the context of the Greek Economy, 
interest rates on bank deposits and bank loans are not market determined 
but are a d m ~ n l s t ere d rat e s set by the so called "Cur-
rency Committee". Moreover, as an institutional fact, the following 
relations hold for the rates on the different kinds of deposits: 
(4.7) 
(4.8) .CB l. 
s 
i ~ > ~ - iCB 
D T s 
Where (iD)~(iT) denote the interest rates on demand and time deposits, 
set at the same level for both commercial banks and SCI; (i ~B) denotes 
s 
the interest rate on saving deposits with commercial banks and (iSC1 ) 
s 
denotes the saving deposit rate with SCI. We note that commercial banks 
and SCI were paying explicit interest on demand deposits up to the 
third quarter of 1975. 
(4) Because of lack of published data on reserve requirements we were 
not able to split the reserves of commercial banks and SCI into requir-
ed and excess reserves. Thus instead of test~g the excess reserve 
ratios of commercial banks and SCI upon interest rates we tested the 
total reserve ratios. Although this procedure is not unsound in the 
case of a theoretical model,it creates some problems in empirical re-
search; for, if instead of testing the dependence of the excess reserve 
ratio, we test the dependence of the total reserve ratio upon interest 
rates, in effect we "throw" the required res.erve ratio into the error 
term and if this ratio is correlated with interest rates the problem of 
statistical bias arises. Hopefully, however, this problem is not S2-
rious for the Greek economy since, as we mentioned above, interest rates 
are not market determined, but are "administered prices". 
After the above remarks we are nOH ready to proceed in our analysis. 
We start by the behavioural analysis of the weight (A); as it is clear 
from equation (4.4) however, to accomplish this task we should first 
examine the behaviour of the (a) and (g) ratios. 
We postulate the following equation for the {a)-ratio: 
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(4.9) dO/diSCI < O. 
where iCB weighted average yield on deposits with com. banks 
i SCI : weighted average yield on deposits with SCI. 
Equation (4.9) has been tested for the period 1959I-1976IV (end-of-quarter 
data) and the fOllowing regression was obtained: 
(4.10) o - 0.684 + 0.0894 i - 0.0807 i (14) 
(0.0217) CB (0.0207) SCI 
R2 - 0.304 
As it can be seen from (4.10) above, the partial regression coef-
ficients for iCB and iSCI are highly significant and their signs con-
form with a priori expectations. 
The weighted average yields (iCB~' (iSCI ) are defined as follows: 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
where (4.13) Vz + Wz + lZ = 1, Z_= CB, SCI 
(vCB ) denotes the ratio of demand deposits with commercial banks to 
total private deposits with commercial banks, (wCB ) is the ratio of 
saving deposits to total private deposits with commercial banks, and 
(ICB) denotes the ratio of time deposits to total private deposits 
with commercial banks. Exactly analogous notation holds for SCI. 
Moreover, standard portfolio theory suggests that the weights 
(v), (w ), (1 ) are not exogenous but are dependent upon interest Z Z Z 
rates; in particular the following relations are expected to hold: 
(14) 
In this regression as well as in all regressions to follow, the 
numbers in parentheses denote standard errors. 
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(4.15) - ("z . iT) ; dwZ/di~>O, dWzldin<O, Wz - ~-lZ 1. S ' 1.n , z - CB, SCI; dWZldiT<O. -
(4.16) lZ lZ(iT, 
.z 
in); Z CB, SCI; dlzldiT>O, dlzldi~ dlzldi
n 
<0. = 1. s' = <0, 
Making use of equations (4.9) and (4.11) - (4.16) we derive the partial 
responses of the (a)-ra.tio to h . .CB .SCI . . c anges In 1.
s 
,1.s ,1.
n
, 1.T : 
Although the expressions in curled brackets in the RHS of (4.17), 
(4.18) have ambiguous signs on a priori grounds, in practice they are 
almost certainly positive. That this is so can be seen as follows: 
expressing the partial derivatives appearing in the expressions in 
question in terms of elasticities and taking average values of wz' Vz (Z~ CB, SCI), in' iT' i;B, i;CI for the period 1959I-1976IV we obtain 
that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the above expressions 
to be positive are: 
() CB . CB 4.21 eWCB' is < 4.58-1.18 eVCB' 1. s 
(4 22) ew i SCI .SCI 
. SCI' s <7.9 - 0.33 evSCI ' 1.s ( 
.SCI) 
evSCI ' 1.s <0 
The elasticity of the ratio of saving deposits to all other deposits 
{denoted by (S/L» is connected with (w) through the following formula: 
(4.23) 1 .Z 
- 1-w . ewZ' 1.s Z 
Z = CB, SCI 
Substituting (4.23) into (4.21), (4.22) we obtain the following necessary 
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(4.21') 
(4.22') e(S/L)SCI, i SCI <37.61 _ .SCI s 1.57 evSCI , 1S 
Clearly both the above conditions are weak and are most probably 
met in practice. Given that the expressions 1n curled brackets in the 
RHS of (4.17), (4.18) are positive and given that (d~/diCB) > 0, 
(da/aiSCI ) < 0 we have that expression (4.17) is positive and expression 
(4.18) is negative. 
On the other hand expressions (4.19), (4.20) have ambiguous signs; 
they may be either positive or negative. To resolve this ambiguity and 
to confirm the signs of (4.17), (4.18) we estimated regression equations 
for vCB ' vSCI,wCB' wSCI over the period 1959I-1976IV (end-of-quarter data) 
which are reported in footnote (15) below. Using the partial regression 
ff " f h . ( 16 ) h . 1 '. ff" coe 1C1entso t ese equat1ons, t e part1a regress10n coe 1C1ents 
of equation (4.10) as well as taking average values for vz' wz' lZ' 
(Z=CB, SCI), (iD), (iT)' (i;B), (i~CI),\Ve calculated the partial response. 
patterns of the a-ratio to changes in interest rates, which are presented 
in elasticity terms in table 4.A below: 
Table 4.A average elasticity coefficients of the a-ratio: 1959I-1976IV 
. .CB .SCI . x 1CB lSCI 1 1 1D 1T s s 
e 0.660 -0.680 0.454 -0.575 -0.011 0.077 
a.x 
(15 ) 
- 0.00856 i CB 2 (1) vCB -. 0.1394 + 0.05369 iD + 0.00073 iT R = 0.858 s 
(0.00421) (0.00969) (0.00927) 
.CB 
- 0.03149 iT 2 (2) WeB - 0.7173 + 0.02864 1 - 0.02853 iD R = 0.578 - s 
(0.00729) (0.00316) (0.00697) 
.SCI 0658 . 0.0178 + 0.01832 iD - 0.00811 1S + 0.0 1T 
2 R = 0.738 
(0.00161) (0.00548) (0.00508) 
.SCI 154' 0 00254 . 0.8263 + 0.00531 1S - 0.04 lD -. 1T 
2 R = 0.772 
(0.0119) (0.00352) (0.0111) 
(16)In regressions (1), (3) above the regression coefficients of (iT) are 
statistically insignificant and have the wrong sign. For this reason, 
in the calculations of the elasticity values of table 4.A, these coef-
ficients are taken to be zero. 
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The above analysis as well as the empiricale~dence enable us to 
write the following equation for the a-ratio: 
(4.24) a. = .23 . > 0 .SCI ea.:.. s ' ea.1-T ; ea.1-s ' eaiD < O. 
Next we postulate the following equation for the ratio of deposits 
by SCI with commercial banks to total ~eposits by the non-bank public 
wi th SCI, (g) 
-'-(4.25) g - g{i', i~) dg/di'>O, dg/di~ < O. 
L 
.'-(i~) is a loan rate index relevant for loans granted by SCI. Since SCI 
deposits with commercial banks consist of demand and time deposits the 
yield (it) is a weighted average yield of demand and time deposits by 
SCI with commercial banks. Equation (4.25) has been tested for the 
period 1959IV-1976IV and the following regression was obtained: 
_t. 
.. 
(4~26) g - 0.372 + 0.0707 i' - 0.0849 iL 
(0.0150) (0.0144) 
2 R = 0.345. 
As it can be seen from (4.26) the two partial regression coefficients 
are statistically significant and their signs conform with a priori 
expectations. 
The weighted average yield (i') 1.S defined as follows: 
(4.27) i' = ziD + (1-z)iT 
where (z) is the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits by SCI with 
commercial banks. 
Moreover we postulate the following behavioural equation for (z): 
The partial responses of the g-ratio to changes in (iD), (iT) are given 
by the following expressions: 
(4.29) dg/diD = (dg/di')(di'/diD) 
(4.30) dg/diT = (dg/di')(di'/diT) 
where: 
(4.31) di' / diD z + (iD-iT) 
dZ 
- din -
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(4.32) di'/~iT (1) (. .) dZ 
o = -z + In-1T di
T 
> 0 
Expression (4.32) is unambiquously positive; the sign of expres-
sion (4.31) is ambiguous, the necessary and sufficient condition for a 
positive (dil/din ) being eZin < in/CiT-in)' To resolve the ambiguity 
of the sign of (4.31) as well as to confirm the positive sign of (4.32) 
we rely on empirical evidence; in particular we regressed (z) on (in)' 
(iT) over the period 1959IV-1976IV, including a trend variable (t) in 
the regression to allow for the upward trend in (z). The regression 
obtained is as follows: 
(4.33) z - 0.3921 - 0.05648 in - 0.02285 iT + 0.00233 t R2 = 0.464 
(0.03312) (0.00923) (0.0140) 
As it can be seen from (4.33) the regression coefficient of (iT) 
is significant and its sign conforms to a priori expectations. On the 
other hand the coefficient of (in) is statistically insignificant and 
has the wrong sign. For this reason, in our subsequent calculations we 
take the value of (dz/di
n
) to be zero. 
Using the values of the regression coefficients of (4.26), (4.33) 
as well as the average values of (g), (z), (in)' (iT)' (if) over the 
period 1959IV-1976IV we calculated the partial response patterns of 
(g) to changes in interest rates which are presented in elasticity terms 
in table 4.B below: 
Table 4.B: average elasticity coefficients for the g-ratio: 1959IV-1976IV 
x if 
e~ 2.942 -4.780 0.153 3.197 
The above analysis as well as the empirical evidence enable us to 
write the following behavioural equation for (g): 
(4.34) 
Using equations (4.24), (4.34) and the definition of the weight (A) 
(see equation 4.4), we can easily derive the partial elasticity coeffici-
ents of (A) with respect to interest rates: 
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(4.35a) A· CB a(i-g) .CB > e ~ =. ea~ 0 s A s 
(4.35b) A· SCI e ~ = a(i-g) . .SCI< ecu 0 
s A s 
(4.35c) eAi
n 
-
a(i-g) 
eai
n 
g(l-e:.) 
egi > 0 
-
I 
A A n< 
(4.35d) eAiT -
( i-g) 
eaiT + 
g(l-a.) 
egiT >0 - A A 
.'. gel-a) 0' • (4. 35e) .. eAi L = .egiL < 0 A 
Table 4.C below presents the partial elasticity coefficients of (A) 
with respect to interest rates; the calculations were made using for-
mulas. (4.35a)-(4.35e) and are based on the elasticity coefficients of 
tables (4.A), (4.B) as well as on the average values of (a.), (g), (A) 
over the period i959IV-1976IV. 
Table 4.C: average elasticity coefficients for (A): 1959IV-1976IV 
x = 
eAX 
. CB 
~ 
s 
0.374 
.SCI 
~ 
s 
-0.473 
0' • .. 
-0.253 -0.0009 
o 
.~ 
T 
0.233 
From table 4.C we can see that the elasticity of (A) w.r. to the 
demand' deposit rate (in) is of negligible magnitude. Therefore we 
may assume without introducing serious error that the weight A is in-
dependent of (in). On the other hand,expressions (4.35a)-(4.35e) as 
well as the elasticity estimates of table 4.C enable us to write the 
following equation for the weight (A): 
(4.36) , _ '(l.CB, l·SCI .*) /\ /\ S s' ~T' ~L ; 
"\ .CB 
e/\l , 
s 
, . SCI 
e/\~ , 
s 
Having examined the behavioural dependences of the weight CA) we 
next turn to examine the dependence of commercial banks' and SCI reserve 
ratios (rCB ' r SCI ) upon interest rates. Quite conventionally we postul-
ate the following behavioural equatio~s: 
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(4.37) ~ rCB(iL, p); drCB/diL<O drCB /dP>O r" = CB 
~ ~ ~ (4.38) n rSCI(i~,p); drSCI/di~< r SCI= 0 drSCI/dp > 0 
~ ~ ~.. l1li-
where rCB' r SCI denote the desired r2serve ratios of commercial banks 
* and SCI respectively, i L, iL denote loan rate indices relevant for loans 
granted by commercial banks and SCI respectively and p is the Central 
Bank's discount rate. Equations (4.37), (4.38), supplemented by a partial 
~ 
adjustment mechanism of the type: x-x = y(x·:x ) linking the actual to 
-1 -1 
desired reserve ratio, have been estimated over the period 1960I-1976IV 
using end-of-quarter data and the following regressions were obtained: 
(4.39) r CB= 0.0689 - 0.01052iL + 0.00928p + 0.5708rCB ; R2= 0.63 (0.0223) (0.00383) (0.0033) (0.0817) -1 
~ 
d = 2.27, 
(17) 
h = -1.51 
.. (4.40) r SCI= 0.0395 - 0.00235iL - 0.00029p + O.789rSCI ; R2= 0.77, 
(0.0318) (0.00642) (0.0041) (0.057) -1 d = 2.44, 
h =-2.05. 
Equation (4.39) confirms the postulated behavioural dependences 
of the commercial banks reserve ratio; the regression coefficients of 
p are statistically significant and have the a priori expected 
signs. On the other hand the regression coefficients of i L, p in equa-
tion (4.40) for the SCI reserve ratio are statistically insignificant 
and moreover the coefficient of the Bank rate (p) has the wrong sign. 
The poor performance of the loan rate and the bank rate in the equation 
for the SCI reserve ratio may be partly explained from the fact that 
SCI are State owned institutions constrained by monetary authority regu-
lations and therefore a postulated reaction to interest rate incentives 
as if SCI were unconstrained profit maximising institutions may not ap-
ply. 
(17) h is equal to r./(n/1-nV(b» where r is the estimated first order 
autocorrelation coefficient of the residuals, n is the nlli~er of 
observations and V'(b) is the sampling variance of the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable. The h statistic has been develop-
ed by Durbin as a large sample test for serial correlation when lag-
ged dependent variables are present. h is tested as a standard normal 
deviate; thus if h>1.645 one would reject the hypothesis of zero auto-
correlation at the 5 per cent level. See J. Johnston: Econometric 
Methods 2nd edition. pp 312-313. 
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Table 4.D below presents the long-run elasticity coefficients of 
rCB' r SCI ' with respect to interest rates. Since the regression coef-
ficient of p in (4.40) is both statistically insignificant and has the 
wrong sign we take the par~ial response of r SCI to changes in the dis-
count rate (p) to be zero. 
Table 4.D: average elasticity coefficients of rCB' r SCI : 1960I-1976IV 
x 
-2.151 
.f • 
.. 
-0.744 
p 
1.472 
0.000 
Combining equations (4.36), (4.37), (4.38) and (4.3) we can easily 
derive the following response patterns of the weighted average reserve . 
ratio (r) to changes in interest rates: 
(4.41a) 
r 
eriL = 
A. ( CB). erCBiL < 0 r 
(4.4lb) . rCB erp = A. (---r-) .erCBP > 0 
(4.41c) .'. 
(rCB-rSCI) ~': r SC1 . 'I: 
eriL - A. eAiL + (1-A). ( ).erSCIlL < 0 -
r r 
(4.41d) .CB 
(rCB-rSCI) A· CB > 0 iff > erl - A. e l rCB < r SCI - < s r s 
(4.41e) 
(4.41f) eriT ~o iff 
The slgn of expression (4.41c) is ambiguous on a priori grounds; 
.'. 
if rCB>rSCI then eriZ is unambiguously negative; if rCB<rSCI ~ii: may 
be posi ti ve or negative depending on ~o{hether the first term in the RHS 
of (4.41c) dominates the second or vice versa. In practice however the 
second term in the RHS of (4.41c) almost certainly dominates the 
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f1'rst(18) and therefore er1'
L
* . . 1S almost certa1nly negative. Expressions 
(4.41a - 4.41f) for the partial responses of the r-ratio to changes in 
interest rates enable us to write the following equation for the r-ratio: 
.'. 
. CB .SCI J • .. 
r(iL, i L, iT); eriL, <0; 
. 
r - p, 1 1 erp > 0, er1L - , , 0 s s < 
.CB 
eriT 
> iff reB ~ er1 , < 0 r SCI s 
Table 4.E below presents the average partial elasticity coefficients of 
the r-ratio with respect to interest rates calculated using the elasti-
city values of tables (4.0), (4.C) and taking average values for (A), 
(rCB )' (rSCI )' (r) over the period 19S9IV-1976IV. 
Table 4.E: average elasticity coefficients of the r-ratio: 19S9IV-1976IV 
x = p 
erx -1. S49 -0.188 1.06 
.CB 
1 
s 
-0.039 
.SCI 
1 
s 
0.049 -0.024 
Having completed the behavioural analysis of the reserve ratio, we 
now turn to examine the dependence of the total deposits other than de-
mand-demand deposit ratio (the t-ratio) upon interest rates. We remind 
that in the analysis to follow, the t'-ratio will be assumed to be domi-
nated by the private sector behaviour. 
Following the standard principles of portfolio theory, we postulate 
.'. 
that the desired t-ratio (t") depends positively on a weighted average 
yield on saving and time deposits (denoted by i) and negatively upon the 
demand deposit rate (iO) . 
. '. .. (4.43) t - t(i, io); at/ai >0 at/aiD < o. 
(18) 
In no quarter over the period 19S9IV-1976IV the elasticity of (r) 
w . r. to (1..'E) assumed a posi ti ve value. The arithmetical value of 
eriE for the quarter 1976IV,where the expression (rCB - rSCI)/r 
assumes i~highest negative value (-1.888),is equal to -0.10. This 
elasticity value is calculated by takin~ the ave~age value of A over 
period 19S9IV-1976IV, the values of eAi£, erSCri£ from tables 4.C, 
4.0 and the values of r, rCB, rSCr for the quarter 1976IV (r=0.0563, 
rCB=0.0247, rSCI= 0.131). 
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Equation (4.43), supplemented by the conventional partial adjustment 
.<. 
mechanism t-t = y(t~t ), has been tested for the period 1959II-1976IV 
-1 -1 
and the regression obtained confirmed the postulated dependences of the 
t-ratio. The regression equation is as follows: 
(4.44) t = 1.582 + 0.0823i - 0.4153iD + 0.7428t , 
(0.497) (0.0396) (0.1318) (0.0691)-1 
R2_ 0.94, d - 2.254, 
h =-1.32 
The weighted average yield on saving and time deposits, (i), is de-
fined as follows: 
(4.45) 
Where ~ is the ratio of saving deposits by the private sector to 
total saving and time deposits by the; private sector; ~ is the ratio 
of private saving deposits with commercial banks over total private sa-
ving deposits. (4.45) can be written as follows: 
Where s is the weighted average yield on saving deposits: 
(4.47) 
We further postulate the follmIing equation for the weights ~, ~ : 
(4.48) ~ = ~(d); ~'< 0 where d = i SC1 _ iCB s s 
Using equations (4.46)-(4.49) we can derive the following partial response 
( ) 0 (l.0CB), Cl.·SCI ), (. ) patterns of i to changes l.n s s l.T : 
(4.50a) 
(4050b) 
(4.50c) 
ai 
ai SCI 
s 
. e.ss ) 
i -s T 
s 
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Expression (4.50c) is unambiguously positive Slnce 0<~<1, iT>s, 
a{1/aiT<O. On the other hand, expressic:-:s (4.50a) (4.50b) have ambi-
guous signs. Expression (4.50a) will b~ positive if and only if either 
of the following two conditions is satisfied: 
(4.50d) lelldl< 1 and E{1s< s/(iT-s) 
(4.50e) lelldl> 1 and E > {1s s/(iT-s) 
On the other hand, Slnce er,d is negative and therefore the expression 
{1 ll(l+elld)} is always positive, a necessary and sufficient condi-
t · f' . t . f (.) h . ( . SCI) lon or a POS1 lve response 0 1 to c anges 1n 1 1S that 
s 
e{1s< s/(iT-s). 
If lelldl> 1 and E{1s> s/(iT-s),then 
and ai/aiSCI will be negative. If !elldl> 
s 
1 
~./~.CB . b . d ~./~.SCI . 01 01 Wlll e negat1ve an 01 01 Wlll 
ai/diCB 
s 
will be positive 
and E~s< s/(iT-s), 
be positive. If lelldl< 1 
s s 
and e{1s >s/(iT-s), both di/di~B, ai/di~CI will be negative. Finally, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for both ai/aiCB and ai/aiSCI 
s s 
to be positive are that: 
(4.51) 
(4.52) 
Clearly whether or not these conditions are met in practice is 
an empirical question. Since, as an institutional fact of the Greek 
financial system s/(iT-s) is always higher than unity, calculated 
elasticity values of elld, e{1s less than unity ensure that expressions 
(4.50a), (4.50b) will be positive. To obtain quantitative estimates 
of the elasticities elld and e~s we regressed the (~)-ratio on (d) and 
the (~)-ratio on (s) and (iT) over the period 19591 - 1976IV (end-of-
quarter data). the regressions obtained are as follows: 
(4.53) l.1 = 0 .759 -0 .1757d (0.0195) 
R2 =0.53S 
average elasticity of the l.1-ratio with respect to (d): -0.116 
(4.54) ~ = 0 .848 + 0.029285 - .J .J 3571iT (0.00699) (0.00635) 
2 R = 0.502 
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average elasticity coefficients of the ~-ratio w.r to (s)~ (iT): 
0.217 , - - 0.314 
The arithmetical values of e~d, e~s imply positive signs for di/ai~B~ 
~./~.SCI I . h I I d 1 f d / . 01 01S . nsert1ng t e ca cu ate va ues 0 e~ ~ e~s' d~ dlT, as 
well as the average values of ~, ~, 1T, s over the period 19591-1976IV, 
into expressions (4.50a)-(4.50c) we obtain: 
(4.S5) di/aiCB - 0.447, 
s 
ai/aiSCI = 0.297, 
s 
ai/aiT - 0.265 
Combining the above estimates with the long-run partial regression 
coefficients of equation (4.44) \-le calculated the long-run average ela-
sticity coefficients of (t) with respect to interest rates Tor the period 
1959I-1976IV, which are presented in table 4.F below. 
Table 4.F: average elasticity coefficients of the t-ratio: 1.9S9I-1976IV. 
.CB .SCI 
iT iD x . 1 1 1 . S S 
etx: 0.323 0.135 0.097 0.098 -0.335 
The above analysis as well as the empirical evidence enable us to 
write the following equation for the t-ratio: 
() ( .CB .SCI . ) 4.56 t - t 1S ,1S ,1T' 1D ; e .CB, e t1.SCI, e . > 0, e t . < O. t1s s t1T ~D 
Finally, let us turn to examine the behavioural dependence of 
the cash-demand deposit ratio (k). As in the case of the t-ratio we 
assume that the k-ratio is also dominated by private sector behaviour. 
Standard portfolio theory suggests that the k-ratio depends negatively 
upon the demand deposit rate (iD). Moreover, if cash and demand deposits 
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possess different degrees of substitutability with respect to saving 
and time deposits, we expect that the k-ratio will be sensitive to 
changes 1n the weighted average yield (i) on saving and time deposits. 
If cash 1S closer substitute with saving and time deposits than demand 
deposits, we expect that a rise in (i) will cause a fall in the k-ratio, 
whereas if demand deposits are closer substitute than cash with saving 
and time deposits we expect that a rise in (i) will bring a rise in the 
k-ratio. Thus we can write the following equation for the desired k-
ratio (k ~':) : 
(4.57) dk/ai~ o. ' 
The above equation, supplemented with a partial adjustment mecha-
nism, has been tested for the period 1959II-1976IV (end-of-quarter data) 
and the following regression was obtained: 
(4.58) k = 0.5331 - 0.02315iD - O.00738i + 0.8476k-1 , R2= 0.755, d=2.20, (0.2753) (0.03568) (0.0177) (0.0666) h = 1.02 
From equation (4.58) we see that the partial regression coefficient 
of (iD) has negative sign conforming to a priori expectations. The part-
ial regression coefficient of (i) is also negative providing some evidence 
in favour of the clo~ersubs:,ti tutabili ty of cash with saving and time depo-
sits. Nevertheless, as it can be seen from the standard errors of (4.58), 
the regression coefficients of (iD), (i) are statistically insignificant. 
For the sake of completeness however, and since the signs of the partial 
regression coefficients in question are not inconsistent with a priori 
expectations(19), we obtained numerical values for the partial long-run 
elasticities of the k-ratio with respect to interest rates, combining 
the coefficients of regression (4.58) with the quantitative estimates 
(4.55). These long-run elasticities are presented in the following 
table :. 
(19 ) 
Equation (4.58) has been reestimated omitting the lagged dependent 
variable (k-l) and the regression obtained is as follows: 
k = 3.602 - 0.1836 iD - 0.0596i R2 = 0.161. 
(0.0534) (0.0303) 
The above regression has reinforced our decision to proceed in the 
elasticity calculations of table 4.G since the regression coefficients 
of (iD) (i) have the same signs as in (4.58). Moreover these coeffici-
ents are of the same order of magnitude with the long-run regression 
coefficients of (iD), (i) in (4.58) which are equal to -0.1519,-0.0484. 
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Table 4.G: elasticity coefficients of the k-ratio: 1959I-1976IV 
. .CB .SCI 
x 1. 1. 1. 1.T 1.D s s 
ekx -0.096 -0 .. 040 -0. 0~9 -0.029 -0.062 
On both theoretical and empirical grounds we may write the follow-
ing equation for the k-ratio: 
Having completed the behavioural analysis of the proximate determi-
nants of the money multiplier we are now ready to connect the two build-
ing blocks of our money supply hypothesis by examining the dependence of 
the money multiplier upon interest rates. First, let us rewrite, for 
convenience, the basic behavioural equations for the r, t and k ratios: 
.CB . > 0 1.·ff 
er1.s ' erlT < 
.SCI > 0 ·ff < er1.s < 1. r CB > r SC1 
(4.56) C CB .SCI i D); t·
CB .SCI 
etiT > 0; etiD< 0 t = t 1. , 1 , 1.T, e 1. , et1. , s s s s 
(4.59) = k(iD, 
.CB .SCI iT) ; ekiD, k·
CB k· SCI ekiT < o. k 1. , 1. , e 1 , e 1. , S S S S 
Moreover, from our analysis of section two and taking into account 
table 2.A (P.l03) we may write the following equation for the money ml,llti-
plier: 
(4.60) m = m(r,t,k); emr, emt emk < O. 
Using equations (4.42), (4.56), (4.59), (~.60), we can easily deri-
ve the following response patterns of the money multiplier (m) to changes 
in interest rates: 
(4.61a) emiL = (emr)(eriL) > 0 
. '. 
.I • 
. . 
.. (emr)(eriL) > 0 (4.6lb) emiL = 
(4. 61c) emp = (emr )(erp) < 0 
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(4.61d) emin - (emt)(etin)+(emk)(ekin) > 0 -
(4. 61e) .CB (emr)(eriCB)+(emt)(etiCB)+(emk)(ekiCB) em1. = s s s s 
(4.61f) emiT = (emr)(eriT)+(emt)(etiT)+(emk)(ekiT) 
(l.j .• 61h) .SCI (emr)(eriSCI)+(emt)(etiSCI)+(emk)(ekiSCI). em1. = s s s s 
Expressions(4.61e), (4.61f) have ambiguous signs; in both these 
expressions the second term is negative, the third term 1.S positive and 
the first term is negative or positive depending on whether rCB is larger 
or smaller than r SCI ' If rCB>rSCI' the first term is negative in which 
case a sufficient condition for (4.61e), (4.61f) to be negative is that 
the second term in the above expressions dominates the third term in 
ab I I Th ' d'" I . I . . (20) so ute va ue. 1.S con 1.t1.on 1.S a most certa1.n y met 1.n pract1.ce 
and thus we postulate that if rCB>rSCI expressions (4.61e), (4.61f) are 
negative. Expression (4.61h) has also ambiguous sign. The second term 
is negative, the third term is positive and the first term is negative 
or positive depending on whether rCB is lower or larger than r SCI • If 
rCB < r SCI a sufficient condition for (4.61h) to be negative is that 
the second term dominates the third in absosute value; since this condi-
tion is almo~t certainly met in practice(21) we postulate that (4.61h) is 
negative. 
(20)The lowest absolute value of e over the period 1959I-1976IV is 0.069 
and the highest absolute valuem~f emk over the same period is 0.112. 
Using the above values as well as the values of eti~B, ekiCB, etiT' 
~_. from tables 4.F, 4.G we obtain: lemtoetiCBI=0.0093 le~.ekiCBI= 
-K1.T I ISS 
= 0.0045; lemt. etiT I=0.0068, emkoekt'T =0.0032. Clearly then we have: 
lemt eti~BI > lemk eki~BI, lemt etiT > lemk ekiTI 
(21)Lowest absolute value of emt = 0.069;highest absolute value of emk 
0.112. From tables (4.F), (4.G) we obta~n eti~CI= 0.090, eki~CI=-0.027 
. Using these values we calculate = I emt eti~CI I = 0.006'7, I emk eki~CI I = 
= 0.0032. Therefore lemt eti~CII > lemk eki~CII. 
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Expressions (4.61a)-(4.61h) as well as the above discussion enable 
us to write the following equation for the money multiplier: 
e . , e
ml. 1" e . >0; e < o. filL L m1n mp 
then e .SCI < 0 
m1 
s 
if rCB>rSCI then emiSCI~ o. 
s 
Before proceeding to test equation (4.62) we should note that this 
equation can be considerably simplified if we take into account that some 
of the interest rates appearing as arguments in (4.62) are very closely 
correlated with each other. In particular, the correlation coefficient 
.'. 
between (iL), (i~) for the period 19591I-1976IV was 0.96 and the corre-
1 · ff" b ( . CB) ( . SCI) d (. CB) (.) atlon coe 1C1ents etween 1 ,1 an 1 ,1T were, over 
s s s 
the period 1959I-1976IV 0.99 and 0.97 respectively. Given these close 
associations we can think of (i~) as a function of (iL) and (iT)' (i:CI ) 
as functions of (iCB ), ln which case (4.62) can be written as follows: 
s 
( ) { .*(.) . .CB. (.CB) 1.SCI(1.CB)} 
.4.63 m = miL' lL 1L ' p, 1D' 1S.' 1T 1S 's S 
where the partial elasticities of (f) w.r. to interest rates are: 
(4.65b) e fp -
(4.65c) e fin= 
(4.65d) efiCB 
s 
e ...... e 
ID.. !'p 
<0. 
emt·etin+ernk 
= e . (e . CB mr r1 
s 
+ emt(etiCB 
s 
+ emk(ekiCB 
s 
ek · >0. 1n 
+ e .SCI. e.SCI . CB+ e .. e .. CB) + 
r1 1 1 r1T 1Tls S s s 
+ e .SCI.e.SCI .CB + e . e. CB) + t1 1 1 t1T lTis s s s 
+ ek·SCI.e.SCI iCB + eke e. iCB) 
1 1 s 1T 1T s s s 
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Expressions (4.65b), (4.65c) are identical with expressions 
(4.61c), (4.61d) respectively. Moreover (4.65a) is unambiguously 
positive as it can be seen by looking at expressions (4.61a), (4.6lb). 
Finally expression (4.65d), although ambiguous on a priori grounds, is 
almost certainly negative, over the period under examination~22) For 
convenience, we rewrite equation (4.64), indicating the signSof the 
partial responses of (m) to changes in interest rates: 
(4.64) -F( • •• CB) m = - lL' p, lD' lS ; e f O >0, e f <O~ lL P 
Different linear versions of (4.64) have been tested for the period 
195911-1976IV and the regressions obtained are as follows: 
(4.66) m = 1.044 + 0.0309iL - 0.0174p - O.o184i
CB 
s 
- 0.0033iD; R2= 0.336, 
(0.073) (0.0163) (0.0048) (0.0146 ) (0.0103) d = 1.202 
t-values: (14.27), (1.89), (-3.60) , (-1.26), (-0.32) 
(4.67) m = 1.024 + 0.0350iL - 0.0178p _ 0.0214i
CB ; R2= 0.335 d = 1.202 s 
(0.039) (0.0100) (0-.0046) (0.0112) 
t-values: (25.99), (3.50), ( - 3.865) , (-1.902) 
(22) 
The arithmetical values of the average elasticity coefficients 
e .. CB' e.SCliCB are 0.872, 0.908 respectively over the period 
lTl lS s 
1959!-1976IV. Using expressions (4.41d), (4.41e), (4.41h)~ the 
first bracketed expression in the RHS of (4.65d) can be written 
as follows: 
MrCB-rSCr) '.-(eAiCB + eAiSCr. eiSCliCB+ eAiT.eiTiCB). Taking the 
r s s s s s 
mean value of (A) and the h i g h est negative value of (rCS-rSCI)/r 
over the period 1959IV-1976IV, as well as the elasticity values of 
table 4.C we obtain that the above expression is equal to -0.207. 
Moreover, using the elasticity values of (4.F), (4.G) we obtain the 
'following values for the second and third bracketed expressions in 
the RHS of (4.65d) respectively: J.308,-0.091 Using the above 
arithmetical values as well as the elasticity estimates of e ~ 
e ,e
mk over the period 1959r-1976IV (see section 2 table 2~), we mt 
obtain: efi~B = -0.0065. Thus, even though we took the highest ne-
gative value of (rCB-rSCr)/r which is most unfavourable to the hy-
pothesis that efoCB is negative we see that this hYpothesis still 
lS 
holds. 
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(4.68) m = 1.077 + 0.0184i - 0.0220p; 
L 
(0.029) (0.0049) (0.041) 
t-values: (37.47) (3.72) (-5.37) 
2 R = 0.30 
(4.69) m = 0.646 + 0.0115iL - 0.0144p + 0.404m -1 
(0.110) .(0.0048) (0.0042) (0.100) 
t-values: (5.87), (2.39), (-3.42), (4.04) 
d = 1.113. 
R2= 0.436, d = 1.975 
h = 0.195 
In all the above regressions the coefficient of the discount rate 
(p) is highly significant and has the sign expected on a priori grounds. 
The coefficient of the loan rate (iL ) is statistically significant and 
has the right sign in all regressions except in regression (4.66) where 
the coefficient in question has the right sign but the value of the 
t-statistic, though quite high,is lower than the critical value at the 
5 per cent level of significance. In regressions (4.66), (4.67), the 
coefficient of the saving deposit rate (iCB ) is negative, conforming 
s 
with the theoretical analysis undertaken above, but it is statistically 
insignificant. It should be noted however that in regression (4.67) the 
value of the t-statistic is close to the critical value at the 5 per cent 
level of significance. Finally, as it can be seen Trom regression (4.66), 
the coefficient of the demand deposit rate (in) has the wrong sign but 
it is highly insignificant. 
In regressions (4.66)-(4.69) a linear functional dependence of the 
money multiplier upon interest rates is postulated. We have also tested 
the dependence of (m) upon interest rates using a log-linear specification 
which is obtained by an exactly analogous process to the one followed by 
d . . h· I" 1 h th . ( 23 ) Brunner an Meltzer In testlng t e~r non- lnear money supp y ypo eSlS. 
Transforming in logarithms the expression for the money multiplier (eq. 
4.1 p. 42) and totally differentiating the resulting expression we obtain: 
(4.70) dm 
m 
dr dt dk 
- emr r + emtt + emk k 
Treating the partial elasticities of m w.r. to r, t, k, a'S ' 
constant and integrating (4.70) we get: 
(23) 
See chapter one,section 3.2 . 
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Postulating further that the r,t,k ratios depend ~n a log-linear 
fashion upon interest rates we obtain 
(4.72) 
From equat ion (4.64) it is clear that the following·· s~gns are 
expected for the coefficient$of equation (4.72) : 
Different versions of (4.72) have been tested for the period 
19601-1976IV (end-Of-quarter date) and the only t~10 worth mentioning 
are reported below : 
(4.73) 1nm - -0.0484 + 0.2041iL - 0.0867p - 0.0839 i~B ; R2 =0.142 
(0.130) (0.1197) (0.347) (0.0870) d =1.215 
t-valu:es (-0.371) (1.705) (-2.50) (-0.964 ) 
(4.74) 1nm - 0.0601 + 0.0980iL - 0.0989p; 
R2 
= 0.129 d = 1.17 -
(0.0655) (0.0471) (0.0323) 
t-values (0.918) (2.081) (-3.065) 
In regression (4.73) the partial regression coefficients have the 
a priori expected §igns but only the coefficient of the discount rate 
is statistically significant. In regression (4.74) both the coefficients 
of (iL) and (p) have the right signs and are statistically significant. 
In this section we examined theoretically and tested the dependence 
of the money stock upon interest rates. The empirical evidence provided 
by regressions (4.66)-(4.69) and (4.73),(4.74) confirms to a large extent 
our theoretical analysis, by revealing that the money multiplier depends 
significantly upon at least two interest rates: the commercial banks' 
loan rate and the Central Bank's discount rate. Thus as a general con-
clusion to this section we may say that in the context of the Greek Eco-
nomy and over the period 1959-1976 the empirical evidence favours the 
hypothesis that the nominal stock of money is an endogenous variable(24) 
significantly dependent upon the loan rate and the discount rate. 
(24)To avoid misunderstanding we note that although the money stock may 
be endogenous with respect to interest rates, it may well be exogenous 
with respect to other macrovariables such as income and prices. Given 
that in the Greek Economy interest rates are administered and assuming 
that the authorities strictly control the cash base of the system, 
rhanQes in income will not affect the nominal stock of money. 
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~A.p~p~e~n~d~i~x~t~o~~c~h~a~p~t~e~r~t~w~o~:~~~ncorporation of commercial banks' 
and SCI borrowing ratios into the money supply hypothesis. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter (section four), the 
monetary base (H) can be decomposed into two parts: unborrowed cash, 
which is usually referred to as the "adjusted base" (Ha) and the banking 
system's borrowings from the Central Bank (B). The rationale for this 
partition is that, to the extent that these borrowings are demand deter-
mined, then only the "adjusted base" may be considered as a genuine exo-
genous variable of the system. 
Clearly this partition of the cash base is operationally useful 
only if borrowing from Central Bank is, at least partly, demand determin-
ed; in the context of the Greek Economy however, it is not at all certain 
that this is so. Referring, in particular, to SCI borrowings from the 
Central Bank, which are by far larger than commercial banks' borrowings, 
it may well be argued that they are a "supply determined" magnitude, 
regulated by the monetary authorities. Such a presumption is based on 
the fact that in the Greek Economy, due to the inadequacy of private 
deposits, SCI do not only use the discount window for the conventional 
purpose of meeting temporary adverse clearing balances but they rely 
heavily, and on a perm~nent basis, upon Central Bank funds in order to 
finance their credit activities. Given this special nature of SCI bor-
rowings, it may be argued that the monetary authorities have, at least 
in principle, a strong motive to control lending to SCI. 
Central Bank lending policy to financial institutions will be exten-
sively examined in chapter five in the context of a general equilibrium 
framework. In this appendix we shall briefly indicate how financial 
institutions' borrowings from the Central Bank can be incorporated into 
our money supply hypothesis and we will also provide some empirical 
evidence regarding the behavioural responses of commercial banks' and 
SCI borrowing ratios. 
To show how the borrowing 
be incorporated into our money 
system of equations: 
(A.l) M = C + D 
(A.2) Ha = C + R - B 
(A.3) R = reD + T) 
(A.4) C = k.D 
(A. 5) T = t.D 
(A.6) B - beD + T) 
-
ratio of commercial banks and SCI can 
supply hypothesis, we write the following 
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In the above system (Ha) denotes the "adjusted base" B : commercial 
banks' and SCI borrowing from the Cen~~al Bank and (b) the weighted ave-
rage borrowing ratio of commercial ba~<s and SCI; the remaining variables 
of the system have already been defined in section two of this chapter 
(see p. 99 ) . 
Substituting (A.3), (A.4) (A.6) into CA.2), substituting (A.5) in 
the resulting expression and solving for CD) we get: 
D = l/{(r-b)(l+t)+k}' .Ra. Combining the above expressions with (A.l), 
(A.4) and solving for (M) we obtain: 
1 + k (A.7) M - (r-b)(l+t)+k . Ha. 
where (A.a) Emb = b(l+t)/{(r-b) (l+t)+k} > o. 
Moreover as in the case of the r-ratio, the b-ratio is also a 
weighted average of commercial banks' and SCI borrowing ratios denoted 
by (beB)' (bSCI ) respectively: 
where (A. 10) A = a + g (1- a) . 
Standard portfolio theory suggests that the desired borrowing ratio 
depends positively upon the market rate-discount rate differential: a 
rise in the market rate or a fall in the discount rate lowers the cost 
of borrowing from the Central Bank relatively to the return which can 
be obtained on earning assets. 
For the Greek Economy we postulate that commercial banks' and SCI 
desired borrowing ratios depend positively upon the loan rate-discount 
rate differential: 
.'. . .. 
CA.12) bSCI =bSCICiZ- p); dbSCI/d(i~- p»o. 
The postulated positive dependence of (bCB )' (bscr ) upon the loan 
rate-discount rate differential reinforces the positive effect of a rise 
In the loan rate or/and of a fall in the discount rate upon the stock 
of money which operates via the reserve ratio; a rise in the loan rate 
of a fall in the Bank rate raises the ~-ratio which in turn raises the 
value of the money multiplier. 
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Before reporting the empirical tests of equations (A.11) (A.12) 
we should note that, given that the demand for Central Bank funds is 
a positive function of the loan rate-discount rate differential, a 
positive and statistically significant regression coefficient of the 
borrowing ratio with respect to the loan rate-Bank rate differential, 
provides some evidence in favour of the hypothesis that commercial 
Banks' and SCI borrowings from the Central Bank are, at least partly, 
demand determined. On the other hand a statistically insignificant 
or a negative regression coefficient is unfavourable to the hypothesis 
that borrowing)from Central Bank are demand determined; clearly a 
candidate alternative hypothesis is that borrowing from Central Bank 
is' a supply determined magnitude, used by the monetary authorities as 
a policy instrument. 
Equations (A.11) (A.12) have been tested, in linear form, over the 
period 1959II-1976IV and over the sub-periods 1959II-1967IV, 1968I-1976IV. 
The results of the tests are reported below: 
Commercial Banks' borrowing ratio (bCB ) 
period 1959II-1967IV (end-of-quarter data) 
(A.13a) b = 0.06765 + 0.00227 (iL- p) 
R2 
= 
0.027 
CB (0.00509) (0.00242) 
period 1968I-1976IV (end-of-quarter data) 
(A.13b) b CB = 0.01227 + 0.00947 (iL-p) 
R2 
= 0.224 
(0.00651) (0.00302) 
period 195911-19761V (end-of-quarter data) 
(A.13c) bCB = 0.04136 + 0.00474 (iL-p) 
R2 
= 0.0317 
(0.00681) (0.00319) 
Of the above regresslons, only (A.13b) covering the period 19681-
19761V has a statistically significant regression coefficient; the re-
gression covering the period 19591-1976IV has an insignificant coeffici-
ent. One possible explanation of these results is that the nature of 
commercial bank borrowing may have been different between the above sub-
periods j over 195911-19671V (especially in the early quarters of this 
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period), due to the inadequate flow of private deposits, commercial banks 
were relying to a certain extent upon Central Bank funds in order to finance 
their credit activities, whereas over the subperiod 1968I-1976IV, commerc-
ial bank borrowing took the form of conventional facilities at the discount 
window for the purpose of meeting temporary adverse clearing balances. 
The point is that commercial bank borrowing which prevailed over the 
subperiod 1959-1967 may well have been"sypply determined", whereas, 
borrowing of the type which prevailed during the subperiod 1968-1976 
d d determl" ned. (25) is, at least partly, eman 
SCI borrowing ratio (bSCI ) 
Data for SCI borrowing from the Central Bank exists only for the 
pe~iod 1965-1973 (annual data) and 1974I1I-1976IV (quarterly data). 
Using the existing data we fitted a logarithmic time trend and the 
regression obtained is as follows: 
In b SCI = 9.2552 + 0.05497t R2 = 0.997 
Using the above regression, we calculated projected values of b SC1 
over the period 1959II-1976IV and we used these values in our regressions 
where actual values are not available. Below we report the regression 
results. 
period: 1965-1973 (annual data) and 19741I1-1976IV (quarterly data) 
.f. 
(A.14a) bSC1 = 1.1368 - 0.00431 (i~ -p) 
2 R = 0.00073 
period: 19681-1976IV (quarterly data; where actual values do not exist, 
projected values are used) 
(A.14b) 
.f. 
1.1257 - 0.0204 (i~ - p) 
(0.0202) 
2 R = 0.024 
period: 1959IV-1976IV (quarterly data; projected values except ln 1965IV, 
1966IV) 
.-. 
(A.14c) 1.0003 - 0.08636 (i~ - p) R2 - 0.589 
(0.01295) 
(25)As an institutional fact, Central Banks hardly deny any lending to 
commercial banks, if the discount window is used by them on a tempor-
ary basis for the purpose of restoring their reserve position. 
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Of the above regressions only the coefficient of (A.14c) is stati-
stically significant; moreover all the regression coefficients are ne-
gative whereas,on theoretical grounds,we expected them to be positive. 
Clearly such a sign is unfavourable to the hypothesis that SCI borrow-
ing~from the Central Bank are demand determined and the question arises 
on how this negative reaction of bSCI to changes ln the loan rate-Bank 
Rate differential can be explained. A plausible explanation can be 
given if we assume that SCI borrowings from the Central Bank are under 
the control of the monetary authorities; if,in this case,the authori-
ties adopt a restrictive monetary policy, they may raise the loan rate 
and at the same time restrict lending to SCI, in which case we expect 
to find a negative relation between SCI borrowing ratio and the loan 
rate-discount rate differential; the argument holds mutatis mutandis 
for an expansive monetary policy. 
In concluding, we may say that the empirical evidence is, in general 
unfavourable to the hypothesis that commercial banks' and SCI borrowings 
from the Central Bank are demand determined except in the case of commerc-
ial bank borrowings over the period 1968I-1976IV. Although it does not 
necessarily follow that these variables are supply determined,this latter 
hypothesis represents an obvious alternative deserving further consider-
ation. 
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C H. A P'T E R 
"THE MONETARY BASE AND THE ISSUE OF ITS CjNTROL IN THE GREEK ECONOMY" 
Throughout the be.havioural analysis of the money supply underta-
ken in the previous chapter) we did not deal with the most important de-
terminant of the money stock, the monetary base, making in effect the im-
plicit assumption that the base is an exogenous variable under the control 
of the monetary authorities. 
The exogeneity-endogeneity 1ssue of the monetary base however, is 
an important issue which cannot be decided on a priori grO.unds and deserves 
careful examination; for even if we tak~ for granted that, in a given eco-
nomy, the authorities are 1n principle able to control the base if they 
choose to, the real issue is whether they did actually control the moneta-
ry base over any given time period under examination. 
In this chapter we attempt to throw light on the exogeneity-endo-
geneity issue of the monetary base for the Greek Economy, by dealing with 
the question on whether the Greek monetary authorities have been control-
ling the base and/or i.ts domestic cOqlponent over the period 1959-1976. 
In the first section of the chapter we derive and explain the 
identity specifying the sources of the monetary base; this identity con-
stitutes the main analytical tool in our subsequent analysis. 
In section two, we deal with the issue of the authorities beha-
viour with respect to two monetary aggregates: the cash base of the system 
and its domestic component which will be referred to as "domestic credit". 
The method used to obtain empirical evidence is the examination of the 
lead-la~ structure of the different components of the sources side of the 
o 
base, using cross correlation analysis. 
Finally in the third section of this chapter we provide more evi-
dence on the endogeneity-exogeneity issue of the. monetary base and "dome-
stic credit" by undertaking "Sims Tests" for unidirectional causality 
between the above two monetary aggregates on the one hand and income and 
prices on the other. 
Section 1: The sources side of the monetary base: derivation and expla-
nation. 
As we have discussed in chapter one (see section 4 ) the 
cash base of the system can be viewed from two sides: the uses side and 
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the sources side; the uses side(l) specifies the disposition of the 
base, whereas the sources side specifies the "backing" of the base or, 
in a dynamic context, the generation of the base. It is of course al-
ways the case that the two sides are necessarily equal as a matter of 
accounting identity derived from the Central Bank's balance sheet. 
The examination of the monetary base from the sources side is 
useful, since, up to a certain extent, it can reveal some information 
regarding the monetary authorities' behaviour with respect to the base 
as well as its domestic component. Below we present an aggregated 
form of the Bank-of-Greece balance sheet which is used to derive the 
identity for the sources of the cash base. The presentation is accom-
panied by some explanatory comments regarding the different items of 
the balance sheet. 
Bank-of-Greece 
ASS ET S 
Gold and foreign exchange re-
serves (RF) 
Advances to the government (A ) g 
Advances to the Banking Sector 
(AB) 
Advances to other sectors (A ) 
o 
(private sector, public ent.er-
prises and public entities) 
Other assets (OA) 
L I A B I LIT I E S 
Notes plus coin in circulation (C) 
Government deposits (D ) g 
Deposits by the Banking sector (DB) 
Demand deposits by other sectors 
(Dd) 
0 
Other deposits by other sectors (D ) 
0 
Liabilities in foreign exchange CLF) 
Other Liabilities (OL) 
The item "notes plus coin in circulation" contains an artificial-
ity: while Notes is the Liability of the Central Bank, Coin is the Ii a-
bili ty of the Treasury; since howe'ler coin in circulation is included 
in the monetary base, we added this item both to the item "notes in 
(l)We remind that the uses side of the monetary base has been defined 
as cash in the hands of the non-bank public plus the reserves of 
the Banking System (vault cash plus deposits with the Central Bank). 
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. I . " d C1.rcu at1.on an to the item "other assets" which also includes among 
others, the value of the Central Banks' Premises and other real pro-
perty. 
The item "Advances to the Government" mainly includes direct cre-
dit extended to the Government for the purpose of financing its expendi-
tures ; the need for finance arises even when the budget is balanced over 
any given period, because of the imperfect synchronisation of government 
expenditures and receipts; in the context of the Greek Economy, how-
ever, direct credit to the government is not limited to this type of 
finance but it is also used to finance budget deficits~2) In addition 
the above item also includes a small amount of Treasury bills held by 
the Central Bank. 
The item "Advances to the Banking Sector" consists of Central 
Bank Credit to commercial banks and "Special Credit Institutions" (SCI); 
as we mentioned in the appendix to chapter two, credit to SCI is by far 
larger than credit to Commercial Banks. 
The item "advances to other sectors" has a small overall value; 
it consists of advances to the private sector and public enterprises 
and of a very small amount of advances to public entities. 
The item "Gold and foreign exchange reserves" needs no explana-
tion; we only note that, in the Central Bank's balance sheet this item 
is expressed in terms of domestic currency, whereas in the Balance-of-
payments statistics, it is expressed in US dollars. 
Turning now to the liabilities side of the Bank-of-Greece balance 
sheet, we note that the item "Government deposits" arises from the fact 
that Government receipts are deposited with the Central Bank; as in 
most other countries the Bank of Greece is the Banker of the Government 
and therefore all governmental transactions are accomplished through 
the Bank-of-Greece. 
The item "deposits of the Banking sector" includes required and 
other deposits by Commercial Banks and SCI; since the reserves of the 
Banking system consist partly of vault cash and partly of deposits with 
the Central Bank, the above item comprises a part of the monetary base. 
Central Bank Credit finances the "consumer goods account" of the 
budget which includes direct and indirect (through the scheme of 
minimum prices) subsidies to the agricultural sector. 
.. 
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The item "demand deposits by other sectors" refers to demand de-
posits by the private sector, public enterprises and public entities; 
it has a small overall value and along with notes and coins held by the 
non-bank public, it comprises the "cash held by the non-bank public" 
component of the monetary base. 
The item "other deposits held by other sectors" mainly consists 
of deposits by public entities with the Central Bank; public entities 
have a legal obligation (Law 1611/1950) to deposit their funds with the 
Bank-of-Greece and therefore the Bank presumably has effective control 
over those funds. The above item also includes a relatively small amount 
of private deposits with the Central Bank~3) 
The item "Liabilities in foreign exchange" consists of deposits in 
foreign exchange held at the Central B~k; an example of how these depo-
sits may arise concerns foreign direct investment in Greece: foreign ca-
pital inflows used for direct investment in the country are deposited with 
the Central Bank and when domestic currency is needed to implement the 
projects, foreign currency is sold to the Bank in exchange for domestic 
currency. 
The item "Other Liabilities" includes, among others the Central 
Bank's capital and reserves. 
Let us now write down the Central Bank's balance-sheet in algebraic 
form: 
The identity defini~~ the uses side of the monetary base is as 
fOllows~4) 
(1.2) H - C + D~ + DB 
(3) A large part of those deposits represents guarantees for imports. 
To be precise the uses side of the base is defined as Cp + R 
where Cp is cash held by the non-bank public ~nd R den~tes ~ank 
reserves; it is just one step however to arrlve from ldentlty 
(1.2) to the above definition: all we have to do is to substract 
the vault cash held by the banking system from (C) and add it to 
(DB) 
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Combining identities (1.1), (1.2) we obtain: 
(1.3) H = (RF_ LF) + (A - D ) + (AB+ A - D ) + (OA - OL) g goo 
Let us introduce the following notation and terminology: 
(1.4) R - RF_ LF; R = net reserve position of the Central Bank. 
(1.5) CR = A - D . CR = net Central Bank Credit to the government. g g g' g 
(1.6) C~= AB + (Ao- Do); CRB = net Central Bank credit to the banking 
and other sectors. 
Substituting (1.4) - (1.6) into (1.3) we obtain: 
(1.7) H = R + CRg + C~ + (OA-OL). 
Each component of identity (1.7), which specifies the sources 
of the monetary base, has been calculated over the period 1959-1976, 
both on annual and quarterly basis using data obtained from the publish-
ed balance-sheets of the Central Bank. All the components of (1.7) cal-
culated using quarterly data have been seasonally adjusted and their 
seasonal patterns are reported in table 1.A below. 
Table 1.A: Seasonal patterns of the monetary base and its sources. 
quarters H R CR C~ 
.g 
I 0.967 0.989 0.989 0.935 
II 0.975 0.976 0.895 0.989 
III 1.007 1.014 0.993 0.989 
iV 1.051 1.021 1.131 1.088 
As the above table reveals, the highest seasonal variation in the 
monetary base occurs in the fourth quarter of the year where (H) increa-
ses by 5.1 per cent because of seasonal reasons; this seasonal increase 
is primarily due to seasonal increases in CRg' c~ by 13.1 and 8.8 per 
cent respectively. We also observe that the next higher seasonal vari-
ation in the monetary base occurs in the first quarter of the year where 
(H) decreases by 3.32 per cent because of seasonal variations; this de-
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crease 1S primarily due to a seasonal fall in CRE by 6.50 per cent. 
A slight reclassification of the sources of the monetary base 
as specified by identity (1.7) leads us to the following identity: 
(1.8) H = R + DC + (OA-OL) 
where (DC) equals the sum of CRg and C~; (DC = CRg + C~). Identity 
(1.8) specifies the separation of the r..onetary base into a foreign and 
a domestic component; in particular, the base is backed partly by net 
foreign reserves and partly by'tlomestic credit" (DC) which, according 
to identity (1.7) equals to "net credit to the government" plus "net 
credi t to the Banking and other sectors '.' 
First differencing identity (1.7) and dividing both sides by 
(Ht - 1 ) we get: 
(1.7' ) 
Identity (1.7') above, specifies the contribution of each source 
to the rate of change in the monetary base; we may also say that (1.7') 
specifies the "generation" of the base. 
In an exactly analogous way, identity (1.8) may be transformed in 
identity (1.8') below: 
(1.8' ) 
Mit 
Ht - 1 
~CRgt 
Ht - 1 
For convenience let us introduce the following notation: 
h ; h : the rate of change in the monetary base 
= t t 
= g . g . the contribution of ch2-J.l.ges in ne't credit to the govern-t) t· 
ment to the rate of change in (H). 
= b
t
; b
t
: the contribution of changes in net credit to the banking 
and other sectors to the rate of change in (H). 
r : 
t 
the contribution of changes in net reserves to the rate 
of change in (H). 
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= et ; e t : the contribution C~ all other unclassified 
factors to the rat~ of change in (H) 
~DCt 
= dt ; dt : the contribution of changes in domestic credit to the Ht - 1 
rate of change in (H). 
Given the above notation identities (1.7'), (1.8') can be respect-
ively written as follows: 
Since the above identities will be extensively used to provide 
empirical evidence in our subsequent analysis we should briefly comment 
on their quality. The "residual term" (e
t
) arises purely from lack of 
statistical information: the published balance sheets of the Bank-of-
Greece lump all unclassified assets in the item "other assets" and all 
unclassified liabilities in the item "Other IJiabili ties"; it is there-
fore impossible to avoid inclusion of the residual term (et ) in the 
above identities. 
Such an inclusion would not create any serious problems if: the 
term (e ) was following a random behaviour being uncorrelated with the t . 
classified components of the above identities. Unfortunately, however, 
the term (et ) is negatively and significantly correlated with both (gt) 
and (bt)~S)and this reduces the power of identities (1.9), (1.10) as 
tools of empirical analysis. To the ex tent that items included in "other 
assets" and/or "other liabilities" should be included in (g ) or (b ), 
. t t 
these latter components are "misquanti::ied"; moreover, even if items in-
cluded in (OA) and/or (OL) should not be included in (gt) and (b
t
) we 
might want to know, by what mechanis8 a negative correlation between 
such items and (gt)' (bt ) arises. Since however there is no way to 
improve identities (1.9) and (1.10) because of lack of information on 
what is included in (OA-OL), we shall retain their present specification 
in our subsequent analysis, being conscious that the reliability of the 
evidence they will provide may be somewhat lower than it would be, had 
(5 )The correlation patterns bet\.;een (et) and the components of identity 
(1.9), for the period 19S9II-1976IV, are as follows: Carr (ht, et) = 
0.129, Corr (rt, et) = 0.186, Corr (gt, et) = -0.474, Corr (bt, et)= 
-0.390. 
-147-
all the sources of the monetary base been properly specified. 
Below we present some statistical findings regarding the contri-
bution of each source to the rate of change in the monetary base. Spe-
cifically table 1.B reports the results derived on annual basis over 
the period 1960-1976, and table 1.C reports the results derived from 
end-of-quarter seasonally adjusted data over the period 195911-1976IV. 
Table 1.B:Average contribution of each source to annual changes in 
the monetary base (per cent). 
period h r g b e 
1960-1965 13.79 1.64 6.19 4.11 1.85 
(100) (11.89 ) (44.89) (29.80) (13.42 ) 
1966-1970 10.52 1.42 2.30 7.96 -1.17 
(100) (13.50) (21.86 ) (75.66) (-11.12 ) 
1971-1976 20.78 7.01 3.38 11.63 -1.23 
(100 ) (33.73) (16.26 ) (55.97) (-5.92) 
1960-1976 15.29 3.47 4.05 7.89 -0.13 
(100) (22.69) (26.49) (51.60) (-0.85) 
Remarks: (a) h denotes the average rate of change in the cash base; 
r, g, b, denote the average contributions of "net reserves", "net cre-
dit to the government" and "net credit to the banking and other sectors" 
respectively; e denotes the average contribution of all other unclas-
sified factors to the rate of change of the cash base. (b) The number 
in parentheses denote the average relative contributions of the sources 
of the monetary base. These numbers are obtained by dividing the average 
contribution of each source over any given period with the average rate 
of change in the base over the same period. 
Table 1.C: Average contribution of each source to guarterly changes in 
the monetary base (per cent) 
period 11 r g D e 
195911-19651V 3.47 0.53 1.94 0.43 0.58 
(100 ) (15.27) (55.91) (12.39 ) (16.71) 
19661 -19701V 2.57 0.34 0.55 1.90 -0.21 
( 100) (13.23) (21.40) (73.93) (-8.17) 
19711 -19761V 4.92 1.71 0.80 2.66 
-0.27 
(100) (34.76) (16.26 ) (54.06) (-5.49 ) 
195911-1976IV 3.71 0.87 1.16 1.60 0.07 
(100) (23.45) (31.27) (43.13) (1.89 ) 
Remark: As in table 1.B, numbers in parentheses denote average relative 
contributions. 
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As it can be seen from the above tables the contribution of "net 
credit to the banking and other sectors is the highest both over the 
subperiods 1966-1970, 1971-1976 and over the whole period 1960-1976. 
On the other hand the contribution of "net credit to the government" is 
the highest over the subperiod 1960-1965 but it declines considerably 
over the subsequent subperiods. This may be partly explained from the 
practice, gradually developed by the Greek Government, of financing a 
large part of budget deficits not by direct credit from the Central 
Bank but by issuing Treasury Bills which are absorbed by Commercial Banks 
and Special Credit Institutions (SCI). The contribution of net reserves 
to changes in the monetary base is relatively low in the subperiods 1960-
1965, 1966-1970, but it increases considerably over the subperiod 1971-
1976. It should be noted however that this rise in the contribution of 
net reserves may not wholly reflect an endogenous process of reserve 
acquisition by the private sector but it may partly result from the pro-
ceeds of loans in foreign currency granted to the Government which are 
deposited with the Central Bank~6) 
Section 2: The monetary authorities behaviour with respect to the mone-
tary base and its domestic component. 
Making use of the identities (1.7) (1.8) specifying the sources of 
the rno~etary base derived in the previous section, we now come to investi-
gate the authorities' behaviour with respect to the monetary aggregates. 
In particular we shall try to test the hypothesis that the authorities 
control either of the following two monetary variables: (1) The monetary 
base, (2) the domestic component of the monetary base, ie the component 
which is backed by domestic assets~which from now on will be referred to 
as "domestic credit". 
Before proceeding in our analysis however, we should say a few 
words about the meaning and implications of the statement that the authori-
ties control the monetary bas9 or any other monetary aggregate. 
Although it does not necessarily follow that control of an econo-
mic variable is a sufficient condition for its use as a policy instrument, 
it is hard to think of a case where the authorities control a variable 
(6) We will revert to this point later 1n the chapter. 
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without using it actively or passively as a policy instrument. It is 
therefore reasonable to assert that, in most cases, control of an eco-
nomic variable by the authorities implies its use as an instrument of 
policy. Applying the above argument to the case of monetary variables 
we postulate that their control is a sufficient condition for their use 
for stabilization policy purposes. 
There are two ways through which the monetary authorities can 
use monetary variables in stabilization policy: (1) they can actively 
manipulate monetary instruments in a reactive fashion in view of unde-
sired developments in target variables (Discretionary policy). (2) They 
can use monetary variables to form policy rules (automatic policy); a 
well known policy rule advocated by monetarists, is a steady rate of 
growth In the money supply. 
It follows from the above reasoning, that if the empirical evi-
dence favours the hypothesis that the authorities control either the 
monetary base or domestic credit, it also favours the hypothesis that 
either of the above monetary variables is used as an instrument of 
policy. If, on the other hand, the evidence suggests that the autho-
rities do not control the above two monetary aggregates, we should tent-
atively accept the hypothesis that the cash base and its domestic compo-
nent are endogenous variables affected by other endogenous variables 
(7) . 
of the system through such channels as the government budget and the 
Balance-of-payments. 
After the above brief digression, we proceed to examine the autho-
rities' behaviour. Among the sources determining the monetary base, net 
reserves are outside the control of the Central Bank; although the mo-
netary authorities can take action to adjust the average level of reserves, 
over a given period towards a target level, they cannot control short-
run fluctuations in reserves. 
Referring to "net credit to the Banking and other sectors" we 
remind that it is defined as (AB+ A - D ) (see equation (1.6) p.144). o 0 
As we mentioned in the previous section while explaining the items of the 
Central Bank's balance-sheet, (A ) has a small overall value; the largest 
o 
part of (~) consists of Central Bank Credit to "Special Credit Insti tu-
tions" (SCI); clearly such credit can potentially be under the control 
(7) 
Most obvious candidates are income and prices. 
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(8) 
of the Central Bank. Moreover CD ) largely consists of public enti-
o 
ties' funds deposited with the Bank-of-Greece and as we mentioned in 
the previous section, the Bank presumably has an effective potential 
control over those funds. On the above consideratioTIS,it seems reason-
able to postulate that the Central Bank potentially controls "net cre-
dit to the Banking and other sectors". 
Referring to "net credit to the Government", things are not 
clear-cut, the reason being the lack of information regarding the de-
centralization of stabilization policy responsibilities between the 
Central Bank and the Treasury. For this reason we shall approach the 
issue of the authorities behaviour using two different institutional 
settings. In the first setting we postulate that, by and large, the 
burden of the control of monetary aggregates falls upon the Central 
Bank; the Treasury does not manipulate the part of the budget deficit 
financed by Central Bank Credit so that to contribute to the control of 
monetary aggregates and thus the item "net credit to the government" re-
flects variations in the budget. Under this setting the only instrument 
of control of the cash base and its domestic component at the disposal 
of the Central Bank is the item "net credit to the Banking and other 
sectors"; both net reserves and net credit to the Government are taken 
to be endogenous variables, outside the control of the Central Bank. 
In the context of the second setting, we postulate that the Trea-
sury shares the responsibility of controlling the monetary aggregates 
and contributes to this task by manipulating the part of the budget fi-
nanced by Central Bank Credit in coordination with the Bank-of-Greece. 
Under this setting the operational significance of the distinction be-
tween "net credit to the government" and "net credit to the banking and 
other sectors" is blurred and what matters is "domestic credit" consisting 
of the sum of the above two items, which is postulated to be a potentially 
. d b h .. (9) controllable magnltu e y the monetary aut orltles. 
(8) The Central bank can either set the bank rate leaving credit to the 
banking system to be demand determined or it can set the bank rate 
and at the same time control the supply of credit· The 
empirical evidence provided in the appendix of chapter two regarding 
Central bank Credit to SCI is unfavourable to the hypothesis that such 
credit is demand determined, without at the same time being inconsist-
ent with the hypothesis that credit to SCI is controlled by the mone-
tary authorities. 
(9) Under this setting the monetary authorities consist, by definition 
of both the Central Bank and the Treasury. 
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Section 2.1: First setting; the Central Bank is solely responsible for 
monetary control. 
We start by rewriting and renumbering identity (1.7) of section 
1-, 
(2.1.1) 
We remind that H denotes the monetary base, R denotes "net reserv-
es", CRg denotes "net credit to the Government" and CRB denotes "net cre-
dit to the banking and other sectors". The domestic component of the ba-
se, referred to as "domestic credit" is the sum of CRg and C~ and it ~s 
denoted by (DC). (Rt ), (CRgt ) are taken to be outside the control of the 
Central Bank, whereas (CRBt ) is taken .to be a potentially controlled vari-
able. If the Central Bank attempts to control the monetary base, then it 
should-use (CRB) to.offset the combined variations in (R) and (CRg); 
therefore we expect to find a negative association between (R + CR ) and g 
(C~). If the Bank attempts to control domestic credit, it should use 
(C~) to offset variations in (CRg ), in which case we expect a negative 
correlation between (CRg ) and (C~). 
Negative correlatimshowever, do not necessarily imply that the 
authorities attempt to control the above two monetary aggregates; the 
causality may run from (CRB ) to the endogenous components of the cash 
base and domestic credit. To illustrate this point assume an autonomous 
increase in (C~); the monetary base rises in the same direction and it 
affects upwards real income and prices which in turn cause a reduction 
in the BOP surplus and an increase in the budget surplus; concequently 
(R + 
(R + 
CR ) falls. g Thus, again, a negative correlation between (C~) and 
CR ), as well as between (CRB) and (CR ) arises. g g 
Some evidence helping to resolve the causality problem can be pro-
vided by examining the lead-lag structure of changes in the variables we 
are concerned with. If the authorities offset changes 
(CR .) using (C~), then we expect changes in (CR + R) 
in (R + CR ) or g 
and/or (CR ) to g g . (10) g 
lead changes ln (C~). On the other hand, if changes in (C~) cause 
changes in (R + CR ) and/or (CR ) through the endogenous process describ-g g 
(10 ) 
If the Bank reacts fast to variations in the endogenous sources of 
the base then series (R+CRg ) and/or (CRg ) will probably be moving 
contemporaneously with series (C~). 
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ed above we expect series (CRB) to lead series (R + CR ) and/or series (CR )~11) g 
g 
In order to obtain empirical evidence about the lead-lag struct-
ure of the relevant series we calculated the cross-correlation patterns 
between the sum of net reserves plus net credit to the government (R+CR ), 
g 
and past and future values of net credit to the banking and other sectors, 
(CRB), as well as between net credit to the government, (CRg ), and past 
and future changes in (CRB), using quarterly data for the period 195911-
1976IV. To avoid spurious correlations due to common time trends in the 
relevant variables, we performed all calculations using identity (1.9) 
(see p.l~~ which is simply a transformation into rates of change of iden-
tity (2.1.1). For convenience we rewrite and renumber identity (1.9): 
In the above identity h is the rate of change in the cash base, 
and r, g, b denote the contributions of net reserves, net credit to the 
government, and net credit to the banking and other sectors to the rate 
of change in the monetary base. 
( 12) Below we present the correlation patterns between the rele-
vant components of identity (2.1.2): 
Table 2.1.A Corr {(rt+gt ), bt +i } i = -5, •.••• , +5, 1959II-1976IV 
i = -5 i = -4 i = -3 i = -2 i = -1 i= 2 i= 3 i= 4 1.= 5 
0.039 0.005 0.169 -0.210 0.050 -0 .310 (s)-O~08 0.066 -0 .. 100 0.063 0.011 
. Table 2.1.B Corr (gt' bt+i)i = -5, ••••. ,+ 5 195911 - 1976 IV 
1.= -5 l= -4 1.= -3 i= -2 l= -1 i = 0 l= 1 i= 2 l= 3 l= 4 l= 5 
O.OOL;. -0.089 0.228 -0.256~) 0.091 -0.lS6 -0.038 0.102 -0~12 -0.023 0.023 
Let us start the interpretation of the above results by examining 
the correlations pattern between (gt) and (bt +i ); the peak of the correla-
(11)If however the speed of the endogenous mechanism is high, it lS pos-
sible that the series (R+CRg ), (CRg ) and(CRB) will be moving con-
temporaneously. 
(12)In all the correlation patterns to follow the superscript (s) denotes 
significant correlations at the 5 per cent level. All correlation co-
efficients in which this superscript does not appear are statistically 
5,!"'s i9:!li r; cant at the 5 Der cent level. 
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tion series occurs at i= -2 and it has a value of -0.256, which implies 
that, probably, series (b) leads series (g) by two quarters. Thus the 
lead-lag structure between (g), (b) provides same evidence favouring the 
hypothesis that causality runs from (b) to (g). Even if we are not pre-
pared to take the above evidence at face value, it is hard to find any 
further evidence suggesting that the monetary authorities offset vari-
ations in (g) through manipulation of (b) in an attempt to control do-
mestic credit; as it can be seen from table 2.1.B, the correlations 
between (gt) and future values of (b) are all very low and the corre-
lation between changes in (gt) and contemporaneous changes in (b
t
), 
although it has a negative sign, it is statistically insignificant. 
In concluding, we may say that the evidence provided by the cor-
relations pattern of table 2.1.B does not favour the hypothesis that the 
Central Bank controls the domestic component of the monetary base by ma-
nipUlating "net credit to the banking and other sectors", ln order to 
offset variations in "net credit to the government". 
Turning now to the correlations pattern between (gt+rt) and past 
and future values of (b),(Table 2.1.A), we observe that the peak of the 
correlation series occurs at i=O which implies that, probably, the two 
series move contemporaneously. Therefore the correlations pattern be-
tween (rt+gt ) and (bt+i) do not help us to resolve the causality issue; 
the correlation coefficient of -0.310 between variations in (gt+rt) and 
(bt ) may imply a causal influence running either from (C~t) to (Rt+CRgt ) 
or the other way around. 
The objection might be raised that it is rather far-fetched to 
assume that changes in net credit to the banking sector, (C~), affect 
through an endogenous mechanism involving, for example, income and pri-
ces net reserves, (R), and net credit to the government (CR ), in the g 
opposite direction into the same quarter. This is clearly however an 
empirical question regarding the speed of adjustment and it cannot be 
answered on apriori grounds. Thus in order to make any further progress 
towards reSolving the causality issue we need supplementary evidence. 
The nature of the evidence needed is clarified by the methodologi-
cal arguments to follow. Let us suppose that the negative correlation 
between (b t ) and (rt+gt ) is due to a causal influence running from net 
credit to the banking sector, (CRBt ), to the sum of net reserves plus 
net credit to the government, (Rt+CR ). Clearly the causal mechanism gt 
must involve one or more "intermediate" variables, ie variables which 
are influenced by (CRB) and which in turn influence (R+CRg ). Let us 
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further assume that we succeed in identifying such a variable -call it 
(x). Since the empirical evidence suggests that Corr {C~t' (Rt+CRgt)}<O, 
either of the following two sets of conditions should be satisfied: 
Needless to say that we know on a priori grounds which of the above 
two correlations patterns fits in our specific case; since the choice of 
(x) implies that we have a certain transmission mechanism in the back of 
our minds,it follows that we expect on a priori.grounds a certain corre-
lationspattern between the intermediate variable and the main variablesin 
question. 
Suppose, however, that our calculations reveal either of the fol-
lowing correlation patterns: 
Given that the causality hypothesis is consistent with one of 
conditions (A), (B), calculated ,correlation patterns like (C) or (D) 
above, would lead us to reject the hypothesis that causality runs from 
(C~t) to (Rt+CRgt ). The power of this test however depends heavily on 
whether the variable (x) is the "right" variable, which in turn depends 
on whether the transmission mechanism we have in mind is the "right" one. 
Moreover, although we may reject the Jlypothesis that causality runs 
from (C~) to (R+CRg ) if correlation patterns (C) or (D) prevail (given 
that x is the right intermediate variable), we cannot accept for sure the 
causality hypothesis . if the right correlation pattern prevails. In 
other words, although one of conditions (A),(B) is a necessary condition 
for causality, it is not a sufficient condition, the reason being that it 
may be that changes in (xt ) cause into the same time period, changes ln 
both (C~t) and (Rt+CRgt ) in opposite directions, producing the same cor-
relation pattern with the one that would prevail if causality ran from 
(C~) to (R+CRg ). 
To summarise the argument so far, some further evidence regarding 
whether causal influence runs from net credit to the banking sector, (C~), 
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to the sum of net reserves plus net cre~it to the government (R+CR) 
. ' g , 
can be obtained as follows: having in nind a possible mechanism through 
which (CRB) influences (R+CRg ), we select a "right" intermediate variable 
and we find the correlation coefficients between variations in this vari-
able and contemporaneous variations in (CR ) and (R+CR ) respectively' B g , 
next we check whether the resulting correlation pattern accords with the 
one expected on a priori grounds; if not~ we would tend to reject the 
hypothesis that causality runs from (C~) to (R+CRg ); if however the 
expected and actual correlation patterns conform, although our evidence 
for a causal influence running .from (C~) to (R+CRg ) is strengthened, 
we cannot definitely accept the causality hypothesis. 
One plausible candidate for the role of the intermediate variable 
is money income. A possible transmiss.ion mechanism involving money in-
come is as follows: an increase In (C~) raises the monetary base which 
in turn raises income; the rlse in income reduces the BOP surplus and/or 
the budget deficit and thus the sum (R +CR t) falls. Thus an a priori t g 
plausible correlations pattern is the following one: 
If the calculated correlations do not conform with the above pat-
tern we would tend to reject the hypothesis that the causal influence 
runs from (CR_ ) to (R +CR ), at least through a process involving money 
-13t t gt 
income. 
If on the other hand, the calculated correlations pattern conforms 
with the expected one, the evidence, although consistent, does not neces-
sarily imply the causality hypothesis; the reason is that changes in 
money income may affect (C~) and (R+CR
a
) in opposite directions into 
o 
the same time period, through the following possible mechanism: changes 
in money income affect, through the BOP and/or the government budget, 
(R+CR ) in the opposite direction; on the other hand, the change in 
g 
money income may bring a change in the private sector's demand for bank 
credit in the same direction·, because of a change in the liquidity needs 
of the economy. This would induce the banking system to change its deri-
ved demand for funds from the Central Bank; if the Bank follows a per-
missive credit policy, (CRB) would change in the same direction as the 
change in money income. 
Moreover, besides reflecting causal influence runnlng from (C~) 
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to (R+CR ) or vice-versa, the negative and significant correlation coef-g 
ficient found between (CR ) 
Bt 
variable (Z) influencing the 
and (Rt+CR~t) may be the result of a third 
o 
variables in question in opposite directions 
and with the same time lag. We illustrate the case by the following 
scheme: 
tZt_i---~( CRBt t4-
(Rt +CRgt ) +t 
Here the choice of the "third variable" is more difficult to be 
based on theoretical grounds and therefore it is bound to be somewhat 
arbitrary. Again, we choose money income for our empirical analysis, 
both because a possible rationale for this choice exists, as already 
argued in the previous paragraph, and because it is a convenient choice 
in view of the fact that we choosed money income as an "intermediate 
variable" for the test of the causality hypothesis. 
The above analysis suggests that some further evidence helping 
to resolve the causality issue between (C~) and (Rt+CRgt ) can be found 
by calculating the following correlation patterns: 
(13) Corr (C~t' Yt - i ) l = 0, 1, ..... , n 
A problem for the calculation of the above correlation pattern 
arises because, although there exist cata for the monetary variables -on 
a quarterly basis, data for income are published only on annual basis. 
We dealt with this problem in the following way: taking annual data 
for GDP and dividing each figure by four we located the resulting figu-
res at the central quarter of each year; then for every pair of succesive 
years, we calculated, using the compounding formula, the rate of growth 
of quarterly income between these years. Using these rates of growth we 
calculated quarterly income figures to fill the gap between the income 
figure located at the central quarter of each year and the one located 
at the Central quarter of the following year. The quarterly income fi-
fures so calculated cover the period 19601-1974IV and are used to calcu-
late the above correlation patterns. 
(13)The variable (Y) denotes money inco~e. 
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The main defect of the above method however~ is that it is based 
on the assumption that quarterly income increases at a constant rate be-
tween the Central quarter of a year and the central quarter of the fol-
lowing year; such an assumption restricts the variability of the 
calculated data and therefore may cre2.-:e a misleading corre-
lations pattern. For this reason we tried another way~ in addition to 
the first, to deal with the data problem. Taking a quarterly index of 
industrial production and a quarterly index of wholesale prices of indu-
strial products, we formed an index of the Value of Industrial Production 
(denoted by V) for the period 1966I-1976IV, which is used as a proxy for 
income in the calculation of the relevant correlation patterns. 
Tables (2.1.C) and (2.1.D) below, present the calculated correla-
tion patterns between present and past values of money income (Y) and 
(C~t)' (Rt+CRgt ) respectively. To avoid spurious correlations due to 
common time trends~ all the relevant variables were transformed into 
( 14) 
rates of change. 
Table 2.1.C: Corr {bt , (LW/Y_1)t-i} ~. = O~ ••••• ,5 
i = 0 i = 1 i = ,2 i = 3 i ~ 4 . ~ = 5 
0.120 0.24-2 0.159 0.175 0.085 0.050 
Table 2.1.D 
i = 0 i-I i - 2· i - 3 i = 4 i = 5 
0.142 0.131 0.100 -0.081 -0.077 -0.184-
The above correlation patterns provide some additional evidence 
regarding the causality ~ssue; first Lie hypothesis that the negative 
correlation between the contribution of net credit to the banking sector 
(b ), and the combined contributions of net reserves and net credit to 
t 
the government to the rate of change in the base, (rt+gt ), implies a 
caus.al influence running from net credit to the banking sector, (C~t)' 
to the sum of net reserves plus net credit to the government, (Rr+CRgt ), 
(l4-)The calculations of the correlation patterns are based on 59 observa-
tions; the variable (~Y/Y-1) covers the period 1960II-1974IV, whereas 
the variables (b ), (r +g ) cover a maximum period from 196011 to t t t 1 n'7C T 
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. 
1S not supported by the evidence. For, the correlation coefficients 
between (b.Y/Y-i)t and (b ), (r +g ) respectively are both positive whe-t t t 
reas a necessary correlation pattern for a causal influence running from 
(C~) to (R+CRg ) 1S: 
Regarding the hypothesis that the negative correlation between 
(bt ) and (rt+gt ) is due to the fact that both variables are influenced 
by money income in opposite directions with the same time lag, the evi-
dence is less conclusive; from tables (2.1.C), (2.1.D) we can see that 
the correlations pattern most supportive of such an hypothesis is the 
following; 
However,... the magnitudes of the above correlation coefficients are 
not large enough to justify such a hypothesis; thus, although we can-
not preclude that the negative correlation between (b
t
) and (rt+g
t
) may 
be partly due to the fact that money income influences (CRB ) and (R+CRg ) 
1n opposite directions three quarters later, we should not put much 
weight on such a hypothesis. 
Next, in tables (2.1.E), (2.1.F) below, we present the relevant 
correlation patterns, calculated using a quarterly index of the Value 
of Industrial production (V) in place of money income. 
Table 2.1.E(15) Corr {bt , (~V/V-1) t-i} i = 0, ••.•.. , 5 
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 
0.128 0.094 0.022 -0.356(s) 0.492(S) 0.022 
Table 2.1.F Corr {(r t +gt)' (~V/V-1)t-i} . 0, 5 1 = . . . . . , 
1 2 . 3 4 . 5 l 0 1 = 1 = l = l = 1 = 
0.266 -0.187 -0.028 -0.047 -0.094 -0.050 
(15)In the correlation patterns of tables (2.1.£) (2.1.F), the variables 
(b), (r+g) cover the period 19S9I1-1976IV whereas the variable (~V/V_1) 
coversthe period 196611-1976IV. Thus the calculations of the correla-
+;~n ~npfficients use a maximum number of 43 observations and a mini-
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Again, the above correlation patterns do not favour the hypothe-
sis that the negative correlation between (b ) and (r +g ) is due to a 
t t t 
causal influence running from (CRB) to (R+CR ). The correlation pattern . g 
most supportive of the hypothesis that the negative correlation between 
(b t ) and (rt+gt ) is due to the fact that a "third variable" influences 
both (CRBt ) and (Rt+CRgt ) in opposite directions is the following: 
Since however the latter of the above correlation coefficients is 
small, the above pattern accounts at most partially for the negative cor-
relation between (bt ) and (rt+gt ). 
In concluding, we may say that the empirical evidence cited above 
1S consistent with· the hypothesis that the authorities react to offset 
the combined variation in (R) and (CRg ) by manipulating (C~). Since 
however, as it can be seen from table 2.1.A (p.152), the correlation 
coefficient between (bt ) and (rt+gt ) has not a particularly high value 
and since we cannot preclude the possibility that this correlation may 
be partly due to a causal influence of income, in opposite directions, 
upon both net credit to the banking sector, (C~t)' and the sum of net 
reserves plus net credit to the government, (R +CR ), we conclude that 
t gt 
the monetary authorities' attempt to control the monetary base is only 
partial, the largest part of variations in (R +CR ) remaining unoffset. 
t gt 
Section 2.2.: Second setting; both the Central Bank and the Treasury 
are responsible for monetary control. 
The discussion in the context of the second setting will take 
place with the help of identity (l.S) of section 1 which we rewrite 
and renumber for convenience: 
) ( OA 0) I h · . d ...... -l- p' th t b (2.2.1 Ht=Rt+DC t + -Lt. nt_lslenLll...y~ .. lS lcemoneary ass, 
R is net reserves and DC is domestic credit. As we already explained, 
domestic credit (DC) is taken to be. a potentially controllable variable; 
if the monetary authorities attempt to control the monetary base, they 
should use (DC) to offset variations in net reserves (R); therefore 
we expect to fin~ a negative correlation between (R) and (DC). 
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As in the previous cases however, a problem of causality arises: 
h (16) t e monetary approach to the Balance-of-Payments suggests that a 
r1se in domestic credit causes a fall in foreign reserves. Thus a nega-
tive correlation between (R) and (DC) 1S consistent both with the hypo-
thesis that the authorities control the monetary base and with the endo-
genous process indicated by the monetary approach to the BOP. 
Again the lead-lag structure of changes in net reserves, (R), 
and domestic credit, (DC), provides some evidence about the direction of 
causality.; if the causal influence runs from (DC) to (R), we expect 
changes in (DC) to lead changes in (R); if, on the other hand causality 
runs from (R) to (DC) we expect changes in (DC) to lag changes in (R). 
Below, we present the correlations pattern between changes in (R) 
and past and future changes in (DC); to avoid spurious correlations 
we base all our calculations on identity (1.10) of section 1 (1.10: h = 
t 
rt+dt+et ) which is a transformation into rates of change, of identity 
(2.2.1) . In this identitY" rand d denote the contributions of net reserves 
and domestic credit to the rate of change in the monetary base. 
( 17) Table 2.2.A: Corr {rt , dt +i } 1= -5, ...••. , 0, •.... , +5 
i= -5 1= -4 1= -3 1= -2 1= -1 1= 0 1= 1 1= 2 1= 3 1= 4 i= 5 
-0.028 -0.042 -0.196 0.177 0.016 -0.46 8(s) -0.120 0.136 0.110 0.050 -0.002 
The peak of the above correlation series occurs at i=O which implies 
that, probably, series (r) and (d) move contemporaneously. Thus the causa-
lity problem is not resolved and further evidence is needed; the arguments 
developed in the context of the previous setting, regarding the nature of 
the evidence needed, apply in an exactly analogous way in the present set-
ting and need not be repeated; two intermediate variables will be used 
in the empirical analysis to follow: (1) the calculated quarterly figures 
for money income (y) (2) the quarterly index of the value of industrial 
production (V). 
(16)For typical expositions-of this approach see: R. Mundell: "Monetary 
theory" chapter 9. H. Jonhson: "Further essays in Monetary Econo-
mics" chapter 9. D. Laidler: "Essays on Money and Inflation" cha-
pters 8,9. 
(17)variables (d) and (r) cover the period 1959II-1976IV; thus the calcu-
lations of the correlation coefficients use a maximum number of 71 
observations and a minimum number of 66 observations. 
l61-
. (18) 
Tables (2.2. B), (2. '2 .'.) below present the correlation patterns 
between present and past cl,;-t II!::!:es in money income and changes in (DC) and 
(R) respectively. 
Table 2.2.B: i = 0 5 , ...... , 
i = 0 J.=1 i-2 I = 3 
. 
1 = 4 i - 5 
0:115 0.270(S) 0.226 11.126 0.050 -0.055 
Table 2.2.C: Corr ( ( 6 -r! '\ ) . ) . r t ' -1 t-l 1 = 0, •.... , 5 
--------------------~-----
i = 0 = 3 i .= 4 i = 5 
0.126 -0.024 -0.091 _(1.149 -0.103 -0.096 
If the negative corr"l Lation between (r ) and (d ) is due to a t t 
causal influence running fI" 1111 domestic credit, (DC), to net reserves, (R), 
through a mechanism invol v:i II~~ money income, we should expect a posi ti ve 
correlation between (d
t
) aIl,1 (6Y/Y_ 1 )t and a negative correlation between 
(r
t
) and (6Y/Y_
1
)t. The c..-:tl,'ulated correlation series however, indicate 
that the above correlation;: ,-ire posi ti ve and thus the evidence is unfavo-
urable to the hypothesis tll. d the association between contemporaneous 
changes in (R
t
) and (DC
t
) (II -0.468 is due to causality running from 
(DC) to (R). 
Moreover, the questj 1111 arises whether the negative correlation 
between (d ) and (r ) arisn;-i because past changes in income influence 
t t 
the above variables in opp(l::ilte directions and with the same time lag. 
To give s:>_me evidence on th1.; issue we pick from tables (2.2.B). (2.2.C) 
the following pairs of corr'e: Lations: 
(d
t
, (6Y/Y-1)t-3) 
,- 1 o I _b .- Corr (dt , (6Y/Y-1 )t-2) = 0.226 1. Corr -- . J J } 
Corr (rt , (6Y/Y- 1 )t-3) 
=-0. II,~ ~ Corr (rt , (6.Y/Y- 1)t-2) =-0.091 } 
(18)The calculations of tho 2orrelations patterns in tables (2.2.B) 
(2.2.C) are based on S'I ,)bservations; the variable (6Y/Y-1) co-
vers the period 196011 1·_n~IV, whereas the variables (dt ) Crt) 
cover a maximum period r 1'.);-:; 196011 to 1976I. 
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The above correlation coefficients are not large enough to justi-
fy the hypothesis that the negative correlation between Cdt)' (r
t
) re-
sults because money income influences both domestic credit, (DC), and 
net reserves (R), in opposite directions. At most, we may say is that 
the above pairs of correlations only partially account for the negative 
correlation between (d ) and(r ). 
t t 
Next, in tables (2.2.D), (2.2.E) below, we present the correlation 
pattern between present and past changes in the Value on Industrial Pro-
duction (V) and changes in (rt ) and (dt ) respectively. 
Table 2.2.D: Corr (rt , (L\V/V...,l)t_i) i = 0, ..•.•• , 5 
i ... 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 
-0.161 -0.125 -0.078 -0.083 -0.260 -0.119 
(19 ) 
Table 2.2.E: Corr (dt , (L\V/V_ 1)t_i) l - 0, ..•..• , 5 
i= 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = Lj. i = 5 
0.370(s) -0.032 0.029 -0.222 0.030 
The .above correlation series provide much more definite evidence 
regarding the nature of the correlation between (dt ) and (rt ). First 
we note that the pair of correlations 
is consistent both with the hypothesis that causality runs from (DC) to 
(R) and with the hypothesis that (V) affects both domestic credit, (DC), 
and net reserves, (R), in opposite directions into the same quarter. 
Moreover the pair of correlations, Corr (rt , (L\V/V_ 1 )t_4)=-0.260 
Corr (d ,(L\V/V 1) ) = 0.354, provides evidence consistent with the 
t - t-4 
hypothesis that (V) affects both (DC) and (R) in opposite directions 
four quarters later. 
(19 ) 
In the correlation patterns of tables (2.2.D), (2.2.E), the varia-
bles (d ), (r ) cover the period 195911-1976IV whereas the variable 
(L\V/V_ 1) cove~s the period 19661I-1976IV. Thus the calculations 
of the correlation coefficients use a maximum number of 43 observ-
ations and a minimum number of 38 observations. 
The empirical 
that the correlation 
setting reactions of 
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evidence presented above, favours the hypothesis 
of -0 .. 468 between (dt ) and (rt ) is not due to off-
the monetary authorities to variations In (r
t
), 
but it is due, to a large extent, either to a causal influence running 
from (DC) to (R) or, perhaps more important, to the fact that a "third 
variable" affects (DC) and (R) in opposite directions. 
Apart from the empirical evidence cited above, there may be 
another important reason accounting for the negative correlation between 
(rt ) and (dt ). Specifically, the proceeds of the loans in foreign cur-
rency granted to the Greek government from abroad, are sold to the 
Central Bank and the counterpa;t:'t '. in domestic currency is deposi ted with 
the Bank; thus an increase in foreign reserves brought about by Govern-
ment loans taken from abroad, results in an automatic increase in govern-
ment deposits in domestic currency with the Central Bank and consequently 
In a decrease of equal magnitUde in the item "net credit to the govern-
ment". Moreover, to the extent that government expenditures abroad are 
financed by Central Bank Credit, a fall in foreign reserves is automatic-
(20) ally offset by a rise In the item "net credit to the government". 
The accounting mechanism described above, which should be distin-
guished from a situation where the monetary authorities react actively 
to changes in reserves by manipUlating domestic credit, can clearly ac-
count for a negative correlation between net reserVes and "net credit 
to the government" which is a major component of "domestic credit". 
There is indeed a correlation of -0.388 between changes in net reserves, 
(rt ), and changes in net credit to the government, (gt)' calculated on 
a quarterly basis over the period 195911-1976IV and a correlation of 
-0.652 between the same variables calculated on annual basis over the 
period 1960-1976. In contrast, the correlation between quarterly changes 
in Crt) and changes in net credit to the banking sector, (bt ) is only 
(20)A better understanding of how this accounting mechanism arises is 
provided with the help of the following simplified identity for 
the sources of the cash base: H= R+CRg , where eRg = Ag-Dgo H is 
the cash base R is net foreign reserves, CRg is net credlt to the 
government, A is Central Bank advances to the government and D~ 
is governmentgdeposits with the Central Bank. A rise in R brought 
by a government loan from abroad results in an equal ris7 in ~g and 
therefore an equal fall in CRg. On the ot~er hand th7 flnanclng 
of government imports by Central Bank Credlt result~ In a rise in 
Ag , and therefore in CRg, matched by an equal fall In R. 
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-0.199 while the correlation between 2~nual changes in the same variables 
is -0.215. 
Let us now briefly summarise the argument so far; we found a cor-
relation coefficient of -0.468 between changes in net reserves and con-
-te~poraneous changes in domestic credit (d
t
); Slnce this correlation 
coefficient represents the peak of the correlation series between changes 
in (r t) and past and future change~o in (dt ) the problem of causality is 
not resolved. Further evidence obtained through involving money income 
as well as the Value of industrial Production in the analysis (taken to 
be a better proxy for money income than the calculated seriesof GDP) 
suggests that the negative correlation between (r
t
) and (d
t
) may be lar-
gely due either to a causal influence running from domestic credit to 
net reserves or, more important, to the fact that both domestic credit 
and net reserves are influenced by the value of industrial production 
- -
(taken as a proxy for money income) in opposite directions. Finally 
we have argued, that the negative correlation in question may be partly 
due to the fact that an institutional mechanism exists through which 
changes in net reserves lead, as a matter of accounting, to opposite 
changes In net credit to the government. 
Clearly, the question arises, to what extent the negative corre-
lation between (rt ) and (dt ) is accounted for by the above mentioned 
factors and to what extent it-- reflects a reaction by the authorities 
to variations in net reserves. Unfortunately we do not have the stati-
stical information to resolve this issue, but we suspect that the part 
of the correlation between (d ) and (r ) not accounted for by the above 
t t 
mentioned factors will at most justify an only partial control of the 
base on behalf of the monetary authorities. 
Finally we come to discuss the issue of whether the monetary au-
thorities control domestic credit in the context of the second institu-
tional setting we have adopted. Given our assumption that domestic cre-
dit is a potentially controlled variable, we want to test whether the 
authorities have act u all y controlled domestic credit. This is 
a very difficult task and the evidence provided by correlation analysis 
is in general inconclusive. There is only one special case we can test 
with some confidence using correlation analysis; specifically we can 
test the hypothesis that the authorities control domestic credit using 
a monetarist control rule; namely they allow domestic credit to grow 
at a given rate per period trying to avoid any large variations in this 
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rate of growth. 
Let us examine which correlatio~ pattern this hypothesis leads 
to, using identity (1.10) (section 1 p .146) which we rewrite and renumber 
for convenience: 
(2.2.2.) ht = r t + dt + et . 
h is the rate of change ln the cash base and r, d are the contributions 
of net foreign reserves and domestic credit to changes in the base. 
A monetarist type of control would produce small variations in 
(dt ); in this case variations in (rt ) would be largely reflected in 
variations in (ht ) whereas variations in (rt ) would not affect (dt ). 
Thus we expect a high positive correlation between (h ) and (r ) and 
t t 
statistically insignificant correlations between (h ) and (d ) as well 
. t t 
as between (rt) and (dt ). 
At this point we must note that the empirical evidence we have 
previously presented is inconsistent with the above prescribed correla-
tion pattern; specifically, the correlation coefficient between (r
t
) 
and (dt ) is -0.468 (see table 2.2.A), whereas a monetarist control rule 
implies an insignificant correlation. The objection could be raised, 
however, that the above evidence is not wholly conclusive; as we discus-
sed above, a negative correlation between (rt ) and (dt ) could arise not 
as a result of either an endogenous process or a reaction of the mone-
tary authorities, but as a result of an accounting mechanism through 
which changes in reserves are automatically accompanied by changes In 
net credit to the govenment or vica versa. If this is the case, it is 
legitimate to ask whether the authorities control the "endogenous" as 
distinct from the "accounting" variations in (dt ). In other words, it 
is conceivable that although the authorities do not offset variations 
ln dom~stic credit which result as a matter of accounting, they do try 
to avoid variations in (d ) brought about through an endogenous process, 
t 
by variations in other endogenous variable3 of the system. 
If we could break the total changes in (dt ) and (rt ) into "endo-
genous" and "accounting" changes we would be able to test the above hy-
pothesis; suppose we achieved to form the following identities: 
(2.2.3) dt = d
a 
t + 
de 
t 
(2.2.4) a e r t = r t + r t 
(2.2.5) da _ a - r t t 
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Adding (2.2.3), (2.2.4) by parts and makirig use of (2.2.5) 
we obtain (2.2.6) dt + r t = d~ + r~ 
Substituting (2.2.6) into (2.2.2) we obtain: 
Usin! (2.2. 7), we would calculate the correlations, -Corr (h
t
, d~) 
Corr (ht , r t ), Corr (d~, r~), to see whether they conform with the cor-
relations pattern implied by a monetarist control rule. Unfortunately 
we do not have the required information to form identities (2.2.3) (2.2.4) 
and therefore we cannot test, using correlation analysis, whether the au-
thorities control the "endogenous" part of (d), according to a monetarist-
control rule. 
Nevertheless, some indirect evidence on the issue can be obtained 
as follows; let us assume that the negative correlation between (d) and 
(r) is entirely of an "accounting" nature and suppose that the monetary 
authorities try to avoid any "endogenous" variations in the growth of 
domestic credit. The variable (dt - Srt ) is the change in domestic cre-
dit net 0 f the lin ear i n flu e n ceo f c han g-
e sin res e r v e s. Thus, given our assumption that the authori-
ties adopt a monetarist control rule, the variations of (d
t 
- Sr
t
) should 
be quite small relatively to the average value of this variable over the 
period under examination (1959II-1976IV). However, the evidence does not 
support such an hypothesis, for, the standard deviation of (dt - Brt ) is 
(0.0489) whereas the mean of the above variable is (0.0354); thus the 
coefficient of variation of (d
t
- Srt ) is (1.38), a quite high value to 
make us accept the monetarist control rule hypothesis. 
In concluding,we may say that although we are not able to test 
whether the monetary authorities have in general controlled domestic 
credit, we would rather tend to reject the hypothesis that the authori-
ries have controlled domestic credit using a monetarist control rule. 
Before ending this section, we give a brief summary of the questions 
we raised and of our empirical findings. We addressed ourselves to the 
question on whether the monetary authorities control the following two 
monetary aggregates: (1) the monetary base (2) the domestic component 
of the base (domestic credit). We analysed the issue with the help of 
an identity, derived in the first section of this chapter, which specifies 
the sources of the monetary base and we produced our empirical evidence by 
taking cross-correlation patterns between the different components of this 
identity. The analysis as well as the empirical work took place in the 
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context of two settings; in the first setting we postulated that the 
only authority responsible for the con~rol of the monetary aggregates 
is the Central Bank and that the part of the budget financed by Central 
Bank Credit is an endogenous variable outside the control of the Central 
Bank. In the second setting we postulated that the Treasury shares the 
responsibility of controlling the monetary aggregates and it manipulates 
the part of the budget financed by Central Bank credit in coordination 
with the Central Bank, in order to contribute to monetary control. 
In the first setting, the empirical evidence is consistent with 
an only partial control of the base and virtually no control of domestic 
credit. In the context of the second setting, the evidence is consistent 
with an at most partial control of the monetary base; referring to dome-
stic credit, the empirical method used in this section is inadequate to 
provide any evidence on whether the authorities have actually controlled 
this magnitude. There is only a special case on which some evidence can 
be provided, namely whether the authorities have controlled domestic cre-
dit using the control rule advocated by monetarists. The evidence obtai-
ned tends to reject such a: hypothesis. 
Section 3: "The causal pattern between monetary aggregates and economic 
activity" 
In this section we turn to' provide more evidence regarding the exo-
geneity-endogeneity issue of the monetary base and its domestic component 
(domestic credit) by undertaking tests for unidirectional causal influ-
ence between the above two monetary aggregates on the one hand and income 
and prices on the other. 
Before describing the causality tests undertaken and reporting the 
results obtained we should briefly discuss the kind of evidence we expect 
to obtain from such tests. Suppose we find that causality runs unidirect-
. (21) 10nally from the monetary base to income and prices; this implies that 
variations in these latter variables do not exert any significant feedback 
upon the cash base of the system. Clearly then, such an evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the monetary authorities control the 
base by offsetting variations in it, caused by variations in income and 
(21)The argument to follow holds mutatis mutandis for domestic credit. 
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prices. If, on the other hand, the tests fail to detect unidirectional 
causality or if they reveal causality running unidirectionally from real 
income and prices to the monetary base, then such an evidence, although 
not necessarily contradictory to the hypothesis that the authorities con-
trol the base, is nontheless consistent with the hypothesis that the base 
is an endogenous variable, left uncontrolled by the monetary authorities, 
affected by variations in income and prices via such channels as the bud-
get and the balance-of-payments. 
A statistical method enabling us to detect unidirectional causal 
influence between two variables, has been proposed by Christopher Sims;~22) 
the "Sims test" for unidirectional causality is as follows: Let there be 
two variables (Y) and (X); regress (Y) on past, present and future values 
of (X), as well as (X) on past, present and future values of (Y). We 
accept the hypothesis that causality runs unidirectionally from (X) to 
(y) if, in the regression of (.Y) on past and future (Xs), the coefficients 
of the future values of (X) are insignificant as a group, whereas in the 
regression of (X) on past and future (Ys), the coefficients of the future 
values of (y) are significantly different from zero as a group. 
A causality test requires a total of four regressions: 
(3.1) .y = f(Xt , past Xs ) t 
(3.2) Yt = f(future X~, Xt , 
past xs) 
(3.3) Xt = f(Yt , past ys) 
(3.4) Xt = f(future Ys, Yt , past Ys) 
The regressions are used in pairs: (3.1), (3.2) are used to test, 
with the help of the F-statistic, whether the future values of (X) are 
significant as a group in explaining (Yt ), whereas (3.3), (3.4) are used 
to test the group significance of the future values of (Y) in explainins 
variations in (Xt ). 
(22) 
Christopher Sims: "Money, income and causality; AER 1972 For an 
application of Sims test see: 
J.R. Barth and J.T. Bennett: "Cost - push versus demand- pull infla-
tion: some empirical evidence" Journal of money credit and Banking 
1975. 
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Applying the Sims test described above, we tested the causal 
connection between the monetary base and domestic credit on the one 
hand and two endogenous variables of the system-real income and prices-
on the other. Clearly, the best empirical counterparts for real income 
and prices are real GDP and the general GDP deflator; since however, 
data on these variables exist only on an annual basis, we choosed to 
use an index of the volume of industrial production (IPR) as a proxy 
for real income and the consumer price index (CP) instead of the gene-
ral GDP deflator. The tests were carried out using quarterly seasonally 
adjusted data covering the period 19601-19761V. All data was transform-
ed in logarithmic first differences to avoid spurious associations due 
to common time trends and the regressions required for the tests, employ-
ed current, five lagged and four future values of each variable along with 
a constant term. All regressions start at 19611I1 to accomodate the five 
(23) lagged value~; to . allow for the fo,ur future values, the regressions 
on the past only ended in 19751V, while the regressions on the past and 
future ended in 1976IV. 
In table (3.A) below, we present a summary of the estimated regres-
sions. In these regressions H denotes the monetary base, DC denotes dome-
stic credit (monetary base minus net reserves), 1PR is the volume of in-
dustrial production and CP is the consumer price index. (F) represents 
the statistic, calculated according to the formula (R2/k-l)/«(1-R2}/(n-k», 
(where k stands for the number of estimated coefficients including the 
constant term and n is the number of observations) which is required to 
test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the explana-
tory variables are insignificantly different from zero as a group. If 
,the null hypothesis is true, the above statistic follows the F-distri-
bution which (k-l), (n-k) degrees of freedom. To accept the null hy-
pothesis, the calculated statistic must be lower than the critical value 
of the F-distribution with (k-l), (n-k) degrees of freedom at a given 
level of significance. The starred valu2s of (F) in Table 3.A indicate 
that 'the calculated (F) values are higher than the critical values of 
the F-distribution at the 5 per cent level of significance and thus the 
explanatory variables in the respective regressions are significant, as 
a group, in explaining the variations in the dependent variable. 
(23)Note that one observation 1S lost because of the logarithmic 
transformation of data. 
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TAB L E 3.A 
R2 Standard Degrees Regressions F error of of 
estimate Freedom 
1. H=f(CP, 5 past values) 0.063 0.619 0.0388 51 
2. H=f(CP, 4 future, 5 past values) 0.21;: 1.293 0.0371 47 
3. CP=f(H, 5 past values) * 0.227 2.497 0.0227 51 
4. CP=f(H, 4 future, 5 past values) 0.253 1.592 0.0232 47 
5. H=f(IPR, 5 past values) 0.167 1.707 0.0367 51 
6. H=f(IPR, 4 future, 5 past values) 0.248 1.550 0.0363 47 
.> • 
7. IPR=f(H, 5 past values) ... 0.258 2.958 0.0535 51 
.? 
8. IPR=f(H, future, 5 past values) ... 4 0.372 2.788 0.0512 47 
9. DC=f(CP, 5 past values) 0.129 1.262 0.0848 51 
10. DC=f(CP, 4 future, 5 past values) 0.161 0.900 0.0867 47 
11. CP=f(DC, 5 past values) 0.067 0.608 0.0249 51 
12. CP=f(DC, 4 future, 5 past values) 0.183 1.052 0.0243 47 
13. DC=f(IPR, 5 past values) 0.158 1.590 0.0834 51 
14. DC=f(IPR, 4 future, 5 past values)O.240 1.482 0.0825 47 
.> • 
past values) ... 15. IPR=f(DC, 5 0.337 4.312 0.0506 51 
i: 16. IPR=f(DC, 4 future, 5 past values)0.480 4.345 0.0466 47 
.>. 
significant at the 0.05 level ... = 
Table 3.B. below contains the results of the F-test for the signi-
ficance of the coefficients of the four future variables. 
Table 3.B: F-test for significance of Four future variables'Coefficients 
Causal patterns 
(a) CP -:+-H 
H + CP 
(b) IPR+ H 
H + IPR 
(c) CP + DC 
DC + CP 
(d) IPR+ DC 
DC ~ IPR 
Regression equations F4 47 , 
H on CP 2.217 
CP onE 0.407 
H on IPR 1.263 
IPR on :-r 2.139 
DC on :';J '-~ 0.441 
CP on TV'" .... A .. 1.671 
DC on :;:PR 1.271 
.' . .. 
IPR on DC 3.250 
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To illustrate the nature of the test, let us take equations (1), 
(2) of table (3.A); having estimated the above regressions we form the 
following statistic: 
where (expl. SS) stands for the variation in the dependent variable ex-
plained by the regression, (Res. SS) stands for the variation left unex-
plained, ki(i= 1,2) is the number of estimated coefficientS(including 
the constant term) In each regression and (n) is the number of observations. 
If the null hypothesis, that the coefficients of the four future 
variables are insignificantly different from zero as a group, is true, then 
the above statistic follows the F-distribution with (k2-k1 ), (n-k2 ) degrees 
of freedom. In the present tests (k 2-k 1 ) is equal to (4) and (n-k 2 ) is 
equal to (47). 
Since the critical value of the F-distribution at the 0.05 level 
of significance with 4, 47 degrees of freedom is approximately (2.56), the 
calculated F-statistics shown in table 3.B reveal that in all regressions, 
except the one of industrial production (IPR) on domestic credit, (DC), 
the coefficients of future variables are insignificantly different from 
zero as a group. Thus in all pairs of variables except the one between 
(DC) and (IPR) the Sims tests failed to detect any unidirectional causal 
pattern, whereas the causal pattern between domestic credit and industrial 
production, runs unidirectionally from the latter variable to the former. 
Let us take for example the monetary base (H) and consumer prices 
(CP); for a unidirectional causal influence running from (H) to (CP), we 
require that according to the F-test the coefficients of future values of 
.(H), in the regression of (CP) on (H) should be insignificant as a group, 
whereas in the regression of (H) on (CP) the coefficients of the four 
future values of (CP) should be significantly different from zero as a 
group. Although the F-test meets the first requirement it fails to meet 
the second and thus the hypothesis of unidirectional caulality running 
from (H) to (CP) is rejected. Moreover it is clear that the test fails 
to detect causality running from (CP) to (H) since the coefficients of 
the four future values of (H) in the regression of (CP) on (H) are not 
significant as a group, as they should be if causality ran from (CP) 
to (H). 
Referring to the causal patterns between domestic credit (DC) and 
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industrial production (IPR), the test reveals that the coefficients of 
the four future values of (IPR) in the regression of (DC) on (IPR) are 
insignificant as a group, whereas the future values of (DC) in the regres-
sion of (IPR) on (DC) are significantly different from zero as a group; 
this suggests that causality runs unidirectionally from industrial produ-
ction to domestic credit. 
As a conclusion to this section vle may say that the evidence on 
causality presented and discussed above, allow us to make the rock-bottom 
statement that the empirical evidence provided by the causality tests 
does not contradict our previous evidence which suggests that the monetary 
authorities exert an, at most, loose control on the monetary base and vir-
tually no control on domestic credit. 
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APPENDIX A: Quarterly data on identity specifying the 
sources of the monetary bas~. 
h = r + g + b + e where h the rate of c~2nge of the monetary base, r, 
g, b the contributions of net reserves, net credit to the government and 
net credit to the banking and other sec~ors, and e the contribution of 
all other unclassified factors to the rate of change in the monetary base. 
quarter h r ~ b e ::;, 
1959 
2 0.0274 0.0050 -0.0014 0.0255 -0.0017 
3 0.0318 -0.0312 0.0964 -0.0307 -0.0026 
4 0.0876 0.0662 0.0975 -0.1039 0.0278 
1960 
1 0.0320 0.0489 -0.0433 0.0277 -0.0013 
2 0.0107 0.0121 0.0315 -0.0014 -0.0316 
3 -0.0132 -0.0076 0.0298 -0.0377 0.0024 
4 0.0157 -0.0188 0.0248 0.0526 -0.0430 
1961 
1 0.0339 0.0280 -0.0341 -0.0325 0.0725 
2 0.0225 -0.0157 -0:0005 0.0492 -0.0105 
3, 0.0640 -0.0232 0.1003 0.0122 -0.0253 
4 0.0565 0.0748 -0.0593 -0.0195 0.0606 
1962 
1 0.0682 0.0678 0.0032 -0.0311 0.0282 
2 0.0054 -0.0019 -0.0055 -0.0149 0.0278 
3 0.0324 -0.0338 0.0853 -0.0219 0.0029 
4 0.0592 0.0062 -0.0136 0.0556 0.0111 
1963 
1 0.0908 0.0387 0.0031 0.0035 0.0454 
2 -0.0038 o .0013 -0.0457 0.0145 0.0261 
3 0.0098 -0.0304 0.0347 0.0011 0.0044 
4 0.0600 0.0001 0.0504 0.0531 
-0.0435 
1964 
1 0.0245 0.0094 0.0064 -0.0083 
0.0171 
2 0.0246 0.0093 0.0297 0.0326 
-0.0471 
3 0.0684 -0.0237 0.0876 0.0318 
-0.0272 
4 0.0142 -0.0042 0.0038 -0.0337 
0.0483 
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quarter h r g b e 
1965 
1 -0.0081 -0.0107 0.0222 -0.0056 -0.0140 
2 0.0517 0.0033 0.0069 0.0375 0.0039 
3 0.0443 -0.0179 0.0353 0.0093 0.0176 
4 0.0264 -0.0100 -0.0296 0.0514 0.0076 
1966 
1 0.0731 0.0286 0.00'04 0.0185 0.0255 
2 -0.0180 0.0163 0.0042 -0.0526 0.0141 
3 0.0597 -0.0051 0.0014 0.0364 0.0270 
4 0.0403 -0.0005 0.0190 0.0156 0.0062 
1967 
1 ,-0.0131 0.0012 0.0058 -0.0216 0.0015 
2 0.1190 -0.0020 0.0118 0.0958 0.0134 
3 -0.011 0.0004 -0.0141 0.0102 -0.0075 
4 0.0452 0.0117 0.0124 0.0212 -0.0002 
1968 
1 0.0387 -0.0102 0.0274 0.0507 -0.0292 
2 0.0125 -0.0071 0.0420 0.0019 -0.0244 
3 0.0142 0.0265 -0.0842 0.0772 -0.0054 
4 0.0522 0.0175 0.0281 0.0070 -0.0004 
1969 
1 -0.0326 -0.0203 0.0383 -0.0308 -0.0197 
2 0.0527 -0.0100 0.0964 0.0271 -0.0607 
3 -0.0046 0.0245 -0.0556 0.0327 -0.0062 
4 0.0256 0.0015 -0.0216 0.0200 0.0257 
1970 
1 -0.0368 -0.0186 -0.0253 0.0145 -0.0074 
2 0.0457 0.0144 0.0125 0.0258 -0.0071 
3 0.0240 o .00Ltl -0.0337 0.0411 0.0126 
4 0.0283 -0.0041 0.0442 -0.0112 
-0.0005 
1971 
1 0.0146 -0.0017 0.0143 0.0934 
-0.0914 
2 0.0644 0.0245 0.0480 -0.0070 
-0.0010 
3 0.0304 0.0659 -0.0437 0.0200 
-0.0119 
4 0.0806 0.0310 0.0109 0.0021 
o .0366 
1972 
1 0.0367 0.0279 -0.0079 0.0529 
-0.0362 
-175-
quarter h r :::, b e 
1972 
2 0.0827 0.1109 -0.0132 -0.0020 -0.0165 
3 0.0833 0.0389 0.0342 -0.0118 0.0220 
4 -0.0126 0.0812 -0.0827 -0.0016 -0.0095 
1973 
1 0.0993 0.0447 0.0491 0.0621 -0.0567 
2 0.0909 0.0094 0.0656 0.0452 -0.0292 
3 0.0464 -0.0067 0.0635 0.0044 -0.0148 
4 -0.0458 -0.0416 -0.0324 0.0596 -0.0314 
1974 
1 0.0942 -0.0159 0.·1030 0.0641 -0.0570 
2 0.0449 -0.0005 -0.0962 -0.0081 0.1497 
3 0.1051 0.0044 0.0081 0.0783 0.0142 
4 -0.0373 -0.0163 0.0805 -0.0418 -0.0597 
1975 
1 0.0524 0.0171 -0.0285 0.1162 -0.0524 
2 0.0395 -0.0008 0.0119 0.0231 0.0023 
3 -0.0005 0.0533 -0.0946 -0.0231 0.0639 
4 0.1087 -0.0100 0.0485 0.0132 0.0570 
1976 
1 0.0510 0.0012 0.0643 0.0276 -0.04-21 
2 0.0006 0.0033 0.0051 -0.0334 0.0255 
3 0.0994 0.0049 0.0511 0.0267 0.0167 
4 0.0532 -0.0151 -0.0676 0.0790 0.0570 
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APPENDIX B: Quarterly data used for the causality tests. 
H denotes the monetary base, DC is domestic credit, IPR denotes 
the index of the volume of industrial production, CP denotes the consumer 
price index. All data is transformed into logarithmic first differences. 
quarter H DC I??- CP 
1960 
2 0.0106 0.0612 -0.0167 0.0102 
3 -0.0133 -0.0159 0.0139 0.0067 
4 0.0155 0.1437 0.1051 0.0133 
1961 
1 0.0333 -0.1244 -0.0368 0.0077 
2 0.0222 0.0954 -0.0504 0.000 
3 0.0620 0.1947 -0.0192 -0.0132 
4 0.0550 -0.1414 -0.0140 0.0044 
1962 
1 0.0660 -0.0583 -0.0460 -0.0100 
2 0.0054 -0.0482 0.0503 0.0078 
3 0.0319 0.1433 0.0611 0.000 
4 0.0575 0.0873 -0.0240 0.0154 
1963 
1 0.0869 0.0139 -0.0470 0.0151 
2 -0.0038 -0.0735 0.0443 0.0032 
3 0.0098 0.0837 0.1317 -0.0075 
4 0.0583 0.2102 -0.0436 0.0064 
1964 
1 0.0242 -0.0038 -0.0948 0.0043 
2 0.0243 0.1173 0.1467 0.0053 
3 0.0662 0.1968 0.1545 -0.0064 
4 0.0141 -0.0489 -0.1062 0.0096 
1065 
1 -0.0081 0.0280 -0.0181 0.0042 
2 0.0504 0.0705 0.0673 0.0167 
3 0.0434 0.0694 0.0356 0.0052 
4 0.0260 0.0442 -0.0346 0.0184 
1966 
1 0.0706 0.0288 0.0640 0.0111 
2 -0.0182 -0.0809 0.1178 0.0178 
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quarter H DC IPR CP 
1966 
3 0.0580 0.0627 -0.0234 -0.0020 
4 0.0395 0.0572 -0.0258 0.0195 
1967 
1 -0.0132 -0.0268 0.0185 0.0077 
2 0.1124 0.1675 0.0448 0.000 
3 -0.0112 -0.0063 -0.0375 -0.0164 
4 0.0442 0.0523 0.0153 0.000 
1968 
1 0.0380 0.1166 0.0283 0.0040 
2 0.0124 0.0624 0.0641 0.0087 
3 0.0141 -0.0098 0.0089 -0.0039 
4 0.0509 0.0489 0.0048 0.0115 
1969 
1 -0.0331 0.0107 0.0239 0.0048 
2 0.0514 0.1560 0.0581 0.0151 
3 -0.0046 -0.0286 -0.0264 -0.0066 
4 0.0253 -0.0020 0.0036 0.0103 
1970 
1 -0.0375 -0.0140 0.0444 0.0019 
2 0.0447 0.0475 0.0103 0.0257 
3 0.0237 0.0092 0.0289 -0.0027 
4 0.0280 0.0414 0.0319 0.0117 
1971 
1 0.0145 0.1277 0.0278 -0.0009 
2 0.0625 0.0452 -0.0119 0.0292 
3 0.0299 -0.0275 0.0559 -0.0203 
4 0.0776 0.0157 0.0207 0.0185 
1972 
1 0.0361 0.0567 0.0502 0.0087 
2 0.0795 -0.0194 0.0160 0.0274 
3 0.0800 0.0309 0.0093 -0.0162 
4 -0.0127 -0.1323 0.0641 0.0370 
1973 
1 0.0947 0.1692 0.0754 0.0237 
2 0.0871 0.1573 0.0497 0.0557 
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quarter H DC IPR CP 
1973 
3 0.0453 0.0929 0.0327 0.0315 
4 -0.0469 0.0366 -0.0618 0.1341 
1974 
1 0.0900 0.1908 0.0748 0.0669 
2 0.0439 -0.1263 -0.0991 0.0420 
3 0.1000 0.1103 -0.0783 0.0069 
4 -0.0381 0.0503 0.1114 0.0362 
1975 
1 0.0511 0.1018 0.0487 0.0398 
2 0.0387 0.0432 -0.0542 0.0423 
3 -::-0.0005 -0.1463 -0.0243 0.0010 
4 0.1032 0.0792 0.1154 0.0581 
1976 
1 0.0498 0.1185 0.0448 0.0267 
2 0.0006 -0.0368 -0.0302 0.0369 
3 0.0948 0.0982 -0.0380 -0.0032 
4 0.0519 0.0149 0.1415 0.0470 
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C HAP T E R F 0 U R 
mTHE INFLUENCE OF MONEY ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY"-. 
~- - ~ - - -
One of the most -important debates in Monetary Theory as it deve~opea 
after the Keynesian revolution, concerned the importance of the quantity 
·of money and monetary policy as a means of influencing the pace of eco-
nomic activity. The early Keynesian view that money is a rather ineffec-
tive instrument in influencing aggregate expenditure and the level of 
income, came under forceful attack by the "neo-quantity theory" or "mo-
netarist" school, originating from the "Chicago tradition" under the 
leadership of proffesor MiltonFriedman. 
The monetarists produced voluminous empirical evidence regarding 
the importance of money as a key variable which has a significant effect 
on activity. Perhaps the most impressive part of this evidence, which 
stimulated further research, is the new· explanation provided by Friedman 
and Schwartz(1) on the causes of the Great Depression. Contrary to the 
widely accepted view that the depression was due to the fall in invest-
ment spending caused by pessimistic expectations regarding the future 
profitability of investment, Friedman and Schwartz argued that the main 
causal factor of the depression was a large contraction of the money 
(2) 
supply . 
Despite the large amount of empirical work produced by the moneta-
rists, which confirms the importance of money, the monetarist literature 
on the theoretical aspects of money and monetary p~licy is less volumi-
nous. Although in several occasions Friedman and his colleagues verbally 
. . . f h (3) h . exposed the transmlSSlon mechanlsm 0 monetary c anges ,t ere lS a 
lack of formal models specifying with adequate detail the channels through 
h f · . (4) which changes in the quantity of money affect t e pace 0 actlvlty . 
(l)M.Friedman and A.Schwarz :"A Monetary History of the United States 
1867-1960" NBER 1963 
(2)However, Kaldor argued that the contraction of the money stock was 
the concequence rather than the cause of the Depression. See N.Kaldor: 
II· The New Monetarism" Lloyds Bank Review 1970. For an illuminating 
exposition of the Friedman-Kaldor debate see D.Laidler :"The influence 
of money on economic activity : a survey of some current problems" in 
D.Laidler :"Essays on Money and Inflation" Manchester 1975. 
(3)See, for example, M.Friedman and A:Schwartz :"Money and Business Cycles". 
Review of Economics and Statistics 1963. 
(4)Brunner and Meltzer's work represents an encouraging effort towards 
a more complete presentation of monetary policy channels. See Brunner 
and Meltzer :"Money Debt and Economic Activity" Journal of Political 
Economy 1972. See also Brunner and Meltzer :"Aggregative Theory for 
a Close:d Economy" in J. Stein (ed) "Honetarism", North-i-iolland 1976 
It should be noted however, t0at the monetarist nature of Brunner and 
r~'+nA)()'''' J,lonk bas been questloned. 
" 
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The lack of a formal monetarist model prolonged the Keynesian-Monetarist 
debate ; a lot of time has been wasted in talking at cross-purposes. 
Keynesians were continuously criticizing Monetarists for not having a 
formal theory, whereas Monetarists were criticizing Keynesians for ha-
ving a too restrictive theory : the Hicks-Hansen IS/LM model. Further-
more the lack of a formal model gave Monetarists greater flexibility 
in interpreting the empirical evidence and in avoiding Keynesian criti-
cisms on some characteristic Monetarist propositions. 
In the first section of this chapter we briefly examine two main 
theoretical aspects· of the Keynesian-Monetarist debate~ the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and the relative effectiveness of monetary 
and fiscal policies. In the second section we undertake a preliminary 
investigation of the importance of money in the Greek economy using the 
IS/LM framework. The IS/LM model is used ln two settings. In the first 
sett~ng we ~xamine the implications of the rigidity of interest rates 
on bank loans and deposits for the effectiveness of monetary and fis-
cal policy. In the second setting we use the model to provide some ru-
dimentary empirical evidence on whether the price of existing capital 
relatively to its reproduction cost plays some role in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. 
Section 1 The Keynesian-Monetarist debate ; some theoretical aspects 
Some aspects of the Keynesian monetarist debate can be fruitfully 
examined in the context of the standard IS/LM macromodel(5). As it is 
well known this model contains, in its simplest form, three behaviou-
ral equations : an equation for Saving postulating that Saving is an 
"increasing function of income and, possibly, the rate of interest, an 
equation for investment postulating that investment is a decreasing 
function of the rate of interest, and an equation for the demand for 
money postulat"ing that desired money balances depend positively on in-
come and negatively on the rate of interest. In addition the model con-
tains two equilibrium conditions : one for equilibrium in the market for 
goods, saying"that saving must equdl investment plus government spending, 
and one for equilibrium in the money market saying that the demand for 
(5)For a discussion of the diffrences between Keynesians and Monetarists 
in the context of the IS/LM model see V.Chick "The Theory of Monetary 
Policy 1973 chapter 3. 
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money should be equal to the exogenously glven money stock. 
Solving the model for income in terms of the exogenous variables 
we can obtain the income multiplier with respect to the stock of money 
which shows the total effect of a unit rise in the quantity of money u-
pon income. The magnitude of the multiplier depends crucially upon the 
relative magnitudes of two elasticities : the interest elasticity of 
expenditu~e and the interest elasticity of the demand for money. The 
larger is the former elasticity relatively to the latter, the stronger 
is the effect of changes in the quantity of money upon income and vice-
versa. At one extreme, if the interest elasticity of expenditure tends 
to infinity and /or the interest elasticity of desired money balances 
tends to zero, that is when the IS curve is horizontal or/and the LM 
curve is vertical, it follows that monetary policy is powerful and fis-
cal policy-is completely ineffective to 'influence economic activity: 
"only money matters". At the other extreme, when the interest elastici-
ty of private spending tends to zero or/and the interest elasticity of 
the demand for money tends to infinity, monetary policy is impotent to 
affect economic activity: "money does not matter". 
To the extent in which the Keynesian-Monetarist debate took place 
1n the context of theIS/LM framework, it was characterized by the struggle 
of each camp to occupy the middle ground by throwing the other in one 
f h b (6) M' h h K . o tea ove two extreme cases . onetar1sts argue t at t e eynes1an 
case rests heavily on the assumption that desired money balances are 
infinitely elastic with respect to the rate of interest (the liquidity 
(7 ) 
trap case) ,whereas Keynesians argue that the monetarist case rests 
on the assumption that the demand for money 1S independent of the rate 
. ( 8 ) . . . 1 h th d d f of 1nterest . Extens1ve enp1r1ca researc on e eman or money, 
l)owever, indicated that neither of -the above extreme positions is empi-
rically relevant : the interest elasticity of the demand for money is 
. f" (9) negative and statistically significant but does not tend to 1n 1nlty . 
(6)See V.Chick op cit chapter 3 pp 2S-29. 
(7)See M.Eriedman : "A theoretical framework for Monetary 
R.J.Gordon (ed) "Milton Friedman's Monetary Framework" 
see esp. pp.21-29 on Absolute Liquidity preference. 
Analysis" in 
1974 pp 1-62; 
(8)See J.Tobin : "Friedman's Theoretical Framework in Gordon op.cit. 
pp.77-S9 see esp. pp. 77-78. 
(9)For a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical work 
on the demand for money see D.Laidler : "The Demand for money : 
Theories and evidence" 1977. 
-182-
Therefore the LM curve slopes upwards but it is neither vertical nor 
horizontal. Given that the IS cu~ve has the no~ I t' I 4 4ma nega lve s ope, money 
matters but it is not all that matters. 
Although the empirical evidence on the demand for money contributed 
to some convergence of differing views and forced $ome extremists of 
both camps to modify their initial positions, it is nontheless true 
that a general consensus between Keynesians and monetarists has not been 
achieved. To distinguish the existing differences it is necessary to e-
xamine the way in which the two camps view the transmission mechanism 
of monetary changes on the real side of the economy. 
The traditional Keynesian argument is that changes ln the quantity 
of money operate via the rate of interest on financial assets. An open 
market operation which raises the quantity of money, reduces the rate 
of interest on financial assets. The fall in the rate of interest redu-
ces the cost of borrowing for investment purposes and therefore invest-
ment rise$_ raising in turn income via the multiplier. 
Later developments in the neo-Keynesian camp however,originating 
from the work of Tobin and the "Yale school'~ suggested that the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy operates not only through the rate,of 
interest on financial assets but through a larger spectrum involving not 
only financial assets but also titles on the existing real productive 
capital. In particular, Tobin views the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary changes as an exercise in portfolio theory, where : changes in the 
money stock disrupt the existing portfolio balance between money, finan-
cial assets and real capital or titles on it, and set in motion portfo-
lio substitutions which ultimately affect the accumulation of newly pro-
. (10) duced capltal . 
To illustrate Tobin's argument let us assume an initial portfolio 
equilibrium which is disrupted by a rlse in the quantity of money brought 
about by open market bond purchases. The effect of the open market ope-
ration will not be limited to the initial fall in the rate of interest 
on bonds which induced wealth holders to absorb the additional money ba~ 
(10)See J.Tobin :"Money, Capital and other stores of Value ", American 
Economic Review 1961. Tobin and Brainard :"Financial Intermediaries 
and the effectiveness of monetary controls n. American Economic Revie~ 
1963. Brainard and Tobin :"Pitfalls in Financial Model Building" 
:'American Economic Review 1968 
J.Tobin :"A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory" 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking 1969. 
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lances, but it will have further repercussions. For, the fall in the 
bond yield relative to the return on equities will induce substitution 
in favour of equities and against bonds and as a result the price of 
equities will rise and their return Hill fall. But the rlse In the price 
of equities means that the price of the existing stock of real capital 
has risen relative to its reproduction cost ; in other words the asset 
price of real capital has risen relative to its output price. Now, since 
newly produced capital is relatively cheaper that the existing capital, 
investors are induced to substitute old for new capital and therefore 
the rate of real capital accumulation is accelerated (ie investment 
rises) . 
Although Monetarists seem to agree with neo-Keynesians that mone-
tary changes are transmitted to the "real" side of the Economy through 
a process of asset substitutions in wealth-holder's portfolios, they in-
sist that a far wider rang.e of assets and interest rates should be con-
sidered, than those considered by Keynesians. Not only financial assets 
and titles on real capital (i.e equities) but also all kinds of real as-
sets which form a part of private wealth should be taken into account. 
As Friedman and Meiselman point out "the crucial issue that corresponds 
to the distinction between Keynesian and Monetarist effects of monetary 
policy is not whether changes in the stock of money operate through in-
terest rates but rather the range of interest rates considered .•...... 
On the monetarist view, monetary.,policy impinges on a much broader range 
of capital assets and correspondingly broader range of associated ex-
. (11) pendltures" . 
Any asset may be thought of as possesslng an "own-rate of interest" 
determined by the flow of future services it renders (either in terms 
of money or in terms of utility) and by the price of the asset. Accor-
ding to Monetarists a rise in the quantity of money will not only lower 
the return on financial assets and on titles on productive capital but 
the process of portfolio substitution will reduce the yield of all eX1S-
ting·real assets or, equivalently, will raise the asset price of all 
forms of existing real assets relative to their output price (i.e rela-
tive to their reproduction costs). Clearly then, the resulting rise in 
the relative price of existing assets in terms of newly produced assets 
(ll)See r1.Friedman and D.Heiselman : "T;;e relative stability of monetary 
velocity and the investment multi~lier ~n the 9n~ted States, 1897ff 1958", Research Study Two in Stabllisatlon Pollcles Englewood Cll s, 
1964 p.217. 
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will induce an increased spending not only for the acquisition of new 
productive capital, but also for the acquisition of a much wider range 
of newly produced real assets. Hence the monetarist transmission me-
chanism implies that a given change in t~e money stock will have, cete-
ris paribus, a stronger effect on private expenditures than Keynesians 
would tend to believe. 
If we had to "squeeze" the above discussion into the standard 
IS/LM framework we would say that a monetarist would interpret "the" 
rate of interest appearing in this framework as an "average" of interest 
rates on a broad range of financial and real assets whereas a Keynesian 
would consider "the" rate of interest as representative of a more nar-
row group of financial and real assets(12). As a result, a monetarist 
would argue that the elasticity of expenditure with respect to "the" 
rate of interest is relatively larger, and therefore the IS curve rela-
tively more flat, whereas a Keynesian would consider the interest ela-
city of expenditure as smaller and therefore the IS curve as relatively 
more steep. 
Besides the differences regarding the range of assets involved in 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, Keynesians and monetarists 
make different assumptions regarding the degree of substitutability among 
assets. In particular, Keynesians consider money to be a close substi-
tute for financial assets, while not such a close substitute for real 
assets. Monetarists, on the other hand, regard money "as an asset posses-
sing certain unique characteristics which render it not a particularly 
d b · f . f . f ( 13 ) Th goo su stltute or any specl lC asset or group 0 assets . ese 
differing views regarding the substitutability between money and other 
assets create important implications for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. To examine these implications more formally, let us consider a 
simple portfolio model with three assets: money(M), financial assets (B) 
and real capital (K). The right-hand sidesof equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.3) 
(12)A formal model specifying either the sophisticated Keynesian or the 
monetarist transmission mechanisms should take into account at least 
three assets : money, financial assets and real capital. The IS/LM 
model specifies only two assets : money and bonds. Real capital is 
implicitly considered as perfect substitute with bonds and therefore 
it is aggregated with them. 
It should be mentioned that the work of Brunner and Meltzer is cha-
racterized by the treatment of bonds and capital as imperfect substi-
tutes. 
(13)See C.A.E. Goodhart: "The importance of money". Banx of England 
Quarterly Bulletin Vol. 10, no.2. 
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below, are the demand functions for these assets whereas the LHS repre-
sent the fixed supplies of those assets. Equations(1.4), (1.5), (1.6) re-
present the a priori restrictions imposed by portfolio theory upon the 
structural parameters of the asset demand functions(14). 
(1.1) M - L(rB,rK) . L < 0 T < - , , .u 0 r B r K 
(1.2) B = F(rB,rK) F > 0 F < 0 r B 
, 
r K 
(1. 3) K = D(rK,rB) D > 0 D < 0 r K 
, 
r B 
(1.4) FrB + L + D = 0 r B r B 
(1.5) F + D + L = 0 r K r K r K 
(1.6) F - D -r K r B 
The effect of a rise in the money stock, brought about though open 
market bond pu pchasEB, upon the rates of return, (rB), (rK), on finan-
cial and real assets are glven by (1.7), (1.8) below: 
(1. 7) 
(1.8) 
dr K 
dM 
= < 0 
< 0 
Taking into account the signs of the structural parameters of the asset 
demand functions as well as restrictions (1.4),(1.5), it is easily seen 
that expressions (1.7), (1.8) are negative and therefore a rise in the 
money stock is expansionary since it lowers the rates of interest on fi-
nancial and real assets. Given the degrees of substitutability between 
money and real assets,and between financial and real assets, the higher 
is the degree of substitutability between money and financial assets, 
) ( ) . (15) . the larger will be the parameters (L ,F ln absolute value ln 
r B r B 
(14)See Tobin : A general equilibrium approach 
(15)Given the degree of substitutability between financial and real 
assets, the parameter (D ) will remain constant in which case it 
is clear from (1.4)that rB (Fr +L ) will be also constant. B r B 
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which case the lower drB/dM, drK/dM will be in absolute value. 
Therefore, the higher is the degree of substitutability between money 
and financial assets the weaker will be the contractionary effect of a 
r1se in the money stock on interest rates. 
Now, since Keynesians assert that money lS a close substitute for 
financial assets and not such a close substitute for real assets, and 
Monetarists assert that money 1S not· a particularly good substitute 
either for financial or for real assets, it follows from the preceding 
argument that according to monetarists a rise in the money stock will 
have a more contractionary effect upon rates .- of interest and therefore 
a more expansionary effect on aggregate expenditure than Keynesians be-
lieve. 
Again, the above argument may be "squeezed" into the IS/LM model 
by taking "the" rate of interest to rep~esent a kind of "average" of .... 
interest rates on various financial and real assets. We then may say 
that monetarists consider the elasticity of the demand for money with 
respect to "the" rate of interest to be relatively low and therefore the 
LM curve to be relatively steep. Whereas Keynesians take the interest 
elasticity of the demand for money to be higher and the LM curve to be 
less steep than monetarists believe. 
Up to this point the Keynesian and monetarist transmission mecha-
nisms have been described in terms of portfolio substitutions taking 
place among money, financial assets and real assets. However, both mone-
tarists and Keynesians seem to agree that monetary changes may be trans-
mitted not only through substitution effects but also through wealth ef-
fects. Wealth effects may arise either-directly from changes in the 
stocks of assets which constitute private sector's net wealth or/and In-
. f . h (16) directly through changes ln rates 0 lnterest on t ose assets . 
The indirect wealth effect is particularly relevant to the analysis 
of Keynesian and monetarist transmission mechanisms undertaken above. 
Its essense is that the rise in the prices (fall in the rates of interest) 
of real and financial assets resulting from the expansion of the :-:1orley 
stock, cause a revaluation of private sector's wealth which induces wealth 
holders to spend more on consumable goods and services. Thus the wealth 
(16)For excellent reviews on the operation of different types of wealth 
effects see: D.Currie : "Monetary and Fiscal policy and the crowding 
out issue" Queen r1ary Col).ege discussion paper 1978 L.Meyer :"Wealth 
effects and the effectiveness of Monetary and Fiscal Policies" Jour-
nal of Money Credit and Banking 1974 . 
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effect further strengthens the expansionary influence of monetary po-
licy by reinforcing the substitution effect initiated by changes in the 
quantity of money. 
Direct wealth effects change the quantity as distinct from the prlce 
of wealth and, again, inducewealth holders to increase consumption on 
goods and services. The operation and strength of direct wealth effects 
depends on the precise specification of the assets included in priVate 
sector's net wealth. Although there is general agreement that high-powe-
red money and real assets are included in net private wealth, there is 
much dispute on whether demand deposits and government securities consti-
tute net wealth (17). Contrary to Gurley and Sra·w, Peseck and Saving argue 
that demand deposits constitute net wealth(18). Moreover it has been 
argued that government bonds should not be included in net wealth since 
the private sector takes into account that the coupon payments on bonds 
have a present value equal to the discounted future taxes which must 
be payed by the private sector to finance the interest payments on govern-
ment debt. However, this argument is based on "ultra rationality" on be-
half of wealth holders, and it is rather far-fetched to assume that wealth 
h · h d f·· (19) H holders possess such a 19 egree 0 ratlonallty . ence, government 
bonds should be, at least partly, included in net private wealth. 
The dependence of the operation of the direct wealth effect on the 
definition of wealth can be easily illustrated in the case of an open 
market bond purchase which raises the stock of high-powered money. If 
both high-powered money and government bonds are included in net wealth 
but demand deposits are excluded the open market purchase vlill. not cause 
a direct wealth effect. 
If, on the other hand, demand deposits are wholly or partly included, 
or/and government bonds are wholly or partly excluded from net wealth, 
the open market operation will cause a direct wealth effect, which fur-
ther reinforces the :expansionary effect of the rise in the quantity 
of money upon aggregate demand caused by the substitution effect and the 
indirect wealth effect. 
The comparison of Keynesian and Monetarist transmission mechanisms 
led to the conclusion that the existing differences between the two groups 
(17)see D.Currie op.cit. 
(18)See the discussion of chapter one (Section 1.1) of this thesis. 
(19)See D.Currie op.cit. 
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are of degree rather than of kind. Differing views regarding the range 
of assets involved in the process of portfolio substitution, and the 
degree of substitutability among assets, imply that monetarists regard 
monetary policy more effective than fiscal policy, whereas neo-Keynesians 
hold the converse view. Although the issues can In principle be resolved 
by recourse to empirical evidence, difficulties arlse In practice since 
the interest elasticities of the demand for money and of different cate-
gories of expenditures which have been estimated, are quite sensitive 
both to different specifications in the form of equations and the variables 
included, and to different sample periods. 
Despite the differences which may exist regarding the relative ef-
fectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies, recognition by both camps 
that the interest elasticities of aggregate expenditure and the demand 
for money are neither zero not infinite, should have led them to concede 
that both monetary and fiscal policies are in principle capable of in-
fluencing the pace of activity. Nevertheless, although Neo-Keynesians 
do accept that money matters, Friedman argues that while the demand for 
money may be interest elastic, fiscal policy unaccompanied by changes 
in the money supply is rather impotent to exert a permanent influence 
. . (20) A h h F . d d·d ·d· upon nomlnal lncome It oug rle man l not provl e a rlgorous 
argument explaining this assertion,which in the context of the standard 
IS/LM model seems inconceivable, he gave a clue of what he had in mind 
in the following passage of his rejoinder to Tobin's criticisms :" ...... a 
deficit financed by borrowing involves an once-for-all shift to the right 
in the IS curve, a higher interest rate, a higher velocity, and a higher 
level of spending for a given monetary growth path ••... finanqing the 
deficit by creating money shifts the LM curve to the right. But this is 
not an once-for-all shift. Solong as the deficit continues, and continues 
to be financed by creating money the nominal money stock continues to 
grow and the LM continues to move to the right. Is there any doubt that 
(20)As Friedman ponts out :"1 regard the description of our position as 
money is all that matters for changes in nominal income and for short-
run changes in real income as an exaggeration but one that gives the 
right flavour of our conclusions", see Friedman :"A theoretical frame-
work for monetary nanlysis" in Gordon (ed) op.cit. p.27. See also 
Friedmand :"Comments on the critics :Tobin" in Gordon(ed) op.cit see 
esp.pp.139-140. Hote however, that not all monetarists share Friedman's 
view. The version of monetarism reflected in the work of Brunner and 
Meltzer recognizes the ability of fiscal policy to influence nominal 
income. 
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this effect must swamp the effect of the once-for-all shift of the IS 
curve ?" ~21}_. In the above passage Friedman looks beyond the short-run 
(first-round) effects of expansionary fiscal policy on income and con-
siders the re'percussions on the economy resulting from the financing of 
the budget deficit created by the initial fiscal expansion . Related to 
the above passage is Friedman's assertion that a main difference between 
neo-Keynesians and Monetarists is that tne first group considl=rs almost 
exclusively the first-round effects of policy changes while the latter 
group concentrates in the ultimate effec~s. In Friedman~s own words :"One 
way to characterize the Keynesian approach is that it gives almost exclu-
sive importance to the first-round effect. This leads it to attach im-
portance primarily to flows of spending rather than to stocks of assets. 
Similarly, one way to characterize the quantity theory approach is to 
say that it gives almost no importance to first round effects". (22) 
Friedman's assertion that fiscal policy is incapable o! permanently 
affecting income, coupled with his assertion that Keynesians attach al-
most exclusive importance to the short-run effects of policy changes spe-
cified the issue towards which further research should be directed. The 
lssue ln question concerns the long-run effects of pure fiscal policy 
(that is fiscal policy unaccompanied by changes ln the money stock) upon 
income. Will fiscal policy have a lasting effect on lncome or the· effect 
will only be-temporary disappearing in the long-run? 
The long-run effects of fiscal policy have been examined theoreti-
cally by several economists. The first study that met Friedman's challenge 
. ". (23) has been undertaken by A.Bllnder and R.Solow, w o,ln a ploneerlng paper, 
present'ed an IS/LM model augmented by wealth effects ln the consumption 
function and the demand for money and incorporating the dynamic identity 
for the government budget financing requirements (the Government budget 
constraint). The budget constraint endogeneizes at least one of the two 
financial assets included in the model, money and government bonds, 
whereas the model's investment function, by making investment negatively 
dependent upon the stock of capital allows the derivation of a long-run 
desired stock of capital. The long-run is defined as a stationary state 
(22)See Friedman :"Comments on the critics :Tobin" ln Gordon (Ed.) 
op.cit. p.147. 
(23)A. Blinder and R.Solow :"Does fiscal policy matter? "Journal of 
public economics 1973. See also A. Blinder and R.Solow : "Analy tical 
Foundations of Fiscal policy" in The Economics of Public Finance 
Washington 1974. See esp. pp. 45-57. 
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ln which both investment and private and government saving are zero. 
The model treats the price level as constant assuming that aggregate 
demand faces no supply constraints. Using this model Blinder and Solow 
examine the long-run effects of a change in government spending for goods 
and services under two modes of financing budget imbalances : pure mo-
ney finance and pure bonds finance. In what follows ws give a brief ac-
count of the essentials of Blinder-Solow model. 
Starting' from an initial long-run equilibrium with a balanced 
budget assume a rise in government spending on goods and serVlces. In 
the conventional IS/LM model the IS curve will shift to the right and 
income will rise. However, this is not the end of the story since the 
budget deficit created by the initial fiscal expansion needs financing, 
and the issue of money and/or government bonds resulting from the fi-
nancing of the deficit will have further repercussions for aggregate de-
mand and the level of income. Let us consider in turn p~re money and 
pure bonds finance of the budget deficit. 
The increased issue of cash resulting from the budget deficit raises 
net . private wealth ; hence a wealth effect operates via the consumption 
function which shifts the IS curve further to the right. On the other 
hand, since the partial response of the demand for money to changes in 
wealth is less than unity, the rise in cash creates an excess supply 
of money and therefore the LM curve shifts to the right. Thus, the rise 
in cash coming through the budget has an unambiguously expansionary ef-
fect on aggregate spending and the level of income. 
Moreover, as long as the budget is in deficit the issue of cash will 
continue, the IS and LM curves will continue to move to the right, and 
income will be rising. The rise in income will be raising tax revenues 
and the budget deficit will be getting smaller. Eventually a long-run 
equilibrium will be achieved characterised by balanced budget and a per-
manently higher level of income. Since a rlse ln cash exerts an unambi-
guously expansionary effect on income it follows that money finance of 
the budget is always stable : a budget deficit financed by money creation 
will eventually close. 
In the case of bond financing of the budget, the deficit created 
by the initial fiscal expansion will result in bond issues. Given that 
government bonds constitute net private wealth, the expansionary wealth 
effect operating via the consumption function will shift the IS curve 
further to the right. On the other hand the wealth effect operating via 
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the demand for money 1.S cor1tractionary since it creates an excess de-
mand for money which shift,; the LM curve to the left. Thus, whether a 
r1.se in the stock of bond~ is on the whole expansionary or contractio~ 
nary depends on the relati-/(; strength of the wealth effects operating 
via the expenditure and th" demand for money functions. If the wealth 
effect on the consumption f'mction is strCnger than the wealth effect 
on the demand for money a 1,ise in bonds will be expansionary, and con-
versely if the wealth effef.t on the demand for money dominates the wealth 
effect on the consumption function. 
Now, if bonds have a :-;ufficiently expansionary effect on income, 
bond financing of the deficit will be stable(24). The issue of bonds 
which will be taking place ~)o long as the deficit continues will be 
raising income, reinforcing the initial expansionary effect of the rise 
in government spending. As income rises, tax revenues will be rising and 
eventually a new long-run equilibrium will be achieved with a balanced 
budget and a higher level of income. It is important to note that the 
long-run effect of government spending on income is higher under pure 
bonds finance than under pure money finance. This is because under bond 
financing the increased is:c:ue of bonds results in increased· coupon pay-
ments to the private sector which also need financing. Therefore the bud-
get deficit is harder to c]ase and a larger rise in tax revenues 1.S re-
quired. For this to happen income must rise by more than in the money 
finance case. 
If,on the other hand,a rise 1.n the stock of bonds held by the pri-
vate sector is contractionary, then bond financing of the budget will 
be unstable. The issue of tands resulting from the budget deficit will 
be causing a fall in income which raises the budget deficit and requires 
larger bond issues which in turn cause larger contractions in income. 
Cumulative instability arises with income tending, in principle, to mi-
nus infinity. 
Clearly, whether or not bond financing of the budget is stable is 
an empirical question depending on the relative magnitudes of the wealth 
effects on the expenditure ~nd demand for money functions. If bond finan-
(24)With exogenous capital ~tock a necessary and sufficient condition 
for stability is that tLe effect of a rise in government bonds on 
aggregate demand be hif,her than (l-T)/T where T is the marginal 
tax rate. In the case e)f an endogenous capital stock the above con-
dition along with the r:0ndition that a rise in the stock of capital 
must depress aggregate demand are jointly sufficient for stability. 
See Blinder and Solow ('l). cit 
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clng lS stable, the monetarist argument that the long-run effect of 
pure fiscal policy is zero, is not justified. On the contrary~the ana-
lysis of Blinder and Solow suggests that a bond financed rise in govern-
ment spending lS more expansionary in the long-run than an equal rise 
in government spending financed by money. But even if bond finan-
cing is unstable, Friedman is wrong to assert that the long-run effect 
of fiscal policy lS zero. For, In this case,fiscal :policy has a sys-
tematic and powerful, though perverse~effect on the level of lncome. 
Moreover, unstable bond financing of the budget is not palatable 
to monetarists since it undermines one of their major policy prescrip-
tions, the control of the money supply, In particular, Currie has shown(25) 
that a policy of controlling the money stock and residual financing of 
budget deficits and surpluses by bond issues or purchases will lead to 
cumulative destabilization of income in -£ ace of random disturbances in 
aggregate demand. Assume, for example, a random disturbance which rai-
ses income and creates a budget surplus. If the authorities keep the mo-
ney supply constant, the surplus will lead to bond purchases from the 
private sector and since, by assumption, bond finance of the budget is 
unstable,the reduction in the stock of bonds held by the private sector 
will raise income. Thus the budget surplus will rise by more,requiring 
further bond purchases which will further raise income. Clearly then 
.cumulative instability arlses. 
Tobin and Buiter examin~ the long-run effects of pure fiscal policy 
o d 1 0 0 1 h d b Bl o d d Solow(26). The mal·n uSlng a mo e Slml ar to t e one use y In er an 
differences between the two models are the following two : First, Tobin 
and Buiter specify explicitly the long-run desired stocks of wealth and 
~eal capital and next formulate saving and investment functions of the 
stock-adjustment type, whereas in Blinder-Solow model the Long-run desi-
red stocks of wealth and capital are implicit in the consumption and in-
vestment function, and can be derived by equating~ consumption with dis-
posable income and by setting investment equal to zero. (Both models take 
(25)See D. Currie :"Optimal stabilization policies and the government 
budget constraint " Economica 1976 and D. Currie :" On the desta-
bilizing properties of automatic stabilizers" 
Queen Mary College discussion paper 1976 
(26)J.Tobin and W.Buiter :"Long-run effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
on Aggregate Demand" in Jerome Stein (ed) Monetarism 
North-Holland 1976 pp.273-309. 
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bonds and capital to be perfect substitutes in wealth-holders' portfolios). 
Second, contrary to Blinder and Solow, Tobin and Buiter include income 
as a major determinant of the desired capital stock and hence of the rate 
of investment. 
Tobin and Buiter examlne the long-run effects of fiscal policy under 
two regimes. In the first regime supply constraints on the economy are 
assumed away and prices are held constant. The justification for such 
an assumption is the desire to concentrate on the "pure logic of aggre-
gate demand". As the authors! point out "logically the natural rate of 
unemployment hypothesis is distinct from the monetarist propositions a-
bout fiscal policy; one could accept either one without the other". (27) 
In the second regime full employment and flexible prices are as-
sumed throughout the analysis. Two fiscal policy parameters are used in 
the model. The first, (G'), is the sum of government spending on goods 
and services plus the interest payments on the existing government 
debt. Given this definition, constant fiscal policy (i.e constant G') 
requires that if interest payments on debt increase, government purchases 
are curtailed correspondingly. The seco~d fiscal policy parameter is 
defined as government purchases of goods and servic8s, (G), and excludes 
the interest payments on existing deb~. Both these policy measures are 
used to analyse the effects of fiscal· policy in the case of fixed prl-
ces, whereas in the case of flexible prices only (G') is used. 
The analysis of the long-run effects of debt financed fiscal policy 
under the fixed prices regime led to the following results: When (G') 
is used as a fiscal instrument, the long-run effect of fiscal policy 
on income is expansionary and equal to the inverse of the marginal tax 
rate. Moreover the adjustment of the system from the old to the new sta-
tionary state equilibrium is stable, provided that the slope of the short 
run IS curve is negative. This stability condition should be considered 
as weak since a downward sloping IS curve and an upward sloping LM curve 
ensure the stability of the simple IS/LM model given the usually postu-
lated pseudodynamic response patterns of income and the rate of inte~est 
to disequilibrium in the goods and money markets. When the fiscal ins-
trument is (G), the long-run income multiplier with respect at (G) may 
be either positive or negative. However,Tobin and Buiter have shown that 
the parameter values of the model which generate a negative. multiplier, 
(27)See J.Tobin and W.Buiter op.cit p.274 
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also generate instability. In the case c~ a positive long-run multiplier 
the system may be 'either stable or unstc.jle. 
In the full employment-flexible pri~es case the analysis of the ef-
fects of pure fiscal policy led to strik~ng differences between impact 
and long-run effects. The impact effect of a rise in (Gt) is a new tem-
porary equilibrium with higher prices a~d rate of interest. The new 
long-run equilibrium however, is characterized by a lower price level 
and interest rate and higher income and ~apital stock. The intuitive 
explanation of these rather paradoxical ~esults is that for the budget 
to be balanced at the new equilibrium a higher real income is required 
(real taxes depend only on real income in Tobin-Buiter model). With full 
employment of labor, higher real income requires capital deepening 
which in turn requires lower interest rate. But a higher income and a 
lower interest rate raise the demand for real balances ; glven the stock 
of nominal balances higher real balances require a lower price level. 
However the stability of these comparati~e static results is problematic. 
The new long-run equilibrium configuration is stable; if at all, only 
if price expectations adapt fairly quic~ly to price experience. 
Another model which examines the lo~g-run effects of fiscal policy 
both under money finance and under debt =inance of the government budget 
(28) is the model by Brunner and MeltzeF . Contrary to Blinder-Solow and, 
Tobin-Buiter models, the model by Brunner and Meltzer assumes that debt 
and real capital are imperfect substitutes ; indeed debt is considered 
as closer substitute for money than for real capital. Concequently the 
model includes three assets, moneY,debt and capital and determines two 
asset yields the yield on debt and the yield on capital. Aggregate prl-
vate expenditure depends negatively on tie above yields, positi~ely u-
pon the real values of human and non-huEan wealth and negatively upon 
the price level. ,Non-human wealth is the market value of real capitalplus the 
market value of government debt plus th~ monetary base. The fiscal policy 
variable in the model is real government purchases of goods and services. 
(28)K.Brunner and A.Heltzer : "An Aggregative Theory for a Closed Econo-
my" in J.Stein (ed) op.cit pp.69-103. 
Brunner and Meltzer clalm to be monetarists but, as they themselves 
recognize, their version of monetar~sm differs from Friedmants ver-
sion. In a certain sense, we may sa=: that they are " \'ialrasian mone-
tarists"whereas Friedman is "Marsha~.2.ian monetarist ". It should be 
noted however that the monetarist nature of Brunner-Meltzer work 
has been questioned. For example, R.:=;ornbusch says that "their model 
is in the best tradition of eclectic macroeconomics". See R.Dornbusch: 
"Comments on Brunner and Meltzer" in J.Stein op.cit p.125. 
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Real taxes are postulated to depend pos~~ively not only on real income 
but also on the price level,since a tax structure progressive on nominal 
income is assumed. 
An important point ln the Brunner-:·:eltzer model is that it takes a 
rise in government debt to exert an expa~sionary effect on aggregate de-
mand. A rise ln government debt raises ~je value of non-human wealth 
and the rate of interest on debt but at ~he same time lowers the yield 
on real capital by virtue of the assumpt:'on of closer substitutability 
of debt with money rather than with capi~al. It is assumed that the rise 
in the yield on debt does not dominate a~d therefore a rise in government 
debt is expansionary. As we have discussed above, whether or not the rise 
in government bonds is expansionary or contractionary is of crucial lm-
portance for the stability of the system in the Blinder-Solow model. By 
contrast, the Brunner-Meltzer model largely .bypasses the stability 
problem. It should be noted however, tha~ if the Brunner-Meltze~ assump-
tion regarding the substitutability of assets is valid it is more proba-
ble for a rise in the stock of bonds to je expansionary~·than in the case 
where bonds and real capital are close substitutes as it is assumed in 
both Blinder and Solow and Tobin and Bui~er models. 
The analysis of the effects of fiscal policy in the Brunner- Heltzer 
model mainly takes place in the context of three ffruns" : the short-run 
the intermediate-run and the long-run. Moreover some conjectures are pro-
vided for the final-run (the very long r.m). All "runs" are characteri-
zed by price flexibility but the short and intermediate runs assume mo-
ney wage rigidity and therefore an upward sloping supply of output in 
the price-output space. The long and fir-al runs are characterised by 
wage and price flexibility. In the short-run the supplies of financial 
and real assets are exogenous. The inter:nediate and long-runs are charac-
terized by balanced budget, endogenous supplies of money and/or debt, 
and exogenous capital stock. In the fiLal-run the stock of capital be-
comes endogenous. 
The short-run effects of expansion~y fiscal policy are pretty stan-
dard ; the system reaches a new equilibrium with higher real income and 
price level . But this equilibrium is te~porary since the budget deficit 
created by the fiscal expansion results in accumulation of money and/or 
debt which further raise income and the ?rice level. The new intermediate-
run, balance-budget, equilibrium is characterized by higher income and 
price level than the short-run·equilibr~:':::1. Furthermore output and prices 
are higher in the case of debt finance c~ the budget than in the 
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case of money finance. This is because the issue of debt results ln 
higher interest payments by the government and therefore higher tax 
revenues are needed to close the deficit. But higher tax revenues re-
quire higher real lncome and/or higher price level. In the long-run, 
where an absolute supply constraint exists output falls to its origi-
nal level prevailing before the fiscal expansion. In order to preserve 
the budget balance, prices rlse relative to their intermediate-run le-
vel. Again, debt financing of the budget brings a higher rise in prices 
that money financing, the reason being that the higher interest pay-
ments resulting from the issue of debt require higher tax revenues which, 
given the supply determined level of output, require a higher price 
level. In the final-run, where real capital is endogenous, capital shal-
lowing takes place and output falls ; however, the price level rises 
further in order to preserve the budget "balance. Furthermore, the hi-
gher lS the budget share financed by debt the higher is output reduc-
tion and the higher is the rise in the price level. 
As in the case of Blinder and Solow model, the general conclusion 
which seems to emerge from the models by Tobin and Buiter, and Brunner 
and Meltzer is that the effects of pure fiscal policy are not temporary 
but are sustainable in the long-run. Therefore, Friedman's position re-
garding the inability of fiscal policy to permanently influence nominal 
lncome seems unjustifiable. In can be argued, however, that the very 
construction of these models makes them incapable to distinguish between 
the neo-Keynesian case in which fiscal policy matters and the monetarist 
(Friedmanian) case in which fiscal policy dows not matter in the long-run. 
What is needed is a general model which can produce the Keynesian and 
. d " monetarist results as particular cases. As R.Rasche po~nte out ...... . 
there is no general model which can produce the post-Keynesian model as 
a particular case, and the monetarist and classical models as alternative 
cases. Such a framework is useful in order to discriminate between alter-
native hypotheses and to construct ~ empirical tests which have the pot en-
. h.' ,,(29) tial to refute one, or bot posltlons . 
The model constructed by Stein(30) represents an interesting attempt 
to produce a general model which can generate Keynesian and Monetarist 
(29)R.Rasche :"A comparative static analysis of some monetarist proposi-
tions". Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Review 1973,p.15 
(30)J.Stein: " Inside the monetarist black box" in J.Stein (ed) op.cit. 
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results for particular values of its structural parameters. Stein's 
model contains an equation for the rate of change in real wages which 
incorporates the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis. An equation 
for unemployment makes this variable positively dependent upon the real 
wage. Price inflation is postulated to depend positively upon the rate 
of change in nominal wages adjusted for the rate of labor augmenting '_ 
technical change and also " positively dependent upon excess demand for 
output which in turn depends positively upon the rate of unemployment 
(provided that the marginal propensity to save exceeds the marginal pro-
pensity to invest), positively upon the expected rate of price inflation, 
real money balances, government spending and government interest bearing 
debt, and negatively upon the nominal rate of interest. The rate of in-
terest depends negatively upon unemployment and real money balances, and 
positively upon expected inflation and the stock of government debt. 
Actual and expected rates of inflation are connected via an adaptive ex-
pectations hypothesis. A government budget constraint is included in the 
model ; the size of the deficit as well as the rate of monetary expansion 
are taken as control variables whereas the ratio of bonds to money is 
determined endogenously by the budget constraint. 
In Stein's model the steady state is defined as a situation where 
both the unemployment rate and the rates of actual and expected inflation 
are constant. The long-run effects of pure fiscal policy depend crucially 
on the effect of the ratio of government debt to money (Z) upon aggregate 
demand. If the effect in question is non-positive monetarist results are 
obtained; if positive, Keynesian results are obtained. If the effect 
of (Z) is zero , the acceleration of government purchases (G) would tem-
porarily lead to a lower unemployment rate and a higher i~flation. When 
'(G) stabilize at the higher level, the rate of inflation returns to its 
initial equilibrium and unemployment returns to its natural rate. The 
level of nominal income will be higher than it was before the rise in 
government spending but it will continue to grow at the same equilibrium 
rate equal to the rate of growth of the money supply. In the case of a 
negative effect of (Z) upon aggregate demand, the acceleration of govern-
ment spending produces the same temporary effects as in the previous case. 
When (G) stabilizes at a higher level, unemployment will eventually re-
turn to its natural level but the rate of inflation will decline to a 
lower equilibrium level. Thus nominal income will be growing at a lower 
rate than the rate of monetary expansion. Finally, in the case where the 
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effects of (Z) on aggregate demand lS positive an expansionary fiscal 
policy will produce a new steady-state equilibrium characterized by a 
higher rate of inflation and therefore a faster growth of nominal in-
come ralative to the growth of the money stock. 
Many economists may disagree with the technicalities of Stein's 
model but few would disagree with the view which motivated the construc-
tion of his model. Indeed the construction of a general model which can 
generate both Keynesian and l-1onetarist results for particular values of 
its structural parameters can considerably contribute towards convergence 
of differing views. For this to happen, however, such a model must be 
"fair" to both camps in the sense that it should not contain any built-
in Keynesian or Monetarist bias. Since the difficulty lies precisely on 
the agreement that a model is "fair,,(31), this task may be best accompli-
shed if the two camps collaborate in model building. 
Section 2 The importance of money ln the Greek Economy ;a preliminary 
investigation. 
In this section we undertake a preliminary analysis of the importance 
of money in the Greek Economy using as our framework the standard IS/LM 
model. In particular the following two issues will be examined, the 
first theoretically and the second empirically What are the implications 
for monetary and "fiscal policy of the fact that, "in the Greek Economy 
interest rates on bank loans and deposits are administered prices set 
by the monetary authorities ? Do the prices of existing real assets re-
lative to their reproduction costs play some role in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary changes as suggested both by the sophisticated 
Keynesian and monetarist approaches? In the version of the IS/LM mo-
del used to examine the first issue it is assumed that investment is 
financed by issuing debt instruments which are purchased by savers. 
Organized spot markets in which existing real assets are traded are as-
sumed away and therefore the opportunity cost of holding money is iden-
tified with the rate of interest on debt issued by the business sector. 
Desired money balances depend positively on lncome and negatively on the 
rate of interest. Saving depends positively on income and (possibly) on 
(31)For example Solow argues that Stein's model is biased towards mone-
tarism. See R.Solow : "Comments on Stein in J.Stein (ed) op.cit 
pp. 248-250. 
the rate of interest, and investment de?ends negatively on the rate of 
interest. The rate of interest is assu~ed to be fixed by the monetary 
authorities by decree. This should be co~trasted with the case where the 
authorities keep the rate of interest a~ a constant level by endogenei-
zing the supply of money ; in the analys~s to follow the supply of money 
1S taken to be exogenous. 
Figure 2.A depicts a situation where the rate of interest is fixed 
at a level (r ) below its equilibrium level. At an i~~me level (Y1) the 
money market is in equilibrium and the goods market lS in excess demand 
whereas at an income level (Y2 ) the gooes market is in equilibrium and 
the money market in excess demand. At lncome levels below Y2 saving falls 
ShOl.'t of desired investment and 
r there lS an excess supply of se-IS 
LM curities or, what is the same, 
r r-----------~~------~------
o ~------------+-------~----------~ 
y 
Figure 2.A 
an excess demand for funds._Given 
the fixity of the rate of inte-
rest, quantity rationing of funds 
takes place and as a result a 
corresponding amount of investment 
is curtailed. Therefore, at in-
corne levels below Y2 desired in-
vestment faces a savings const-
raint and therefore effective 
investment is determined by the level of saving. Since any income level 
below Y2 satisfies the equality between saving and effective investment, 
which particular level of income will in fact prevail depends solely on 
the position of the LM curve ; the level of income will be determined 
by the equilibrium in the money market. In figure 2.A the money market 
equilibrates at an income level Y1 ; at lower income levels an excess 
supply of money prevails ; money holders will try to eliminate excess 
money balances by increasing their deDa~i for goods a~d securities ar.d 
therefore income will rise towards Y1 . A~ lncome levels higher than Y1 
excess demand for money prevails and the reduced demand for goods and 
securities by wealth holders results ir. a fall in income towards Y1 . 
Clearly, in the case where the rate of interest is fixed below its 
potential equilibrium level "only money ::latters". Changes in the money 
stock will directly affect the level of ~ncome whereas changes in fiscal 
instruments will be incapable to affect ~ncome. Given the existence of 
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a savings constraint, changes in government spending will "crowd out" 
investment on a one-to-one basis. Moreover, so long as the rate of 1n-
terest is fixed below its equilibrium level, the fixing of it at a hi-
gher level will create an excess supply of money and income will rise. 
Figure 2.B presents the case where the rate of interest is fixed 
above its potential equilibrium level. In this case the level of income 
r LM 
IS 
rr---------~~-----------*~-----------
o ~--------~----------~------____ __. 
y 
Figure 2.B 
will be determined solely 
by the IS curve and it 
will be equal to Y10 At 
an income level Y1 equi-
librium in the market for 
goods prevails but there 
1S an excess supply of 
money coupled by an excess 
demand for securities. 
Since however the rate 
of interest is fixed, the 
disequilibrium prevailing 
1n the securites market 
cannot be eliminated and money holders are forced to hold excess liqui-
dity. At income levels below Y1' desired investment exceeds saving but 
the financing of investment is not constrained by saving since the excess 
of invEatmentover saving is financed by money holders' excess liquidity. 
Therefore, at income levels below Y1 effective investment exceeds saving 
and income r1ses towards Y1. Moreover, income levels above Y1 are not 
sustainable since saving exceeds the desired level of investment. 
Clearly, when the authorities fix the rate of interest above its 
potential equilibrium level changes in income can only come from chan-
ges in the autonomous components of private expenditure and from changes 
in fiscal instruments. "110ney does not matter". It should be noted that 
changes in autonomous investment and government sDending do D8t face any 
financial constraints since such changes will be automatically finan-
ced by the excess liquidity prevailing in the economy. Therefore any mo-
vement of the IS curve will produce the full simple Keynesian multiplier 
effects upon income. Furthermore fixing of the rate of interest at a 
.') lbwer level will raise investment and the level of income and conver-
sely for an increase in the rate of interest. 
Summarizing the above discussion we may say that the relative ef-
fectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies depends crucially on whether 
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the rate of interest is fixed by the monetary authorities below or 
above its potential equilibrium level. ~f it is fixed below the equi-
librium level, only money matters and f~scal policy is ineffective. 
If it is fixed above the equilibrium lev2l, monetary policy is ineffec-
tive and fiscal policy produces the full Keynesian multiplier effects. 
It is important to note that these results in no way depend upon the 
slopes of the IS and LM curves ; in the case where the rate of interest 
is fixed by decree by the monetary authorities the slopes of these 
curves become irrelevant. 
Next we turn to provide some rudimentary evidence on the question 
whether the price of existing real assets relative to their reproduc-
tions cost plays some role as a link in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary changes in the Greek Economy. As we have seen in the previous 
section, both neo-Keynesians and monetarists argue that the market yield 
of real assets plays a crucial role in Lhe transmission mechanism. Chan-
ges in the money stock affect, through portfolio substitutions, the 
market yield on existing real assets which in turn affects the rate of 
accumulation of newly produced assets. 
To establish the significance of the relative prlce of existing 
assets in terms of new assets as a relevant link in the transmission 
mechanism in the Greek Economy we should examine whether or not this 
price can be considered as a relevant opportunity cost of holding money, 
as well as whether it affects different components of aggregate expen-
diture. On a priori grounds we may say that the importance of the rela-
tive price on real assets in the transmission mechanism depends on the 
existence of organized spot markets in which real assets are traded. 
In the Greek Economy organized spot markets exist for at least two groups 
of real assets : houses and titles on industrial commercial and bank 
capital. Quite apart from the fact that the size of those markets is 
rather limited (this being true mainly for the equities market), their 
existence and functioning, makes the sig~ificance of the D.2rket yield 
on real assets a relevant empirical issue to consider. 
Some rudimentary empirical evidence has been obtained on the issue 
by estimating behavioural equations for two key macrovariables of the 
system : desired money balances and aggr2gate private investment. Clear-
ly~significant regression coefficients of the market yield on existing 
assets, and/or the relative price of existing assets, in the demand for 
money and investment functions provide some evidence favouring the hy-
pothesis that monetary changes are par~ly transmitted via the market 
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yield on real assets. 
Before reporting the results of the statistical estimations~we 
shall briefly comment on the empirical specification of the variables 
used in the estimations. The money concept used (M) is the inclusive 
one, including Time and Saving deposits, and it is deflated by the 
GNP deflator. The variable representing aggregate investment spending 
(I) consists of gross private fixed investment plus changes in stocks 
held by the private sector. Investment is valued at constant 1970 prices. 
The empirical counterpart of income (Y) is GNP at constant 1970 prices. 
As a proxy for the price of existing assets in terms of newly produced 
assets (q), the index of market prices of industrial equities deflated 
by the GNP deflator is used. The market valuation of real assets has 
been obtained by taking data on capital.stock (K) valued at constant 
1970 prices and multiplying it by (q). The own rate of interest on real 
assets (rK) has been calculated using the following formula : rK=N/qK 
where (N) consists of income accruing to households from property and 
enterpreneurship plus corporate savings minus interest payments on Sa-
ving and Time deposits . (N) is valued at constant 1970 prices and it 
is taken as a proxy for profits on capital. The above formula can be 
written as follows r K= (N/K)/q = R/q where (R) is a proxy for the ave-
rage return on physical capital. Assuming that the average rate of re-
turn on physical caRital is positively associated to the marginal ra~e 
of return, we may use (R) as a proxy for the latter concept. The loan 
rate (rL) used in the estimations of the investment function is a simple 
average of rates on different bank loan categories, whereas the interest 
rate used in the estimations of the demand for money function is the rate 
~n Saving deposits with commercial banks. All regressions use annual 
data over the period 1960-1978. 
The following three versions of the demand for money function have 
been estimated using a linear specification : 
(2.1) M L(rs,rK) L1 > 0 L2 < 0 = y 
(2.2) M - L(~ , r s ' r K, qK) L1 > 0, L2 > 0, L3 < 0, L4 > o. - qK 
r M L(~ (2.3) - ,rs,rK) L1 > 0, L2 > 0, L3 < o. -qK qK 
In all the above equations the demand of real balances 1S postulated to 
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depend negatively upon the market yield on real assets. Moreover, given 
that substitution" is not limited between narr0"ll money and saving depo-
sits but also takes place between real assets and Saving and Time depo-
. t th d d fIb I (32). b .. Sl s, e eman or rea a ances w111 e pos1t1vely dependent u-
pon the Saving deposit rate (r
s
)' The market valuation of the capital 
stock (qK) appearing in equations (2.2) (2.3) is taken as a proxy for 
wealth . The variable (Y/qK) is introduced on transactions demand for 
money considerations : a rise in income relative to wealth, raises the 
desired real balances held for transaction purposes. 
The regressions corresponding to equations (2.1)-(2.3) are as follows 
(numbers in parentheses denote values of the t-statistic) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
M = 0.436 + 0.014 rs 
Y (5.61) (1.42) 
0.0053 rK; R2 - 0.75 DW - 0.65 
(4.11) 
M = 124.9 + 642.0 Y + 7.63 r - 23.48 r K + 0.014 qK (2.67) (2.99)qK (1.26)s (3.46) (0.62) 
R2 - 0.89 DW = 1.35 
M _ 0.107 + 1.37. ~- 0.0082 r - 0.0356 r K ; qK - (2.31) (5.97)qK (1.34) s (4.78) R 
-2 0 9 = . 4 DW= 1.28 
In all the above regressions the coefficient of (rK) is highly 
significant and has "th'e a priori expected negative sign. The coefficient 
of the rate on Saving deposits is statistically insignificant in all re-
gressions and moreover in regression (2.6) the coefficient 1n question 
has the wrong sign. "Finally the regression coefficients of the variable 
Y/qK 1n equations (2.5), (2.6) are significant and their signs conform 
with a priori expectations. 
Including the previous year's rate of inflation (denoted by p) as 
an additional explana.tory variable in the above regressions, the fol-
lowing regressions were obtained : 
(2.7) 
2 DW =0.69 M 0.399 + 0.0229rs 0.0053 r - 0.0026 P 
. R =0.76, , 
- K Y - (4.33) (1.47) (4.09) (0.76) 
(2.8) 91.47 + 646.8 Y + 15.77 rS - 23.65 r K - 2.35 P + 0.015 qK M = - (1.41) (0.68) (1.79) (3.12) qK (1.91) (3.61) 
2 _ 
R -0.90, DW =1.60 
(32)We remind than an inclusive money co~cept lS used. 
(2.9) 
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MK- -0.091 + 1.37 Y -0.0043 r - 0.0357 r - O.OOllp q (1.67) (5.84)qK (0.46) s (4.68) K (0.57) 
0.94, DW - 1.29 
Comparing regressions (2.7)-(2.9) with regressions (2.4)-(2.6) 
respectively we may see that the introduction of the past period's 1n-
f1ation in the demand for money does not make much difference. The ma-
gnitudes and the significance of the regression coefficients remain 
broadly unchanged except in the case of regression (2.8) where the ma-
gnitude and the value of the t-statistic of the regression coefficient 
of (r ) increases significantly relative to regression (2.5). The co-s 
efficient of the inflation rate, though having the a priori expected 
negative sign, is statistically insignificant in all the above regres-
. (33) S10ns . 
The versions of the investment function which have been estimated 
for the period 1960-1978 are as follows 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
(2.13) I -
I > 1 < 0 , 
In the above equations (R) is the average return on capital which is 
taken as a proxy for the marginal return, (rK) is the market determined 
own-rate of interest on existing capital assets, CrL) is the rate on 
bank loans and (q) is the price of existing capital assets relative to 
their reproduction cost. The empirical estimation of equations (2.10), 
(2.11) led to the following regressions: 
(2.14) I - 180.5 - 5.49 R 
(1.55) (0.98) 
1.305 r K - 3.07 r L (4.40) (0.63) 
2 R =0.76 DW = 1.30 
(33)For empirical work on the demand for money in the Greek Economy see 
J.M.Papadakis :"lvloney and Economic Activity" Athens 1979 (ch.3) 
(Printed in Greek) 
J.A.Leventakis :"The demand for money :empirical investigation of 
the demand for money in Greece ll Bank of Greece 1973 (printed in G!'eek) 
N.Tsoris :" The demand for money" Athens 1975 
The above studies do not include the market yield of real assets as 
an explanatory variable in the demand for money. 
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(2.15) I - 40.0 + 1.348 (R-rK) + 2.44 rr (2.15) (4.51) (1.28)~ 
0.73 DW - 1.03 
In both the above regressions the coefficients of (rK) are significant 
and have the a priori expected signs. The coefficient of the loan rate 
is insignificant and in regression (2.15) it has the "wrong" sign. In 
regression (2.14) the coefficient of (R) has the wrong sign but it is 
statistically insignificant. 
The estimation of equation (2.13) g~ves much better results. The 
regressions obtained are as follows 
(2.16) I - 21.05 + 0.24 Y + 7.64 ql 5.19 r L 
2 
- R = 0.96 DW = 1.98 (3.57) (10.1) (2.99) (4.71) 
(2.17) I - 19.64 + 0.24 Y + 8.05 q2 - '5.06 rL 2_ DW 1.97 - R - 0.96 -
-(3.32) (10.3) (3.05) (4.59) 
(2.18) I = -2.16 + 0.15 Y + 10.60 q1 . R2= 0.91 DW - 1.05 , -
(0.43) (6.79) (2.80) 
(2.19) I - -3.30 + 0.15 Y + 11.41 q2 . R2~ 0.91 DW = 1. 06 - , 
(0.69) (7.40) (2.99) 
In regressions (2.16)-(2.19) (q1) is the index of industrial equity pri-
ces deflated by the GNP deflator and (q2) is the same index deflated by 
the deflator relevant for investment spending. Both (q1) and (q2) are 
taken as proxies for the price of existing capital relative to its re-
production cost. In all the above regressions the coefficients of (q1) 
and (q2) are significant and positive conforming with a priori expecta-
tions. Moreover the regression coefficients of both income and the loan 
rate are statistically significant and have the "right" signs. 
The empirical evidence on the demand for money and private invest-
ment reported above favours the hypothesis that the relative price of 
real assets may be a potentially important link in transmitting monetary 
changes to the "real" side of the economy. 
The market yield on real assets seems to be a relevant opportunity 
cost of holding money and therefore there seems to be a certain degree 
of substitutability between money and ex~sting real assets. Moreover the 
price of real assets in terms of newly produced assets seems to affect 
the rate of investment. It should be stressed however that the above 
evidence is only preliminary. Hore strong and conclusive evidence 
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evidence should be provided by using estimation techniques superior to 
the OL5 technique used in this chapter and by using better specified 
proxies for the relevant variables. 
Two issues have been examined separately In this section. First 
the implications of administered interest rates on bank loan5and deposits 
for monetary and fiscal policies have been briefly analysed in the con-
text of the simple IS/LM model. Second some rudimentary evidence has 
been provided regarding the role played by the relative price of real 
assets in the transmission mechanism. In the following chapter we shall 
analyse the implications of interest rates rigidity in a much more spe-
cific way using a general equilibrium model with incorporates the bank 
credit market and takes into account a market for titles on existing 
real capital. 
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C HAP T E R F I V E 
" THE TRANSHISSION MECHANISM OF MOlETARY POLICY 
IN THE GREEK ECONOMY" 
In this chapter we shall examine the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in the Greek Economy using a model which takes into 
account the institutional peculiarities of the Greek financial system. 
At the center of our analysis there will be the market for bank credit , 
both because of its well known importance in the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy emphasized by monetary economists(l) and because the 
institutional peculiarities mentioned above mainly refer to this market. 
Starting our analysis (section 4.1) we construct a simple supply-
of-bank loans hypothesis using a simplified balance-sheet of the banking 
system, which, ,.nontheless, does not deviate in its essentials from the 
actual balance-sheet of the Greek banking system. 
In proceeding (section 4.2), we derive analytically a demand for 
bank loans hypothesis with the help of a very simple balance sheet of 
a "representative" firm. 
In section 4.3 we bring together the supply and demand sides of the 
bank credit market and we undertake a "partial equilibrium" analysis of 
this market. Our analysis lead us to distinguish three different states 
of the bank credit market, in the context of ~ach of them the effects of 
policy instruments on the main endogenous variables of the system may 
be both quantitatively and qualitatively different. 
In section 4.4 we incorporate the market for bank leans into a 
short-run macromodel which specifies demand functions for the main fi-
nancial assets of the Greek economy as well as the ident~ty for the 
'Government financial requirements (the government budget constraint). 
After commenting on each of the model's behavioural equations, we indicate 
(1) 
The bank credit market plays a crucial role in Brunner-~eltzer 
m~del on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy; 
, •• • ,t 
see Brunner and Meltzer: "Money, dent and economJ:c actl.Vlty 
Journal of political Economy 1972. P_lso, Goldfeld' s post-war aggre-
gate quarterly model for the US Economy puts much emphasis on the 
behaviour of the banking sector; as Goldfeld points out, "variations 
in the size and composition of bank assets, playa large pa"t in 
transmitting the influence of monetary policy to the economy"; 
. .." see S. Goldfeld "Commercial bank behaviour and Economl.c actl.Vlty 
Amsterdam 1966. 
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the necessary amendments which make the model conformable to the as-
sumptions underlying each of the three states bf the loan market 
distinguished in the previous section. 
In sections 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, we formally derive, explain and com-
pare the impact effects of changes in the exogenous variables upon the 
maln endogenous variables of the system, notably income, in each of the 
three states of the loan market, using the model specified in section 4.4. 
Finally, in section 4.8 we summarise the main conclusions of the 
chapter and we indicate directions for further extensions of the model. 
4.1 The supply of bank loans. 
We start our analysis of the supply of bank credit by presenting 
a typical balance-sheet of the Greek banking sector, which, as we 
discussed In chapter two of this study, consists of Commercial banks 
and "Special Credit Institutions" (S.C.I.). 
Consolidated Balance-sheet of the Greek Banking system. 
ASS E T S 
cash : (vault cash plus deposits 
with the Central Bank) 
Loans and Advances 
Treasury Bills 
Securities 
Other assets 
Deposits 
L I A B I LIT I E S 
(demand saving and 
time deposits) 
Borrowings from the Central Bank 
Capital and Reserves 
Other Liabilities 
The most important earning asset of ""the Greek banking sector is 
the item "Loans and Advances"; to give a quantitative flavour we note 
that in 1975, this item comprised 64% of total bank assets. An important 
institutional fact is that "the" (2) rate of interest on bank loans lS 
not a'market-determined variable but instead it is an "administered price" 
determined by the so called "Currency COIIl.l11i ttee"" 
The next in importance earning asset of the Greek Banking system 
is "Treasury Bills" \vhich in 1975 comprised 13% of total bank assets. 
(2) In reality, different rates of interest are set for different loan 
categories. 
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It is important to mention that an "outside market" for Treasury Bills 
1S non-existent, the chief absorbers of them being the banking sector 
and to a much lesser extent public entities (mainly the var10US Insurance 
Funds). Since the marketability of Treasury Bills is extremely limited, 
their absorbtion by the banking system came to be "de facto" compulsory. 
The item "securites" comprised in 1975 about 5% of the banking 
system's total assets. Roughly half of the amount of securities held, 
consists of private shares whereas the rest consists of bonds issued by 
the Government and public enterprises. 'de note that a market for private 
bonds is non-existent and although there exists a market for government 
bonds, it is of limited size and institutionally weak. This is the rea-
son why the monetary authorities never use open market pperations- at 
least not as a routine process - as a means of changing the cash base 
of the system. 
Turning to the liabilities side of the banking system's balance 
sheet we note that, as in the case of the loan rate, the rate on bank 
deposits is also an administered price set by the "Currency Committee". 
Referring to the item "Borrowings from the Central Bank" we should 
distinguish between commercial banks and SCI since the quantitative 
significance of the above item in the balance-sheets of the two groups 
of institutions 1S very different. Tables 4.1.A, 4.1.B, 4.1.C below,pro-
vide some relevant information. 
Table 4.1.A Commercial Bank borrowing from the Central Bank as a 
percentage of their total liabilities. 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
0.97% 0.59% 1.05% 1.8% 3.6% 
Table 4.1.B SCI borrowing from the Central Bank as a percentage of 
their total liabilities 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
40.9% 41.4% 43.7% 44.2% 42.5% 
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Table 4.1.C Ratio of SCI borrowings from the Central Bank to total 
1971 
1.22 
deposits with SCI. 
1972 
1.26 
1973 
1.43 
1974 
1.47 
1975 
1. 31 
A compari~on of tables 4.1.A, 4.1.B, shows that the quantitative 
significance of borrowing from Central Bank is much higher for SCI than 
for commercial banks. In fact, table 4.1.C reveals that such borrowing 
is the main source of funds for SCI credit activities. Clearly this is 
an important peculiarity of the Greek financial system. 
After the above descriptive part concerned with the consolidated 
balance-sheet of the Greek banking system, we proceed more analytically 
in order to construct a supply of bank credit hypothesis. First we write 
d · 'f . l'f' d . (3) f own ~n algebra~c orm a s~mp ~ le verSlon 0 the balance-sheet 
presented in page 2oZ. 
(4.1.1) D + A = R + CRs + T 
where D : bank deposits, A : the banking system's borrowing from the 
Central Bank, R bank reserves, CRs : bank loans and advances supplied 
to the economy, T Treasury Bills held by the banking system. Solving 
for loans (CRs ) and expressing the resulting equation in first difference 
form we-get 
(4.1.2) CRs -CRs _1 = (D-D_ 1) + (A-A_ 1 ) - (R-R_ 1 ) - (T-T_ 1)· 
Given the administered nature of the interest rate on bank deposits 
and the extremely low marketability of Treasury Bills, it is clear that 
(D) and (T) do not represent choice variables for the banking system. 
On the other hand we may ~~ite down, quite conventionally, the following 
demand function for bank reserves : 
aR (4.1.3) E.= R(rL,p) . D; aD > 0 aR aR <o-;--p >0. arL a 
where (r_) is the (exogenous) interest rate on loans a~d adva~ces a~j 
L 
(p) is the Central Bank's discount rate. 
(3)In simplifjing we have omitted the i-rem "securities" because of its 
small quantitative significance ; we also omitted the item "capital 
and reserves" as well as the residual items "other assets", other 
I , b'l' , " 1.a 1. 1.tles . 
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The specification of a behavioural equation for the banking system's 
borrowing from the Central Bank needs more explanation. As Goldfeld points 
out(4) two polar theories exist: the need theory and the profit theory. 
According to the need theory, banks borrow from the Central Bank to meet 
difficulties arising from unexpected outflows of deposits which create 
temporary adverse clearing balances ; such borrowing is of a temporary 
nature and banks repay their debts as soon as possible. 
The profit theory emphasizes the possibility of a bank securing 
funds at one rate (the discount rate ) and utilizing the funds in another 
market, thereby increasing the return on bank capital. 
The above two polar theories of borrowing should not be necessarily 
considered as mutually exclusive ; at a given market rate-discount rate 
differential (r-p) , a bank may keep a given average indebtedness with 
the Central Bank, used to finance unfavourable day-to-day variations in 
deposits, and at the same time, if the interest differential is favoura-
ble the bank may borrow from the Central B~nk and relend the proceeds 
at a profit. To put the argument more formally let us write down the fol-
lowing identity 
(4.1.4) 
where Al : borrowing from the Central Bank motivated by need and 
A : borrowing motivated by profit. 
2 
+ (r-p) 
(r-p) 
·Ol--------,~-----------.... Al 
A2 
.•. 
OL-_________________ ------+ A2 
Figure 4.l.a 
(4)see s. Goldfeld 
Figure 4.1.b 
tlCommercial Bank behaviour and Economic Activity" 
Amsterdam 1966 p.43. 
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Figure 4.1.a above, illustrates the functional dependence of (A
1
); 
given the variability of bank deposits, the lower the market rate-
discount rate differential, the lower is the desired average stock of 
indebtedness to the Central Bank and vice-versa. The reason is that a 
fall in the interest differential implies either an increase in the 
real cost of borrowing from the Central Bank or / and a decrease in the 
opportunity cost of financing adverse clearing balances by not relending 
loan repayments or by liquidating earning assets. Horeover, if the va-
riability of bank deposits increases with their average level, we may 
postulate that (A1 ) is an increasing function of the average level of 
bank deposits. The above reasoning enable us to write the following 
behavioulal. equation for (A1 ) : 
a A1 
A1 = Al (r-p, D) ; 
a(r-p)' 
(4.1.5) > 0 , > 0 • 
a p 
Figure (4.1.b) illustrates the functional dependence of desired 
borrowing from the Central Bank motivated by profit (A~), upon the 
market rate - discount rate differential. The argument is based on con-
ventional marginal theory and goes as follows : it can be assumed that 
the process of borrowing from the Central Bank and of relending the pro-
ceeds to the private sector, involves increasing marginal transaction 
costs, which are represented by the curve A2-A2 in figure 4.1.b ; the 
standard profit maximization assumption requires that the bank should 
equate the transaction costs of the marginal loan with the given market 
rate - discount rate differential; thus the curve A2-A2 represents the 
demand for borrowing (A~) from the Central Bank. 
Another way to justify the functional dependence of (A~) upon the 
'interest differential, which may be considered either as an alternative 
or as a complement to the rationale given in the previous paragraph takes 
into account the element of risk ; suppose that every loan extended from 
a bank is associated with a risk factor ; given the loan rate - discount 
rate differential, we assume that banks ~llocate the funds borrowed 
from the Central Bank, ranking them according to risk. Such an assumption 
implies that the risk factor associated with any given loan extended to 
the economy is positively related to the amount of borrowing from the 
Central Bank. If we think of the curve A2-A2 of figure 4.1.0 as represen-
ting such a marginal risk curve, the typical bank will continue the 
borrowing relending operations up to the point where the risk factor 
associated with the marginal loan equals the market rate - discount rate 
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differential. Therefore, the curve A2-A2 may be thought of as represen-
ting the demand for borrowing from the Central Bank. 
The above discussion suggests the following behavioural equation 
for the banking system's desired borrowing from the Central Bank motiva-
ted by profit : 
(4.1.6) 
a A": 2 
-----> 0 • 
d(r -p) 
Moreover we postulate that the banking system's actual borrowing from 
the Central Bank adjusts to its desired level via the following partial 
adjustment mechanism 
(4.1.7) = Tt(A~': - A ) 2 2-1 
Combining equations (4.1.6) (4.1.7) we get 
Referring to the Greek financial system, we may say that although 
commercial bank borrowing from the Bank of Greece may be motivated both 
by need and profit, SCI borrowings, which are by far larger than those 
of commercial banks, are mainly used as a source of funds for credit 
activities and therefore they may be taken to be motivated by profit. 
This institutional fact enable us to make the assumption, without the 
introduction of any serious error, that the total borrowings of the 
Banking sector from the Bank-of- Greece, are wholly motivated by profit. 
Thus, in the context of the Greek Economy, we may write the following 
behavioural relation for borrowings from the Central Bank: 
(4.1.9) A-A 
-1 
_..;;..d_a ___ > 0 
, 0 < Tt < 1. 
a(rL -p) 
In completing this section we rewrite, for convenience, equations 
(4.1.2), (4.1.3), (4.1.9) which constit~te our simple supply of bank 
loans hypothesis for the Greek Economy : 
(4.1.2) CRs CRs =(D-D_ 1 ) + (A-A_ 1 ) - (R-R_ 1 ) - (T-T_ 1 )· -1 
R(rL,p ). D ~< aR 0 o < aR (4.1.3) R - . 0 --> -< - , , , aD a~L ap 
-p) aa 0 . 0<11'<1-(4.1.9) A-A = a(rL - TtA_1 
. > , , 
-1 a (r-p) 
1. 
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4.2 The demand for bank loans 
Our task in this section is to construct a demand for bank loans 
hypothesis for the business sector of the economy. The analysis will be 
carried out with the help of a very simple balance-sheet of a "represen-
tati ve" firm which is presented belm.,( S) • 
ASS E T S L I A B I LIT I E S 
Real Capital (K) Equity Capital (V) 
Bank Loans (CR) 
Other Assets Other Liabilities 
In the above balance-sheet, it is assumed that the firm's real 
capital is entirely financed partly by issuing equities and partly by 
bank loans. Moreover assuming that the firm in question does not face 
any constraints in its financial operations, the actual distribution 
of real capital financing between equities and bank· loans will corres-
pond to the desired one. Thus we may write the following equation : 
(4.2.1) 
where (Vd ) is the stock of equities, valuated at historical prices, 
which at any moment of time "covers" a desired proportion of real capi-
tal and (CRd ) is the firm's desired stock of indebtedness with the 
banking system. 
Further, we postulate the following behavioural equation for the 
d desired indebtedness with the banking system (CR ) : 
(4.2.2) K ; aCR o < CR < 1 ; ---
ar:'L 
aCR . 
--- < , 
aq 
where (r ) is the interest rate on bank loans, and (q) is the market L 
price of equities. Equation (4.2.2) says that the higher the loan rate 
(S)For a nice derivation of a demand function for loans with the help of 
a consolidated balance-sheet of the corporate sector see D.M.Jaffee, 
"Credit rationing and the Commercial Loan Harket lf ,1971 Chapter five. 
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and the market price of equities, the lower is the part of real capital 
stock financed by bank loans and vice-versa. The rationale behind equa-
tion (4.2.2) is that a rise in the loan rate raises the cost of loan 
financing relatively to the cost of equity financing and induces the 
typical firm to substitute equities for loans at the margin by issuing 
equities and using the proceeds torepay some of the loans outstanding. 
The same reaction applies in the case of an increase in the market price 
of equities which represents a fall in the cost of equity financing re-
lative to the cost of loan financing. 
Writing equation (4.2.1) in first difference form we get 
(4.2.3) 
The definition of (Vd ) is as follows 
t 
(4.2.4) 
i=- 00 
(E~ 
1 
(E~ - s is the of equities issued where E. 1) number during 1 1-
(q. ) is the market price of equities prevailing in period 1 
Taking first differences of equation (4.2.4) we get that 
(4.2.5) 
period(i) 
(i). 
: 
and 
Substituting (4.2.5) into (4.2.3) and taking into account that (Kt-K
t
- l ) 
represents investment in real capital t.aking place in period (t), we 
obtain : 
(4.2.6) ( d Cd) (Es_Es ) I = CR - R_1 + q -1 
.Equation (4.2.6) represents the financing constraint of the firm; it says 
that investment is financed either by issuing additional equities at the 
prevailing market price or/and by demanding additional bank loans. Expres-
sing equation (4.2.2) in first difference form we obtain the firm's flow 
demand function for bank credit : 
(4.2.7) CRd- CRd CR ( ) I 
-1 = rL,q·; CR , CR 
r L q 
. 
<0 ' 0 
9 I 
In equation (4.2.7) the level of investment (I) represents the cons-
traint variable on the flow demand for bank loans. Since 1n our subsequent 
analysis the level of investment will be taken to be one of the main links 
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through which changes in monetary variables are transmitted to the "real" 
side of the economy, we need to endogeneize this variable. For the pur-
poses of our analysis it is sufficient to postulate the following siDple 
investment function : 
(4.2.8) a I 
a y > 0, a I dr L 
< 0, 
a I 
a q > o. 
Given that the level of income is positively related to the level of 
sales, a ceteris paribus rise in income raises the expected marginal 
productivity of real capital and thus shifts upwards the demand schedule 
for capital goods. This raises the demand price of real capital and given 
the supply schedule of the capital goods producing industries, the pro-
duction of real capital is accelerated(6). 
The loan rate (rL) affects investment t~rough the conventional cost of 
borrowing chanriel : a ceteris paribus rise in the loan rate raises the 
cost of capital, lowers the net rate of return on investment and induces 
a fall in the rate of real capital accumulation. 
The market price of equities (q) affects investment through the following 
process : a rise In the price of equities relative to the price of newly 
produced goods represents a rlse in the price of old capital relative to 
the price of newly produced capital. Since new capital becomes cheaper 
relative to old capital investors are induced to substitute old capital 
for newly produced capital and thus real capital accumulation is accele-
rated. It is important to note that Tobin and the "Yale School" assert 
that the ultimate effect of monetary policy is to affect real capital 
accumulation via changing the terms of exchange between old and new ca-
pital. (7) 
Inspecting equations (4.2.7), (4.2.8) it is easily seen that the 
(6)see J.G.Witte, "The microfoundations of the Social Investment 
function" Journal of Political Economy 1963 
(7)see J.Tobin "Money, capital and other stores of value" American 
Economic Review 1961 ,J.Tobin and VI.Brainard, "Financial intermedia-
ries and the effectiveness of monetary controls" in Hester and Tobin 
(eds), "Financial markets and economic activity"1967, J.Tobin, "A 
general equilibrium approach to Monetary Theory Journal of r'~oney 
Credit and Banking 1969 
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effects of the interest rate on bank loans and the price of equities on 
the demand for bank loans can be decompos~d into two parts : the pure 
substitution effects obtained by holding the level of investment cons-
tant and the scale effects resulting from the influence of the loan rate 
and the price .of equities on the level of investment. Substituting equa-
tion (4.2.8) into (4.2.7), differentiating with respect to income (Y), 
the loan rate (rL) and the price of equities (q), and expressing the 
resulting expressions in elasticity terms we get : 
(4.2.9) 
(4.2.10) 
(4.2.11) 
~ CRd~y 
E d 
CR ,rL 
E d 
CR ,q 
= EI Y > 0 , 
- ( E )I:const + E < - d I,rL CR ,rL 
= (E d ) I:const + EI,q 
CR ,q 
0 
Expressions (4.2.9) and (4.2.10) are positive and negative respe-
ctively ; in (4.2.10) the negative substitution effect is reinforced by 
the negative scale effect and thus the total elasticity of the demand 
for bank loans with respect to the loan rate lS unambiguously negative. 
On the other hand, the total elasticity of bank loans with respect to 
the market price o.f equities is ambiguous ; the negative substitution 
effect represented by the first term in the RHS of (4.2.11), is weakened 
by the positive scale effect represented by the second term in the RHS of 
(4.2.11). We postulate however that the substitution effect alw~s domi-
nates the scale effect, so that we can write the following condition of 
"normal" behaviour 
(4.2.12) E d < 0 
CR ,q 
Having specified the firm's financial constraint and the demand 
for loans, the (flow) supply of equities can be_('~ey~ve¢. as a residual 
by c;:offibining equations (4.2.6), (4.2.7) : 
(4.2.13) 
As in the case of the demand for loans, the effects of the loan rate 
and the price of equities can be decomposed into a substitution effect, 
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and a scale effect operating via the influ2nce of the loan rate and 
the price of equities on investment. The total effects of income (Y) the 
price of equities, and the loan rate ,on the supply of equities, expres-
sed in elasticity terms, are given by the following expressions 
(4.2.14) E - EI Y > 0 -
ES,y , 
(4.2.15) E - (e: ) + EI > 0 -s s E ,q E ,q I:const ,q 
(4.2.16) e: - (E + E - ) S s I,rL E ,rL E ,rL I:const 
The first terms in the RHS of (4.2.15), (4.2.16) represent the substi-
tution effects of changes in the price of equities and the loan rate on 
the supply of equities, whereas the second terms represent the scale 
effects. Moreover the following expressions for (EES n )I' t 
,'1... • cons 
( EEs]:' ) b' 1 d . d ~ L I: canst can e eaSl y erlve : 
(4.2.17) (E ) ES,q I:const 
(4.2.18) 
Now Slnce the pure substitution effects of changes in the price of equi-
ties and the loan rate on the demand for loans are negative, and since 
o < CR< 1 it follows from (4.2.17), (4.2.18) that (EES~'> I:const 
(EES r) I' t are positive. From equations (4.2.15), (4.2~_16) it fol-
,L . cons 
lous that the total effect of the price of equities on the supply of 
equities is unambiguously positive, the positive scale effect reinforcing 
the positive substitution effect. On the other hand the total effect of 
the loan rate on the supply of equities is ambiguous since the substitu-
tion effect is positive and the scale effec~ is negative. As a condition 
of normal behaviour hm.;rever,we postula~e that the substitution effect 
dominates the scale effect and therefore the total effect of the loan 
rate on the supply of equities is positive : 
(4.2.19) EEs > o. 
,rL 
Our demand for bank loans hypothesis constructed ln this section 
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consists of equations (4.2.6), (4.2.7), (4.2.8) supplemented by condi-
tions (4.2.12), (4.2.19) of normal behaviour, which postulate that the 
total effect of a change in the price of equities on the demand for bank 
loans is negative whereas the total effect of a change ln the loan rate 
on the supply of equities is positive. For convenience we rewrite the 
equations comprising our hypothesis : 
(4.2.6) I = q(Es_Es ) 
-1 + (CRd-CR
d ) 
-1 
CRd-CRd 
a(CRd-CRd ) 
(4.2.7) - CR(r r ,q). I . CR ,CR < o < -1 =CR < - 0 ;<. 
-1 , 
.l.J r L q aI 
(4.2.8) I - (Y,rL,q) aI aI ar - . >0 < 0 --> o . , ay , arL aq 
(4.2.12) ECRd;q ::: (E d ) + EI,q < 0 CR ,q I: const 
(4.2.19) EEs r - (EES) . Ehr > 0 - . , L 
. ,rL I: const + h 
4.3 A"partial equilibrium" analysis of the market for bank credit. 
In this section we put together the supply and demand functions for 
bank loans derived in the previous sections and we examine some important 
implications for the loan market createdby the institutional rigidities 
of the Greek financial system. 
Combining equations (4.1.2), (4.1.3) of section 4.1 and rewriting 
equation (4.1.9) we have 
(4.3.1) 
(4.3.2) 
CRs-CRs =. {l-R(rL,p) } • (D-D ) + (A-A_1 ) - (T-T_ 1)· -1 -1 
A-A 
-1 
. , 
As we have explained in section 4.1, the term (A-A_ 1 ) in the RHS of 
(4.3.1) represents the part of the supply of bank credit financed by the 
banking system's borrowing from the Central Bank. The demand for such 
borrowing is represented by equation (4.3.2). 
Let us assume that borrowing from the Central Bank is unconstrained 
by supply ie that at a given loan rate-discount rate configuration, the 
Central Bank leaves the supply of funds to the banking system to be 
1 
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determined by demand. Figure 4.3.A presen~s the supply of bank loans 
o------------------------------------~ Figure 4.3.A 
curve under ceteris 
paribus conditions. 
The curve CRs-CRs 
represents.the total 
supply of bank loans 
whereas the curve D D 
s s 
is the supply of bank 
loans financed by bank 
deposits after allowance 
for the absorbtion of 
Treasury Bills. 
The curve D D 1S up-
S s 
ward sloping Slnce a ceteris paribus rlse 1n the loan rate (rL ) lowers 
the demand for bank reserves and thus lijerates funds available for bank 
loans. The horizontal difference between the two curves represents the 
supply of bank loans financed by borrowing from the Central Bank. Since 
the demand for such borrowing is an increasing function of the loan rate-
discount rate differential it follows that, ceteris paribus, the higher 
is the loan rate the larger is the horizontal difference between the 
CRs-CRs D D curves ,. 
s s 
An increase in the flow of bank deposits will shift both curves of figure 
(4.3.A) to the right, the horizontal difference between them remaining 
constant. A rise in the rate of Treasury Bills absorbtion by the banking 
system would shift both curves to the left, again the horizontal diffe-
rence between them remaining constant. Finally, a fall in the Bank rate 
(p) would shift both curves downwards to the right, increasing the hori-
zontal difference between them, and vice-versa for a rise in the discount 
rate. 
Figures (4.3.B), (4.3.C) depict the demand curve for bank loans. 
The position of the curve depends positively on the level of -income 
and negatively on the market price of equities (q). An increase in income 
shifts the demand curve for bank loans upwards to the right, whereas a 
rise in the market price of equities shifts the curve downwards to the 
left. 
The flow supply and demand curves for bank loans are brought toge-
ther in figure 4.3.D. Clearly if the "Currency Committee" sets the loan 
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rate below rL(o) - say at r L(l) - there '~;ill be an excess demand for 
bank loans equal to the distance AB . ac"Cual loans granted to the private , 
CRd CR
d 
CRd CR
d 
\ CRd CRd \ r L \ , \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 
\ \ \ \ 
\ \ CRd \ \ 
\,CRd CR
d 
\ CRd CRd \ CRd q=qo q<qo \ 
q>qo Y<Yo y-y Y>Y 
- 0 0 a 
a Figure 4.3.B CRd_CR~l Figure 4.3.C CRd_CR~l 
sector are represented by the distance rL(l) - A whereas loans demanded 
are equal to the distance r L(l) - B. Under a state of excess demand for 
bank loans, a fall in the Bank rate, a rise in the inflow of bank deposits 
and a fall in the rate of absorbtion of Treasury Bills by the banking sys-
CRs 
--------
tem, all shift 
the supply curve 
of bank loans 
downwards to the 
right, increase 
the availability 
of funds to the 
IL(a) ------- private sector and 
thus they have an 
expansionary effect 
on investment spen-
ding.Boreover, 
under a state of 
IL (1) 
a~----------------~--------------------------~ 
Figure 4.3.D CR-CR-I 
excess demand, a 
rise in the loan 
rate(rL) may well 
have an expansionary effect on investmen~, if the effect of the increased 
availability of funds dominates the effect of the increased cost of bor-
. (8) 
rowlng 
(8)We will revert to this point later In the chapter. 
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At a loan rate above rL(o) there lS an excess supply of loans and 
thus the demand for loans is always satisfied. At a rate between (r
L
)2 
and rL(o) (figure 4.3.D), borrowing from the Central Bank by the banking 
system, for the purpose of financing loa~s to the private sector, is 
positive but less than the desired one. For example, at a rate r
L
(3) 
, 
desired borrowing from the Central Bank is equal to the distance DF 
whereas actual borrowing is equal to DE; although unconstrained by 
Central Bank, the banking system's borrowing is constrained by the pri-
vate sector's demand for loans. At a loan rate above r
L
(2)' the demand 
for loans falls short of the supply of loans which is financed solely 
by bank deposits (allowing for the absorbtion of Treasury Bills). Thus 
at the region above r L(2)' it is reasonable to assume that the banking 
system uses the inflow of excess funds to repay past borrowings from 
the Central Bank, in which case the flow of the banking system's bor-
rowing from the Central Bank becomes negative. 
The above discussion makes clear that under a state of excess 
supply of loans, equation (4.3.2) for the banking system's demand for 
borrowing from the Central Bank, becomes irrelevant, for, such borrowing 
is constrained by the private sector's demand for loans. Under a state 
of excess loan supply, borrowing from the Central Bank becomes an acco-
modating variable adjusting to keep actual bank loans granted to the 
private sector equal to the demand for.them. Changes in the discount 
rate, the flow of deposits and the rate of Treasury Bills absorbtion 
will produce accomodating changes in borrowing from the Central Bank(9) 
but they will leave investment spending unaffected. Moreover a rise in 
p p 
o 
(9) 
Figure 4.3.E 
For example, a rise in 
rate of Treasury Bills 
duct ion in the rate of 
Central Bank. 
s . ~ Flgure 4.3.t 
the flow of bank deposits or a fall in the 
absorbtion w~ll produce an accomodating re-
the banking system's borrowing from the 
, 
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the loan rate will exert an unambiguously contractionary effect on the 
demand for bank loans and investment and an accomodating fall in bor-
rowing from the Central Bank. 
Our analysis so far, has been based on the assumption that the 
banking system's demand for Central Bank funds lS always satisfied, l.e 
that the supply of lending by the Central Bank is perfectly elastic at 
the given Bank rate (p). Now we turn to analyse the market for bank cre-
dit in the case where the supply of funds by the Central Bank imposes 
a constraint on the demand for funds. The point is illustrated in fi-
gures (4.3.E), (4.3.F). In figure (4.3.E) the supply of Central Bank 
funds is perfectly elastic at (po) and therefore it does not impose 
any constraint on the demand for funds by the banking system. Figure 4.3.F 
depicts a situation where the monetary authority chooses both to set 
the Bank rate and to control the supply' of funds. As figure 4.3.F shows, 
at a discount rate (p ) the supply of funds is represented by the dis-
o 
tance p -A whereas the demand for funds is represented by p -B; hence 
o 0 
at the given Bank rate (p) there is an excess demand for Central Bank 
o 
funds equal to the distance A-B. 
CR 
a 
-------7' 
--.------
o 
Figure 4.3.G 
/ 
/ 
/ 
--7E 
/ 
/ 
CRS 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
CRS / 
Control of lending to the banking system by the Central Bank implies 
that such lending can be u'sed as a policy instrument through which 
the situation in the "market" for Central Bank funds may be partially 
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relieved or made more tight with further repercussions In the economy. 
Figure 4.3.G reproduces figure 4.3.D but now there is an important dif-
ference in that the authorities regulate both interest rates and the 
supply of Central Bank funds. Hence although the curve CRs-CRs repre-
sents the desired supply of bank credit, the actual supply of bank loans 
is equal to the supply of loans financed by bank deposits, represented 
by the curve DsDs' plus whateveramount of funds the Central Bank chooses 
to lend to the banking system. 
It is important to note however, that there are limits In the use 
of Central Bank lending as a policy instrument. This can be seen with 
the help of figure 4.3.G. At a loan rate r L(2) the demand for loans is 
equal to the distance r L(2)-B ; if Central Bank lending were demand 
determined there would be an excess supply of bank loans and actual 
borrowing of the banking system from the Central Bankwould be equal to 
the distance A-B. Given the loan rate r L(2) and all other factors which 
determine the position of the curves D D ,CRd-CRd , CRs-CRs , it is impos-
s s 
sible for the Central Bank to supply a flow of funds to the banking sys-
tem larger than the distance A-B per time period. This implies that if 
the Bank uses its lending to the banking system as a policy instrument, 
then the market for bank loans will be in excess demand. If, for example, 
at a loan rate r
U2
) the Bank chooses to provide a flow of lending equal 
to AC (see fig. 4.3.G), there will be an excess demand for bank loans 
equal to CB ; for, while the flow of Central Bank lending to the banking 
system necessary to satisfy the demand for loans by the private sector 
is equal to the distance A-B, the actual flow of funds permitted by the 
. d' A C(lO) Central Bank 1S equal to the lstance - . 
(lO)It might be objected that the proposition that effective regulation 
of Central Bank funds implies an excess demand for loans is not 
strictly correct, since, if the Central Bank sets its flow of len-
. ding equal to A-B, the private sector's demand for bank credit will 
be satisfied. However, if the Bank chooses to supply a flow of l~~­
ding equal to AB, the supply constraint imposed by the Bank, simply 
coincides with the preexisting constraintimposed by the private sec-
tor's _demand for loans. Clearly then, the Central Bank's constraint 
cannot be said to be effective, for, even if it was altogether re-
moved and Bank lending became demand determined, the flow of Central 
Bank lending to the banking system would remain unchanged at a level 
equal to A-B. 
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Obviously the above analysis holds not only for the specific 
interest rate r L(2) but for any loan rate belonging to the open 
interval { rL(o),rL(l) }. We can therefore generalize the argument 
by saying that for loan rates between rL(o) and rL(l) the feasible 
range of effective regulation of Central Bank lending is the ho-
d d rizontal difference between the curves D D and CR -CR . cloreover, 
s s 
effective regulation of lending to the banking system implies that 
the bank credit market is in a state of excess demand. 
-
To illustrate how the regulation of Central Bank funds affects 
the conditions in the loan market, assume that at the loan rate 
r L(2) (fig.4.3.G), the Central Bank chooses not to provide any funds 
to the banking system : therefore the actual supply of loans to the 
private sector is represented by the curve D D and the excess de-
s s 
mand for bank credit is equal to A-B. Next suppose that the Central 
Bank decides to supply a flow of funds per period equal to A-C; in 
this case the actual supply of bank loans to the economy is repre-
sented by the curve CR -CR and the excess demand for loans falls 
a a 
to CB. Hence the financialstringency in the credit market is par-
tially relieved and the increased availability of funds to the pri-
vate sector exerts an expansionary effeGt on investment expenditure. 
The argument holds mutatis mutandis for a reduction in the flow of 
lending to the Banking system. 
For loan rates below rL(o) (always referring to fig.4.3.G) there 
is an excess demand for loans even if the supply of Central Bank 
lending is demand determined, and therefore the banking system's ,borrowing 
from the Central Bank does not face a constraint imposed by the pri-
vate sector's demand for loans. At a loan rate equal to r L(3)' the 
desired flow of borrowing from the Central Bank is equal to D-E. 
Obviously the Bank cannot supply a flow of lending to the banking sys-
tem larger than D-E ; if the Bank wishes to directly regulate the 
supply of its lending, it should confine its lending operations to 
the interval (D,E). Suppose that the supply of lending by the Central 
Bank is equal to D-F; since the banking system's demand for borrowing 
from the Central Bank is equal to DE, it is clear that the supply of 
Central Bank funds constitutes an effective constraint on the demand 
for funds by the Banking system and as a result the already existing 
excess demand for bank loans by the private sector increases by FE. 
-226-
General~ing the above argument we may say that at loan rates below 
rL(o)' the feasible range of Central Bank's lending operations is 
represented by the horizontal difference of the curves D D , CRs-CRs • 
s s 
Effective control of lending by the Central Bank lncreases the already 
prevailing excess demand in the bank credit market. 
Finally, it is obvious that at loan rates above rL(l) (fig.4.3.G) 
the Central Bank cannot use lending as a policy instrument, it only 
passively accepts the repayments of past loans which the Bank had gran-
ted to the banking system. This is because at loan rates above rL(l) 
the demand for credit by the private sector falls short of the part of 
bank loans supply which is financed from bank deposits (represented by 
the curve DsDs In figure 4.3.G). Consequently the banking system 
finds itself with excess funds which are used to repay past borrowings 
from the Central Bank. 
Let us now briefly summarize. the main points of the analysis of 
the bank credit market undertaken in this section. We postulated two 
alternative modes of Central Bank behaviour. According to the first, 
the Central Bank determines the discount rate and leaves the supply 
of lending to the banking system to be determined by demand ; accor-
ding to the second, the Central Bank not only sets the Bank rate, but 
. it also directly controls the supply of lending to the banking system, 
using it as a policy instrument. 
In the context of the first behavioural hypothesis, we have shown 
that a situation of excess supply or excess demand in the bank credit 
market may prevail, depending on the existing loan rate-discount rate 
configuration, other things being equal. Moreover,we have shown that 
the second behavioural hypothesis is necessarily associated with excess 
demand in the market for bank loans. Hence different interest rate 
configurations in combination with the Central Bank's lending policy 
enable us to distinguish the following three states of the bank credit 
market 
State A : The banking system's borrowing from the Central Bank is 
demand determined and excess supply of loans prevails in the bank Credit 
market. 
State B : The banking system's borrowing from the Central Bank is 
demand determined and excess demand prevails in the bank credit market. 
State C : Central Bank lending is a policy instrument, directly regu-
lated by the Central Bank and therefore excess demand prevails in the 
credit market. 
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Obviously the monetary authorities have the power to reverse 
the prevailing state of the loan market by using interest rates as 
well as other policy instruments or by reconsidering their attitude 
towards lending policy. If however the changes in the policy instru-
ments are such as to leave the credit market in its initially prevai-
ling state, it can be shown that in each of the above three states, 
the set of available policy instruments may be different (a variable 
which is a policy instrument in one state may be endogenous under ano-
ther state) and, more important, the impact of policy instruments on 
the key endogenous variables of the system may differ both quantita-
tively and qualitatively according to the prevailing state of the loan 
market. 
Before proceeding to the next section of this chapter in which we 
put the bank credit market into a general equilibrium context, we should em-
phasize. the close connection of our analysis of the bank credit market 
undertaken in this section to the well known "availability doctrine" 
of monetary theory, by undertaking a brief exposition of this doctrine. 
The "availability doctrine" first appeared in the literature du-
ring the fifties,(ll) and its essence can be easily given with the help 
of figure 4.3.H.ln 
I" 
S 
oL-____ ~-----L----L-----------~ 
Loans 
Figure 4.3.H 
this figure, DD is 
the.demand curve for 
bank loans which are 
used to finance in-
vestment spending,SS 
is the supply of 
bank loans and (r) ~s 
the loan rate. Assume 
an initial equilibri-
um in the loan market 
at a sLock of lcans-
loan rate configura-
(11)The first exposition of this doctrine is due to Roosa,see R.Koosa, 
"I t t ates and the Central Bank" in "Boney, Trade and Economic n eres I" ~ . .. 
Growth" (1951) The availability doctrine ~oldS a pI" ~ml.nent posltJ.on 
in the "Radcliffe Report". See, "Report oJ.. the CommJ.tt:e on the wor-
king of the Monetary System" 19S9.for exce~lent summarles of the 
'1 b'l't d ctrine see D.~.Jaffee 0p.Clt. pp.16-19 and D.P.Tucker, 
aval all yo, ~ . d" 
"Credit Rationing, interest rate lags and.Moneraty pO~lCy spee 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1968 especlally pp.S4-S7. 
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tion (Lo,ro ). A reduction in the stock of money by open market bond 
sales, raises the bond rate and probably induces a reallocation of 
bank portfolios in favour of bonds and against bank loans ; conce-
quently the supply of loans shifts to t~~ left to the position 5'5'. 
If the loan rate adjusts instantaneously to clear the loan market, a 
new equilibrium will be achieved characterized by a higher loan rate 
(r1 ) and a lower equilibrium stock of loans (L1 ). However, the above 
reasoning is hardly novel since this is precisely the traditional 
interest rate mechanism through which monetary policy affects invest-
ment. As it can be seen from figure 4.3.H, the extent of the loans 
reduction depends on the interest elasticity of the demand curve for 
loans which reflects the interest elasticity of investment. Clearly, 
if investment is perfectly interest inelastic, the fall in the money 
stock will raise the loan rate but this rise will not affect investment 
spending. 
The "availability doctrine" refers to the case where the loan rate 
is sticky and it does not adjust quickly to clear the loan market. Sup-
pose that after the leftward shift of t~e loans supply curve, the loan 
rate remains at (r ) in which case an excess demand for loans ~s 
o 
created and bank credit is rationed. Actual loans granted to the pri-
vate sector fall to (L2 ) and this fall is independent of the interest 
elasticity of investment : investment will be curtailed not because 
the cost of borrowing has risen but because investors cannot get the 
. h . . (12) necessary f~nance to undertake t e lnvestment proJect • 
Nevertheless, the disequilibrium nature of the "availability 
doctrine" should be recognized : the loan rate will not remain indefina-
tely at (r ) ; sooner or later it will start adjusting upwards. As long 
. 0 
as the adjustment is taking place, actual loans will be "climbing" the 
supply of loans curve, credit rationing will be gradually declining and 
eventually the "availability effect" of monetary policy will disappear 
(12)As it is referred in the "Radcliffe report", " •.. If the money 
for financing the project cannot be got on any tolerable terms 
at all this is the end of the matter " {1959 paragraph 387 } 
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and only the "cost effect" will remain(13). During the transition pe-
riod however, the availability effect may have a strong impact on in-
vestment spending even if investment is completely interest inelastic. 
The major weakness of the "availability doctrine" is the lack of 
a rigorous explanation on why the rate or interest on bank loans is re-
latively sticky and adjusts slowly to changing conditions of the bank 
credit market. However in the analysis undertaken in this section, such 
an explanation need not be provided, since in the Greek Economy the loan 
rate is an administered price set by the "Currency CommitteeU and there-
fore it cannot provide any equilibrating mechanism either ih a state of 
excess loan demand or in a state of excess loan supply. 
4.4 A short-run macromod,el for the Greek Economy. 
In this section, we specify a short-run fixed-price macromodel for 
the Greek Economy in the context of which we shall formally examine the 
effects of changes in the exogenous variables upon the key endogenous 
variables of the system, under each of the three states of the bank 
loan market specified in the previous section. Along with the equations 
describing the bank credit market, the model incorporates the identity 
for the Government financial requirements (the goverment budget cons-
traint) as well as behavioural equations for the main financial assets 
of the Greek Economy. 
. d d' h . ( 14) f h d 1 First, we present an lSCUSS t e equatlons 0 t e mo e , and 
we, specify the a priori restrictions which should be imposed upon the 
structural parameters of the model. Next, we reformulate the model by 
deriving, through an aggregation procedure, explicit demand and supply 
functions for money ; this reformulation makes the model more concise 
and manageable for the purposes of our subsequent analysis. Finally, we 
indicate the necessary amendments which make the model conformable to 
each of the three states of the credit market distinguished in the pre-
vious section. 
(13)This transitory, disequilibrium, nature of the availability effect 
may partly eAplain why the availability doctrine hs.3 :"'l.:Jt been inco::--
porated into formal macromodels. For an excellent, and one of the 
very few models which incorporates t~e availability effect into for-
mal macrotheory see D.P. Tucker Ope cit. 
(14)For mathematical convenience all equations of the model will be 
written in linear form. 
-230-
The model 
(4.4.1) 
(4.4.2) 
(4.4.3) 
(4.4.4) 
(4.4.5) 
(4.4.6) 
(4.4.7) 
(4.4.8) 
(4.4.9) 
(4.4.10) 
(4.4.11) 
(4:4.12) 
(4.4.13) 
(4.4.14) 
(4.4.15) 
(4.4.16) 
C = Co+Cy (1-Ty ) . Y + Cr .rs + Cq.q ; 
s 
I - o <1y <1, I <0, I >0. 
r L q 
1o+1y.Y + 1r .rL + I .q; L q 
I = (CRd_CR~l ) + q (E-E_ 1 ) 
- CR .rL + CR .q + C~1.1; CR ,CR <0; 0<CR1<1 r L q 4'r L q 
CRs-CRs - (D-~1) + (S-S 
-1) + (A-~1) (R-R_1 ) - (T-T_1 ) --1 
R/(D+S) - R +~ .rL + Rp.p . .r''r <0, R > 0 - , . o L L P .-
A-A - Ad' (rL -p) - nA . > 0 0 <1T<1 -1 - -1 , ..... -d , . 
Cp - CPo + CPy.y . CPy > 0 - , 
D - Do+Dy'Y + D . r s + I: . q 
. Dy> 0, D < 0, Dq - , r q rs s 
S - S o"tSy'y + S S .-q; > S > o,S > - .r + Sy < 0, r s q rs q s 
G-T y - (H-H_ 1 ) + (T-T_ 1 ) -y 
B = H + A 
B Cp+ R 
Cp+ D 
Cp + D + S 
> O • 
o. 
Equation (4.4.1) is the equilibrium condition for national income. 
Equation (4.4.2) is the consumption function; consumption depends posi-
tively on disposable income {(l-Ty )y }, hegatively on the rate on Saving 
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and Time deposits (rs )' and positively on the market price of equities 
(q). Equation (4.4.3) is the investment function; investment (I) is 
postulated to be positively dependent upon income (Y) and the market 
price of equities (q) and negatively dependent upon the interest rate 
on bank loans (rL). 
Equations (4.4.6)-(4.4.8) describe the supply side of the credit 
market; equation (4.4.6) represents the consolidated balance-sheet of 
the banking sector written in first difference form ; (CRs ) denotes 
the supply of bank credit, (D) denotes demand deposits, (S) denotes 
Saving and Time deposits, (A) denotes the banking system's borrowing 
from the Central Bank, (R) denotes bank reserves and (T) denotes the 
stock of Treasury Bills issued by the government and absorbed by the 
Banking system. Equation (4.4.7) is the demand for bank reserves re-
latively to bank deposits; it says that the banking system's reserve~ 
ratio is positively dependent upon the discount rate (p) and negati-
vely dependent upon. the loan rate (rL) ; (4.4.8) represents the ban-
king system's demand for borrowing from the Central Bank; it is 
'postulated that the flow of such borrowing per time period depends 
positively upon the loan rate-discount rate differential (rL-p) and 
negatively upon the stock of borrowing outstanding at the beginning of 
the period. 
Equation (4.4.4) is the financing constraint of the business sec-
tor; it says that investment is financed either by issuing equities (E) 
or by demanding bank loans (CRd ). Equation (4.4.5) represents the (flow)· 
demand for bank credit (CRd_CR~l) ; loans demanded are postulated to be 
positively dependent upon the level of investment and negatively depen-
. f .. (15) dent upon the loan rate and the market prlce 0 equltles . 
Equation (4.4.9) represents the demand for cash by the non-bank 
public (Cp); cash demanded is independent of the rates of return on 
alternative assets and it is positively dependent on the level of income. 
Equation (4.4.10) postulates that Demand deposits (D) depend positively 
on income on the usual "transactions demand for money" considerations 
negatively on the rate on Saving and TiDe deposits and positively on 
the market price of equities. In equation (4.4.11) it is postulated that 
(15)see section 4.2 
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Saving and Time deposits (S) depend pos:'-::ively on the "own" rate of 
returners) and the price of equities (q); their dependence upon the 
level of income is ambiguous and may be ~ositive or negative depen-
ding on whether Saving and Time deposits are mainly used for tran-
saction purposes or as a store of Wealt~.If Saving and Time deposits 
are mainly used to accomodate transactic~s, a ceteris paribus rise 
in income will raise the demand for cas~, demand deposits and Saving 
and Time deposits at the expense of a fall in the demand for equities. 
If, on the other hand, Saving and Time deposits are mainly used as a 
store of Wealth, then, glven the level 0::- Private Wealth, a rise ln 
income will raise the demand for cash ani Demand deposits at the ex-
pense of a fall in the demand for Saving and Time deposits, and equi-
ties. Since in the Greek Economy Saving. and Time deposits are a main 
means of wealth accumulation, it lS more probable for their partial 
response to chapges in lncome to be nega~ive rather than positive. 
Equation (4.4.12) specifies the Government budget constraint(16); 
it says that the budget deficit is finan~ed either by issuing cash or 
by issuing Treasury Bills which are ass~~ed to be wholly absorbed by 
the banking system. Equation (4.4.13) specifies the sources side of the 
monetary Base(B) ; (H) represents the co~ponent of the base which ' 
"enters" the economy through the governr:lent budget and it is usually 
referred to as "unborrowed cash" ; (A) is the component of the base 
which entersthe economy through Central 3ank lending to the banking sys-
tem. Equation (4.4.14) represents the cO:1ventional l1uses side" of the 
monetary base. Finally, equations (4.4.15) , (4.4.15) define the "exclu-
sive (Ml) and "inclusive'.' (M2) concepts of the money stock. 
A notable omission in the model spe~ified and explained above, re-
fers to the exclusion of wealth effects :'n the consumption function and 
in the demand functions for financial assets (especially for Saving and 
Time deposits). This omission would introduce serious error in the ana-
lysis of the long-run effects of policy =~anges ; since, however, i~ the 
subsequent sections, our analysis will be confined to the impact effects 
of policy changes, the omission of weal-::~ effects may not introduce se-
rious error in the comparative static results of the model. 
(15)For a survey and an extensive biblic5~aphy of the literature on the 
budget constraint see D. Currie, M2=~oeconomic policy and the Govern-
ment's financing requirement a sur~ey of recent Developments, in 
Proceedings of the 1977 AUT E cor.::-erence 
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A second omission refers to the non-inclusion of the interest 
payments on Treasury Bills in the Government budget ; again, this omis-
sion is much more serious for the long-run rather than the short-run 
properties of the model. 
A third omission refers to the lack of a foreign sector. The se-
riousness of this omission partly depends on the level of sophistica-
tion of the foreign sector p0tentially included in the model : a simple 
foreign sector of the keynesian type would not introduce serious changes 
in the comparative static results' of the model, whereas a sophisticated 
foreign sector would considerably increase the complexity of the model. 
A further drawback of the model refers to the specification of the 
consumption function and the demand functions for Demand, and Saving and 
Time deposits. Consumption, Demand depo~its,and Saving and Time deposits 
were all made positively dependent upon the market price of equities (q); 
a strictly correct specification, however, would be a negative depen-
dence on the return on equities which in turn depends positively upon 
the marginal product of capital and negatively upon the market price 
of equities. Now, if the marginal product of capital depends positively 
on the level of income, income would affect consumption', Demand deposits, 
and Saving and Time deposits both directly, via the channels already 
specified in the relevant equations, and indirectly via the marginal 
product of capital. A rise in income would raise the marginal product 
of capital, thereby increasing the return on equities and therefore con-
suption, Demand deposits and Saving and Time deposits would fall. 
However, ihis indirect channel of influence is not incorporated in our 
model. 
All in all, we may say that, up to a certain extent, whether or 
not the above omissions and drawbacks are considered serious is a mat-
ter of judgement; on the other hand,they certainly reduce the tedious-
ness of the algebra as well as the ambiguity of certain comparative 
static results of the model. 
He left for final comment what may be thought of as the most se-
rious drawback of the model, namely the assumption of price fixity. 
Nevertheless, given the purposes of our analysis, this drawback is ra-
ther superficial: for, the present model is constructed in order to 
analyse and compare the effects of policy changes upon aggregate demand 
under alternative states of the bank credit market and alternative modes 
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of government budget financing, having ~~ intention to analyse how 
changes in aggregate demand are apportio~ed between changes in real 
income and changes in the price level. ~o put the point dlfferent-
ly our purpose is to examine the extent of the h 0 r 1 z 0 n tal 
dis pia c e men t of the aggrega~e demand curve in the price-
output space which results from changes in the exogenous variables of 
the model. Given the slope of the aggregate demand curve, the more 
anelastic is the supply of output with respect to the price level, the 
higher will be the effect on prices and the lowe:r th~_- eff~ct on output 
of a given displacement in the demand c~ve. It remains true however, 
that , ceteris paribus~ the larger is _the horizOntal displacement of the 
demandcurve-, the larger will be the impac.t on both output and prices. 
Apart from the restrictions imposed upon the structural parameters 
of the model, written beside each of its equations, some further restric-
tions., are suggested on a priori grounds. We remind that in our ana-
lysis of the demand of bank loans by the private sector (section 4.2), 
we postulated that the total effect of a change in the market price of 
equities (q) on the demand for bank loans is negative and the total ef-
fect of the loan rate on the supply of e~uities is positive, both con-
ditions implying that the relevant substitution effects dominate the 
scale effects resulting from changes in investment. In the present mo-
del these two conditions of "normal';' bel-.aviour imply the two following 
inequalities : 
(4.4.17) < 0 
(4.4.18) o. 
Moreover; portfolio theory imposes a further set of restrictions 
upon the structural parametes of the asset demand functions of the mo-
del(17). First we should note that although our model includes four 
assets-cash, demand deposits, Saving anc Ti~e deposits, equities -func~ 
tions.for only three of them are specified. An equation for the demand 
(17)For the restrictions which portfolio theory imposes upon the para-
. "A l' meters of the asset demand functions see J.Tobln: genera equl-
librium approach to monetary theory" Journal of Money Credit and 
Banking 1969 ; see also C.A.E. Good::-_~rt : "Honey information and 
uncertainty" chapter 3 Appendix A. 
-235-
for equities should not be included in the model, since it arises as a 
residual from the other asset functions and the private sector's 
wealth constraint. In addition, it follows from standard portfolio 
theory that, given the level of pnvate wealth, the sum of the partial 
responses of the asset demands to changes in income as well as to changes 
in the different rates of return on assets should be equal to zero. Thus, 
for changes in income,the interest rate on Saving and Time deposits and 
the price of equities, the following relations should hold 
(4.4.19) 
(4.4.20) 
(4.4.21) 
+ D 
r 
s 
+ S 
r 
s 
+ (qE) = 
rs 
o 
o 
In equation (4.4.19), the partial response of the demand for equi-
ties to changes in income (qE)y' must be negative : given the level of 
wealth, a rise in income raises the need for means of payments and in-
duces wealth holders to substitute cash and Demand deposits at the. 
expense of equities in their portfolios. Given that (qE)y is negative, 
the fOllowing inequality holds : 
(4.4.22) 
In equations (4.4.20), (4.4.21) the partial responses of the de-
mand for equities to changes in the rate on Saving and Time deposits 
and the market prlce of equities are clearly negative ; a rise in the 
rate on Saving and Time deposits raises the demand for such deposits 
and lowers the demand for equities and demand deposits, whereas a rise 
in the price of equities raises the demand for Saving and Time deposits 
and Demand deposits and lowers the demand for equiti~s. Moreover, since 
the partial responses of the demand for cash to changes in the rate on 
Saving and Time deposits and the price of equities are postulated to be 
zero, relations (4.4.20), (4.4.21) imply the following inequalities: 
(4.4.23) S + D > 0 
r rs 
s 
(4.4.24) o 
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Having specified the restrictions tjat should hold on apriori 
grounds upon the structural parameters of the model, we next turn to 
reduce the dimentionality of our model by deriving, through an ag-
gregation procedure, explicit demand and supply function~!o~ tpe in-
1 .. 2 (18) C USlve concept of the money stock (M ) - • 
Adding equations (4.4.9), (4.4.10), (4.4.11) by parts we get 
(4.4.25) 
Making use of equation (4.4.16) and restrictions (4.4.22)-(4.4.24) we 
may write 
(4.4.26) 
The RHS of (4.4.26) represents the demand for the inclusive money 
concept (M2). 
Dividing equations(4.4.16), (4.4.14) by parts and making some 
simple algebraic manipUlations we get : 
(4.4.28) = 1 + (Cp/D+S) ------~~--~---. B 
(R/D+S)+(Cp/D+S) 
The RHS of (4.4.28) is the usual multiplier formulation of the money 
supply where the money multiplier de~ends negatively upon the non-bank 
public's cash-bank deposits ratio and the banking system's reserve ratio. 
Adding equations (4.4.13), (4.4.11) by parts, and dividing equation(4.4.9) 
and the resulting expression by parts, we get the following expression 
for the cash-deposit ratio : 
(4.4.29) 
The dependence of Cp/(D+S) upon income is negative or positive 
depending on whether the elasticity of the demand for cash with res-
pect to income is lower or higher than the elasticity of the demand 
for bank deposits with respect to income. The partial response of the 
(18 )The exerClse to follow is closely related to t.he proposition of 
chapter one of this study {see section 111.3 .} that: ~ .. the 
demand and supply functions of money are "semi-reduced" forms de-
rived from a "higher level~'· financ:'al model. 
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cash-deposit ratio to changes in the ra~e on Saving and Time deposits 
(rs ) and the market price of equities is negative. 
Substituting equations (4.4.29), (4.4.7) into (4.4.28), we get the 
following expression for the supply of the inclusive money concept 
(4.4.30) 
For convenience in our subsequent analysis we adopt a linear specifica-
tion of equation (4.4.30) : 
(4.4.31) 
m ~ y o ; mr 'IDr ,mq > 0 ; m < 0 ; ill- > 1. s L P Jj 
Having derived an explicit expression for the supply of money, we 
next turn to link the supply of bank credit to the private sector, to 
the supply of money. Adding and substracting the expression (Cp-Cp-1) 
in the RHS of equation (4.4.6) of the model and taking into account e-
quations defining the inclusive money stock (M2) and the uses side of 
the monetary base (equations 4.4.16, 4.4.14 of the model) we get: 
(4.4.32) 
Writing equation (4.4.13) for the sources side ot the cash base in first 
difference form and substituting it into (4.4.32) we get: 
(4.4.33) 
Equation (4.4.33) says that the (flow) supply of credit to the private 
sector by the banking system is equal to the rate of increase in the 
money supply (M2) minus the rate of increase in unborrowed cash minus 
s 
the rate of Treasury Bills absorbtion by the banking system. 
Having completed the reformulation of our model, let us rewrite 
and renumber the equations of the model in its new form : 
Equilibrium condition for aggregate income 
(4.4.34) y = C + I + G 
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Consumption flunction 
(4.4.35) C = C +Cy (l-Ty ).Y+C r +C q; 0 < Ty,Cy < 1, C < 0 C > o. o rs s q r q 
s 
Investment function 
(4.4.36) I = I +Iy.Y+I .rL+I.q; 0 < Iy < 1, I < 0 I > 0 
o r L q :1 r L q 
Business sector financing constraint 
Private sector's demand for ban~ credit 
d d (4.4.38) CR -CR-1 = C~ rL+CR .q+CRI.I; 
L q CR , CR < 0 , 0 < CRr < 1. r L q 
Supply of bank credit to the private sector 
(4.4.39) 
(19 ) Supply of money 
(4.4.40) 
Demand for Noney 
(4.4.41) 
; m r ' m ,m > 0 ; m < 0, ffiB > 
s q r L P 
Monetary equilibrium condition 
'(4.4.42 ) 
The sources side of the monetary base 
(4 .. 4.43 ) B = H + A 
1. 
The banking system's demand for borrowing from the Central Bank 
(4.4.44) A-A 
-1 
The Government budget constraint 
(4.4.45) 
(19)From mow on the symbol (M) will denote the inclusive money concept. 
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Next we turn to examine the necesscry amendments to be made, 
ln order to render the model consisting of equations (4.4.34)-(4.4.45) 
conformable to each of the three states of the bank credit market 
specified in the previous sections under the headings "state A", 
"state B", "state C" (see section 4.·3 p.'l26) 
State A : The banking system's borrowing from the Central Bank 
is demand determined, and excess supply prevails in the bank credit 
market. 
For a better understanding of the necessary amendments of the model 
under "state A", we write equation (4.4.40) for the money supply in 
first difference form, holding all other variables except the moneta-
ry base constant, and we substitute it along with equation (4.4.43) 
for the source~ side of the cash base, also written in first dif-
feI"ence form, in equation (4.4.39). The expression we obtain J..S as 
follows 
(4.4.46) 
Equation (4.4.46) , along with equation (4.4.44) specifying the ban-
king system's demand for Central Bank fw!ds, comprise the supply side 
of bank credit. As we have explained in the previous section however, 
under "state A", the banking system's desired borrowing from the 
Central Bank is constrained by the private sector's demand for loans 
and thus actual borrowing from the Central Bank is always smaller than 
the desired one. Clearly then, equation (4.4.44) for the banking sys-
stem's demand for Central Bank funds becomes irrelevant and it should 
be omitted. Under "state A", actual borrowing from the Central Bank 
becomes an accomodating variable helping to keep actual bank loans equal 
to loans demanded. In equation (4.4.46), given the rate of change of 
un borrowed cash and the rate of Treasury Bills absorbtion, the variable 
(A) adjusts so that to keep the demand for bank credit always satisfied. 
Therefore, the model should be supplefi1e::.-::ed by an !1equilibrium condi-
. (20) 
tion" saying that actual loans extended to the prlvate sector (CR) 
are equal to loans demanded (CRd ) 
(4.4.47) = CR - C~ ~1. 
(20)Perhaps it needs saying that in equa~ion (4.4.39) of the model as 
W:ll as in eq.(4.4.4~), (C~s-~R~l) s~ould b: substituted by (CR-CR_ 1 ), 
Slnce the former varlable lndlcates the deslred supply of loans, . 
which under state A, is larger than the actual supply (CR-CR_ 1 )· 
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The above reasoning makes clear, that under "state A" the right spe-
cification of the model consists of equations (4.4.34)-(4.4.43),(4.4.45),(4.4.4 
State B : The banking system's borrowing from the Central Bank is 
demand determined and excess demand prevails in the bank credit market. 
The state of excess demand in the bank cre.dit market in combination 
with the rigidity of the loan rate (rL), implies that the demand for 
loans is constrained by supply and therefore it is only partially sa-
tisfied. In such a situation the question arises what is the reaction 
of the business sector regarding its investment spending. 
From a rather abstract point of view we may say that if there 
exists some optimal distribution of investment financing between loans 
and equities, it may not pay the typical firm to finance all its un-
satisfied demand for loans by issuing additional equities, in which 
case some planned investment will be curtailed. At a more practic'al 
level, we may say that many firms of small and medium size may have 
limited access to the stock market and therefore they may rely hea-
vily on bank loans for the financing of their investment projects. If~ 
therefore,the demand for loans by this category of firms is not met 
by supply, most of their planned investment will be curtailed. We should 
note that this institutional argument isparticularly relevant £or the 
Greek Economy where the stock market is of a rather limited size. 
The above reasoning enable us to write the following reaction 
. . (21) 
function for the bus~ness sector 
(4.4.48) 
where (Ia) denotes actual (or effective) investment and (I) desired 
investment .. Equation (4.4.48) says that, given the level of desired 
investment the higher is the excess dem~ld in the credit market, the 
lower will be effective investment spending. The value of the reaction 
coefficient (A) depends on institutional factors such as the size and 
the degree of organization of the equit'::"es market, the percen::age of 
firms having access to this market and on the speed with which firms 
adjust their modes of financing to changes in financial conditions. 
To illustrate the dependence of (A) on institutional factors, 
(2i)A similar reaction function is postulated by'Tucker ; see 
D.P.Tucker op.cit. 
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assume an extreme case where there are two categories of firms 
-call them "big" and "small" - the firs~ category financing invest-
ment projects exclusively by issuing equities and the second exclu-
sively by bank credit. Clearly, in such an institutional environment, 
(A) will tend to unity. At the other extreme, if the capital market ~s 
highly organized and there are many financial instruments which can be 
used by the business sector, (A) will assume a low value. Presumably, 
In the Greek Economy (A) tends to a ratter high value. 
Besides the specification of equation (4.4.48) which, under 
"state B", forms an integral part of the model, two other amendments 
are in place. First, in the equilibrium condition for aggregate income 
(eq.4.4.34), desired investment (I) is irrelevant and it should be 
substituted with effective investment (Ia) in which case the equili-
brium condition becomes : 
(4.4.49) y = C + Ia + G 
Second,in the business sector's financial constraint (eq.4.4.37), 
effective investment should take the place of desired investment and 
the flow demand for loans should be substituted by the flow supply 
of loans. Therefore, the firms' financial constraint should be written 
as follows 
(4.4.50) s s) ) Ia = (CR -CR_ 1 + q (E-E_ 1 . 
According to the above discussion, the right specification of the 
model under "state B" consist of equations (4.4.49), (4.4.35),(4.4.36), 
(4.4.48), (4.4.50) and (4.4.38)-(4.4.45). 
"State C" : Central Bank lending to the banking system is a policy 
instrument directly regulated by the Bank and therefore excess demand 
prevails in the bank credit market. The formal model relevant for 
"State CIf is identical to .the one specified under "state BU the only 
difference being that, since now borrowing from the Central Bank is 
"supply determined", equation (4.4.44) of the model which specifies the 
banking system's demand for such borrowing becomes irrelevant and it 
should be omitted. Thus the right specification of the model under 
"state C" consists of the following equations: (4.4.49), (4.4.35), (4.4.36) 
(4.4.48), (4.4.50), (4.4.38) - (4.4.43), (4.4.45). 
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In completing this section one final remark is in place ; restric-
tions (4.4.22)-(4.4.24) have been used in the aggregation procedure 
which transformed our initially specified tlhigher level" model into 
the model consisting of equations (4.4.34)-(4.4.45) and are no longer 
needed; on the other hand,restrictions (4.4.17), (4.4.18) referring to 
the total effect of the price of equities and the loan rate upon the 
demand for bank credit and the supply of equities continue to form an 
integral part of our model in each of the three states of the loan mar-
ket. 
In this section we have set the basis for our subsequent analysis 
by specifying a model which takes into account the institutional pe-
culiarities of the Greek financial system. In sections 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 to 
follow, we shall be using the proper specifications of this model, in 
order to derive the impact (one-period) effects of policy instruments 
upon the main endogenous variables of the system under each of the three 
states of the bank credit market. As we have mentioned in section (4.3.), 
large changes in policy instruments may cause the bank loan market to 
"jump" from one state ot another. Neverthe.l:.ess,in the subsequent sections 
we shall confine our analysis to changes which do not alter the preva,i-
ling state of the bank credit market. 
4.5 Analysis of the model under "state A" of the bank credit market. 
In this section we present and analyse the impact effects of exo-
genous variables upon the main endogenous variables of the model under 
"state A" of the loan market, using the model specification which is 
relevant "forthis state. For convenience we· rewrite and renumber the equa-
tions of the model. 
(4.5.1) y = c + I + G 
(4.5.2) C - Co+Cy (l-Ty )Y+Cr rs+C q; o < Cy ' 1y < 1; C < 0, C > 0 - r q s q s 
I = I +Iyy+I rL+I q . o < Iy < 1; I < 0, r > o. , q o r L q r L 
(4.5.3) 
r - (CRd-CRd ) + q. (E-E -1) -
-1 (4.5.4) 
(4.5.5) d d CR -CR_1=C~ .rtLCRqq+CRrI; CR ,CR < 0,0 < CRI < 1 . L r L q 
(4.5.6) 
(4.5.7) 
(4.5.8) 
(4.5.9) 
(4.5.10) 
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Ms = Y m Troy +mqq+mr rs+~ rL+c~p +mBB 
o s L ~ 
> 
my < 0; m ,mq,m > r r 
s L 
= L +LyY+L r +L q . 
o rs s q , Ly,L ,L > o. r_ q 
.::> 
CR - CR_ 1 
(4.5:11) "B - H + A 
(4.5.12) G-T Y Y 
. (22) As we have mentioned in the previous sectlon , the model should 
be supplemented by the following inequalities ~ 
(4.5.13) < 0" 
(4.5.14) 
Moreover, we postulate the following further restrictions upon the 
parameters of the model : 
(4.5.15) 
(4.5.16) 
(4.5.17) L > m . q q 
Inequalities (4.5.15)-(4.5.17) ensure the stability of the money 
market by postulating that rises in income (Y), the "own" rate of 
return on money and the price of equit~es (q), create an excess demand 
for money. 
(22)see section 4.4, p. 242 
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The above model consists of twelve independent equations in the 
following twelve endogenous variables: Y,C,I,q,CRd,E,CR,Md,Ms,A,B, 
and H or T depending on whether the government budget is financed by 
cash or Treasury Bills.The exogenous variables we shall consider are: 
autonomous consumption (Co), autonomous investment (I ), Government 
o 
spending (G), the rate of inteJrest on bank loans (rL), the rate of 
interest 'on Saving and Time deposits (r ) and the discount rate (p). 
s 
Two of the above six variables (C ,I ) are purely exogenous whereas the 
o 0 
remaining four (G,rL , rs'p) are policy instruments. Before reporting 
and analysing the mathematical expressions for the impact effects of 
the exogenous variables upon the main endogenous variables of the 
system, we may gain a better grasping of the model's mechanics if we 
first undertake a step-by-step analysis, using both algebra and geome~ 
try, of each of the three markets included in the model: the goods 
market, the money market and the bank credit market. 
Let us start by analysing the bank credit market ; substituting 
equation (4.5.3) into (4.5.5) we get the following expression for 
the demand for credit 
(4.5.18) 
In (4.5.18) the demand for cre~it depend~ positively upon autono-
mous investment (I ) and the level of income (Y) and negatively upon 
o 
the market price of equities (q) (see 4.5.13) and the loan rate (rL )· 
Substituting equation (4.5.7) into (4.5.6) and substituting 
(4.5.11) into the resulting expression r,'le get the following equation 
for the actual supply of bank credit : 
(4.5.19) CR-CR_ 1 = m Y+m q+m r + m rL+m p+(mB-l) (H-H l)+mB(A-A 1) Y q rs s rL p - -
-(T-T_1)-mvY l-rr:~ q l-ID-- r l-my, r~ -- -~,..,P-l·· 
.L - c -- --y s- - U J. ~ 
- s L 
(4.5.19) says that the (flow) supply of bank credit depends positive-
lyon the market price of equities, the rate of change in unborrowed 
cash (H-H_
1
), the rate ofc~nge~n the banking system's borrowing from 
the Central Bank (A-A_ 1) and negatively upon the discount rate (p) and 
the rate of Treasury Bills absorbtion by the banking system (T-T_ 1); 
the influence of income on bank credit is ambiguous. 
As we have explained in the previous section (see section 4.4 p.239) 
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under "state N' of the loan market, bank credit is demand determined 
and borrowing from the Central Bank (A) is an accomodating variable, 
passively adjusting to satisfy the demand for bank credit by the pri-
vate sector. Since the variable (A) is a component of the monetary 
base (B), it follows that the base itself passively adjusts to clear 
the credit market. To give an example, consider a rise in the loan 
rate (rL) ; the rise in (rL) will reduce the demand and raise the sup-
ply of bank credit ; therefore an excess supply of credit will arise 
and the . ,banking system's borrowing from the eentral Bank (A) will pas-
sively fall to keep the actual supply of credit equal to demand ; the 
fall in (A) will reduce the cash base of the system by the same 
amount. Analogous arguments hold for changes in the other variables 
of equation (4.5.19). 
Moreover, tit can be easily shown with the help of (4.5.19) that, 
irrespectively of whether the budget deficit is financed by cash of 
by Treasury Bills or by any combination of them, a rise :Ln govern-
ment spending will always raise the cash base of the system. Under 
"state A" of the bank loan market, the authorities d.o not have the 
ability to undertake a fiscal expansion while keeping the monetary 
base constant. To see that, assume a given rise in unborrowed cash 
-
equal to ~H ; this rise will create an excess supply of Bank Credit 
equal to (mB~l).~H (see eq.4.5.19); for the excess supply to be eli-
minated, the variable (A) must fall by an amount equal to -(mB-1)/mB·~H; 
so, the total rise in the base will be equal to : ~B ={1-(mB-1)/mB}·~H = 
~H/mB. On the other hand a rise in Treasury Bills (6T) equal in value 
-
to the rise in unborrowed cash (6H - 6T), will create an excess demand 
forbank credit equal to (~T) and for the excess demand to be eliminated 
(A) must rise by an amount equal to (~T/mB)' We therefore see that a 
rise in unborrowed cash brings the same rise in the monetary base as 
an equal rise in Treasury Bills. The above reasoning makes clear that 
under "state A" of the credit marKet t"te distinction between "money 
financing" and "Treasury Bills financing " of the Government budget 
has not any operational significance ; in either case, a rise in the 
monetary base takes place which accomodates fiscal expansion. 
Taking into account equations (4.5.11),(4.5.12) of the model the 
expression (mB-1)(H-H_1)+mB(A-A_1)-(T-T_1) appearing In the RHS of 
(4.5.19) can be written as follows: 
-246-
Substituting (4.5.20) into (4.5.19), substituting the resulting expres-
sion along with (4.5.18) in the "equilibrium condition" for bank credit 
(eq.4.5.10 of the model) and solving for the monetary base we bbtain(23) 
(4.5.21) 
Expression (4.5.21) gives the value of the monetary base (B)which 
equilibrates the bank credit market. A rise in autonomous investment(I ), 
o 
government spending (G) and the discount rate, all raise (B), whereas 
a rise in the market price of equities (q), the loan rate (rL) and the 
rate on Saving and Time deposits (I' ), all lower (B). Finally, the de-
s 
pendence of (B) on income is ambiguous, the ambiguity arising because 
of the term (my), Given that (Ty-CRIIy) is positive(2~), a positive va-
lue of (my) implies a negative dependence of (B) on income, whereas a 
negative (my) makes this dependence ambiguous. 
Inserting equation (4.5.21) into equation (4.5.7) .~or the money 
supply and making some simple algebraic manipUlations we get: 
(4.5.22) M = mo-(Ty-CRlly)Y+(CRq+CRllq)q+G+CRllo+(CRrL+CRllrL)rL' 
aM/ay, aM/aq <0; aM/aG, aM/alo >0; aM/arL <0. 
Equation (4.5.22) gives the value of the money stock which is consis-
tent with equilibrium in the bank credit market. As it can be seen from 
equations (4.5.21), (4.5.22), while the monetary base depends on(rs ) 
and (p), the money stock is independent of these variables; the reason 
is that the direct effect of (r
s
) and (p) on the money supply is exactly 
offset by the effect of (I' ), (p) exerted via the monetary b~se. 
s 
(23)Since our analysis deals with, one period, flow equilibrium, all 
lagged variables ~appearing in equations (4.5.18),(4.5.19) have 
been omitted. 
(24)Besides the fact that for plausible values of Ty , I ,CR1,Ty-CRlly 
is positive, this positive value can be rationalized on theoretical 
grounds : a sufficient condition for the Keynesian multiplier pro-
cess tq be stable is : CyTy-Iy > 0 ; given that this condition 
holds, it follows that T~-CRIly is also positive since 0 < eRr < 1. 
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-Tne credit market clearing value of the money supply (M)depends 
negatively upon the level of income (Y), the price of equities (q) and 
the loan rate (rL) and positively upon Government spending and autono-
mous investment. Figure 4.S.A gives the credit market clearing value of 
(M) as a function of the level of income. Since (M) depends negatively 
M M 
M 
M 
o 
Y 
Figure 4.S.A 
on income, it fol-
lows that the curve 
MM is downward slo-
ping . Horeover 
since the price of 
equities(q) lowers 
the credit market 
clearing value of 
the money stock, 
it follows that a 
rise in (q) will 
shift the MH curve 
downwards to the 
left; in fig. 4.S.A the MM curves lying further upwards to the right 
correspond to lower values of the market price of equities. Finally, 
rises in autonomous investment (I ) and government spending (G) shift 
o 
the whole family of MM curves of figure 4.S.A upwards to the right and 
-
a rise in the loan rate (rL) shifts all curves downwards to the left. 
In our analysis of the market for bank credit undertaken above,we 
treated income and the price of equities as exogenous variables and we 
have shown how the credit market clearing values of the monetary base 
and the money stock are determined in terms of income the price of e-
quities and the exogenous variables of the model. In the analysis of the 
godds and money markets to follow, we shall examine the determination 
of income and the market price of equities, treating the money supply 
as an exogenous variable. 
Substituting equations(4.S.2), (4.5.3) for consumption and invest-
ment functions into the equilibrium condition for income (eq.4.5.1) we 
get the familiar IS curve which, in the context of our model shows the 
combinations of income and the market price of equities(q) which keep 
the goods market in equilibrium. Since a rise in income creates an 
excess supply of goods and a rise in the price of equities, through its 
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positive influence on consumption and investment, cpeates an excess de-
mand for goods, it follows that for equilibrium in the goods market to 
be maintained a rise in income requires a rise in the market price of 
equities (q) which implies that the IS curve will be upward sloping. 
Rises in autonomous consumption (Co)~autonomous investment (I ) and 
o 
Government spending,create an excess de~and in the goods market and 
shift the IS curve to the right. On the other hand rises in the rate 
on Saving and Time deposits (rs ) and the loan rate (rL), through their 
negative influence on consumption and investment respectively, create 
an excess supply of goods and shift the IS curve to the left. 
Substituting equation(4.5.8) for the demand for money into the 
monetary equilibrium condition (4.5.9) and treating the money supply as 
exogenous we obtain the familiar LM curve which, in the context of our 
model, shows the combinations of income and the price of equities which 
keep the money market in equilibrium. Since both a rise in lncome and 
a rise in the price of equities create an excess demand for money, it 
follows that, for monetary equilibrium to be maintained a rise in in-
come requires a fall in the market price of equities and therefore the 
LM curve is downward sloping. A rise in the stock of-money creates an 
excess supply of money and the LM curve shifts upwards to the right 
whereas a rise in the rate on Saving and Time deposits will create 
an excess demand for money and will shift the LM curve downwards to 
the left. 
In figure (4.5.B), we bring together the IS-LM curves treating, 
as we have already mentioned the money supply as exogenous. Given the 
L S 
I M 
o L-----------~--~--------------~ 
Y 
Figure 4.5.B 
values of the exogenous va-
riables which determine the 
position of the two curves, 
equilibrium is achieved at 
a level of income (Y ) and 
o 
at a level of equity prices 
(q ). Increases in (C ),(1 ), 
000
(G) will shift the IS curve 
downwards to the right raising 
income and lowering the price 
of equities. A rise in the 
loan rate (rL) will shift the IS curve upi{ards to the left lowering in-
come and raising the price of equities. finally a rise in the rate on 
Saving and Time deposits shifts both curves to the left; thps, although 
the level of income unambiguously falls, the effect on the price of equi-
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ties is ambiguous depending on the relative magnitudes of the shifts 
in the two curves. 
Given the values of all other exogenous variables of the systeD, 
rises in the money supply will be shift~ng the LM curve upwards to the 
right, raising the income-price of equities configuration_ which clears 
the goods and money markets. Hence both income and the price of equities 
are increasing functions of the money supply. In figure (4.5.C) the 
curves YY and QQ show the level of inco~e and the price of equities which 
clear the money and goods markets, as functions of the money stock. The 
slope of the YY curve reflects the effectiveness of monetary policy which 
in the context of the IS-LM mo-
Y 
Y 
Y 
O~------~--------------------M~ 
del depends on the price of e-
quities elasticity bfexpendi-
ture relatively to the price 
of equities elasticity of the 
demand for money function. The 
higher the former elasticity 
relatively to the latter, the 
higher is the slope of the YY Q 
q 
Figure 4.S.C 
money stock, income is higher and 
rise in the loan rate (rL) shifts 
curve. 
Rises in autonomous con-
Q sumption and investment, and 
Government spe"Qding, shift the 
YY curve upwards and the QQ 
curve upwards towards the M a-
X1S . at given levels of the , 
the price of equities is lower. A 
the YY curve downwards and the QQ 
curve downwards further away from the M axis; at given levels of the 
money stock, income is lower and the pr~~e of equities 1S higher. Fi-
nally a rise in the rate on Saving and Time deposits (r
s
) shifts the 
YY curve downwards and it may shift the QQ curve either upwards or down-
wards~ 
Having examined the credit market, and the goods and money markets 
1n isolation, we now turn to analyse the General equilibrium of the sys-
tem. A general short-run flow equilibri~n requires that the goods ,money , 
and credit markets all clear simultaneously. Such an equilibrium will 
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prevail when, at a certain level of the money stock, the interaction of 
goods and money markets produces an income-price of equities configura-
tion which is consistent with credit market equilibrium at the initial 
level of the money stock. 
Equivalently, general equilibrium will prevail when a given income-price 
of equities configuration produces a credit market clearing value of the 
money stock which is consistent with equilibrium in the goods and money 
markets at the initial income-price of equities configuration. 
Diagramatically, the general equilibrium of the system is shown in 
figure (4.5.D) which puts together figures(4.5.A},(4.5.C). We remind 
that the curve MM in the upper part of figure (4.5.D) depicts the credit 
market clearing value of 
Y Y 
-Y 
o~--------------~+--------------+ 
M 
Q 
q 
Q 
q 
Figure 4.5.D 
the money stock at each le-
vel of income, given the 
market price of equities 
and the exogenous variables 
of the system. As we have 
already explained rises in 
the market price of equities 
(q) shift the MM curve down-
wards to the left and vice-
versa. The equilibrium va-
lues of income, price of 
equities and the money stock 
are denoted, in figure 4.5.D, 
- - -by (Y,q,M). At an initial 
level of the money stock, 
(M), the (Y,q) configura-
tion clears the goods and money markets ; moreover at this income-price 
of equities configuration the curve HM passes through point A, and this 
implies that the initial level of the money stock, (M), is consistent 
with equiiibrium in the bank credit market. 
Figure 4.5.E depicts the adjustment of the system to a disequilibri-
um situation. The initial position of the economy is represented by points 
A and B, where at a level of money stock (Ho)' the income-price of equi-
ties configuration which clears the money and goods markets 1S (Yo,qo)· 
At this configuration however the money stock (M ) is lower than the 
o 
money stock which clears the bank credit market : point A, in figure 
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4.5.E, lies to the left of the curve t1i1(qo). Therefore, the money stock 
will be rising and this rise will be causing a rise in income and the 
market price of equities (q). As (q) rises the curve MM will be-shif-
M(q) 
Y 
Y 
Y 
0 Y 
0 
Mo I 
qo Q I 
q 
q 
Figure 4.5.E 
M 
V" 
M 
Q 
ting to the left 
and the value of the 
money stock consis-
tent with credit mar-
ket equilibrium at 
each level of income 
will be decreasing. 
The general equili-
brium of the system 
will be established 
at point C where the 
level of income, the 
the market price of 
equities and the money 
stock which equili-
brate the goods, money 
and credit markets, are denoted by Y,q,M respectively. 
Having examined diagramatically the general short-run(one period) 
equilibrium of the system under "state A" of the bank credit market, 
let us now present the mathematical expressions for the impact effects 
of autonomous consumption (Co), autonomous investment (1
0
), government 
spending (G), the loan rate (rL), the rate on Saving and Time deposits 
(r
s
) and the discount rate (p) upon three main endogenous variables of 
the system: income (Y), the price of equities (q) and the money stock. 
To avoid tedious mathematical expressions, we define the following new 
variables 
(4.5.23) k - {l-C (l-T )-1 } > 0 
- Y Y Y 
(4.5.24) f - (Cq+Iq) > 0 -
(4.5.25) ] - CR +CRII < 0 - q q 
-.252-
(4.5.27) 
The determinant of the system is given by the following expression 
(4.5.28) D - k(Lq-j)+fl > 0 
(4.5.29a) 
(4.5.29c) 
dY 1 
dY 
dG 
1 
- -D 
(L -j» 0 q 
> 0 
(4.5.29d) dY = Dl {Ir (L -j)+fh} < 0 drL L q 
(4.5.2ge) 
(4.5.29f) dY 
dp - 0 
(4.5.30a) ~ _-1 
< 0 deo 
(4.5. 30b) dq _ 
dIo 
(4.5.30c) ~ _ 
dG 
D 
~ (k-l) 
(4.5.30d) dq = ~ (kh-I
r 
1) 
drL D L 
(4.5.30f) ~ = 0 
dp 
(4.5.31d) 
(4.5.31e) 
(4.5.31f) dM 
dp 
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- ~ {Ly(Ir (Lq-j)tfh}+L (kh-I I)} 
L q rL 
= 0 
The first thing that should be noted regarding the above list of 
comparative static results, is that these results are invariant to the 
mode of government budget financing ie they are the same both in the 
case of money financing and in the case of Treasury Bills financing. 
This is not surprising however, since as we have already explained 
(seeJ:.245), 'J.nder the state of the loan market we are presently 
examining, the monetary base is an accomodating variable adjusting to 
clear the credit market and the distinction between money financing 
and Treasury Bills financing of the budget is deprived of its operatio-
nal significance. A rise in cash always accomodates a fiscal expansion. 
As it can be seen from formulas (4.5.29a)-(4.5.29f) the effects of 
(Co) ,(Io),(G), on income are positive, the effects of the loan rate(rL) 
and the rate on Saving and Time deposits are negative and the effect of 
the discount rate (p) is nil.On the other hand, except for the effects of 
, ·autonomous consumption (CO) and the discount rate (p) which are ne-
gative and zero respectively, the impact effects of the remaining exo-
genous variables under consideration upon the market price of equities 
are ambiguous. Moreover the impact effects of the exogenous variables 
·under consideration upon the money stock are ambiguous, except for the 
effect of the Bank rate which is nil. 
The complete inability of the discount rate to affect income, the 
price of equities and the money stock can be explained with the help 
of figure 4.5.D (p.25~. Since changes in the Bank rate do not-affect 
either aggregate expenditure or the demand for money the position of 
the YY and QQ curves remains unaltered. Moreover since the credit mar-
ket clearing value of the money stock is independent of the Bank rate(p) 
(see equation 4.5.22), it follows that changes in (p) do not affect the 
position of the MM curve. Clearly then, changes in the discount rate 
do not affect the income-price of equities-money stock equilibrium con-
figuration of figure 4.5.D. 
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Figure 4.5.F 
In figures 
4. 5. F, 4. 5. G, we 
explain diagramati-
cally the effects 
of a rise in autono-
:mous consumption 
upon income, the 
iprice of equities, 
'and the money stock. 
;Assume an initial 
equilibrium at an in-
come-price of equities-
I 
I 
'money stock configu-
ration (Y ,q ,M ) 000 
fig.4.5.F); a rise 
in (C ) shifts the 
o 
IS curve to the right 
raising income and 
10we:C'ing the price 
of equities. Hence 
the curves YoYo, QoQo shift to the positions Y1Y1 and Q1Q1 respective-
ly. Immediately after the rise_in (Co), income and the price of equities 
are equal to (Y1 ) and (ql) respectively. Moreover, the fall in (q) from ~ !~ 
(ql) shifts the MM curve to the position MM(q1)· 
Y 
M(q) 
o 
------- - -r---Qo I 
Figure 4.5.G 
1M 
I 
I 
I 
I 
M 
In figure 4.5.F we 
assume that the curve 
MM(q1) lies to the 
left of point A ; 
therefore, at an ~n­
corne-price of equities 
configuration (Yl,Q1) 
the money stock(MO) ~s 
higher than the one 
consistent with credit 
market equilibrium. 
As a concequence, the 
stock of money is 
falling, causing a 
fall in income and 
the price of equities; 
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but as the price of equities falls the curve L·::-1( ql)will be shifting up-
wards to the right and the credit market clearing value of (M) at any 
given level of income will be increasing. Eventually equilibrium will 
be established when the YY and MM curves cross each other at point B, 
at an income-price of equities-money stock configuration (Y,q,M). 
At the new equilibrium position, income is higher and the money stock 
and market price of equities are lower r~latively to the previous 
equilibrium position. 
In figure 4.5.G, we assume that the initial fall in (q).from (qo) 
to (ql) shifts the MM(qo) curve to the position MM(ql) which lies to 
the right of point A ; therefore the val~e of the money stock (Mo) is 
lower that its credit market clearing va~ue ·and as a result the mo-
ney stock rises,raising income and the market price of equities. As 
(q) rises the curve MM(ql) will be shifting to the left and eventually 
an equilibrium will be achieved at point B, at higher levels of in-
come and money stock and lower price of equities relatively to the 
previous equilibrium. 
From the diagramatic analysis undertaken above with the help 
of figures 4.5.F,4.5.G, we see that the effects of a rise in autonomous 
consumption upon income and the market price of equities are positive 
and negative respectively, whereas the effect on the money stock may 
be either negative or positive depending on whether the fall in the 
price of equities accompanying the rise ~n (C ) shifts the MM curve 
o 
to a position lying to the left or right of point A. 
In figure 4.5.H below, we illustrate diagramatically the effects 
of a rise in the loan rate upon income, the price of equities and the 
~oney stock. A rise in the loan rate (rL) exerts a dire~t contractio-
nary effect on investment and shifts the IS curve to the left. Horeo-
ver, the rise in the loan rate reduces the ~redit market clearing value of 
the money stock (see equation 4.5.22) ane shifts the LM curve to the 
left. The combined shifts in the IS/U1 C'..l:::,':es unaobiguously .redt:.ce 
the level of income whereas the effect on the price of equities is 
ambiguous : if , ceteris paribus, the co~tractionary effect of the 
loan rate on the money stock is strong e~ough, (q), falls; if.the 
effect in question is Heak then (q) may rise. 
Figure 4.5.H depicts a situation where tte combined shifts in 
the IS/LM curves . produce an initial fall in (q). In figure 4.5.~ 
the initial equilibrium of the system is depicted by point A, at 
Y 
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an income-price of equities-money stock configuration (y q M) 
0' 0' 0 . 
Given the money stock, the rise in the loan rate shifts the YY curve 
r·: 
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q 
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Figure 4.5.H 
downwards to the position Y1Y1 and the QoQo curve further away from the 
M axis to the position Q1Q1. On the other hand the rise in the loan 
rate shifts the MM(qo) curve to the left, to the position M'M'(qo)· 
Immediately after the rise in (rL), the economy is at point D, with 
income,price of equities and money stock,(Y1), (ql) and (M i ) resp-
ectively. i'loreover since the price of equities has fallen from (q ), o 
to (q~) the MM curve shifts from the position M'M'(qo) to the posi-
tion M'M'(q1). Clearly at point D the money stock (Hi) is less than 
the value of the money stock consistent with credit market equili-
brium and therefore the money stock rises. 
As the money stock rises both income and the market prlce of 
equities will be increasing and the rise in the price of equities 
will be shifting the M'H'(q1) curve downHards to the left. Lven-
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tually equilibrium will be established at point B with an income-price 
of equities-money stock configuration (Y,q,E). At this new equilibrium, 
income, the price of equities and the money stock are all lower than 
their respective values in the previous equilibrium. It is important 
to note that this result is not due to the construction of figure 
4.5.H but lS perfectly general and it only requires the rise in the 
loan rate to produce an initial fall in the price of equities. 
To see that, let us consider figure 4.5.H. The configuration 
(Y1,q1,r.11 ) corresponding to point D can never be an equilibrium con-
figuration since at this point the money stock is lower than the 
one consistent with equilibrium in the bank credit market; therefore 
the stock of money consistent with general equilibrium lies to the 
right of (M1 ) and concequently both income ant the price of equities 
consistent with overall equilibrium are larger than (Y1) and (ql) 
respectively. On the other hand, point C of figure 4.5.H corres-
ponding to an income-price of equities-money stock configuration 
(Y2 ,M2 ,qo) cannot be an. equilibrium, since at this configuration the 
MM curve lies at the position M'M'(qo) and therefore at point C the 
money stock (M2 ) is larger than the money stock consistent with 
credit market equilibrium. Clearly then, the money stock consistent 
with overall equilibrium lies to the left of (M2) and concequently both 
income and the price of equities consistent with general equilibrium 
are lower than (Y2), (qo) respectively. In a similar way it can be 
shown diagramatically that if the rise in the loan rate (rL) pro-
duces an initial rise in the price of equities then although income 
unambiguously falls and the price of equities unambiguously rises 
the money stock may either fall or rise. 
Analogous results hold for changes In autonomous investment (1
0
) 
and Government spending ; as it can be seen from the relevant for-
mulas (4.5.30~ 4.5.31) if (I ), (G) have expansionary effects upon 
o 
the price of equities, then they also have expansionary effects on 
the money stock. If, on the other hand,the effects of (1 0 ), (G) on (q) 
are negative, then the effects of these variables upon the money stock 
are ambiguous. The explanation of these results is simple: if rises 
in (I ) and (G) raise both income and the price of equities, then the 
o 
demand for money and the equilibrium money stock unambiguously increase; 
if on the other hand rises in (I), (G) raise income but lower the 
, , 0 
price of equities,then the expansionary effect of the rise in inco~e 
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on the demand for money may be offset by the contractionary effect of 
the fall in the price of equities ; therefore the demand for money and 
the money stock may either rise or fall. Finally we should note that 
irrespectively of the qualitative effec~ of a change in the rate on 
Saving and Time deposits (rs ) on the price of equities, the effect of 
(rs ) on the money stock is ambiguous. :or, even if, along with the 
fall in income, a rise in (rs ) brings a fall in the price of equities 
(q), the rise in (rs ) will have a direct expansionary effect on the 
demand for money which may outweight the contractionary effects caused 
by the fall in income and (q). 
From formulas (4.5.30a)-(4.5.30f) showing the impact effects of 
exogenous variables upon the price of equities, it can be seen that 
a necessary and sufficient condition for (dq/dG) to be positive is 
that (k) must he larger than (1). Taking into account restriction 
(4.5.14) in combination with definition (4.5.27) (p252) it can be seen 
that condition k > 1 is sufficient for (dq/drL) to be negative. Horeo-
ver, it can be seen from formulas (4.5.30b),(4.5.30e) that k > 1 is 
necessary but not sufficient for (dq/dlo ) to be positive whereas the 
above condition is necessary or sufficient for a negative (dq/dr ) de-s . 
pending on whether ICr I is larger or smaller than I~ I. Nontheless, 
s s 
the higher is (k) relative to (1) the more probable becomes for (dq/dr ) 
o 
and (dq/dr ) to be positive and negative respectively. 
s . 
That condition k > 1 is sufficient for a positive (dq/dG) can be 
explained as follows : (k) is the inverse of the simple keynesian mul-
tiplier (see 4.5.23 :p •. 25,1)and determines the extent of the horizontal 
shift in the rs curve, to changes in the exogenous variables which 
affect aggregate 
·determines the 
expenditure. On the other hand (1) (1 = LJ+Ty-CRrIy ) 
horizontal shift in the LM curve ; the lower is (Ly) 
the larger the horizontal shift of the LH curve to any given change in 
the money stock ; moreover, the lower is (Ty-CRrIy ) the lower is the 
contractionary effect of income on the money stock (see eq.4.5.22) and 
therefore the larger will be the overall rise J.n the money stock after 
a given rise in government spending. Clearly if k > 1, a given rise 
in G shifts the IS curve to the right by less than it shifts the LM 
curve and therefore (q) rises. 
Let us now turn to examine the dependence of the impact multi-
pliers of income with respect to the exogenous variables of the model, 
upon the structural parameters of the model. Expressions (4.5.29a) -
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(4.5.2ge) can be written as follows 
(4.5.32a) dY 
-
1 (4.5.32d) dY Irr,+ha 
- -dCo k+la 
-drL k+la 
(4.5.32b) dY 1+CR1a (4.5.32e) dY Crs-Lrsa -dIo - k+la -dr - k+la s 
(4.5.32c) dY l+a 
dG = k+la 
where (4.5.33) a = f/(Lq-j) > 0 . 
It is clear from expressiom (4.5.32a)-(4.5.32e) that the larger 
are the parameters (k) and (1) the weaker are the effects of the exo-
genous variables upon income. Since (k) is the inverse of the Keyne-
sian multiplier it follows that the larger is(k) the steeper is the IS 
curve and the smaller is its horizontal displacement to given changes 
in the exogenous variables of the system. Clearly then, the larger is 
(k) the smaller is the change in income produced by any given shift ln 
the LM curve, given the position of the IS curve, and the smaller is the 
change in income produced by a given cha~ge in the exogenous variables 
of the system which dispace the IS curve, given the position of the LM 
curve. 
To explain the negative dependence of the income multipliers upon 
the parameter (1) let us decompose (1) into its two components (Ly) and 
(Ty-CRIIy) respectively (see eq. 4.5.26p.250).Now the larger is (Ly)~the 
steeper is the LM curve and the smaller is its horizontal shift to 
changes in the variables which affect tte money market conditions. 
Therefore, the larger is (Ly )' the smaller will be the change in in-
come produced by any change which shifts the LM curve, given the po-
sition of the IS curve, and the smaller ;·;i.ll be the change 2-n lnC0!:12 
produced by any shift in the IS curve, given the position of the LM 
curve. The negative dependence of the income multipliers upon the 
component of (1) (Ty-CRIIy) is easily illustrated with the help of fi-
gure 4.5.1. 
Point A where the y y , M M curves inte~sect determines the levels of 
o 0 0 0 
income and the money stock consistent wi.~i overall equilibrium. Assuming 
a .rise in (Co), (1
0
), (G) or a fall in (rS),(rs ) the YY curve shifts to 
the position Y1Y1 and a new equilibrium is achieved at point B. Now, it 
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is clear from equation (4.5.22)that the higher is (T -CR I ) the 
Y I Y 
steeper is the MM curve with respect to the Y-axis; in figure 4.5.1 
y 
o M o· O~~----~~~----~--~-------
Figure 4.5.1 M 
exogenous variables of the system. 
the curve M1M1 corres-
ponds to a higher value 
of (Ty-CRIIy) than the 
curve MM. If the curve 
o 0 
M1M1is the relevant one, 
a shift in the YY curve 
from YoYo to Y1Y1 produces 
an equilibrium at point 
C. Clearly then, the hi-
gher, is (Ty-CRIIy) the 
lower is the change in 
income brought about by 
any given change in the 
The dependence of the income multipliers upon the parameter (a) 
presents more inte~st. Differentiating expressions (4.5.32a)-(4.5.32e) 
w.r. to (a) and comparing the resulting expressions with formulas 
(4.5.30a)-(4.5.30e), the following results are easily obtained: If the 
effects of government spending (G) and autonomous investment (I ) 
o 
upon the market price of equit~es(q) are positive, then the larger is 
(a) the st~ger are the expansionary effects of (I ),(G) upon income, 
o 
whereas if the effects of (I ) and (G) on (q) are negative then the 
o 
higher is (a) the weaker are the expansionary effects of these variables 
. (25) 
upon lTICome • If the effects of the loan rate (rL) and the rate on 
Saving and Time deposits (rs ) upon (q) are positive, then the higher is 
'(a) the weaker are the contractionary effects of (rL), (rs ) upon income, 
whereas if the effects of (rL) and (rs ) on (q) are negative then the 
larger is (a) the stronger are the contractionary effects of these va-
riables upon income. 
Now the parameter (a) depends positively on the partial responSe 
of expenditure to the price of equities (f), (f=Cq+1q), negatively on 
the partial response of the demand for money to changes in (q),(Lq), and 
also negatively on the parameter (-j) which denotes the absolute value 
(25)Since the effect of autonomous consu~ption (Co) upon (q) is nega-
tive, it follows that the higher is (a) the weaker is the expansio-
nary effect of (Co) on income. 
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of the (negative) response of the money stock to changes in the prlce 
of equities (see eq.4.5.22 p.245in combination with eq.4.5.25 p.250). 
Therefore, a rise in (f) a fall in (Lq) and a fall in (-j) all raise 
the value of the parameter (a). 
As an illustration of the dependence of the income multipliers u-
pon the parameters (f), (Lq),(-j) we shall consider the case of a rise 
in government spending (G) assuming that the effect of (G) upon the 
price of equities is positive. The argument to follow holds mutatis 
mutandis in the case of a negative (dq/dG). 
The impact effect of (G) on imcome is positively dependent upon 
the parameter (f) : the larger is (f), the stronger are the expansio-
nary effects on private expenditure exerted by the rise in the price 
of equities brought about by the rise in (G), and therefore the higher 
is the rise in income caused by any given rise in government spending. 
The dependence of (dYjdG) on (Lq) is negative: The lower is (Lq),the 
steeper is the LM curve and therefore the higher is the rise in (q) 
caused by the rise in the money stock brought about by the rise in (G). 
Given the value of (f), the larger is the rise in (q), the larger is 
the expansion in private spending and therefore the larger will be the 
rise in income. Finally, the dependence of (dYl'dG) on (-j) is negative; 
the reason is that the lower is (-j) the lower is the negative effect 
of the rise in the price of equities on the money stock and therefore 
the higher is, ceteris paribus, the total expansion in the money stock 
accompanylng a rise in (G). Hence a lower (-j) implies a larger right-
ward shift in the LM curve and concequently a larger rise in income. 
At this point we may state two important conclusions of our analy-
sis : First Under "state A" of the bank credit market the authorities 
can. positively influence economic activity by expansionary fiscal poli-
cy and by lowering the bank loan rate (rL) and the rate on Saving and 
Time deposits (r). The discount rate (p) cannot have any eff2ct o~ 
s 
economic activity. 
Second Under "state A" of the credit market, the distinction between 
money financing and Treasury Bills financing of the government budget 
is deprived of its operational significance ; under both types of fi-
nancing,a change in cash always takes place which accomodates fiscal 
expansion. 
This second conclusion ~as importa~t implications for the cash 
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base of the system Slnce it implies that it is impossible for the au-
thorities to engage in any fiscal action having some influence upon the 
budget deficit and at the same time keep the monetary base constant. 
This in turn implies that under the postulated state of the loan market 
the authorities cannot control the monetary base. In what follows we 
give a formal proof of this proposition . 
Differentiating the system (4.5.1)-(4.5.12) making some appropriate 
ub · .. (26) d k· s stltutlons an rna lng use of definitions (4.5.23)-(4.5.27) . we 
get the following system of equations : 
(4.5.34) 
(4.5.35) 
(4.5.36) 
(4.5.37) 
(4.5.38) 
dH + dA - dB - 0 • 
TydY+dH+dT = dG. 
~L drL - (Lr .-~ )dr s +mp.dp s s 
Using system (4.5.34)-(4.5.38) we shall prove that a fiscal expansion, 
while holding the monetary base constant is impossible. Let us set dB= 0 
and dCo = dI 0 = dr = dr = dp L s = o. Thus the above system becomes one 
of five equations in five endogenous variables (dY,dq,dA,dH,dT) the only 
variable been dG. Writing the system . matrix form we obtain .exogenous In 
k -f 0 0 0 dY 1 dG 
CR1ly-my (j-rr~ ) 1 0 1 dq 0 
(Ly-my) (Lq-rrq) 0 0 0 dH - 0 
-
0 0 1 1 0 dA 0 
Ty 0 1 0 1 dT 1 
(26)Substituting (4.5.2),(4.5.3) into (4.5.1) we get (4.5.34) ; 
Substituting (4.5.3) into (4.5.5) and substituting the resulting 
expression, along with the expression which results from the sub-
stitution of (4.5.7) in (4.5.6), into(4.5.10)we obtain equation 
(4.5.35). Finally substituting (4.5.8),(4.5.7) into (4.5.9) \ole 
get (4.5.36). 
: 
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Looking at the matrix of the above syste~ we see that the 4rth column 
I'd th (27) is a linear combination of the 3 and 5 columns . Thus, columns 
(3),(4),(5) are linearly dependent and tnerefore the determinant of the 
above matrix is zero. Hence the solution of the system is impossible and 
this proves our proposition. 
Another way to see the authorities' i.nability to control .:the base 
is to examine the implications of an attempt to increase the base by rai-
sing the part of the budget deficit fina::1ce·d by cash at the expense of 
issuing Treasury Bills. Setting dCo= dIo = dG = drL = drs = dp = 0 ~n 
the system (4.5.34)-(4.5.38) and treating (dH) as an exogenous variable, 
we obtain a system of five equations in five endogenous variables (dY, 
dq,dA ~dB ,dT). Substituting the solution for (dT) from (4.5.38) into 
(4.5.35) and writing the system in matrix form we get 
k -f 0 0 dY 0 dH 
(CRIIy-my-Ty ) (j-m ) -m 0 dq = 0 q B 
(Ly-my) (Lq-mq ) -mB 0 dB 0 
0 0 -1 1 dA -1 
Applying Cramer's rule we get the followi.ng express~on for dB . . 
k -f 0 0 
(4.5.39) dB - dH (CRIIy-my-Ty ) (j-m ) 0 0 -
D 
q 
(Ly-my) (Lq-mq ) 0 0 
0 0 -1 1 
The third and fourth columns of the determinant in the numerator of 
the above expression are linearly dependent ; therefore the determinant 
has a zero value and consequently dB = o. 
Applying Cramer's rule to find the solution for (dA) we get 
k -f 0 0 
(4.5.40) dA - dB (CRIIy-my-Ty ) (j-m ) -~, 0 - q 
-D 
(Ly-TRy) (L -m ) -m· 0 q q B. 
0 0 -1 -1 
It is apparent that the determinant in tje numerator of (4.5.40) is 
equal to (-D), where CD) is the determi~ant of the system. nence the 
solu~ion for (dA) becomes dA = -dH, and ~his proves the proposition 
( ) th I'd (4) 27 i h 5 column from the 3 we get column . Subtract ng t e 
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that an autonomous rise ln unborrowed cash (H) is accompanied by an op-
posite change in the banking system's borrowing from the Central Bank(A) 
of equal magnitude and concequently the cash base of the system remains 
unchanged. 
Before ending this section it is inportant to point out that the 
e.ndogenei ty of the money stock does not arise from the fact that the 
supply of money function (eq. 4.5.7 ··of t:-... e model) depends upon income 
and the price of equities which are endogenous variables, but it rather 
arises from the endogenous nature of the monetary base which passively 
adjusts to clear the bank credit market. This can be clearly seen from 
equation (4.5.22) (P·246)which gives the credit market clearing value 
of the money stock as a function of income, the price of equities, au-
tonomous investment, government spending and the loan rate. In this 
equation, the credit market clearing value of the money stock is com-
pletely independent of the partial responses of the money supply to 
changes in income the price of equities, the loan rate, the rate on 
Saving and Time deposits and the discount rate which, in equation(4.5.7) 
for the money supply, are denoted by my, m .,m ,mr ,mp respectively. q rL s 
Finally it should be stressed that the endogenous nature of the 
money stock does not mean that money has not any effect on economic 
activity ; it rather means that there is a two-way causal influence 
between money and activity. As we have already explained the general 
short-run equilibrium of the system is achieved through a continuous 
interaction between the money stock, and income and the price of equi-
ties : changes ~n the money stock affect income and the price of equities 
which in turn affect the money stock and so on, until equilibrium in 
both the goods and money markets, and the credit market is achieved. 
4.6. Analysis of the model under "state B" of the bank credit market. 
Using the proper specification, dis~ussed in section 4.4, which 
. (23) 
makes our model conformable to "state Bit of the Bank Credlt market , 
we pr~sent and analyse in this section, the impact effects of the exo-
genous variables upon the maln endogenous variables of the system,nota-
bly income. For convenience we rewrite ~ld renumber the equations of the 
(28)We remind that under "state B~, the credit market is in excess demand 
and the banking system's borrowings from the Central Bank are demand 
determined. 
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model as well as the restrictions upon _~~s t (29) 
- s ructural parameters . 
The model. 
, 
(4.6.1) Y - C + Ia + G 
(4.6.2) 
(4.6.3) 
o < A < 1. 
(4.6.4) I = o < Iy < 1; 
Ia= (CRs-CRs ) ( ) 
-1 + q,E-E_ 1 
(4.6.6) 
(4.6.7) 
(4.6.8) MS = m +myY+m q+m r t~ rL+m p+m B 
o q rs s L p B 
(4.6.9) 
(4. 6. 13) B - H + A. 
Restriction s upm the structural parameters of the model. 
(4.6.14) CR +CRrI < 0 q q 
(4.6.15) 
(29)The restrictions upon the structural parameters of the model are 
the same under all states of the bank credit market. 
(4.6.16) 
(4.6.17) 
(4.6.18) 
> m r 
s 
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Moreover,for later use, let us rewrite and renumber definitions (4.5.23)-
(4.5.27) of the previous section. 
(4.6.19) k - 1-C (l-T ) 
- I > 0 - Y Y y 
(4.6.20) f - (C +1 ) > 0 
- q q 
(4.6.21) j - CR +CRII < 0 - q q 
(4.6.22) 1 - Ly+Ty-CRIIy > 0 -
(4.6.23) h - CR +CRII < 0 . -
rL r L 
The system (4.6.1)-(4.6.13) consists of thirteen independent equa-
tions in the following thirteen endogenous -Nariables: (Y),(C) (Ia) (I) 
. , , , 
(q),(CRd),(CRs),(Md),(Ms),(E),(A),(B) and (H) or (T) depending on whe-
ther the governement budget is financed by issuing cash or by issuing 
Treasury Bills. Before presenting the impact effects of the exogenous 
variables upon income, it would be useful to undertake a step-by-step 
analysis of the model indicating the interconnections which exist be-
tween the goods, money and bank credit markets. 
The basic characteristic of the model under "state B" of the bank 
credit market is that, at least In the short run, equilibrium in the 
goods and money markets may coexist with disequilibrium in the credit 
market. Such an equilibrium however may be termed a "constrained equi-
librium", since, because of the existence of excess demand in the credit 
market in combination with the rigidity of the loan rate, actual (~ 
effective) investment (Ia) is lower than the desired one (I) and there-
fore some investment pla~remain unreal~zed. Clearly the important ques-
tion arises whether such a situation is sustainable in the long-run. 
It is possible that investors,in their efforts to implement their plans, 
may search for new ways of investment financing and therefore new finan-
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cial instruments may be developed. Since however, in the present context 
we are dealing with short-run(one perioj) equilibrium, we shall by pass 
this question and we shall examine the mechanics of the model assuming 
that the "reaction function" (4.6.3) specifies with reasonable accura-
cy investo~s' reactions in the short-run. 
Equation (4.6.3) of the model plays an important role since it 
represents the link between the goods and credit markets ; anything that 
changes the demand-supply conditions in the bank credit market affects 
actual investment (Ia) and consequently the situation in the goods mar-
ket. Substituting (4.6.4) into (4.6.6), substituting the resulting 
expression along with (4.6.4) into (4.6.3), using definitions(4.6.21), 
(4.6.23), and omitting lagged variables(30) we obtain: 
(4.6.24) 
Equation(4.6.24) says that actual investment(Ia) depends positi-
vely on autonomous investment (I ), income (Y), the price of equities 
o 
(q), and the supply of bank credit (CRs ), whereas its dependence on 
the loan rate (rL) . may be either positive or negative. The weaker is 
the response of actual investment to changes in credit market condi-
tions,ie the lower is the reaction coefficient (>..), the more actual 
investment approaches its desired level; in the limit, where (>..) tends 
to zero, equation (4.6.24) collapses to equation (4.6.4) for desired 
investment (I). 
The partial response of actual investment to changes in income 
assume its highest value .W1en >"=0 and its lowest value when A=l. At 
>"=0 investment does not face any financial constraint and therefore 
·the whole rise in desired investment (Iy) brought about by a unit rise 
in income is realized. On the other hand, at >..=1, only that part of 
desired investment which is financed by issuing equities 1S realized. 
At a given value of (>..) between zero and unity, the response of 
effective investment 
positive and higher 
ment (I ). This can q 
to changes in the ?rice of equities, (Iq-Aj) is 
than the respective response of desired invest-
be illustrated by a simple arithmetical example in 
which it is shown that even if desired investment is completely inelas-
tic to changes in the price of equities (q), changes in (q) will hawe 
a positive effect on effective investment. Assume a desired investment 
(30)Since we are dealing with short-run(one period) equilibrium, the 
omission of lagged variables is legitimate. 
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of 100 monetary units, 50 mono units of it being financed by demanding 
bank loans and the remaining by issuing equities. l~ext, assume a fall 
in the price of equities (q); since by assumption desired investment 
1S inelastic w.r.to (q) it will remain a~ its previous level. But the 
fall in (q) will induce a redistribution of financing in favour of bank 
loans and against equities ; suppose that at the lower price of equities 
it is planned that 60 units of investment will be financed by loans and 
the remaining 40 units by equities. If however the supply of loans re-
mains at 50 units an excess demand for loans of ten units will be crea-
ted ; given that excess demand represents a constraint on investment 
plans, it follows that an amount of investment equal to some fraction 
of ten monetary units will be curtailed. Therefore, although desired 
investment may remain unaffected by the fall in the price of equities, 
actual investment falls. 
By an exactly analogous example it can be shown that even if de-
sired investment is completely inelastic to changes in the loan rate(rL), 
the effect of the loan rate on actual investment 1S positive. This posi-
tive effect mitigates and may well outweight the negative effect of the 
loan rate on desired investment; therefore the total effect o£ the loan 
rate upon actual investment, (IrL-Ah), may be either negative or positive. 
Taking into account restriction(4.6.15) 1n combination with (4.6.23) we 
can see that the higher is the reaction coefficient(A), the more probable 
becomes for the effect of (rL ) on actual investment (Ia) to be positive; 
at A=l the effect in question is unambiguously positive. 
Substituting equation(4.6.8) into (4.6.7), making use of equation 
(4.6.13) and omitting all lagged variables we obtain the following equa-
tion for the supply of bank credit to tte private sector 
(4.6.25) 
Equation (4.6.25) says that rises in the price of equities(q), the rate 
on Saving and Time deposits and the loan rate(rL), all raise the su??l~' 
of bank credit. A rise in the discount rate lowers the supply of bank 
credit, whereas the effect of income on bank credit may be either ne-
gative or positive. A ceteris paribus rise in unborrowed cash(H) has 
a weaker positive effect on bank .credit than an equal rise in Central 
Bank lending to the banking system (A), the reason being that while a 
given rise in (A) will be wholly available for lending to the private 
sector, an equal rise in (H) will be only partly available for lending, 
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since Some portion of it will be held in the form of cash by the non-
bank public and bank reserves by the ba~~ing system. On the other hand, 
it is clear that a rise in unborrowed cash (H) brought about by repaying 
Treasury Bills to the banking system wil~ raise bank credit by an equal 
amount as an equal rise in cash brought about jy Central Bank lending 
to the banking system (A). Finally a rise in Treasury Bills held by the 
Banking system (T) reduces, other thing jeing equal, the supply of bank 
credit on a one to one basis. 
Substituting equation (4.6.25) into (4.6.24), substituting the 
resulting expression along with (4.6.2) into (4.6.1) and taking into ac-
count definitions (4.6.19),(4.6.20) we obtain: 
Equation (4.6.26) describes the equilibrium in the goods market and may 
be thought of as the familiar IS curve which in the context of our mo-
del shows the combinations of income and the price of equities which 
keep the goods market in equilibrium. 
. . (31) d h f .. h sltlve an t ere ore a rlse ln t e 
demand ln the market for goods ; given 
The expression (f-Aj+Am ) is po-q 
price of equities creates an excess 
tjat (k+ACRIIy-A~) is positive(32) 
a rise ln income will create an excess supply of goods ; therefore for 
equilibrium in the goods market to be maintained a rise in income requires 
a rise in the price of equities. Consequently Lhe IS curve will be up-
ward sloping. 
(31)Expression (f-Aj+Am ) can be written as follows: Cq+(1q-Aj)+AmQ. (Cq ) represents theqpartial res~o~se of co~~um~tion to changes ln 
(q) and is postulated to be posltlve. (Iq-A]) 1S the response of 
actual investment to changes in (q),whic~, given the supply of bank cre-
dit,and as we already discussed in connection with equation (4.6.24) 
is positive . Finally (Am ) represen~s the effect of (q) on actual 
investment operating via ~e supply of bank credit and it is also 
positive since a change in (q) exerts a positive effect on the sup-
ply of credit which in turn affects actual ~nvestment in the same 
direction. 
(32)1f m < 0 then (k+ACR11y-Amy) is unambiguo'..:sly pqsit~ve whereas if 
m >Yo there is a possibility that the abcve express10n may be nega-
tIve if m is large enough. In wha~ follo~s we shall assume that 
(k+ACR I ~A~.) is positive. I y 't 
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Ceteris paribus rises in autonomous consumption (C ), autonomous 
o 
investment (1 0 ) and government spending (G) shift the IS curve down-
wards to the right, Slnce they all create an excess demand in the goods 
market. A rise in the loan rate (rL) may shift the IS curve either to the 
left or to the right depending on Hhether (IrL-Ah+ltm
r 
) is negative or 
.. (33) Al .. th S· L posltlve . so a rlse ln e rate on aVlng and Tlme deposits has 
an ambiguous effect on aggregate expenditure and therefore it may shift 
the IS curve either to the right or to the left. The ambiguity arises 
Slnce a rise in (r ) directly reduces consumption spending while on 
s 
the other hand it raises effective investment via the positive influ-
ence which a rise in (rs ) exerts on the supply of bank credit. 
Rises in unborrowed cash (H) and in the banking system's borrowing 
from the Central Bank (A) raise the supply of bank credit which in turn 
exerts a positive influence on effective investment spending. Hence rl-
ses in (H) and (A) shift the IS curve to the right. Finally risesin the 
discount rate (p) and the stock of Treasury Bills held by the banking 
system (T), reduce the supply of b~nk credit which in turn lowers '-ef-
fective investment expenditure. Hence rises in (p) and (T) shift the 
IS curve to the left. 
Substituting equations (4.6.8), (4.6.9) for the supply and demand 
for money into the monetary equilibrium condition (4.6.10) we obtain 
the fol:howing equation for the LM curve, which in the context of our 
model shows the income-price of equities combinations which keep the 
money market in equilibrium : 
(4.6.27) (L -m )Y+(L -m )q = -(Lo-m )-(L -m )rs +mr rL+m p+mBB. Y Y q q 0 rs rs L P 
From restrictions (4.6.16), (4.6.18) it is clear that both a rise in 
income and a rise in the price of equities create an excess demand for 
money ; hence if monetary equilibrium is to be maintained a rise in 
income requires a fall in the price of equities and therefore the LM 
curve is downward sloping. 
(33)Expression (I -Ah+Am ) showing the total effect of (rL) on (I ) 
may be decomp~~ed rL into two parts : (I r -Ah) which a L . . 
represents the effect of (r ) on actual lnvestment, glven 
the supply of bank credit a~d which, as we have a~ead~ disc~s~ed, 
maybe either negative or positive, and (A~r) w?lch lS posltlve 
and shows the effect of (rL) on CIa) exerted U Vla the supply of 
bank credit. 
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A rise In the rate on Saving and Time deposits (I' ) creates an 
d ( 34 ) d' f h . s excess emand for money an tnere ore s lfts the LH curve to the 
left. On the other hand~ rises in the loan rate and the monetary baserto not 
affectthe demand for money -but raise the supply of money ; therefore 
increases In the loan rate (rL) and the cash base (B) shift the LM 
curve to the right. Finally a rise in the discount rate (p) reduces the 
supply of money and hence shifts the LM curve to the left. 
Having discussed the goods and money markets in isolation and 
having indicated the interconnections between the goods and bank cre-
dit markets, we are ready to analyse the impact effects of exogenous 
variables upon the level of income . We start by presenting the impact 
multipliers of income with respect to autonomous consumption (Co), au-
tonomous investment (1
0
), government spending (G), the loan rate (rL); 
the rate on Saving and Time deposits (rs ) and the discount rate (p), 
both under mo.ney financing and under Treasury Bills financing of the 
Government budget. 
~oney finance case. 
(4.6.28) 
(4.6.29a) dY - 1 (Lq-mq ) > 0 _._-dCo D 
(4.6.29b) dY 1 (1- ACRI ) (Lq -mq ) 0 = dIo D > 
(4.6.29c) dY 
-
1 {(l->")(L -m )+m (f+AL- -Aj)}> 0 
dG - D q q B .q 
(4.6.29d) dY 
-
1 {(IrL-Ah)(Lq-mq)+(~L+AdmB)(f+>"Lq->"j)} 
- D drL 
(4.6.2ge) dY 1 {(C +;\.L ) (Lq-mq )- (Lr -C:-r~) (~+.\Lq-;\.j)} --dr D rs . rs s ::;, 
s 
(4.6.29£) dY 1 (mp-AdmB)(f+>"Lq->"j) < o. -dp - D 
(34)A unit rise in (I" ) raises the dema~d for money by (LrL ) and the 
of bs (m ) Since L > m (see restrictlon 4.6.17) supply money Yr' r r s 
d d f s money s arises .. an excess eman or 
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Treasury Bills finance case. 
(4.6.3(;) N = (Lq-mq ) (k-Al)+(Ly-my)(f+~Lq-Aj) > o. 
(4.6.31a) dY 1 (Lq-mq ) > = 0 dCo N 
(4.6.3lb) dY 1 (l-ACRI)(Lq-mq ) = > 0 dIo N 
(4.6.31c) dY 1 (l-~) (Lq-mq ) = - > 0 dG N 
(4.6.31d) 
(4.6.3~e) dY 1 
dr - N {(Cr +ALrs)(L -m )-(L -IDr )(f+AL -Aj)} s s" q q rs s q 
(4.6.31£) 
Both under money financing and under Treasury Bills financing the 
r'elevant determinants (D) and (N) are not unambiguously positive. In the 
case of money financing,it can be easily shown that a sufficient condi-
tion for (D) to be positive is 
(4.6.32) 
The above condit±on implies that, glven the levels of unborrowed cash 
and Treasury Bills a rise in income creates an excess supply in the 
goods market. As we have mentioned in connection to equation (4.6.26) 
for the IS curve, condition (4.6.32) is necessary and sufficient for 
an upward sloping IS curve. Since throughout our analysis we are as-
sumlng a positively sloping IS curve, we postulate that condition 
(4.6.32) holds in which cas~(D) is 112af.'1~iguously positive. 
Under Treasury Bills financing, a sufficient condition for a 
positive (N) is:(4.6.33) k+ACRIIy-Affiy>.ATy . 
The above condition implies that a rise in income creates an excess 
supply in the goods market. Given the stock of Treasury Bills a unit 
rise i:: income creates an excess supply of goods equal to (k+ACR1L:{-Arry). 
On the other hand a unit rise in lncome raises taxes by (Ty) and since 
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by assumption the budget is financed by Bills~ the stock of Treasury Bills 
held by the banking system falls by (Ty) and the supply of bank credit 
. 
1ncreases by the same amount. The rise in bank credit by (Ty) raises 
effective investment and creates an excess demand for goods equal to 
(ATy) (see eq. 4.6.26).Hence for a rise in 1ncome to create an excess 
supply of goods it 1S necessary and sufficient that (k+ACR I -A~.) be 
I Y r 
larger than (ATy ). In what follows we shall assume that condition (4.6.33) 
always holds in which case (N) is unambiguously positive. 
Given that (D), (N) are positive it can be seen from expressions 
(4.6.29),(4.6.31), and taking into account restriction (4.6.18) and de-
finitions (4.6.20),(4.6.21), that, under both money and Treasury bills 
financing, the impact effects of autonomous consumption (Co), autonomous 
investment (1
0
) and government spending on income are positive, and the 
impact effect of the discount rate (p) is negative. On the other hand, 
the effects of the loan rate (rL) and the rate on Saving and Time depo-
sits (rs ) may be either negative or positive. Moreover, since (D) 1S 
larger than (N), inspection of the relevant formulas reveals that the 
effects of (Co), (1 0 ) on income are more expansionary under Treasury 
Bills financing than under money financing and the effect of the discount 
rate is more contractionary under Treasury Bills financing than under 
money financing. If the effects of the loan rate (rL) and the rate on 
Saving and Time deposits (r
s ) on income are positive, they are more ex-
pans10nary whereas if they are negative they are more contractionary 
under Treasury Bills than under money financing of the budget . 
FinallY,it can be shown that a necessary and sufficient condition 
for a rise in government spending (G) financed by money to be more 
expansionary than an equal rise in (G) financed by Treasury Bills is 
that the impact multiplier of income with respect to (G), under Trea-
sury Bills financing must be lower than the long-run multiplier of 
government spending which 1S equal to the inverse of the marginal tax 
rate (Ty ). In other words, after allowing for its impact effect on in-
come, a rise in government spending must create a budget deficit. The 
explanation of this condition is simple :assume that a rise in (G) 
financed by Treasury Bills creates a budget deficit ; if the effect on 
income of a rise in (G) financed by money was of the same magnitude to 
the effect of an equal rise in (G) financed by Bills, the cash base of 
the system would rise and since a rise in the cash base is expansiona-
ry, income would rise further. Therefore if the above necessary and 
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sufficient condition holds, a money fina~ced rlse In (G) will be more 
expansionary than an equal rise in (G) financed by Treasury Bills. 
Assuming that the impact effect of government spending on lncome 
under Treasury Bills financing is lower ~han the long-run effect (l/T ) 
y 
let us explain diagramatically the effects of a rise in (G) under both 
money and Treasury Bills financing. Figure '+.6.A depicts an initial 
short-run equilibrium 
q 
ISo at point (A) determi-
LM1 
IS3 ned by the interaction IS1 
"'- I IS 2 of the IS and LM 
"- / 0 0 
" 
curves. A rise In go-
"- / 
/ vernment spending(G) 
/ shifts the IS curve 
'- / 0 
)" to the position IS 1 . 
/ " In the case of money 
financing of the bud-
get the rise in (G) 
is accompanied by a 
rlse In the monetary 
0 
Yo Y2 Y1 Y base In the form of 
Figure 4.6.A unborrowed cash which 
shifts the LM curve 
o 
upwards to the right to the position LM1 . In addition the rise in the 
base raises the supply of bank credit which in turn raises effective 
investment; as a result, the IS1 curve shifts further to the right to 
the position IS 2 . In figure 4.6.A the new short run equilibrium of the 
system is depicted by point B at an income level Y1; under money finan-
cing of the budget a rise in (G) brings a rise in income equal to Y1-Yo ' 
In the case of Treasury Bills financing,the monetary base remalns 
constant and therefore the LM remains at its previous position LM . In 
o 
addition,the rise in Treasury Bills acco~panying the rise in (G) reduces 
the supply of bank credit,which in turn reduces effective investment 
spending ; hence under Treasury Bills financing a rise in (G) partly 
crowds out investment spending and therefore the IS shifts to the left 
from the position IS1 to the position IS 3 . The new short-run equilibrium 
is depicted by point C with an income level (Y2 )(fig. 4.6.A). Clearly 
then,a rise In (G) is more expansionary under money financing than under 
Treasury Bills financing of the governme~t budget. 
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It should be noted that the "crowding out" of private investment 
spending which a rise in (G) brings about under Treasury Bills financing 
is stronger, the stronger is the contractionary effect on actual invest-
ment of a fall in the supply of bank credit ie the higher is the reac-
tion coefficient(t..) . If a fall in the s'Jpply of bank credit lowers 
effective investment on a one to one basis (ie if 1..=1) then the rise In 
(G) completely crowds out investment spending and therefore the level 
of income remains ~nchanged. This cun be clearly seen from expression 
(4.6.31c) where when (t..) is equal to unity (dY/dG) is equal to zero. 
A rise in the loan rate exerts an ambiguous effect on income the 
reason being that, as we have explained in connection to the equation 
(4.6.26) for the IS curve, a rise in the loan rate (rL ) may shift the 
IS curve to the right or to the left depending on whether the expres-
sion (I
r 
-t..h+t..m ) lS positive or negative. For 1..=0 this expression 
L r L 
collapses to (Ir ) which is unambiguously negative ; for 1..=1 the ex-
. L . ( ). h . .. ( 3 5 ) Th presslon in questlon becomes Ir -h+m whlc lS posltlve . ere-
L r L 
fore the higher the value of (t..) the more probable becomes that, given 
the cash base and the stock of Treasury Bills, a rise in (rL ) will shift 
the IS curve to the right. 
q 
o Y 
Figure 4.6.B 
In figure 4.6.B 
we assume that 
other things be-
ing equal a rise 
in CrL) exerts a 
slight expansio-
nary effect on 
effective invest-
ment and shifts 
the IS curve 
from the lnl-
tial position 
IS to the po-
o 
sition IS 1 . On 
the other ha~d, 
given the mone-
(35) ·d t . t' (4 6 15) In comb~nation to defin:'-To see that conSl er res rlC lon .. 
t ion (4. 6.23) . 
-276-
tary base, a rise in (rL) raises the mo:-.ey supply and shifts the LM 
curve from LM to the position LM1 . Froc equation (4.6.11) of the model o 
for the banking system's borrowing froIT. -::~le Central Bank (A), we can see 
that a rise in the loan rate (rL ) raises (A) and the rise in (A) raises 
the monetary base by the same amount. T~e rise in the base further shifts 
the LMl curve upwards to the right to tte position LM3" Moreover the 
rise in (A), via 1ts positive influence on the supply of bank credit 
shifts the lSI further to the right, to the position IS 2 " Consequently, 
ignoring for the moment the repercussions taking place thFough the go-
vernment budget,a rise in the loan rate (rL ) shifts the economy from 
point A to point B. 
Now"if the budget is financed by mO:1ey the rise ln lncome caused 
by the movement of the econorry to point Blowers unborrowed cash (H) 
and .. concequently the monetary base, and'shifts the LM3 curve downwards 
to the left ; in addition the fall in ur~orrowed cash lowers effective 
investment via the supply of bank credit and the IS 2 curve shifts up-
wards to the left. In figure 4.6.B the new short-run equilibrium of 
the system is depicted by the intersection of the IS4/LM2 curves at 
point C, and aggregate income rises by a~ amount equal to YoYl • 
If the budget is financed by Treasury Bills, the rise in income 
resulting by the movement of the economy from point A to point B indu-
ces a fall in the stock of Bills held by the banking system because of 
the budget surplus created by the rise in income .. The fall in the stock 
of Treasury Bills releases funds which jecome available for lending to 
the private sector and concequently effective investment rises. Therefore 
the IS curve shifts further to the right ot the position IS 3 and the 
new short-run equilibrium lS achieved at point (D) at an income level 
'(Y2). Clearly the rise ln income caused jy the rise in the loan rate 1S 
higher under treasury Bills financing than under money financing of 
the government budget. In an exactly analogous way it can be shown dia-
gramatically that if the effect of the loan rate on income is contractio-
nary then it is more contractionary under Treasury Bills financing than 
under money financing of the budget. 
The ambiguity of the effect of a rise ln the rate on Saving and Time 
deposits (r ) 
s 
en income can be explaine~ by the fact that a rise 1n (r ) s 
may shift the IS curve either to the le£~ or to the right depending on 
whether the expression (Cr +Am ) is ne~~tive or positive. Clearly, a 
s rs 
sufficient condition for the expression ~n question to be negative 15 
that ICr I > I~ I. if however Imr 1>lc l then, whether the above 
s s ' S ::'s 
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expression is negative or positive depe~ds on the value of (A) : the 
lower is (A) the more probable becomes that (Cr +Am ) is negative and s r 
vice-versa. s 
The effect of (rs ) on income 1S illustrated in figure 4.6.C where 
we assume that the rise 1n (rs ) exerts a net contractionary effect on 
private spending. Hence, given an initial equilibrium at point A, a 
rise in (rs ) shifts the ISo curve to the 1 ft t th .. (I) e 0 e pos1tlon Sl. 
Moreover a rise in (rs ) creates an excess demand for money and shifts 
q the LM curve downwards to 
the left to the position LM1 . 
Now the lSI and LMI curves 
intersect at point B, at a 
lower level of income. Under 
money financing, the fall in 
income creates a budget defi-
o 
Figure 4.6.C 
Y 
L cit and therefore unbo~rowed 
cash (H) rises,shifting both 
the lSI and LM1 curves to the 
right. Short-run equilibrium 
is achieved at the intersec-
tion of the LM2 IS 3 curves 
at point D, at an income le-
vel (Y1)' Under Treasury Bill financing the fall 1n income resulting 
from the movement of the economy from point A to point B raises the bud-
get deficit and induces an increased issue of Treasury bills which re-
duces the supply of bank credit tb the private sector and shifts the IS 
curve further to the left. Short-run equilibrium is achieved at the in-
1 
tersection of the IS 2/LM1 curves at point C, at a level of income (Y2). 
Clearly, a rise in (r ) is more contractionary under Treasury Bill fi-
s 
nancing than under money financing of the budget. 
The explanation of the contractionary effect of the discount rate 
(p) on income is analogous to the explanation of the effect of the loan 
rate. From equations (4.6.26),(4.6.27) it can be seen that given the 
level of the monetary base, a rise in (p) shifts both the IS and LM 
curves to the left. Moreover, the rise in the discount rate, through its 
eontractionary effect on the banking system's borrowing from the Cen-
tral Bank (A), (see eq.4.6.11), and consequently on the monetary base, 
shifts the IS/LM curves further to the left, thereby intensifying the 
contractionary effect on income. Now, under money financing of the 
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budget, the rise in cash resulting from the fall ln lncome mitigates the 
leftward shifts in the IS and LM curves and thus the overall effect of 
(p) on income, is less contractionary than under Treasury Bill Financing. 
Finally, let us illustrate the effects of a rise in autonomous con-
sumption (Co) on income~noting that an exactly analogous argument holds 
for the rise in autonomous investment (1
0
). Assuming an initial equili-
brium at point A, a rise in (Co) shifts the ISo curve to the position 
q ISo IS
3 
IS1 (fig.4.6.D). Under Trea-
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
I / 
'hIc 
1/1"-.. 
11' I 
III , /1 
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Figure 4.6.D 
sury Bill financing the rise 
in income resulting from the 
rise in (Co) creates a rlse 
in the budget surplus and 
therefore the government re-
duces the Treasury Bills 1S-
sue. Hence, the rate of Trea-
sury Bills absorbtion by the 
banking system falls and more 
funds become available for 
lending to the private sector; 
consequently effective invest-
ment rises and the IS 1 curve shifts further to the right. Short-run equi-
librium is achieved at point B at a level of income Y1. Under money fi-
nancing however, the rise in the budget surplus resul~ing from the rlse 
in income induces a reduction in unborrowed cash and therefore both the 
IS"l and the LMo curves shift to the left ; short-run equilibrium is a-
chieved at point C at an income level (Y2). It is clear from figure" 
4.6.D that a rise in income brought about by a rise in autonomous con-
sumption is larger under Treasury Bills financing of the budget than 
under money financing. 
Having illustrated diagramatically the impact effectsof the exo-
genous variables of the system under consideration upon income, both 
in the case of money financing and ln the case of Treasury Bills fi-
nancing of the government budget, we next turn to examlne the autho-
rities behaviour with respect to the monetary base of the system under 
state B of the bank credit market. ContrarY to state A, in state B of 
the bank loans market the authorities are able to control the cash base 
of the system if they choose to. The preceding analysis makes clear that 
a fiscal expansion can take place while holding the cash base constant, 
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by financing the budget deficit by Treasury Bills. Unlike state A, in 
state B of the bank credit market changes in the stock of Bills held 
by the Banking System do not cause accomodating changes In its borrowing 
from the Central Bank since, In state B, the credit market is In a 
state of excess demand and the banking system's borrowing from the Cen-
tral Bank is not constrained by the private sector's demand for bank 
loans. Horeover,the authorities can always bring about a given rise ln 
the monetary base by issuing cash and using it to purchase part of the 
stock of Treasury Bills held by the banking system. 
From equation (4.6.11) of the model it can be seen that a rlseln 
the loan rate (rL ) or a fall in the discount rate (p) raises the banking 
system's borrovling from the Central Bank (A). Since (A) is a component 
of the monetary base it follows that the authorities can manipulate the 
base by manipulating the loan rate or/and the discount rate. On the other 
hand the authorities are able to change (rL ) or/and (p) while keeping 
the base constant by using unborrowed cash (H) to offset changes in (A) 
resulting from changes in (rL) and/or (p). 
The expression giving the impact effect on income of a ceteris 
paribus rise in the monetary base in as follows : 
(4.6.34) dY _ mB(f+ALq-Aj) 
dB N > o. 
The impact effect of a rise in the cash base on income is unambiguously 
positive and it operates both via the LH and via the IS curve. A rise in 
the base raises the money stock, creates an excess supply of money and 
as a result the price of equities rises. The rise in the price of equi-
ties exerts an expansionary effect on private consumption and investment. 
Moreover the rise in the base raises the supply of bank credit which in 
turn exerts a positive direct effect on effective investment. 
The expression (4.6.31c) showing the impact effect on income of a 
h · t ~DCI""'di n:T financed bJ" Tr22.S 1.lrj Bills D2.y be -rhou~~~ c .2.nge In governmen 2_ -"' _·0 
of a representing the effect of "pure" fiscal policy. On the other hand 
expression (4.6.34) showing the effect on income of a change in the cas~ 
base may be thought of as representing the effect of "pure" monetary po-
licy. Assuming that the partial response of the money supply to changes 
in the price of equities (m
q
) is zero, expressions (4.6.31c),(4.6.34) 
may be written as follows : 
(4.6.35) dY 
-dG -
(4.6.36) dY 
-dB -
where (4.6.37) 
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(1-;\) 
> 0 (k-;\l)+(Ly-rry)a 
I11Ba 
(k-;\I)+(Ly-rry)a > 0 
a =(f-;\j)/ L+ ;\ . 
q 
In the case of an horizontal IS . curve or a Vel'tlcal Lr-1 curve the parame-
ter (a) tends to infinity 1n which ca~expressions (4.6.35)~(4.6.36) can 
be written as follows : 
(4.6.38) dY (4.6.39) dG = 0 dY mB -
- > o. dB Ly-my 
Clearly then , when the IS 1S horizontal or the LM is vertical, pure 
fiscal policy is completely unable to affect economic activity. Obvi-
ously this result is in accordance to the conventional result obtained 
ln the context of the simple IS-LM model. In the case of an horizontal 
LM curve, which corresponds to the liquidity trap case, the parameter 
(a) tends to (;\) and expressions (4.6.35),(4.6.46) can be written as 
follows : 
(4.6.40) dY 
dG > 0 (4.6.41) dY dB 
From expression (4.6.41) we see that, despite the fact that the LM curve 
1S horizontal, monetary policy is still effective. The reason is that, 
'ln the context of our model, changes in the monetary base do not only 
operate via the price of equities but they also affect investment spen-
ding through their influence on the supply of bank credit. 
As we have discussed above, under IIs tate Bit of the loan market, the 
authorities have the ability to control the mone~ar; base i~ they cho~~= 
to. Nontheless even if the authorities strictly control the cash base, 
the money stock 1S an endogenous variable of the system respondir.g to 
changes in income and the price of equities. However, contrary to state 
A of the credit market,where the endogeneity of the money stock res~lts 
from the accomodating nature fo the monetary base, in state B,the endo-
geneity of the money stock results from the fact that the money mul~ipli­
er depends upon income and the price of equiti2s which are key endogenous 
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variables of the system. Clearly then, the endogenous nature of the mo-
ney stock is very different between state A and state B of the loan mar-
ket ; for even if the "money multiplier" is a completely exogenous va-
riable, under state A of the credit market the money stock will be an 
endogenous variable with respect to inco~e and the price of equities, 
whereas under "state B" the independence of the money multiplier from 
income and the price of equities implies exogeneity of the money stock 
with respect to these variables. 
Under treasury bill financing of the government budget, the total 
effects on income of rises in the loan rate (rL) and the discount rate 
(p) can be written as follows 
(4.6.42) 
(4.6.43) (dY/dp) = (dY/dp)B + (dY/dB)(dB/dp) 
In expressions (4.6.42),(4.6.43) the total effects of (rL) and (p) on 
income (Y) can be decomposed into two parts: the pure effects of (rL), 
(p) on income obtained by holding the monetary base constant and the 
effects of (rL),(p) operating via the monetary base, The expressions 
for the pure effects of (rL),(p) on income in the case of Treasury 
bills financing are as follows 
(4.6.44) 1 {(L -m )(IrL-~h)+mrL(f+AL -Aj)} q q q 
(4.6.45) (dY/dp)i3 
Since the effects of rises In (rL) and (p) on the monetary base are 
positive and negative respectively(36)and since the effect of a rlse 
in the base on income is unambiguously positive, it follows that, un-
der Treasury Bill financing, the total effect of (rL) on income is less 
contractionary or more expansionary t~"'a!: the pure effect of C~"L) on i:1-
come,and the total effect of (p) on income is more contractionary than 
its pure effect. 
(36)From equation (4.6.11) of the model we ha~e tha: (dA~drL) = Ad > 0, 
(dA/dp) =-Ad < 0 ; since under Treas~ry Bllls flnanc~ng dA=dB we 
have that dB _ Ad > 0 dB - -Ad < o. 
drL dp 
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Under money financing of the government budget the total effects 
of (rL) and (p) on income can be written as follows 
(4.6.46) 
(4.6.47) (dY/dp ) = (jY/dp )- + (dY/dA)(dA/dp) 
. A 
In expressions (4.6.46),(4.6.47) the total effects of (r ) and (p) on L 
income are decomposed into two parts the pure effects which are ob-
tained by holding the banking system's borrowing from the Central Bank 
CA) ,canstgt}tand the effects operating via changes in CA). In the case 
of money financing, the pure effects of (rL),(p)on income are given by 
the following expressions 
(4.6.48) 
(4.6.49) (dY/dp)j\ 
1 
D 
Moreover the expression for the impact effec~ of (A) on lncome is as 
follows : 
(4.6.50) (dY/dA) mB (f+~Lq-Aj) D > 0 
Given that (dA/drL) = Ad > 0, (dA/dp)= -Ad < o,it-i~_clear from expres-
sions (4.6.46),(4.6.47),(4.6.50} t~at the total effect of (rL) on lncome 
is more expansionary or less contractionary that the pure loan rate ef-
fect and the total effect of the discount rate (p) on income is more -
~ontractionary than the pure effect. 
Before ending this section let us glve a brief comparison of the 
results obtained, relatively to the results obtained in the previous 
section. 
(1) 
• 1 ' h'· ... , Under state B of the cred::.. t marKet tne a1..lt_.orl ":les are l:: prlr..~::"p.le 
able to control the monetary base of the system whereas under state 
":,l A· the authorities are unable to control the base. 
(2) Under state B the impact effects of exogenous variables upon lncorne 
are quantitatively different under money financing and under Treasu-
ry Bills financing of the budget, wtereas in state A the i~pact ef-
fects of the exogenous variables upon income are invaria~t to the 
mode of government budget financing. 
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(3) The nature of the endogeneity of the money stock lS different be-
tween states A and B of the loan ma~ket. 
(4) In state B, the impact effects of eX:Jgenous variables on income 
are quantitatively different and, mo~e important, they may be qua-
litatively different from the impac~ effects of the exogenous va-
riables upon.income under state A of the loan market. In particu-
lar, while in state A the impact effects of the loan rate and the 
rate on Saving and Time deposits on income are unambiguously nega-
tive, in state B of the credit marke~ these effects may be positive, 
this being especially true for the effect of the loan rate (rL). 
Horeover whereas in state A the discc>unt rate does not have any 
effect on income, in state B the discount rate has an unambiguously 
contractionary effect. 
4.7. Analysis of the model under "state :" of the bank credit market. 
Under "state C" lending to the ban:cing system (A) lS directly re-
gulated by the Central Bank and therefore excess demand for loans prevails 
in the bank credit market. The formal moiel relevant for state C is i-
dentical to the model relevant for state B (eq.4.6.1-4.6.13 p. 265) 
the only difference being that Slnce no~ borrowing from the Central Bank 
is a policy instrument directly regulated by the Central Bank, equation 
(4.6.11) specifying the banking system's demand for such borrowing be-
comes irrelevant and it should be omitted. Hence the model suitable for 
state C is the model (4.6.1)-(4.6.13)of :::he previous section with one 
equation omitted (eq.4.6.11) and one previously endogenous variable,(A), 
becoming a policy instrument. 
Under state C, the impact effects on income of autonomous consump-
tions (C) autonomous investment (I ), government spending (G) and the 
o ' 0 
rate on Saving and Time deposits (r
s
) are identical to the impact effects 
derived under State B both in the case of money financing and in the 
case of Treasury Bills financing of the judget. 
Since under state C, changes in the loan rate (rL ) and the discount 
rate (p) are not accompanied by changes ~n borrowing from the Central 
Bank (A), it follows that the impact effects of (rL ) and (p) upon lncome 
are given by expressions (4.6.44), (4.E.~5) of the previous section in 
the case of Treasury Bills finance, and expressions (4.6.48),(4.6.49) 
of the previous section in the case of ~~ney finance of ~he budget. 
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Since the expressions ln question represent the pure effects of (r ) 
L 
and (p) on income, obtained by holding t~e banking system's borrowing 
from the Central Bank constant, it folloiis from the analysis undertaken 
in the previous section that the effects of changes in the loan rate on 
income are less expansionary or more contractionary, and the effects of 
the discount rate are less contractionary in state ethan ln state B 
of the loan market, both in the case of Treasury Bill and ln the case 
of money financing of the budget. 
The main implication of the fact that under State C Central Bank 
lending to the banking system is supply ietermined is that the autho-
rities have more "degrees of freedom l1 in controlling the cash base of 
the system relatively to state B. This increased ease in controlling 
the base manifests itself in three ways. First, the authorities are able 
to manipulate the loan rate and the discount rate without the need of 
offsetting changes in unborrowed cash (H) in order to keep the moneta-
ry base constant ; under state C changes in (rL) and (p) are not ac-
companied by changes in the banking system's borrowing from the Central 
Bank. Second, the authorities may bring a glven change in the cash base 
of the system, not only by changing the amount of unborrowed cash at 
the expense of opposite changes of equal magnitude in the stock of Trea-
sury Bills, but also by directly changing Central Bank lending to the 
banking system. Third, a fiscal expansion may take place while holding 
the monetary base constant without the need for a change in the stock 
(or the rate of issue) of Treasury Bills. This is because the amount 
of cash coming through the budget may be offset by opposite changes of 
equal magnitude in Central Bank lending to the banking system(A). 
The fact that under state C (A)is an exogenous variable has more 
important implications in the context of a stochastic system. If the -
demand for borrowing by the Central Bank (A) contains a stochastic com-
ponent, then under state B of the credit market, where (A) is demand 
determined, stochastic variations in (A) and consequently on the mo~e­
tary base will be taking place even if the loan rate and the discount 
rate remain unchanged. Therefore if the authorities choose to exert a 
strict contrulon the base they must be involved in continuous offseting 
operations using unborrowed cash in combination to Treasury Bills. Clear-
ly under state C such a problem does not arise since Central Bank lending 
is a supply determined variable directly regulated by the Central Bank. 
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4.8. Summary and conclusions. 
In this last section of the chapter, we gl~le a brief summary of 
the approach we followed and of the main conclusions we reached. Moreo-
verwe briefly indicate same possible extentions of the model. 
Our aim in this chapter, was to examine theoretically the effects 
of policy changes upon some key endogenous variables of the model, nota-
bly income, in the context of a model which takes into account the maln 
institutional peculiarities of the Greek financial system, and give~ spe-
cial attention to the monetary sector and the links which exist· between 
this sector and the "real" sector of the economy. 
The first three sections of the chapter analysed the market for 
bank credit which the institutional peculiarities of the Greek financial 
system mainly refer to. Our analysis led us to distinguish three diffe-
rent states of the bank credit market which were classified as "state AU, 
"state B" ,. and "state C" (see section 4.3). 
In section four we incorporated the market for bank credit into a 
short-run macromodel for the Greek economy. After we discussed the equa-
tions of the model and the restrictions which should be imposed upon its 
structural parameters, we indicated the ~ecessary amendments which make 
the model conformable to each of the three states of the loan market. 
In sections five, six, seven, we derived explained and compared the 
impact effects of four policy instruments (G,rL,rs'p) and two purely e-
xogenous variables (C ,I ) upon the key endogenous variables of the sys-
o 0 
tem-notably income- under each state of the loan market. Our analysis 
led us to conclude that some imp~tant differences exist between the 
three states of the loan market. The main differences with arise between 
state A and state B are listed at the end of section 4.6 and need not 
be repeated here (see p. 282)Exactly the same differences arise between 
state A and state C of the credit market. The uain differences between 
state B and state C are the following three : 
(1) Ceteris paribus rises in the discount rate have a less contractiona-
ry effect on income under state C than under state B. 
(2) Ceteris paribus rises in the loan rate have a less expanslonary or 
more contractionary effect under state C ~han ~~der state B . 
(3) The authorities can more easily control the :.lonetary base under state 
C than under state B. 
Although the model specified and ana~ysed in this chapter takes in-
to account some basic institutional peculiarites of the Greek monetary 
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sector, we believe that there is still 'tlork to be done with this model 
. 
ln three main directions. 
First, our model assumes that bank ~oans to the private sector are 
exclusively used for the purpose of financing investment spending. In 
the context of the Greek reality however, a substantial part of bank 
credit is used by the business sector to meet the needs for working ca-
pital. Since it is probable that changes in the supply of working capi-
tal relatively to the demand for it, will have important effects on the 
supply of output, the model should be extended to include properly spe-
cified demand and supply functions for working capital,as well as a re-
action function of output to changes in The conditions in the market 
for working capital. 
Second, our analysis in the context of each of the three states of 
the bank credit market is confined to changes in exogenous variables 
which leave the credit market to its initially prevailing state. Changes 
in policy instruments however, as well as changes in other exogenous va-
riables may cause the credit market to "jump" from one state to another. 
Clearly it would be interest"ing to examine the behaviour of the model al-
lowing the loan market to shift from one state to another. To the best 
of our knowledge such an analysis cannot be undertaken using ordinary 
calculus ; probably the best (and perhaps the only ) method is to under-
take simulations using plausible arithmeTical values for the structural 
parameters of the model. 
A third obvious exten_~on refers to the empirical verification of 
the analysis undertaken in this chapter. However the empirical estimation 
of the model specified and analysed in this chapter is surrounded with 
difficulties which mainly stem from the =act that since the loan market 
may be either in a state of excess demand or in a state of excess supply 
any given observation on bank loans is not an "equilibrium observation" 
ie it does not lie on the intersection of supply and demand curves for 
loans, but it Qay represent either de~2~d o~ supply. In an interesting 
(37) . paper, Fair and Jaffee developed methods whlch enable the estimation 
of supply and demand functions in disequilibrium situations, either by 
separating the given sample of observations between observations belon-
ging to the supply curve and observatio~s belonging to the demand curve, 
or by adjusting for (positive or negative) rationing. However, the me-
(37)R.C.Fair and D.M. Jaffee: "Methods of estimation for markets In 
disequilibrium" Econometrica 1972 
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thods developed by Fair and Jaffee assume that, although the prlce does 
not adjust instantaneously to clear a particular market, it nontheless 
adjusts upward~s or downwards according to whether excess demand or 
excess supply prevails in the market. Clearly then, such methods are of 
little value for our model, for, as we have repeatedly stressed, in the 
Greek economy the loan rate is not market determined but it is an "admi-
nistered price" set by the so called ".currency committee". Therefore, 
if any progress is to be made towards the statistical estimation of the 
model developed in this chapter, some criterion must be found for the 
separation of a given sample of observations on bank loans into observa-
tion referring to demand and observations refering to supply. The deve-
lopment of such a criterion however, does not seem to be an easy task. 
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